

# PURUṢOTTAMAJĪ : A STUDY

A. D. SHASTRI; M A. Ph D

This is a research dedicated to Purushottama Ji - one of the latest Acharyas of Pushti-Marg (Shree Vallabha-Sampradaya).

The first part is biography, the second part dwells mostly on Shuddha-Advalta-Vedanta (compared with Shankara Advalta)

note by Vishnudu1926, July 2017



सं पूषन् विदुषा नय ।

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### Shree Vithaldas Thakordas Choksi

Shree Vithaldas Thakordas Choksi (1891-1930) whose name is associated with This Series was a great philanthropist. Born in a Vaishnava family of Surat, he had a natural leaning and love for religion and culture. At an early age he took to bullion business and ably managed the firm established by him. He made several pilgrimages in search of spiritual solace and at the age of 33 he and his wife were initiated into the Shri-Sampradaya of Ramanuja by Vasudevaswami. The life of Shree V. T. Choksi, though short, was full of acquisitions in worldly possessions and religious merit. He earned money as well as good name, and generously donated large amounts of money to various educational and cultural institutions all over India, without any consideration of caste or creed. A great lover of Sanskrit, he always advocated the cause of improving the knowledge of Sanskrit and introducing the teaching of religion in our system of education. Shree V. T. Choksi will live long in the memory of his countrymen by his virtues of generosity and his deep love for what is noble and sacred in life.

## GENERAL EDITOR'S NOTE

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We are pleased to publish "Puruṣottamaji : A study", the thesis written by Dr. A. D. Shastri for his doctorate in the V. T. Choksi Sanskrit Series sponsored by Chunilal Gandhi Vidyabhavan, Surat. Shree Puruṣottamaji was a great scholar and exponent of the Suddhādvaita system of Vedānta. Dr. Shastri has given in his book a detailed account of Puruṣottamaji's life and works, and examined them with insight and originality. The publication, we hope, will be of great use to all scholars in this field.

We take this opportunity to express our sense of gratitude to the Trustees of the V. T. Choksi Trust for making it possible for us to institute this Series. We are also thankful to Dr. A. D. Shastri for giving us his thesis for publication.

—Jayant Pathak



To  
The Sacred Memory  
of  
My Father

The Late

Shri Devshanker M. Shastri

M. A.

## PREFACE

---

This thesis "Puruṣottamaḥ : A Study" was submitted to and accepted by the M. S. University of Baroda for my doctorate degree. It is a study of the life, works and teaching of Śrī Puruṣottamaḥ, who occupies a unique place in the history of Vallabha-Sampradāya.

To a student of history, mediaeval India presents a very hazy picture, full of a thousand figures. There is a large number of saints and teachers and pundits, belonging to various schools of thought, and a halo of myths and legends has gathered round their names. It is therefore, very difficult to give an exact account of the life of any teacher. Puruṣottama is no exception to this. Puruṣottama's life is described by Śrī M. T. Telivala in an article in the Puṣṭibhaktisudhā, Vol. I, No 3 and by Śrī H. O. Shastri in his Hindi Introduction to Avatara-vādāvalī and in a Gujarati work entitled 'Puruṣottamaḥ Mahārājanun Caritra'. I have examined these sources in the light of whatever other information, I could get, from various other sources and I have tried to give as much information as possible. I have also recorded the traditional accounts.

Another difficulty was in securing his works. Thanks, however, to the help and guidance of my teacher Prof. G. H. Bhatt, and the co-operation of His Holiness Śrī Vrajratnalalji Maharaj and Śrī C. H. Shastri of Surat, I could secure most of his works. Puruṣottama is said to have written so much that one can never be definite about the exact number of works written by him. The lists, given by Śrī M. T. Telivala and Śrī H. O. Shastri may not be conclusive. Some of the works,

listed there, could not be traced by me. Some works written by him are said to have been attributed to others. I had therefore to satisfy myself with as many works as I could get. Some of them had to be examined from the point of view of authorship also, bearing in mind the traditional view about them.

I studied the works of Puruṣottama from the following three points of view.

As Puruṣottama is a very able argumentator, I have tried to study his Vādapaddhati. His method of carefully upholding and expounding the doctrines of his own school, comparing them with those of other schools and criticizing the latter, is worthy of critical examination.

Secondly, Puruṣottama is essentially an interpreter. It is therefore necessary to see how he has interpreted the works he has commented upon. The ācāryas of the various schools of Vedānta have raised their systems of thought on the basis of the Prasthānas. I have, therefore, tried to examine some of the interpretations of Vallabhācārya in the light of Puruṣottama's explanations. I have also studied Puruṣottama's own interpretations of the works, he has commented upon.

Thirdly, Puruṣottama is a very able exponent of the Śuddhādvaita system of philosophy. Vallabhācārya's doctrines have been explained by some modern scholars. Thus, for instance, Dr. S. N. Dasgupta has devoted one chapter to it in his 'History of Indian Philosophy' Vol. IV. In Gujarati, perhaps the best explanation of the Śuddhādvaita is given by Prof. M. G. Shastri in 'Śuddhādvaita Siddhānta Pradīpa'. I have, however, followed Puruṣottama's exposition of the Śuddhādvaita and have tried to show where his analysis leads us.

At the end, I have attempted an evaluation of Puruṣottama, especially his place in the sampradāya and in the history of Indian thought.

I am unable to express adequately my deep sense of gratitude to my guiding teacher, the late Prof G H Bhatt. He took personal interest and constantly encouraged and guided me in my work. Without his guidance, I doubt whether I would have been able to finish this study.

I am highly obliged by His Holiness Shri Vraj-ratnalalji Maharaj of Mota Mandir, Surat. He showed keen interest in my work and was ready to help me with books and information, whenever I approached him. I am also thankful to Shri C H Shastri of Surat for giving me a large number of books from his personal library. I should also express my thanks to Shri Nrisimhalalji Pandya of Nathdvar, for supplying me with a copy of Puruṣottama's horoscope.

I express my gratitude to the authorities of the Chunilal Gandhi Vidyabhavan, Surat, for undertaking to publish this thesis in the V. T. Choksi Sanskrit Series.

I am thankful to the M S University of Baroda for granting the necessary permission for the publication of the thesis.

I should also thank my friend and colleague Shri Rajendra I Nanavati, M A, for helping me in preparing an Index and Errata. In spite of the care in reading the proofs, some mistakes have remained in the printed copy. I request my readers to be indulgent in that regard.

17-11-'66

Surat

A D SHASTRI



## ABBREVIATIONS

- A. B. : Aṅubhāṣya  
A. B. P. : Aṅubhāṣyaprakāśa  
A B with P. & R. : Aṅubhāṣya with Prakāśa and Raśmi.  
Pr. : Prasthānaratnākara  
Prh. : Prahastavāda  
S. S. : Suvarṇasūtra  
T. S. : Tattvadīpanibandha—Sāstrārthaprakaraṇa  
T. S. P. : Tattvadīpanibandha—Sāstrārthaprakaraṇa-Prakāśa  
T. S. Ab. : Tattvadīpanibandha—Sāstrārthaprakaraṇa-  
Āvaraṇabhāṅga.  
T. Sn : Tattvadīpanibandha—Sarvanirṇayaprakaraṇa  
T. Sn P. : Tattvadīpanibandha—Sarvanirṇayaprakaraṇa-  
Prakāśa  
T. Sn. Ab. : Tattvadīpanibandha—Sarvanirṇayaprakaraṇa-  
Āvaraṇabhāṅga  
T Bh. : Tattvadīpanibandha—Bhāgavatārthaprakaraṇa  
T. Bh. P. : Tattvadīpanibandha—Bhāgavatārthaprakaraṇa-  
Prakāśa  
T. Bh. Ab. : Tattvadīpanibandha—Bhāgavatārthaprakaraṇa-  
Āvaraṇabhāṅga-Yojanā  
U. P : Yāvat-prāpya-utsava-nirṇaya-grantha-samuccaya  
V. M. : Vīdvanmaṇḍana

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श्रीमद्ब्रह्मभद्रीक्षिताह्वयहरेर्वन्द्यान्वये सप्तम-  
स्तत्कारुण्यसुधाभिषेकविकसत्सौभाग्यभूमोदयः ।  
दृष्यदुर्मदवादिविद्वदिभदुष्कूटोक्तिकुम्भस्थली-  
सद्योभञ्जनकेलिकेसरिपतिः पीताम्बरस्यात्मजः ॥

नांसीदेन समः समस्तनिगमस्मृत्यादितत्त्वार्थविद्  
वक्ता चाप्रतिमः सदःसु विदुषामद्यापि भूमौ बुधः ।  
यः सर्वं नवलक्षपद्यरुमितप्रौढप्रबन्धं व्यधात्  
स श्रीमान् पुरुषोत्तमो विजयतामार्थचूडामणिः ॥

## CHAPTER I

### VALLABHA SAMPRADĀYA

#### Introductory :

In the history of India the mediaeval period was rich in religious activities. The Vedic age was something belonging to the times of yore. The creative period of the *Upaniṣads*, of the Epics, of Buddhism, and Jainism, when thinkers propounded and propagated whatever theories, they thought correct, was just a memory of the past. The orthodox brahmanism of the Mīmāṃsists was too old to have its sway upon the masses and even the classical systems like the Sāṅkhya, Nyaya and Vaiśeṣika lost all their freshness and vigour. The Hinduism-including Buddhism, Jainism and Brahmanism, was in a dire need of invigoration. Its flow was limited and its vision was conservative. While the pandits were engaged in hair-

splitting controversies, the masses could not understand anything and lived in serene blissful ignorance. The controversies, however, did not stop there. The development of various sects, owing allegiance to the popular Gods of the *Purānas* also added to the chaotic conditions of the time. The Vedic deities of valour and power lost their importance with the emergence of new Gods and Goddesses like Nārāyana and Śiva, Śaktī and Gaṇapati. Vaiṣṇavism and Śaivism became more and more powerful and competed with each other for supremacy. The Śākta sect was also trying to get a field of its own. All these sects were again divided into various sub-sects. The followers of these sub-sects quarrelled with one another and all of them looked down upon the followers as well as the deities of the rival sects.

In this state of affairs Śaṅkara came like a powerful whirlwind. He tried to uproot the old controversies and petty theories and gave a sound philosophical system to Hinduism. But his theories proved too high for the people, his reasoning appeared too powerful. The light that was shed by him was a blinding flash. He said that Brahman alone is real and everything else is unreal in the highest sense. All the beings, the wide world with all its variety, all our weal and woe, all that we see and do—everything is false. There is no dualism. "I am God." "I" am not different from "GOD." The difference upon which this world subsists is only māyā and therefore unreal. Even the God whose form, attributes, virtues and greatness, we have imagined, is not real in the highest sense. We may say that God has created us, but really speaking we have named him, we have fixed for him a particular form, we have thought that he has no vices. The personal God is a

product of ignorance. Brahman is just Being. It can be described only negatively because it is beyond the power of our speech.

Śaṁkara's teaching, even though appealing to reason, was a powerful flood that drowned all beliefs and practices. Thus while it was hailed in the highest esteem from some quarters, it was vehemently attacked and severely condemned by others. Naturally a human being wants a God and he has something of feeling in him besides something of thinking. The evaporation of the God in the scorching heat of Śaṁkara's logic was somewhat too much for a Hindu to bear.

There were also other forces at work. As we have already stated the systems of Vaiṣṇvism and Śaivism, the origin of which goes to a very early period, were popularised in the South by the Tamil saints, Ālvārs and Nāyanamārs. They, especially the former, carried the masses with them by their teaching of simple and sincere devotion depending upon the grace of the Highest Lord.<sup>1</sup> Their hold on the masses was very strong. They penetrated deep into the country and reached the common folk with their easily understandable and appealing theories. The monism of Śaṁkara was naturally outright rejected by the people.

*Another force, still stronger, came from the aliens.* Hordes of muslims came from the Northwest and brought with them a new religion, simpler and more powerful, and strongly backed with military strength. The age-old Hinduism was not only old but was also conservative and had so many divisions and distractions within itself that it

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1. For a discussion of the probable dates of Ālvārs, see Bhāndarkar: *Vaiṣṇavism, Śaivism* etc. P. 68-71.

failed to unite and give a common front to the menacing, destroying power that came with the muslims. The hindu kings were not weak but they lacked the unity that was required to fight the muslims. They were so engrossed in fighting with one another that they could not give a united front against a common foe. India was not one nation, it was a land of petty principalities. All the princes tried to encounter the mohammedans singly, while others showed callous indifference and slowly and slowly all of them were defeated. The Northern part of India was grabbed by the muslims first who later on turned their attention to the South.

This had a shaping influence on the Indian life and thought. People who used to live and work quietly without caring for the political changes till then, could not continue their way of life any longer in the same manner. Hinduism became more and more conservative as the hindus were enslaved in a larger number. Islam could not wipe out Hinduism completely in spite of all this, but it made Hinduism turn more and more inwards. While thus we may find out the impact of Islam on Hinduism, it may also be said that Hinduism especially the philosophical part of it, had its influence on Islam.<sup>2</sup>

When the infiltration of muslims was slowly but strongly carried on towards the South, attempts were also being made in another direction. Vaisnavism, which started as a popular religion of the Sattvatas became a powerful and popular faith of the people. But it was not in the fold of the orthodox Hinduism just as was the case with

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2 We may not enter into a discussion on the influence or counter-influence, for which see Ramdharsinha Diakar *Sanskṛtīle catā adhyaya Adhyaya III*



the Vedāntic or Mīmāṁsist system. While it was not a heterodox system like Buddhism or Jainism, it drew largely from the *Purāṇas* and the *Mahābhārata*, the *Pāñcarātrasaṁhitā* and the later and definitely sectarian *Upaniṣads*. It was not evolved, as it were, from the earlier *Upaniṣads*. A number of Vaiṣṇava Ācāryas came forward to graft the branches of Vaiṣṇavism on the age-old Vedic tree. Śaiva ācāryas also followed in their footsteps and tried to connect Śaivism with the Vedic literature.

Ācāryas :

Śaṁkara's commentary on the *Brahmasūtras* is the earliest extant commentary. It is possible, however, that he might have followed other commentators whose works are not with us. Śaṁkara was followed by Bhāskara, who flourished in about 900 A. D. His commentary, which is known as the *Bhāskara-bhāṣya*, is not a sectarian work and does not favour either Śaṁkara's views or those of Pāñcarātra Vaiṣṇavas.<sup>3</sup> He advocates the theory of Bhedābheda, 'upholding equal reality of both unity and plurality: In his theory Bheda is aupādhika or due to limiting adjuncts, the reality of which is also admitted. Another commentator Yādavaprakāśa propounded in the eleventh century the Brahmaparināmāvāda, theory of the transformation of Brahman. He happened to be Rāmānuja's preceptor for some time.

Rāmānuja was born in the first quarter of the eleventh century in Shriperumbudūr. He lived at Conjeevaram in his youth, as a student of Yādavaprakāśa. He could not however agree to the advaitic interpretations of his teacher, and so left him. He studied carefully the *prabandhas* of the Ālvār

3. Radhakrishnan, *Indian Philosophy* Volume II P. 670.

saints side by side with the vast sanskrit philosophical literature Yāmunācārya, who was impressed by this youth, thought of appointing him as his successor to the apostolic seat at Shreerangam Unfortunately Rāmānuja could not see him at the time of his death As a successor of Yāmunācārya, he lived at Shreerangam and toured South India He also visited the noted holy places of North India, converting many persons to Vaiṣṇavism He renounced the world, perhaps because he could not live a happy married life As a sannyāsin he was very popular among the masses His important works are *Vedāntasāra*, *Vedāntadīpa*, *Vedānt<sup>1</sup>asamgraha*, and the *Bhāṣyas* on *Brahmasūtras* and the *Bhagavad Gītā* His *Śrībhāṣya* is a very brilliant work of mature scholarship

Ramānuja propounded viśiṣṭādvaita or qualified monism As against Śaṅkara, he believes in the reality of the world In his opinion the world and the individual souls are the gross forms of the non-sentient or acit and the sentient or cit respectively, and are thus effects of the subtle acit and cit Both cit and acit constitute the body of Brahman The causal form is Brahman with the subtle cit and acit while the effect form is Brahman with the gross cit and acit Brahman is qualified or viśiṣṭa by the cit and acit, there is thus oneness between Brahman on the one hand and the cit and acit on the other on the ground of the body-soul analogy Oneness between the cause and the effect can also be understood as the Brahman with the subtle cit and acit is the cause and the Brahman with the gross cit and acit is the effect

In this way Rāmānuja maintained the ultimate reality of the world and the jivas In his opinion the Highest

Lord Viṣṇu is endowed with all the virtues and is devoid of all the vices. He can be realized not by knowledge alone, as contended by Śaṅkara, but by devotion. Rāmānuja can be credited with being the first Ācārya who tried to evolve Vaiṣṇavism and Bhaktimārga from the *Upaniṣads*, the *Bhagavad Gītā* and the *Vedānta-sūtras*. He also holds *Viṣṇupurāṇa* in very high esteem. The Bhakti, which he advocates, is however the same as meditation or Upāsana preached in the Vedic literature. It is thus slightly different or modified from the sincere and ardent devotion of the Āḷvārs depending upon the grace of God alone. Rāmānuja's system is however peculiar in as much as it accepts the Pāñcarātra theory of vyūhas.

Rāmānuja was followed by Nimbārka, son of Jagannātha and Sarasvatī. He was a Telugu Brahmin living in a village called Nimba. While his date is uncertain, he is said to have flourished in the latter part of the eleventh century after Rāmānuja. His sect is called Sanakasaṁpradāya. His commentary on the *Brahmasūtras*, called *Vedāntpārijātasaurabha*, is a very small work. His another work *Siddhāntaratna*, popularly known as *Daśaśloki* gives the essence of his system in ten verses. His theory is called Dvaitādvaita or Bhedābheda: thus admitting both identity and difference. The world, the Jīvas and God are different from one another, but they can also be called identical in so far as the first two are dependent upon God for their existence. The difficulty, however, is that his system has not been well explained and elaborated. There are two important points which deserve special notice. Firstly, Nimbārka differs basically from Rāmānuja in his teaching of the path of devotion. Rāmānuja, in his enthusiasm to find an Upaniṣadic backing for his advocacy of Bhaktimārga,

‘makes Bhakti almost similar to meditation or contemplation. Nimbārka, on the other hand, does not change the original character of Bhakti and puts emphasis more on love and devotion. Another difference between the two teachers is, that, “ while Rāmānuja confines himself to Nārāyaṇa and his consorts Lakṣmī, Bhū, and Līlā, Nimbārka gives almost an exclusive prominence to Kṛṣṇa and his mistress, Rādhā, attended on by thousands of her female companions. ”<sup>4</sup>

Madhva was born at Kallianpur in Udipi Taluka of South Kanara district. His father’s name was Madhyageha-bhaṭṭa and his own name was Vāsudeva. In the beginning he was a disciple of one Acyutaprekṣa who was a follower of Śaṅkara; but as it happened in the case of Rāmānuja, Madhva also parted with his teacher and proclaimed his own dualistic philosophy. He lived a fairly long life. He went on extensive tours of India, discussing, debating and finally putting down the theory of Māyā. He is also known as Ānandatīrtha, Pūrṇaprajña and Madhyamandāra. His important works are a commentary on the *Brahma-sūtras*, *Anuvyākhyāna*, commentaries on the *Bhagvad Gītā* and the *Upāniṣads*, a gloss on the *Bhāgaratapurāṇa*, a commentary on the first forty hymns of *Ṛgveda*, *Bhārā-tatātparyanirṇaya*, and several other *prakaraṇas*. Jayatīrtha’s commentaries on his *Brahmasūtra-Bhāṣya* and *Anuvyākhyāna* are very brilliant.

Madhva’s system is the sharpest criticism of the system of Śaṅkara. He condemns Śaṅkara and criticises Rāmānuja. He believes in five eternal distinctions, (1) between God and a jīva, (2) between God and inanimate objects, (3)

between jīvas and inanimate objects, (4) between one jīva and another, (5) between one inanimate object and another. He is not prepared to admit monism in any case. He thinks that God is only the efficient cause of the universe and not the material cause. He upholds the path of devotion and admits the grace of God in attaining to the state of final liberation. Even though Madhva interprets the *Upaniṣads* and *Sūtras* so as to teach his dualistic doctrines, he relies more upon the *Purāṇas*. He holds the *Bhāgavata Purāṇa* in very high esteem. The main difference between Madhvā's system and those of Rāmānuja and Nimbārka is that unlike the former he does not support the orthodox Pāñcārātra theories, and does not accept the Rādhā-Kṛṣṇa element, which is found so prominent in the system of Nimbārka.

Coming to the last Vaiṣṇava Ācārya before Vallabha, we are not treading on sure ground. Viṣṇusvāmin is said to have flourished in the thirteenth century. It is stated that he has written commentaries on the authoritative works of the Vedānta but none of them is extant. Some scholars however have advocated the theory that Vallabha belonged to the same school and only restated his position. Prof. G. H. Bhatt of Baroda has considered this question fully. He has shown that Viṣṇusvāmin actually taught a dualistic theory and the alleged connection between the two does not appear to be correct.<sup>5</sup>

We would also note here two Ācāryas who belonged to Śaivism. Śrīkaṇṭha alias Nilakaṇṭha lived in the four-

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5. Cf. Prof. G. H. Bhatt's papers on the subject read at the 7th and 8th All India Oriental Conference. See Proceedings of the A. I. O. C. Vol. VII P. 449 ff & Vol. VIII p. 322 ff.

teenth century. He has written a commentary on the *Brahmasūtras* and interpreted them in the light of Śaivism. He followed, in fact, in the footsteps of Rāmānuja. He attempted to give a systematic reconciliation between the two traditions, that of the Vedas and of *Śaiva Āgamas*. He rejects both the absolute identification of Śaṅkara and the absolute distinctions of Madhva. Substituting Śiva and Amba for Viṣṇu and Lakṣmī, he generally accepts the theory of Rāmānuja. That is why he is often referred to as a thief of Rāmānuja's doctrines "*Rāmānujamatacaura*"

Another commentator of importance is Śrīpati Paṇḍitācārya, who flourished in c. 1400 A. D. His *Śrīkarabhāṣya* is a valuable work in which he upholds the theory of Bhedābheda. The author has commented upon the Sūtras from the Vīraśaiva point of view <sup>6</sup>

### Popular Movements :

While on the one hand the learned Ācāryas commented upon the authoritative works in sanskrit, and propounded their own systems, the masses were, however, led on the other hand by those popular saints and teachers, who carried on their activities in regional languages which could be easily understood by all the people. Their method was simple and their approach was sincere. They did not enter into the dialectical feats of scholars. They did not discuss

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6. Three important writers after Vallabhācārya should be noted here. Śuka who lived in c. 1550 A. D. propounded dualistic philosophy; while Vijñānabhikṣu (c. 1600 A. D.) explained the Sūtras in the light of the Sāṅkhya theories. His system is known as Avibhāgādvaita. Lastly, Baladeva (c. 1725 A. D.) taught the Acintyabhedābheda. Cf. C. Hayavadanrao: *Śrīkara Bhāṣya of Śrīpati Paṇḍitācārya*; Vol. I, Intro. p. 221.

and debate absolutism, monism or dualism. They just sang the songs in praise of God and through these simple and beautiful songs they could reach the heart of common folk. They threw away the barriers of castes. They opened the doors of religion to any sincere man or woman who aspired to find out the truth. The path of devotion, taught by the Ācāryas, was certainly for the benefit of the lower classes but they were too learned, too orthodox and too much engrossed in their own controversies of isms. A number of saints have flourished in North India and while some of them actually established their own systems, there were others who did not care to do that.<sup>7</sup> Rāmānanda, Nānak, Kabir, Pipā and Dhannā, Senā and Raidas, Mirānbāī and Padmāvati, Nāmadeva and Narasinha Mehta and Tukārāma—all these and many more lived and preached their faith for the uplift of the weltering men and women of India.

Another point, which is worthy of note, is that these teachers did not care for the political changes in India. Whoever was adored on the thrones of Delhi and other capitals, they went on with their own teaching, unmindful of the ruling powers. People had rather religious consciousness than the political consciousness. Gradually there arose a tendency to find out the common points between Islam and Hinduism and to effect a compromise between the two. Guru Nānak, Kabir and other saints turned their efforts in that direction.

The most important movement, contemporaneous with that of Vallabha was that of Caitanya in Bengal. The

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<sup>7</sup> For a study of Saints see Chaturvēdi: Uttaraī Bhūratakī, Santaparaiṅgarā.

original name of Caitanya was Viśvaṁbhara Mīśra. His father was Jagannātha and his mother Śacī Devī. He had one elder brother named Viśvarūpa, who was afterwards known as Nityānanda. Caitanya was born in 1485 A. D. He married at first with one Lakṣmī Devī and after her death married another. He began his mission of life at the age of 23, when he returned from Gaya after making offerings to the manes. He denounced the ritualism of Brahmīns, did not admit the distinctions of castes and preached faith in God alone and love for Him. He wandered from place to place singing songs in praise of Kṛṣṇa and Rādhā. In 1510 A. D. he became an ascetic and did his work with a missionary zeal. After travelling through various parts of India he returned to Puri and lived there for the last eighteen years of his life. He died in 1533 A. D. During his travels in India he had many disciples and had disputations with many scholars. Caitanya, Nityānanda and Advaitānanda are called Prabhus in the school of Caitanya. Caitanya's pupils Rūpa and Sanātana were brilliant writers, but the Prabhus themselves left no important composition. While Caitanya mainly preached ardent and sincere devotion to Hari, his Vedāntic theory, as explained by his followers, is very much akin to that of Nimbārka.

We may also take notice of one important movement which started just after Vallabhācārya. Hita Harivaṁśa, who was born in 1530 (or 1553) A. D., founded the Rādhā-vallabhīya Saṁpradāya, which teaches mādhyabhāva in Bhakti.<sup>8</sup>

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8. For a study of this sect, see Vijayendra Satak : *Rādhā-vallabhīya Saṁpradāya-Siddhānta aur Sāhitya*



## Vallabhācārya :

Vallabhācārya's family belonged to the Bharadvaja Gotra of the *Taittirīya Śākhā* of the Black *Yajurveda*. It was a Vellanaṭṭiya Brahmin family of Andhra. One of the ancestors of Vallabha, named Yaṅṅanarāyaṇa Bhaṭṭa was a wellknown Vaiṣṇava. One Ganapati Bhaṭṭa was the author of a book called *Sarvatantīranigraha* and his son Bālam Bhaṭṭa wrote *Bhaktidīpa*. Balam Bhaṭṭa had two sons, Lakṣmana Bhaṭṭa and Janardana. Lakṣmana Bhaṭṭa married Yallamagāru, daughter of Susarma. He lived in Benaras, moving about in the society of great scholars of the time. Once a rumour about the muslim invasion of Benaras was spread and Hindus left the city. Lakṣmana Bhaṭṭa started southward. In the course of this journey Yallamagaru gave birth to Vallabha in V S 1535 (or V S 1529 according to some followers of the school) in Camparanya near Raichur. The family returned to Benaras because the rumour of muslim invasion was wrong. Vallabha was the fourth child of his parents, the others being Ramakṛṣṇa, Sarasvatī, Subhadra and Keśava. After his Upanayana in the eighth year, Vallabha began his studies under Viśnucitta. He was a very brilliant student and mastered various *Śāstras* in a very short time. In 1490 A D Lakṣmana Bhaṭṭa unfortunately passed away and the family had to return to their home in South India, when Vallabha was only eleven.

Vallabha's journey southward was like the pilgrimage of a Brahmacarin. He came to Vijayanagar in about 1493-1494 A D. At that time there was a prolonged debate going on between the followers of Śaṅkara and the Vaiṣṇavas led by Vyāsārītha, a follower of Madhva, under the patronage of the great king Kṛṣṇadevarāja. When the

former were on the point of winning, Vallabha could manage to go to the royal court with the help of one of his relatives. He reinforced the side of the Vaiṣṇavas and after a long controversy defeated the opponents and propounded his Brahmanvada. He was then declared as the greatest teacher and honoured with *Kanakābhiseka* the golden anointing. Vallabha's followers have given very much importance to this event as a glorious victory of his scholarship and power of debating. The historicity of it can, however, be easily questioned, as Kṛṣṇadeva came to the throne of Vijayanagar in 1509 A. D., whereas the *Kanakābhiseka* is said to have taken place in 1493-1494 A. D. It is likely that the event might have taken place later and not when Vallabha first went to Vijayanagar.

After this, Vallabha was approached by Vyasa-tīrtha and others and requested by them to lead the Madhva Church. Vallabha, however, declined and started on a pilgrimage. He is said to have gone on pilgrimage thrice. As a pilgrim he visited many holy places and shrines, discussed and taught his doctrines and gathered a large following. After the second round of pilgrimage, he married one Mahalakṣmī in about 1500 A. D., which is the year of the foundation of the shrine of Śrī Govardhananāthaji. Once at about the same time, when Vallabha was in Gokulā, on the eleventh day of the bright half of the month of Śravana, he received at midnight the command of God to initiate the people in the new path that God revealed to him.<sup>9</sup> Unfortunately we do not know the year of this event.

After his third round of pilgrimage Vallabha settled down at Benaras and then shifted his headquarters to

Adel, a small village not far from Allahabad. He stayed there for about twenty years and wrote important works. After settling down he built up his Sampradāya and put it on a firm footing. Many disciples came to him at Adel. His meetings with Caitanya are worthy of note. The records of these meetings are preserved by the followers of both. The meetings were very cordial, though the relations of their followers were strained.

Once when Vallabha was returning from Puri, he received a call from God, but as his commentary on the *Bhāgavata* was still to be completed, he did not leave the world. He hastened to complete the work, but his scribe Mādhava Bhaṭṭa Kāśmīrin died, having been shot by an arrow. He was again called by God before he could complete this work. This time the call was too powerful. He thereupon decided to renounce the world and informed his mother and wife about his decision. One Mādhavendrapuri, who was a follower of Madhva, initiated him as a Sannyāsīn (According to some he was initiated by one Nārāyaṇendra Yatī.) He then went to Benaras and at the Hanuman Ghat entered the holy river Gangā and disappeared forever. It is said that a bright flash appeared at the spot and he went to heaven in the presence of many spectators. This happened on the 3rd day of the bright half of the month of Āśadha in V. S. 1587 corresponding to 1531 A. D.

Vallabha was a great writer. He is said to have written eighty-four works but the number is more legendary than real, corresponding as it is to the number of disciples and shrines of the system. The most important work of Vallabha is his *Anubhāsyā*, which remained incomplete.

and which was completed by his son Viṭṭhaleśa. Similarly he is said to have written a commentary on the *Pūrvamīmāṃsā Sūtras* of Jaimini. Only a fragment of this has come down to us. He has also written the *Pūrvamīmāṃsā Kārikās*. His commentary *Subodhini* on *Bhāgavata Purāna* is only on the first three books, on the tenth book and five *Adhyāyas* of the eleventh book of the *Purāna*. He is said to have written *Sūkṣmatikā* on the same work but it is not extant. One of his very important works is the *Tattvadīpanibandha* in three chapters, and a commentary on it. The commentary is, however, found only on the first two chapters and a portion of the third. The most popular works of Vallabha are, however, his sixteen tracts or *Ṣodasagranthāḥ*, which expound his religious teachings. Here also the *Pusti-Pravāha-Maryādā-Grantha* is not complete. He wrote other small works also like *Patrāvalāmbana*. In all, he is said to have written thirty books, all in Sanskrit.

**Viṭṭhalanātha and his descendants :**

Vallabha had two sons Gopinātha and Viṭṭhalanātha. Gopinātha was born in V. S. 1567. He was a sincere devotee of God, and is said to have decided to take his food only after reading the *Bhāgavata Purāna*. As this took a long time, Vallabha gave him *Puruṣottama-Nāma-Sahasra*, as it could be read easily. He died at an early age. He wrote two works *Sādhanadīpikā* and *Sevāvidhi*. He had a son named Purusottama, who also died very young.

Viṭṭhaleśa was junior to Gopinātha by five years. He was born at Caranāṭa near Allahabad in V. S. 1572. It is said that he was given to worldly playfulness and resiled from that mood after being remonstrated by Dāmodaradāsa,

a well-known Vaiṣṇava. It is also said that he was sent by his father to study under Mādhava Sarasvati but instead of attending to his studies, he just devoted himself to the study of *Bhāgavata-Purāṇa*. After the death of Gopīnātha and his son, Viṭṭhaleśa became the recognised representative of his father, and he planned various tours with the sole purpose of propagating the thoughts and practices of the Saṁpradāya. He visited Gujarat for about six times, during the period between V. S. 1600 and V. S. 1638. He visited Jagannāthapuri in V. S. 1616. After that he seems to have stayed at Adel, from where he moved to Bandhegadh. After staying there for a couple of months, he went to Gadha, which was ruled over by the famous queen Durgāvati. He could foresee that the independent hindu kingdom of Durgāvati was perhaps not going to last long. He left his residence at Gadha and went to Mathura and lived there in the 'Seven houses' (Sāt-ghara), built for him by Durgāvati. However, he preferred the quiet smaller place of Gokula to the city of Mathura. In V. S. 1629 he made Gokula his permanent residence. He carried on his literary and other activities at this place. He seems to have had very happy meetings with Akbar, and became the recipient of the Royal Firmans. He had also connections with Raja Todarmal and Birbal. He ousted the followers of Caitanya from the worship of Śrī Nāthaji.

His family-life was quite happy. He married one Rukmiṇī, daughter of Viśvanātha Bhaṭṭa and Bhavāni. He had six sons and four daughters by her. His seventh son Ghanaśyāma was born of his second wife Padmāvati. Two daughters of Gopīnātha, Lakṣmī and Satyabhāmā also lived with him. In spite of bearing the burden of such a large family, he passed his time in devotion to the Lord Kṛṣṇa. He lived

a fairly long life of seventy years and died in V. S. 1642 on the seventh day of the dark half of the month of Māgha.

While Vallabha propounded a new theory and established a system based upon it, it was left for Viṭṭhaleśa to put that school on a sound footing. He was a man of genius and knew how to propagate his beliefs and practices. He started all the practices of the Saṁpradāya and gave it an artistic touch with his fine sense. He was an artist, painter, and singer. He incorporated that art in the service of the Lord. The worship was carried on in houses with separate rooms for bath and bed and dinner. Thus he infused life in religion.

As a writer, Viṭṭhaleśa's contribution to the Suddhādvaita is great. There were, however, certain difficulties which he had to face at the outset. A family quarrel cropped up between himself and his sister-in-law, the widow of Gopinātha. As a result of this, she went away with whatever manuscripts of Vallabha's works she could get. Many of the works were thus lost, and some of those, that could be found, were incomplete. Viṭṭhaleśa made it his mission to complete them. A part of the commentary on *Tattvadīpanibandha* III, and the latter part of the *Aṅubhāṣya* are from his pen. Further, he added many passages also in the body of his father's works. Besides these, he has written a number of independent works and commentaries. The most important of his works is *Vidvanmaṇḍana*.<sup>10</sup>

We have already noticed that Viṭṭhaleśa had a large family. All his seven sons were sincere devotees and good

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10. For a list of his forty-eight works; see : V. C. Shah : *Puṣṭimārganān Pāñcāśo Varṣā* : p. 239.

scholars. All of them tried in their individual and collective capacity to propagate their faith, which was then having a large following in Western India. Viṭṭhaleśa distributed his seven idols of the Lord Kṛṣṇa among his seven sons.

Gokulanātha, the fourth son of Viṭṭhaleśa, was the most prominent of all his sons. He was born in V. S. 1608. He is famous for the fight that he gave to Cidrūpa who, because of his cordial relations with Jahangir could successfully manage to prohibit the use of the Tulasi-string which is one of the outward marks of the Paṣṭimārgīya Vaiṣṇavas. Gokulanātha saw Jahangir personally, convinced him of the Vaiṣṇava position, and got the ban removed. He has written some commentaries in Sanskrit on the sixteen tracts, and other works. He has also written stories of 84, and 252 Vaiṣṇavas in the Vraj dialect. Though not much of an author, Gokulanātha was well-versed in various Śāstrās, and is said to have successfully carried on his controversy with Cidrūpa. His contribution to the Śuddhādvaita lies in the propagation and regulation of the Saṁpradāya. He is honoured as the third great man of the Saṁpradāya. He died in V. S. 1697 at the age of 89.

Kalyāṇarāya, born in V. S. 1625 was the son of Gōvīndarāya, the second son of Viṭṭhaleśa. He has commented upon the sixteen tracts and has also composed some Kīrtanas. He had two sons, Harirāya and Gopeśvara. Harirāya, who lived a fairly long life of about 120 years, was born in V. S. 1649. After Gokulanātha, he became a very important personality [in the Saṁpradāya. Being a sincere devotee himself, he has written so many small

works in Sanskrit, discussing and debating various problems of the Saṁpradāya. The most important of his works are, however, the letters that he wrote to his brother Gopeśvara, who found consolation in them, when he lost his wife. These letters known as *Sikṣāpatras* are written in simple language and are capable of appealing to the masses. They have been translated into Gujarati and Vraj and are often read in the religious meetings of the Vaiṣṇavas even to-day. He had many students whom he taught the principles and practices of his school.

Besides the teachers noted above, there were several others who stayed at various places and contributed to the Suddhādvaita literature. Of these the immediate predecessors of Puruṣottama were Pītāmbāra, Vrajaiāya and Kṛṣṇacandra. We shall however refer to them in the next chapter, as their relation with Puruṣottama was very close.

### Spread of Vallabha-Saṁpradāya in Gujarat :

As Puruṣottama lived and worked in Surat, it would be proper to add a few lines regarding the religious conditions of the province of Gujarat, before and during his occupation of the pontifical chair at Surat.

The charming and fertile land of Gujarat with its natural beauty of rivers and plains has been for ever the recipient of various ideas, religious and others. Gujarat claims to have been the holy land of Lord Kṛṣṇa and the Yādavas. The Rūdradāman inscription of Girnar is a historical record of the existence of Vaiṣṇavism in Gujarat. One Cakrapālita is said to have built a temple of Cakradhara Kṛṣṇa in 456 A. D. In 526 A. D. there flourished in Vallabhi, king Dhṛvasena who called himself Parama Bhāgavata. Poet Māgha, (9th century) pays homage to



Hari in the first verse of his *Śiṣupālavadhā*. The inscription at Dhamadachā, dated 1074 A. D. begins with 'Om namo Bhagavate Vāsudevāya' and praises the Varāha-incarnation. Hemacandra, (1088-1172 A. D.), refers to the existence of the Vaiṣṇava temples in Patan, in his *Dvyāś-rayakāvya*. The prevalence of Vaiṣṇavism has also been referred to by Someśvara (c 1230 A. D.) in his *Kirtikaumudi* and *Surathotsava*. Rājeśhara in his *Caturvīṁśatiprabandha* refers to the building of the temple of Vīranārāyaṇa by Vīradhavalā (1233-1238 A. D.). One Nṛsiṁhāraṇya Muni wrote a work called "Viṣṇubhakti Candrodāya" in 1413 A. D. The inscription on the Revatī Kuṇḍa of Girnar, dated 1417 A. D., begins with the praise of Dāmodara who steals butter. Vāghelā Mokalaīṁha (1499 A. D.) is said to have protected the hosts of the Bhāgavatas. The king who reigned in Baroda in 1511. A. D. was a devotee of Govinda<sup>11</sup>. For centuries the current of the Kṛṣṇa-cult always came to Gujarat and was received there faithfully and enthusiastically, the more so because Dvārakā was known as the holy seat of Lord Kṛṣṇa. This had its effect upon the regional literature of Gujarat. A very powerful influence was welded by the *Gītagovinda* of Jayadeva. It was actually translated into Gujarati in c 1600 V. S.<sup>12</sup>.

Of the Saṁpradāyas, established by the Vaiṣṇava Ācāryas of the South, that of Rāmānuja seems to have had its sway over the people of Gujarat for some time. The followers of Rāmānuja are found in Gujarat even to-day. Shri Munshi says that there is reason to believe

11. *Gujarati Sāhitya* Bk : V : *Madhyakālano Sāhityaprovāha* :  
Ed. K. M. Munshi pp. 309-311.

12. *Ibid.* pp. 313-15,

that the Khijada Mandir Saṁpradāya of Saurashtra is a branch of the same.<sup>13</sup> Madhva and Nimbārka 'could not exercise any influence in Gujarat. The worship of Rāma, propounded by Rāmānanda, of the Śrī Saṁpradāya, seems to have had its influence in Gujarat to a very great degree, in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. The well-known poet Bhāṣa and his son Viṣṇudāsa were devotees of Rāma. One Miṭhā Vaiṣṇava of Talaja wrote a tract on the characteristics of Vaiṣṇavas in V. S. 1587. Kabir, the famous disciple of Rāmānanda, had some 'hold on the lower strata of the Gujarati society in the seventeenth century. Poet Vaccharaja was a follower of Kabir. Dadu Dayala, was born in Ahmedabad in V. S. 1601 and, was initiated in the fold of Kabir by Kamal (or Buddhan). He left Ahmedabad at the age of eighteen and established his seat at Narana, near Ajmer. The Dadu-Saṁpradāya had many followers in Gujarat.<sup>14</sup>

All these and many other sects and movements came to Gujarat. However, the immense popularity of the Purāṇis and the teachers of the Puṣṭimārga ousted them from the field.

The most important religion, not sect or movement, that held its sway over Gujarat for centuries and which commands a large following even to-day is Jainism. It became the royal faith of Gujarat, when Kumārapāla Solanki accepted it at the instance of his teacher Hemacandra. With its rigorous emphasis on non-violence and good conduct, it could very easily appeal to the characteristically soft and tender nature of the mercantile community of

<sup>13</sup> Ibid. p. 321.

<sup>14</sup> Ibid. pp. 323-4.

Gujarat. It could not, however, stand the test of time any longer, and many Jains came over to the Puṣṭimārga, when it was introduced by Vallabha and his son. The reason for this is not far to seek. While Jainism was old and worn out, the new faith was fresh and young; again the Puṣṭimārga did not close the doors of happy and prosperous life while Jainism was rigorous and rigid. It may also be added that Jainism is more or less an ethical religion, whereas Vallabha taught of an eternally playful Kṛṣṇa. The appeal to the masses of this playful sportive God was naturally very deep.

The most important point, which we should note, is the political upheavals and anarchy in the country. The last Hindu king of Gujarat—Karaṇṭ Vāghelo was defeated by Allauddin Khilji in 1297 A. D. For four hundred years Gujarat was ruled by the Subas appointed by the Sultans of Delhi. The invasion of Taimūt Lang however shook the very foundation of the Delhi Empire and so the Subas took advantage of the weakness of the Central Government. They were tempted by the circumstances to become independent kings. Zafar Khan proclaimed his independence and established the reign of the Sultanat in Gujarat in 1407 A. D. The kingdom saw illustrious kings like Ahmedshah and Mohammed (popularly known as Begado), but the Sultanat could not retain its power against Akbar; and Gujarat became a province of the Moghul Empire. The rebellion of Muzaffarkhan proved abortive and once again Ahmedabad became the seat of the Moghul Viceroys. The period, immediately following this annexation, was that of peace and prosperity. The viceroyalty of Mir Aziz Koka, Shah Jahan and Dara Shikoh added to the security and prosperity of the people, and even though there were

occasional incidents, the picture on the whole was decisively bright. It was in this age that Vallabha-Sampradaya spread in Gujarat and its neighbouring areas.

Vallabhacarya in his travels visited Gujarat very often. He is said to have visited Surat, Broach, Morbi, Navanagar, Khambhalia, Pindar, Dakor, Dvarka, Junagadh, Prabhas, Godhra, Naroda and many other villages and cities. The visits are recorded in the literature of the Sampradaya. The propagation of the Sampradāya in Gujarat, however, goes to the credit of Viṭṭhaleśa, who visited Gujarat six times.

It appears that he exercised his influence over Gujarat for nearly forty years. The visits of Viṭṭhaleśa to Gujarat were incidental to his visits to the holy shrine at Dvaraka. Vallabha himself visited Dvaraka thrice and installed the image of Dvārakānātha at Bet Dvaraka. Fortunately, however, Viṭṭhaleśa could get enthusiastic and sincere associates who were devoted to him and who were working for the propagation and expansion of the Sampradaya. Viṭṭhaleśa initiated one Nāgaji Bhaṭṭa, a Sathodara Nagar brahmin, who was an influential officer of the Government in Godhra. Nāgaji Bhaṭṭa was an intelligent pupil, who asked many questions to Viṭṭhaleśa and got their answers. He not only accompanied Viṭṭhaleśa during his travels in Gujarat but even himself went to Adal for paying homage to his preceptor. Bhāila Koṭhari of Asarva, near Ahmedabad was another devotee. His Son-in-law Gopaladasa who was dumb is said to have got his power of speech by chewing the betel-leaf offered by Viṭṭhaleśa. This Gopaladasa is the author of *Navākhyāna*, a popular Vaiṣṇava poem which is responsible for the most tender

feelings, with which the Mahārājas are looked upon in Gujarat. Whenever Viṭṭhaleśa visited Bhāilā Koṭhāri, many people came to see him and embraced his faith. In Cambay there was one Jivā Parekh who contributed much to the rapid spread of Vaiṣṇavism in Gujarat. The wave of Vaiṣṇavism, thus begun in Gujarat, went on for years that came and many people belonging to various sects accepted this faith.

The peace and prosperity, which the province enjoyed under the Moghal rule, was largely instrumental in setting up a particular standard of life. This naturally led to a very happy life full of luxuries and comforts. The fall in the moral standard slowly crept in and there were voices of protest raised against this from various quarters. The most prominent among them is the poet-saint Akho. (c. 1615-1674 A. D.) Popular works of devotion and purāṇic tales were, however, written and sung. Poets like Premānanda and Sāmala Bhatta contributed very much to this sort of literature.

The age of peace and glory of Gujarat, ended in the reign of Aurangzeb, when the great Shivaji plundered Surat, and Gujarat became a scene of many feuds and fights. Though prosperous and wealthy, the cities of Gujarat were not very quiet. Surat,<sup>15</sup> the headquarters of Puruṣottama, was no exception to this.



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15. For the description of Surat, see Vinayavijayaganīvara's *Inludīta* v. 87-99.

## CHAPTER II

### PURUSOTTAMA'S LIFE

#### Genealogy :


Unlike the founders of other systems, Vallabha was a householder. He became a sannyāsīn in Benaras only in his last days. Not only so but in his small work *Sannyāsa-nirṇaya*, he revealed his thoughts on asceticism as such. As a result of this, while in other systems we have the line of teachers and their disciples on the pontifical chairs, here we have the line of direct descendants. These descendants have done much to propound and explain the Sāṃpradāyic theories and practices. Vallabha's system has given us three orders of scholars, the Vaisnavas who were followers of the School, the Bhaṭṭas who were related to the Gosvāmīs by matrimonial alliance, and the direct descendants of Vallabha. Out of

these, the last have served the system most. They had the right of service of the images, that they kept in their own possession. Many of them were great scholars. Again they were looked upon with very high regard by their followers, perhaps because they were direct descendants of Vallabha.

The title 'Gosvami', which was assumed by them and which is retained by them even to-day, does not appear to be the original title of Vallabha himself. Vallabha called himself just 'Diksita'. Even Viṭthaleśa called himself 'Diksita' in some of his works. Viṭthaleśa however, was allowed to graze his cattle at Gokula, Mathura etc by the imperial firmans issued by the Moghul Emperors—Akbar and Jahangir. It was an account of this that Viṭthaleśa was called a *Go-sāmī*—'the owner of cows' and this title went on for centuries. Even to-day Mahārajas are called Gosvamis.

Viṭthaleśa had Seven sons. The third son was Balakṛṣṇa, who again had Six sons. His second son was Vrajanātha while the fourth son was named Pītambara. Vrajanātha had a son named Kṛṣṇacandra. Pītambara had two sons Śyamalāla and Yadupati. Śyamalāla was the father of Vrajpāla and Vrajataya. Yadupati's son was Pītambara whose son was Purusottama. Puruṣṭama refers respectfully to his father and his grand-father in his works.<sup>1</sup> We do not know the name of Purusottama's mother. The genealogy is given below.

1 *Bhaktya naumi pitamaham Yadupatim tatam ca Pīṭmbaram*





## Date and place of birth

The traditionally accepted year of Puruṣottama's birth is V. S. 1724. I could, however, get from Nrisimhalalji Pandya of Nathdvar, a copy of Puruṣottama's horoscope. It runs thus :

॥ श्री ११ ॥

संवत् १७१४ शकः १५७९ भाद्रपद शुक्ल १० चन्द्र वार १८/४ परं ११  
तिथौ प्राकश्य. उत्तरापादा न. घटी ३६/३६ अति गैर योग, घ. कन्यासंक्रान्ति  
गतांशा ६ इष्ट घटी ३३/० गो. श्री पीताम्बरजी गृहे श्री पुरुषोत्तमजी जन्म.

अथ जन्म.



On the strength of this horoscope, we can be definite that Puruṣottama was born on the 10th day of the bright half of Bhādrapada, in V. S. 1714; corresponding to A. D. 1958.

We do not know for certain, where he was born. The tradition relates that he was born in Gokula.

## The Temple at Surat :

We do not know anything about Puruṣottama until he came to Surat and settled in the temple of Bālakṛṣṇa as

an heir of Vrajarāya We may here note the history of the idol of Bālakṛṣṇa till it was installed in Surat by Vrajarāya.

The idol of Bālakṛṣṇa owes its origin to the sacred river Yamuna Once when Vallabha went to the river for a bath, it came out entangled in the sacred thread worn by him, and told Vallabha that it would come to his house Vallabha welcomed the Lord and taking the idol to his house, placed it together with other idols in the Seva There is another tradition also stating that the image came from the Karṇakupa in Vraja At that time Vallabha had five idols and he was spending his time in their devotion at Adel near Prayag

A curious incident has also been recorded in connection with this idol Vallabha's son Viṭṭhaleśa was just a child at that time He also served the small image of Balakṛṣṇa, he decorated it, played with it, served it with the Bhoga and did all sorts of things Once he served 'Thora' (ठोरा) as the Bhoga To his surprise he found that the image began to eat it Viṭṭhaleśa thought that if the Thora was eaten in this way, nothing would remain for him He then tried to take it away from the image but Balakṛṣṇa also pulled it in another direction In the meantime Vallabha came there and was delighted to see this friendship He asked Viṭṭhaleśa to give away the Thora to the idol and another dish of Thora was prepared for Viṭṭhaleśa himself.

This idol of Bālakṛṣṇa remained with Vallabha at Adel, Kashi and Gokula After Vallabha, it came to Viṭṭhaleśa Viṭṭhaleśa had seven idols in all and also had seven sons. So he distributed them to his sons thus .

Name of the son	Name of the idol
(1) Gīridhara	Mathureśa.
(2) Govindarāya	Viṭṭhala-nātha.
(3) Bālakṛṣṇa	Dvārakādhiśa.
(4) Gokulanātha	Gokulanātha.
(5) Raghunātha	Gokulacandramā.
(6) Yadunātha	Bālakṛṣṇa.
(7) Ghanaśyāma	Madanamohana

It will be seen that the idol of Bālakṛṣṇa came in the possession of Yadunātha, the sixth son of Viṭṭhaleśa. Yadunātha kept this image together with that of Dvārakādhiśa, and stayed with Bālakṛṣṇa, the third son of Viṭṭhaleśa. We do not know why Yadunātha took such a step. One of the possible reasons may be that the image of Bālakṛṣṇa is very small. After Yadunātha, his son Madhusūdana also stayed with Dvārakeśa, the son of Bālakṛṣṇa. After sometime however Madhusūdana wanted to be independent of Dvārakeśa and hence he demanded the image of Bālakṛṣṇa from the latter. Dvārakeśa however was not inclined to comply with that demand. The matter was referred to Gokulanātha, the fourth son of Viṭṭhaleśa. Gokulanātha told Dvārakeśa that the image of Bālakṛṣṇa belonged in fact to Yadunātha, who stayed with his father only due to affection. Again Viṭṭhaleśa himself had ordered that whenever Yadunātha or any of his descendants desired to serve the image independently, that desire should be fulfilled. Madhusūdana could thus get this image of Bālakṛṣṇa. After one year's service, the Lord wished to remain in the company of another image of Dvārakādhiśa. Madhusūdana thereupon brought it to

Dvārakeśa who accepted the image on condition that Madhusūdana should not demand it in future Madhusūdana agreed to this. Thus the images of Dvārakādhiśa and Bālakṛṣṇa were kept in Gokula together. After Dvārakeśa, they were served by his son Gīrīdhara. Gīrīdhara's son Dvārakānātha possessed the images after his father. He served them together with his sister Gaṅgābeṭījī and his wife Jānakīvahuji. Dvārakānātha went to Kāśī for study and managed to get the Sarasvatīmantra on his tongue. He became a profound scholar and then returned to his father at Gokula. But the same night, the God Dvārakādhiśa informed him that he had committed the fault of 'Anyāśraya' by resorting to the Sarasvatīmantra and therefore he was no longer fit for devotion. He had to leave his house. Similar such incident is also reported in connection with his father Gīrīdhara. His wife Jānakī therefore with the help of Gaṅgā adopted Vrajabhūšana, son of Śrīvallabha, in the year 1717 V. S.

This deed of adoption was challenged by Vrajarāya, son of Śyāmalāla, who had recently returned to Gokula from Kāśī. He demanded one of the two images served by the trio of Gaṅgā, Jānakī and Vrajabhūṣaṇa. The demand of Vrajarāya was refused. He thereupon approached the Emperor but without any result. He then went to Gokula with some associates and took away both the images by force. The matter was referred to the Emperor Aurangzeb, who ordered that the images should be returned to Vrajabhūṣaṇa. Vrajarāya again met the Emperor and pleased him. He reiterated his demand in the form of a request. The Emperor however did not agree. Vrajarāya then asked for only one image, that of Bālakṛṣṇa, as a right. The Emperor accepted the request and issued

the necessary order. With this order in hand, Vrajarāya came to Gokula, but Gaṅgā and Jānakī together with Vrajabhūṣaṇa went to Agra. Vrajarāya went to Agra, but they left the place for Ahmedabad, taking away with them both the images. They stayed there in an underground room and served the images secretly. Vrajarāya came to Ahmedabad and began his search for idols. After some time he could find out where they were kept. Vrajarāya took the help of the Moghul Viceroy in Ahmedabad and went to that place. At that time both the images were lying in a cradle, and Gaṅgā, Jānakī and Vrajabhūṣaṇa were serving them. Vrajarāya showed to them the imperial order and took away the smaller image of Bālakṛṣṇa with his own hand from the cradle. Jānakī was very angry at this and cursed Vrajarāya to the effect that as he was taking away the image from the cradle there would be no cradle rocking in his house. Vrajarāya accepted the curse and left Ahmedabad.

From Ahmedabad Vrajarāya came to Surat. On account of his scholarship and his devotion to the Lord, he could exercise very good influence on the local Vaiṣṇavas. He settled in Surat and built a temple of his own in V. S. 1727. As he had no son, he adopted Puruṣottama as his heir. Puruṣottama thus occupied the pontifical chair of Surat after Vrajarāya.

The account given above is according to the tradition current in the Saṁpradāya. It seems to have a fairly large degree of historical truth. There is another tradition current in the Saṁpradāya, explaining how Puruṣottama could secure the image of Bālakṛṣṇa. It is said that Puruṣottama took away this image from Gokula

and brought it to Surat, hiding it in the locks of his hair. On account of this the Mahārāja in Gokula cursed Purusottama with childlessness. This tradition does not appear to be correct. That Purusottama could secure the idol of Bālakṛṣṇa from Vrajarāya, is borne out by the statement of Purusottama himself<sup>2</sup>

The historicity of the feud between Vrajaraya on the one hand and Ganga, Janakī and Vrajabhūṣaṇa on the other is corroborated by documentary evidence also, viz a release executed by Gangā, Jānakī, and Vrajabhūṣaṇa to Vrajaraya<sup>3</sup>. The document bears the date, third day of the bright half of the first Aśvina, V S 1737, corresponding to 1681 A D. It is stated in the document that they had settled their old dispute regarding the two idols and the Paduka of the Ācārya. The idol of Bālakṛṣṇa should be given up to Vrajaraya, while that of Dvāraṅganātha should be kept by them. Ganga should keep the Pāduka till her death and after that the Paduka would devolve to Vrajarāya. It was stated in conclusion that no cause of dispute remained between the parties after this. The document was signed by Hariraya, son of Kalyāṇarāya, and others as witnesses.

It appears from the document that the quarrel between Vrajarāya on the one hand and Ganga, Janakī, and Vrajabhūṣaṇa on the other, went on for a long time. Harirāya, who was a famous personality in the Sampradaya

2 A B P Intro V 7 p 2

Vande tam Vrajarajam anvayamanim yadrocisa madraso-  
Pvasin mīrdhni kṛpāparah Prabhuvarah Śrībalakṛṣṇah svayam<sup>2</sup>

3 The document was published in Venunāda Vol I no 3.

at that time seems to have used his good offices to work out a compromise solution.

One important point should however be noted in this connection. The year, given in the document is V. S. 1737. The traditional account given above informs us that Vrajarāya came to Surat after receiving the idol of Bālakṛṣṇa in V. S. 1727. In the *Gujarat Sarvasaṅgraha* prepared by Kavi Narmadashankar, it is stated that the temple of Bālakṛṣṇa at Kanpith was built in 1695 A.D.<sup>4</sup>

We do not know when Puruṣottama came to Surat. Any way he did not come to Surat before V. S. 1727. We also do not know when Vrajarāya died and when Puruṣottama succeeded him. After Puruṣottama, the image was given to another Puruṣottama, son of Muralīdhara and great grandson of Vrajālaṅkāra. This Puruṣottama had a son called Govardhana. As he died without any male issue, his wife Mahārāṇīvahujī adopted Gokulotsava, who belonged to the family of the second son of Viṭṭhaleśa. We have shown below how the image of Bālakṛṣṇa has changed hands in a chart :—

Chart showing how the idol of Bālakṛṣṇa changed hands :

1. Vallabha.
- |
2. Viṭṭhaleśa.
- |
3. Yadunātha. (Sixth son of Viṭṭhaleśa).
- |
4. Bālakṛṣṇa. (Third son of Viṭṭhaleśa).

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4. *Gujarat Sarvasaṅgraha* p. 531.

- 5 Dvārakeśa (Son of Bālakṛṣṇa).  
 |  
 6 Madhusūdana (Son of Yadunātha)  
 |  
 7 Dvārakeśa (Same as No 5)  
 |  
 8 Girīdhara (Son of Dvārakeśa)  
 |  
 9 Dvarakānātha (Son of Girīdhara)  
 |  
 10 Gangā (Sister of Dvarakānātha), Janakī (Wife of  
 Dvārakānātha) Vrajabhūṣaṇa. (Son of Śrīvallabha)  
 |  
 11 Vrajaraya (Son of Syamalāla)  
 |  
 12 Purusottama (Son of Pitāmbara)  
 |  
 13 Purusottama (Son of Muralīdhara)  
 |  
 14. Govardhaneśa (Son of Purusottama, No 13.)  
 |  
 15 Mahārānīvahuḥī (Wife of Govardhaneśa)  
 |  
 16 Gokulotsava (Adopted by Mahārānīvahuḥī)

### Study and Scholarship ·

We do not know much about the childhood of Purusottama. His teacher was Kṛṣṇacandra, whose date of birth is probably V S 1661. He was the son of Vrajanātha, the second son of Bālakṛṣṇa, the third son of Viṭṭhaleśa. He was a very great scholar. Nīrbhayarāma Bhaṭṭa in his *Kalpavṛkṣa* calls him "Śāstravittama"<sup>5</sup>

5 *Evam Śrī Bālakṛṣṇānam jyeṣṭhasyānvaya irtah, Vrajanāthābhī-  
 dhasyātha dvitīyatanayasya tu, Kṛṣṇacandra itī khyāto nandanah  
 sāstravittamah Kalpavṛkṣa*, quoted by Telivāla in *Venunāda*  
 Vol I No 5



We do not know much about the life of this Kṛṣṇacandra. The *Bhāvaprakāśikāvṛtti* is ascribed to him. Puruṣottama pays homage to him as his preceptor in the beginning of his *Aṇubhāṣyaprakāśa*.<sup>6</sup> Shri Telivala thinks that very probably Puruṣottama owes much to Kṛṣṇacandra for the profound scholarship, which is revealed in his works. Telivala says that Puruṣottama is obliged by two Gosvāmis, Vrajarāya and Kṛṣṇacandra. A comparison of the works of Vrajarāya with those of Puruṣottama would show that there is a basic difference in their respective methods of presentation. Naturally the profound scholarship of Puruṣottama does not owe its origin to the genius of Vrajarāya. It is likely that it may be due to the teaching of Kṛṣṇacandra. The argument of Telivala appears convincing, but the term *Guru* may mean only the initiating preceptor and nothing more. Telivala also refers to the *Bhāvaprakāśikāvṛtti* and compares it with the *Aṇubhāṣyaprakāśa*. The *Bhāvaprakāśikāvṛtti* is a very suspicious work and we will discuss its relation with the *Aṇubhāṣyaprakāśa* in the next chapter. It is difficult to say anything for or against the view of Telivala that the scholarship of Puruṣottama owes its origin to the teaching of Kṛṣṇacandra.

There is one curious tradition in the Saṁpradāya, which tries to account for the scholarship of Puruṣottama. It is said that when Puruṣottama was only seven years old, one great Pandit (Appaya Dikṣita according to the Saṁpradāya) came to Surat and challenged the scholars for the Śāstrārtha. As the elderly persons in the Surat temple were absent, Puruṣottama's mother accepted the challenge and said that

6. *Tatputrān saha sūnubhir nijagurūn Śrīkṛṣṇacandraḥvayān...*

her son would be prepared for the Śāstrārtha after three days Puruṣottama then went to the underground room in the Surat temple and continuously muttered the *Sarvottama-stotra* for three days and nights (According to some he muttered the *Trividhanāmāvalī*.) At the end of this the Lord Bālakṛṣṇa, Vallabhācārya and Viṭṭhalanāthāḥ presented themselves before him and blessed him with a thorough understanding of all the works, if he saw just the beginning and the end of the same It is said that a suggestion of this is contained in A B P.<sup>7</sup> After these blessings that he received, Puruṣottama received the blessing from his mother also. He was thus fully prepared for the Śāstrārtha and defeated the rival scholar.

Whatever may be the value of the traditional story, Puruṣottama's scholarship is really profound. He had a thorough study of all the *Bhāṣyas*. He refers to almost all of them at the end of the *Sūtras* or *Adhikaraṇas* in his *Aṅubhāṣyaprakāśa*. He knows of six *Bhāṣyas*, of Śaṅkara, Rāmānuja, Śaiva, Bhāskara, Madhva, and Bhikṣu. At one place while explaining a particular reference of Vallabha, he says that the said opinion is not found in the six known bhāṣyas.<sup>8</sup>

It may appear rather curious that Puruṣottama does not refer to Nimbārka at all. Not only so, but he even does not appear to know of him. He also refers to Vācaspati, Jayatīrtha,

7 A B P Concl V I p 1441.

*Kṛīdan Śrībālakṛṣṇaḥ paramakarunayā manmanah prerayitvā  
Bhāṣyīrtham yo' tigrdham prakatitam akarot sampradāye nivṛtte ...*

8 A B P. III 11 6 P. 885.

*Idam ca na prastidhasadbhāṣyastham .. Ata idānīm  
utsannasyaīya kasyacin matasyollekhaḥ.*

and Vedāntadeśika, the famous followers of Śaṅkara, Madhva, and Rāmānuja respectively. Regarding the literature of his own school, his study is so very deep that he points out where and what exactly Viṭṭhaleśa added to the bulk of his father's works. Even in minor commentaries, such as those on the sixteen tracts, he shows a thorough study of the interpretations given by the elders of the school, like Devakīnandana, Harirāya, Cācā Gopīśa, Dvārakeśa, etc. Apart from the Vedāntic works, he reveals a profound study of the authoritative works of other systems also. He refers to the Bhāṭṭas, the Prābhākaras, Kapila, Īśvarakṛṣṇa, Gautama, Kaṇāda, Udayana, Pārthasārathimiśra, Maithili Bhavadava Miśra, Vanamālīdāsa, the Bauddhas, the Jainas, Madhusūdana Sarasvati, Appaya Dīkṣita and many others very often. He also refers to Pāṇini, Patañjali, and Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita, and even Rāmakṛṣṇa, the author of *Siddhāntaratnākara*. He shows his study of rhetorics and refers to *Kāvyaaprakāśa*, *Dhvanyāloka* and similar standard works on the subject. He refers even to *Arkaprakāśa*, a work on medicine and discusses how the Cinīya pots are manufactured. His study of the *Dharmaśāstra-nibandhas* is simply astonishing, as can be seen by the scores of references to such works in the *Dravyasuddhi* and *Utsavapratāna*. He is thoroughly well-versed in the sacred lore. His passages beam with the references to the *Śrutis*, the great Epics, *Smṛtis* and *Purāṇas*. From the classical literature, he refers to *Prabodhacandrodaya*. He also refers to Narasimha Mehta the famous Gujarati poet-saint. This is not an exhaustive list of the works referred to by him, but it would be sufficient to show how great a scholar Puruṣottama was. There is a traditional verse in the Sampradāya, showing

that he was a very great scholar and composed about nine lacs of verses. The verse runs,

*Nāsīd ena samah samastanigamasmṛtyāditattvārthavid,  
Vaktā cāpratīmah sadāhsu viduṣām adyāpi bhūmau  
budhah Yah sarvam navalakṣapadyakamītapraudhapraban-  
dham vyadhat Sa Śrīmān Puruṣottamo vijayatām  
ācāryacūdāmanih*

Purusottama was not only a great scholar himself, but he also kept many other scholars with him. Purusottama does not appear to have been a man of very narrow outlook. Whenever he found a Pandit, irrespective of the system which that particular Pandit followed, Purusottama treated him with due respect. It is perhaps because of this that Puruṣottama is very exact in his references to other systems.

### Travels and Dīgviyaya

Purusottama is said to have travelled all over India. He went to various provinces and challenged all the great Pandits of the time for the Śastrārtha. This is the reason why he was given the title of *Dasadīgantaviyayi*. It is said that he won over many of them and received written statements of his victory from them.

He is also said to have gone to Dumas very often. Dumas is a place of resort on the sea-shore, about ten miles from Surat. Shri Telivala in his account of Purusottama's life says that many of his works were written and copied there. Telivala further says that Purusottama gave some sort of a letter to a Brahmin follower of his at Dumas and the descendants of that follower are still alive.

While it is difficult to say anything regarding Purusottama's visits to Dumas, a manuscript of *Rāmāyaṇa*, from Dumas may give some clue. The manuscript is now deposited in the manuscript-library of the Chunilal Gandhi Vidyabhavan, Surat.

The following points should be noted in connection with this manuscript.

( 1 ) The manuscript was copied in V. S. 1786. Purusottama, who was born in V. S. 1714, lived a fairly long life and in spite of his gift-deed in V. S. 1781, we can say that he lived even after that time.

( 2 ) That the manuscript has been found at Dumas leads us to a fairly reasonable conjecture that it might have been copied at Dumas.

( 3 ) In the very beginning of the Kāṇḍa I we have ' *Om namo Bhagavate Vāsudevāya* ' which precedes the salutation to Rama. It is really curious in a manuscript of *Rāmāyaṇa*. In the beginning of the Kāṇḍa V we have one verse

*Jitam Bhagavatā tena Hariṇā lokadhāriṇā,  
Ajena viśvarūpeṇa nirgunena gunātmanā*

This verse is followed by the usual *Mangala* ' *Jayati Raḡhuvamśatilakah* ' The verse shows the contradictory attributes as advocated by Vallabha alone and by no other Ācārya. What is the use of this additional verse in the manuscript of *Rāmāyaṇa* ? Both these points show that the owner as well as the scribe might have been a follower of the Śuddhādvaita.

Thus it is possible that Purusottama might have been present in Dumas when the manuscript was copied out, and it is very likely that he saw it, if he did not own it

**Personal Life**

We do not know much about the private life of Puruṣottama. He had three wives, Rāṇī, Candrāvalī, and Padmāvati. He had two sons, Yadupati and Dāmodara and one daughter named Haripriyā. Yadupati was born in V. S. 1749, and Dāmodara in V. S. 1760. Both of them died during his life time. Tradition runs that as Purusottama brought the image of Bālakṛṣṇa concealing it in the locks of his hair, the Gosvāmī Maharāja of that place became very angry and cursed him with childlessness. Hence even though Puruṣottama had two sons, both of them died very young.

Puruṣottama seems to have passed most of his time in the composition of his works. Some of his works were written in Dumas. In Surat, it is said that he used to write in an underground room in the Surat temple. He kept about nine scribes with him. He dictated to them whatever he thought at a particular time. Thus some three or four works were being written simultaneously. This perhaps is the reason why there are mutual references, found in many of his works. It is said that he used to prepare three copies of all his works. One was kept for himself, while the other two were sent to other Gosvāmīs. He had cordial relations with Gosvāmī Viṭṭhalarāya Capasaniwala and one of the copies was sent to him. Whenever he went out, he kept with him cartloads of books rather than clothes or ornaments and things of luxury. Telivala says that he kept some about 32 carts. Puruṣottama again

had a very big library of his own. He used to study the works of Vallabha and Viṭṭhaleśa very often and used to copy out those works in small handwriting. Telivala saw one such manuscript of the *Subodhini* on the first ten *Adhāyas* of the tenth *Skandha* of the *Bhāgavata*. He found it very clear and the handwriting was quite good. Puruṣottama was a very good scribe himself. Shri. Telivala, who saw many of his manuscripts while preparing critical editions of his works, says: "From his manuscripts we find him putting a point where we use a comma; for a fullstop he makes one stroke, and for a complete idea he makes two perpendicular strokes. When he wants to begin a fresh paragraph, he puts two perpendicular strokes and leaving a space of about half an inch he puts another two strokes and then begins a fresh paragraph. Important words are coloured with red senna. Śrī Puruṣottamajī has revised his manuscripts at least three or four times. Where he thought an addition was necessary he would affix a fine slip and re-write over it. Where the angle mark was above the line, we had to look for the addition on the top of the page on the margin, counting the number of lines mentioned at the end of the addition. Where the angle was below the line we had similarly to look for the addition at the bottom of the page."<sup>9</sup>

It appears that Puruṣottama was always busy writing something. This perhaps is the reason of his being called '*Lekhavālā*'. Another title given by the contemporary Gosvāmis to him was '*Vēdapaśu*'. It was a jeer at him.

9. Telivala, quoted by M. C. Perekh in '*Shri. Vallabhacharya...*'

Puruṣottama led a very simple life, even though like other Gosvāmis he was blessed with vast fortune. He was staying in Surat, which was at the height of its glory as the chief emporium of trade on the Western coast of India. It was a centre of business not only in Gujarat but in the whole of India and it attracted the famous Chhatrapati Shivaji for plunder. Puruṣottama was untouched by the pomp and glory of the city. He was an author and scholar, and liked to remain a real author and real scholar.

We do not know much about him as a devotee, as much as we know about Harirāya. He is however said to have been a very good artist. His Holiness Gosvāmi Shri Vrajaratnalalji Maharaj of the Surat temple showed to me certain articles, which are kept in the Sevā and which contain one picture, said to have been painted by Puruṣottama and five paper-cuts said to have been prepared by Puruṣottama. A short description of them is as follows :-


( 1 ) The picture is of Muralīmanohara. It has three colours. Lord Kṛṣṇa is painted as playing upon his flute. There are two female deer at his feet. Above the head are painted the peacock-feathers. The picture is painted on the basis of the verse ' *Dhanyās te mūḍhamataye...* etc.'<sup>10</sup> In the verse the Gopikās describe the female deer which are at the feet of the Lord, hearing his flute with rapt attention and worshipping him with loving glances. The idea in the verse is aptly revealed in the picture.

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10. Bhāgavata Purāṇa X. 21. 11.




( 2 ) Paper-cut of a Palm-tree, with two men ascending the tree with pots. Below at the root of the tree are designed one cow and one pot. There is a border design also. The cutting is very minute and exact. The leaves of the tree, the helmets of two men, and all the details are quite clearly visible. The paper used is white.

( 3 ) Paper-cut of four rams with one face. The four rams are shown as  and the one face which is designed can be fitted to any of them in different postures. There is also a border design. The paper-work is minute and the design is artistic and beautiful. The paper used is white.

( 4 ) Paper-cut of a Saru tree with an artistic border. Below the tree are shown four birds, two on either side. The paper work is minutely executed. White paper is used.

( 5 ) Paper-cut of a leafless dried up tree. The work is done with fineness. The paper is not white but has the dark colour corresponding to that of the trunk and branches of the tree.

( 6 ) Paper-cut of a Kadamba tree. Two apes are shown in the work. One is mounting the tree, while the other is plucking the leaves. The work is so minutely designed that even the tail of the monkey can be seen easily. The tree is fairly big.

Under the Saru tree and the Kadamba tree, the words 'Śri' and 'Śrih' are written respectively in ink. It is seen that the hand-writing is of Puruṣottama, and that 

a proof for the paper-work being done by Puruṣottama himself. According to the requirements of the tradition of the Gosvāmīs if 'Śrī' is not written on the paper, it can not be included in the *Sevā*. Any way, it should be stated that the designs are fairly well preserved<sup>11</sup>

### Contemporaries :

By the time of Puruṣottama, the family of Vallabha became a very big family and his descendants spread over almost the whole of Western India. Thus Puruṣottama had many contemporary Gosvāmīs.

The most important and famous of the contemporary Gosvāmīs, was Hariraya, who was born in V. S. 1649 and who lived a fairly long life of about one hundred and twenty years or so. It is said that he was alive in V. S. 1772. He was thus a senior contemporary of Puruṣottama. Regarding the connection of Hariraya with Puruṣottama, two stories have been preserved by tradition, both of them are intended to establish the superiority of Hariraya to Puruṣottama, as a devotee and as scholar. Both of them are narrated below.

Since the time of Viṭṭhaleśa, there is a convention in the Sampradaya that, whatever wealth is accumulated by a Gosvāmi in the first round of his travels, should be dedicated to Govardhananāthaji. Accordingly, Puruṣottama

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11 Besides what has been described above, there are two copies of the picture of Viṭṭhaleśa, said to have been drawn by himself. There is also a picture of Śrīnāthaji. In it are seen Govindarāya and others. There are also four manuscripts, two in the handwriting of Vallabha and two in that of Viṭṭhaleśa.

travelled all over India and with all his wealth went for dedicating it to Śrīnāthaji. It was the summer season and as a rule shoes could not be presented to the Lord. But Puruṣottama brought with him very costly foot-wear studded with pearls. Looking to this, the Gosvāmi of that place allowed Puruṣottama to present the same to Śrīnāthaji for the limited time of *Rājabhoga* only. The young Gosvāmi Puruṣottama wanted that the shoes should be kept for the whole day and attempted to do so by various means. He did not think that this would be troublesome to God. Harirāya, at that time, was staying at Khimnor not very far from Nathadvar. Śrīnāthaji informed him about this. Harirāya immediately came to Nathadvar on horse-back and ordered that the shoes be taken off. The story thus shows that Harirāya was fortunate enough to obtain the grace of God, who informed him of what he thought and felt, while Puruṣottama was not blessed with similar favour.

Another story runs that once when Puruṣottama was dictating to a scribe his *Prakāśa* commentary on the *Subodhini*, he had doubts about the exact significance of some particular point. Even though he pondered over it for a long time, his doubts could not be resolved. One old lady saw him in a sorry mood and on inquiry could know the reason. She said that she had heard the explanation of that particular point from Harirāya and she was prepared to explain the same to Puruṣottama. Puruṣottama thereupon asked for the explanation and on hearing the same he was satisfied. This story suggests that Puruṣottama had to take the help of one, who just heard from Harirāya.

Both these stories are current among the followers of Hariṛāya. We do not know if there is any historical truth in either of them. So far as Puruṣottama is concerned he shows the same respect to Hariṛāya as he shows to others.

Another Gosvāmi with whom Puruṣottama seems to have had special relationship, was Viṭṭhaleraṇya of Capasenī. He was born in V. S. 1751 and was thus much junior to Puruṣottama. It is said that Puruṣottama sent one copy of all his works to him. He actually commented upon his own *Prahastavāda* at his request<sup>12</sup>.

Another Gosvāmi, with whom Puruṣottama seems to have had cordial relations was Śrīvallabha, the author of 'Lekha' on *Subodhinī*. Puruṣottama refers to him in his *Subodhinīprakāśa* on *Bhāgavata* 1. 14. 20 by *Yathā nevaṃvida ity atra Vedenam vit Bhāve kvip ity artha itī Śrīvallabhah Tan mamāpi sammatam itī "Śrīvallabhah"* as against the plural used in the references to other Gosvāmis, would show that Śrīvallabha was junior to Puruṣottama.

Shri H. O. Shastri in his Gujarati biography of Puruṣottama has given a list of Gosvāmis, who were contemporaries of Puruṣottama. The list is very long and does not appear to be conclusive but it shows how big the family of Gosvāmis was at that time.

Coming to the scholars who did not belong to the Vallabha-Sampradāya, we find that a host of scholars and

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12 *Kṛtavan etam Prahastatikam Viṭṭhalarayapramodaya*  
Prh. Viṭṭi p. 246

authors flourished in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The famous authors on *Dharmaśāstra* like Kamalākara Bhaṭṭa, Mitramiśra and Vaidyanātha Pāyagunḍe alias Bālam Bhaṭṭa flourished at about the same time. Similarly Dinakara Bhaṭṭa and his son Gāgā Bhaṭṭa were also famous contemporaries of Puruṣottama. Both of them were proteges of Chatrapati Shivaji and it is said that Gāgā-Bhaṭṭa was actually called upon to officiate at the coronation of Shivaji in 1674 A. D. Bhaṭṭoji Dikṣita, Nāgeśa and Koṇḍa-Bhaṭṭa were great grammarians. Gadādhara Bhaṭṭa, Gopinātha Mauni, Annam Bhaṭṭa, Laugākṣi Bhāskara, and many other writers on *Nyāya* and great scholars like Paṇḍitarāja Jagannātha also lived in these centuries. In fact many of them were all-round scholars and contributed to almost all the branches of knowledge. Thus the age in which Puruṣottama lived was an age of activity, though one may perhaps feel that many of the works written at that time were more of the nature of commentaries and compilations, rather than original independent works. New theories were propounded only through the medium of commentaries and explanations. It was thus not the creative but the interpretative period in the history of Indian thought.

It has been maintained according to the tradition of the Puṣṭimārga, that Puruṣottama had direct contact with Appayya-Dikṣita. It is said that Puruṣottama had Sāstrārtha with Appayya-Dikṣita, when he was only seven years old. Dikṣita was a prolific writer and wrote about hundred works. His father was Raṅgarāja and his grand-father, ( according to some his great grand-father ) was Vekṣaṣthalācārya. His date has however been a baffling

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question. The generally accepted dates of his life are from 1554 A. D. to 1626 A. D. Shri. Mahalinga Shastri who is a descendant of Appayya himself, gives his dates as 1520 A. D. to 1593 A. D. MM. Dr. P. V. Kane has ably discussed the question in his *History of Sanskrit Poetics*.<sup>13</sup> Shri. H. O. Shastri in his Hindi biography of Puruṣottama<sup>14</sup> has tried to show that Appayya was a contemporary of Puruṣottama. He says that in 1657 A. D. there was a meeting of scholars in Kashi in the Muktimanḍapa and the decision was arrived at there to the effect that the Pañcadrāviḍa Brahmins could sit in the same line with the Devarṣi Brahmins of Maharashtra at dinner. The decision was signed by scholars like Khaṇḍadeva Miśra, and others, who were present in that meeting. One of the signatories was Appayya Dikṣita. The *Nirṇaya-patra* has been published in the '*Citale Bhaṭṭa Prakaraṇa*' of Pimpurkar. Thus Appayya Dikṣita was present in Kashi in 1657 A. D. Shri. H. O. Shastri further argues that Appayya is said to have met Jagannātha in Kashi. Jagannātha who was a protege of Shah Jahan, must have come to Kashi in or after 1658 A. D. when Aurengzeb put his father into prison. The point is really a complicated one. Even if we rely on all that H. O. Shastri has said, can we agree that there was a meeting of Puruṣottama with Appayya Dikṣita? Puruṣottama was born in 1658 A. D. We should also bear in mind that according to H. O. Shastri he was born in 1668 A. D. Vrajarāya came to Surat in V. S. 1727. i. e. 1671 A. D. The meeting could have been possible only after that. Thus we shall have to

13. *Sāhityadarpaṇa*. Intro. pp. 307-309.

14. *Avatāravādāvalī*. Hindi Intro. pp. 12-13.



assume that Dīkṣita came to Surat after 1671 A. D. Again according to the tradition, Puruṣottama was only seven when he discussed with Appayya and defeated him. Hence it must be in 1675 A. D. as the traditional account should tally with the generally accepted year of Puruṣottama's birth i. e. V. S. 1724. It can not tally with the correct year i. e. V. S. 1714, because in that case Puruṣottama himself could not have been in Surat at the age of seven. This is too much to assume. The whole tradition of the Śāstrārtha between Puruṣottama and Appayya Dīkṣita seems to have arisen on the strength of Puruṣottama's composition of the *Prahastavāda*, which was a 'slap' to the Śarvas and which was intended to be a rejoinder to the *Śivatattva-viveka* of Appayya Dīkṣita. I am inclined to believe that the traditional record of Śāstrārtha between Puruṣottama and Dīkṣita does not appear to have an element of historical truth.

Another scholar with whom Puruṣottama is said to have direct contact according to the tradition, was Bhāskararāya. Shri. H. O. Shastri says that some works of Bhāskararāya are preserved in the Babu Dixit Jede Collection of Benaras. The said collection also contains some letters written by Bhāskararāya. In these letters Bhāskara has passed caustic remarks against Puruṣottama. H. O. Shastri says that, it appears from this that Bhāskara, who was defeated in the Śāstrārtha by Puruṣottama, might have referred to him with vengeance.<sup>15</sup>

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15. *Avatāravādāvalī*. Hindi. Intro. p 9.

I could gether some information about Bhāskararāya and his teacher Śivadatta Śukla from various sources <sup>16</sup>

Śivadatta Śukla belonged to Surat His father was Mahādeva and his mother was Gangā. At the age of sixteen, he finished his study of the Vedic lore and mastered Sanskrit and Persian He began teaching students even at that young age. Once while Śivadatta was teaching his students, a Yogin belonging to the Tripurā Sampradāya of the Nātha Pantha came to his place On seeing him Śivadatta could understand that the guest was a Siddha Yogin He served him as his Guru for a fairly long time When the Guru was pleased, he bestowed upon him the *Pūrṇābhīṣeka* and *Mahāsāmrājya Dīksā*, which is considered to be the highest honour in the Nātha Pantha After attaining to this status, Śivadatta was named Svāmī Prakāśānandanātha He soon became well-known in the whole of India and was honoured by all His preceptor then went away, when he found that his work was finished So many miracles are recorded around the name of Vedbhāṣī, as Śivadatta was popularly known

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- 16 Sources (i) *Bavanī no Vad* alias *Bahucarakhyaṭī* Ed M T Jarmanvala
- (ii) *Pūrvamīmāṃsā* Ganganath Jha with a critical bibliography by Dr Umesh Mishra
- (iii) *Lalitāsahasranama with Saubhagyabhāskara* Ed V L S Panshikara
- (iv) *Sarvajānikan*—M T B College, and Sarvajānik Law College Magazine October, 1941 pp 104-107.

His meeting with Bhāskararāya is also said to have contained some miracle. When he met him and became his disciple, Śivadatta Śukla taught him for some time and gave him the *Pūrṇābhiṣeka-Mahāsāmrajya-pada* naming him Bhāsurānandanātha.

Bhāskararāya was the second son of Gambhīrarāya and Koṇāmbikā. He was born in Bhāgānagarī (Sangli ?) and went to Kāshī with his father. He studied the 18-*lores* under Nṛsimhādhvarin and *Tarkaśāstra* under Gaṅgādhara Vājapeyin. His first wife was Ānandidevī and his second wife was named Pārvatidevī, who was a daughter of the brother of the Ācārya of Madhva's school. He was a very great scholar and defeated the Ācāryas of all the schools. He wrote so many works, like *Saubhāgyabhāskara*, *Setubandha*, *Vādakautūhala*, *Vari-vasyārahasya*, etc. Some miracles are recorded even for Bhāskararāya.

V. L. Panshikar in his Sanskrit introduction to *Lalitāsahasranāma* says that Bhāskara was a contemporary of Nārāyaṇa Bhaṭṭa, grand-father of Kamalākara Bhaṭṭa. Kamalākara finished his *Nirṇayasindhu* in V. S. 1968. Hence Bhāskara must have lived some about fifty years before it. Panshikar has however relied upon the tradition about the Vivāda between Nārāyaṇa Bhaṭṭa and Bhāskararāya.<sup>17</sup>

Dr. Umesh Mishra in his Critical Bibliography, suffixed to '*Pūrvamīmāṃsā in its sources*' by Dr. Ganganath Jha says that Bhāskararāya lived in the first quarter of the 18th century. His commentary *Setubandha* on the

17. *Lalitāsahasranāma* with *Saubhāgyabhāskara*. Sanskrit Intro.

*Nityaśoḍaśikārṇava Tantra* was written in V. S. 1789, corresponding to 1732 A. D. His *Saubhāgyabhāskara* was written in V. S. 1785, corresponding to 1728 A.D.<sup>18</sup> Now Bhāskara refers to Śivadatta Śukla in his *Saubhāgyabhāskara* in the first verse thus :

*Yaś ca Śrī Śivadatta Śuklacaraṇaiḥ Pūrṇābhiṣikto' bhavat.*<sup>19</sup>

Hence he must have come to Surat before V. S. 1785. Puruṣottama came to Surat after V. S. 1727 and lived there for almost the whole of his life, except occasional travels. Hence the possibility of a direct contact between Puruṣottama and Bhāskara and even Śivadatta Śukla cannot be ruled out.

We have seen above what Shri. H. O. Shastri has to say regarding the Sāstrārtha between Puruṣottama and Bhāskara.

The followers of Bhāskararāya say that Bhāskara defeated the Ācārya belonging to the Vallabha Saṁpradāya. In the *Bhāskara-Vilāsa Kāvya* of Jagannātha, printed in the beginning of the *Lalitāsahasranāma* referred to above, there are two verses which are important for our purpose. They are :

( 1 ) *Śivadatta - Śuklacaraṇāsāditapūrṇābhiṣekasāmā-jyah, Gurjaradeśe vidadhe jarjaradhairyam sa Vallabhācāryam* V. 30.

18. Cf Pūrvamīmāṃsā : Critical Bibliography p. 65. Also see : *Modacchāyāmītiyām saradī saradrtāv as'vine Kālayukte, Sukle saumye navamyām atanuta Lalitānāmasāhasrabhāṣyam. Saubhāgyabhāskara, concluding V. 1. P. 240.*

19. *Saubhāgyabhāskara. Intro. V. 1. p. 1.*

( 2 ) *Lilāmātreritayā nilācalapūrvayā capetikayā, Vima-  
tādr̥tam prahastam vyatanīṣṭa viḥastam abjambha  
hastah. V. 43*

V. 30 shows that Bhāṣkara defeated the Ācārya of the Vallabha Sampradāya, while V. 43 shows that the *Prahasta* was rendered futile by Bhāṣkara. It is very likely that the second line of V. 30 refers to Puruṣottama or Vrajarāya, and *Prahasta* in V. 43 refers to *Prahastavāda* of Puruṣottama. It is likely that the words, '*Nilācalapūrvayā capetikayā*' may be referring to his work, bearing the name *Nilācalacapetikā*, which might have been written in reply to *Prahastavāda* of Puruṣottama. Together with the references to Puruṣottama seen by H. O. Shastri in the letters written by Bhāṣkara, both these verses show that Bhāṣkara and Puruṣottama must have come in direct contact with each other and their contact was very probably not a very cordial one. As regards the result of the Śastrārtha, one should not be surprised to find that the followers of both the scholars have claimed victory for their side.

### Disciples of Puruṣottama :

As a Vaiṣṇava Ācārya, Puruṣottama naturally must have had a large following in Surat. Some of his pupils were well-known scholars. Unfortunately we do not know much about all of them. One such pupil was Bhaṭṭa Tulajarama, who as his name indicates was a Gujarati. Tulajārāma was a great Pandit himself. His *Utsavanirṇaya*, also known as *Vratotsavanirṇaya* is written in Vraj. It is a summary of *Utsavapratāna* of Puruṣottama. Tulajārāma compiled this work at the instance of Govindarāya. He refers

in this work to Puruṣottama as his Guru<sup>20</sup> and gives a quotation, which is found in the *Utsavapratana*<sup>21</sup> It should be noted that *Utsavanirṇaya* as well as *Utsavapratana* (this is also named *Utsavanirṇaya*) has been mentioned by Dr P V Kane in the list of works on *Dharmaśāstra*<sup>22</sup> The *Sodaśagopikāsamkhyā-tātparyanirṇaya* of Tulajārāma has been printed as an appendix by Telivala and Sankalia in the *Subodhini Daśamapūrvārdhatāmasaphalaprakarana*, with the *Lekha* of Śrīvallabha The work is incomplete, since the first two folios of the manuscript were lost In the Colophon, Tulajārāma calls himself 'Śrī Puruṣottamajīcaranāntevāsin' The work tries to show some significance of the number 16 of the Gopikās, engaged in the Rāsa Another work *Viruddhadharmāśrayatvavivecana* has been found in the manuscript form in the Library of Pandit Gattulajī in Bombay The manuscript bears No 168 and has 6 folios In the beginning the author refers to Puruṣottama as his Guru, 'Saputrān Śrīmadacāryān gurūn Śrīpuruṣottamān' At the end he calls himself, 'Śrīgosvāmī Puruṣottamāntevāsin' The manuscript was copied in Śaka 1784 The said library also contains another manuscript of 12 folios The work is *Navaratnasamākhya* of Tulajarama The manuscript bears No 59 Another manuscript, No 68, dated Śaka 1792, contains the work *Sarvātmabhāvanīrūpana* Though the colophon does not mention the name of the author, in the body of the text we have one sentence 'Evam samādhānam

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20 U P p 16

21 U P p 112

22 History of Dharmasāstra Vol I p 522

'*Na matam devadevasya iti Siddhāntarahasyaṭīkāyām asmadgurucarāṇa - Śrīmat - Puruṣottamagosvāmibhireva kṛtam*'. It is very likely that the author is Bhaṭṭa Tulajārama.

Shri H. O. Shastri says that Veṇīdatta Vyāsa Tarkapañcānana Bhaṭṭācārya was one scholarly pupil of Puruṣottama. This Veṇīdatta was a descendant of Mahīdhara, the famous commentator of the *Sukla Yajurveda*. He made a thorough study of the *Mādhyandina* branch of the *Sukla Yajurveda*, and became a great Pandit in sacerdotal work. He worked as an Adhvaryu in many soma-sacrifices. He stayed at Ghasitola in Kashi. He studied grammar, vedānta, and mīmāṃsā from the Pañcadrāviḍa Brahmins. He was a great scholar of the navya-nyāya, which he learned from the logicians of Bengal. He went to Bengal himself and got the title Tarkapañcānana Bhaṭṭācārya. He wrote many *Vādagranthas* and *Kroḍapatras*, mostly after the style of the navya-nyāya. He was at first a devotee of Rādhākṛṣṇa, but after his contact with Puruṣottama, he was converted to the Puṣṭimārga. It is also said that Veṇīdatta accompanied Puruṣottama in his tours. He stayed in Kashi for a long time and wrote many letters to Puruṣottama. Some of them have been preserved in the Sarasvatī Bhavan, Benaras. In these letters Veṇīdatta used to address Puruṣottama thus : '*Śrījñānāvātārāṇām Garuvaraśrī Puruṣottamagosvāminām Veṇīdattasya koṭīṣaḥ praṇatayaḥ*.' When Veṇīdatta's daughter married, Puruṣottama sent one person with a letter to the Vaiṣṇavas of Kashi, stating that Veṇīdatta was a great scholar of the Saṁpradāya and therefore he should be helped by them. It appears from this that the relation between Puruṣottama and Veṇīdatta was very cordial.

**Ending years :**

We do not know when Purusottama died. We have noted above that Purusottama had two sons, but both of them died during his life-time. Puruṣottama therefore gave his Sevā together with all his wealth to another Purusottama, son of Muralīdhara who was his nearest heir. This Purusottama was the great grandson of Vrajalankara, the fifth son of Bālakṛṣṇa, the third son of Viṣṭhaleśa. The document executed in this connection is printed in Venunada Vol I No 3. According to this document, Purusottama, in full health and of his own free will gave to another Purusottama, son of Muralīdhara, all his property, being the idol of Bālakṛṣṇa, that of Vrajeśvara and another, also the Pādukā and all the ornaments and utensils connected with the care and worship of these idols, with a house and other property situated at Surat. The document bears the date Thursday, tenth of the bright half of the second Āsādhā, V. S 1781, corresponding to 1725 A. D.

Some scholars are of the opinion that Purusottama did not live long after that. The document however cannot be taken as an evidence for drawing any conclusion that Purusottama died in or immediately after V. S 1781. He might have lived long even after that. Some Scholars of the sampradāya think that Purusottama lived for 45 years only. The said document is a proof against the said view, because in that case he would not have lived even upto V. S 1781. Telivala says that in the



chapter of *Tattvadīpanibandha*. On the manuscript is written : '*Puruṣottamānām*'. Again the manuscript has marginal notes, containing explanations written in very small handwriting. This was the practice followed by Puruṣottama. The manuscript thus belonged to Puruṣottama, who was therefore alive in V. S. 1810.

The tremendous work that Puruṣottama has done, would also require a long life. We may say that Puruṣottama died not earlier than V. S. 1810 corresponding to 1754 A. D. Thus he lived a fairly long life of about 96 years. We cannot however be definite about this. It is really unfortunate that we do not know much more about the life of such a great scholar and author.



## CHAPTER III

### PURUṢOTTAMA'S WORKS

#### Introductory :

Vallabha and his followers have enriched the Vedāntic literature with a large number of works. It would be no exaggeration to state that Puruṣottama tops the list of the authors in the Sampradāya. He wrote on almost all the topics connected with the Śuddhādvaita school. Over and above a series of independent works, he has written extensive commentaries on almost all important works of Vallabha and Viṭṭhaleśa. The fame of this prolific writer so reached the scholars of the school, that the commentary of Puruṣottama came to be regarded as a standard to judge the authenticity of a particular work. Thus the authorship of a work which has not been commented upon by Puruṣottama is considered with some doubt. Shree H O

Shastri records a case of this type<sup>1</sup> One work *Bhagavat-Pīthikā* has not been commented upon by Purusottama, nor is it referred to by him in any of his works Hence some scholars in the Sampradāya doubt whether Vallabha himself wrote *Bhagavat-Pīthikā*

Works of Purusottama are listed by Shree H O Shastri and Shri M T. Telivala<sup>2</sup> Both the lists are much the same, though they do not agree fully Thus for instance, Telivala's list includes *Khalālanavidhvamsavāda* and *Māndūkyaopanīṣaddīpikā*, which are not listed by H O Shastri Again *Dīpikās* on *Kaivalya*, *Brahma* and *Nṛsimhatāpini* are called *Arthasamgrahas* by Telivala

To study the works of Purusottama, we may divide them into two broad divisions—*independent works and commentaries* Even here the division cannot be followed fastidiously, because a work which, strictly speaking, can be called a commentary may have close connection with an independent work or vice versa Thus for example, Purusottama's own commentary on his *Prahastavāda* is considered together with the *Vada* Similarly the *Sodaśa-prakaranagranthasangati* which is an independent work will be dealt with while examining Purusottama's glosses on the sixteen tracts Some of the works are, again, not found by me I have simply referred to them in my account of the works connected with them For the sake of describing them it will be convenient to deal with

1 Cf *Avataravādāvali* Hindi Intro pp 5-6

2 Telivala's article on Purusottama's life in *Puṣṭibhaktisudhā* Vol V No 3 and *Avataravādāvali* Hindi Intro

them in four sections dealing with the *Avatāravādāvali*, Puruṣottama's other independent works, his commentaries on the works of Vallabha and Viṭṭhaleśa and those on other works. A list of the works that have been described in the following pages is as follows.—

*Avatāravādāvali*

- ( 1 ) *Prahastavāda.*
- ( 2 ) Commentary on *Prahastavāda.*
- ( 3 ) *Pañḍitakarabhindipālavāda*
- ( 4 ) *Bhedābheda-svaiūpanirṇaya.*
- ( 5 ) *Pratikṛtipūjanavāda*
- ( 6 ) *Sṛṣṭibhedavāda.*
- ( 7 ) *Khyātivāda.*
- ( 8 ) *Andhakāravāda.*
- ( 9 ) *Brāhmaṇatvādivatāvāda.*
- ( 10 ) *Jīvapratibimbavakhaṇḍanavāda.*
- ( 11 ) *Āvirbhāvātirobhāvavāda.*
- ( 12 ) *Pratibimbavāda*
- ( 13 ) *Bhaktyutakarṣavāda.*
- ( 14 ) *Khalālanavidhvāmsavāda.*
- ( 15 ) *Nāmvāda.*
- ( 16 ) *Mūrtipūjanavāda.*
- ( 17 ) *Ūrdhvapuṇḍradhāraṇavāda.*
- ( 18 ) *Śaṅkhaçakradhāraṇavāda.*
- ( 19 ) *Tulasimālādhāraṇavāda.*
- ( 20 ) *Upadeśaviṣayaśaṅkāurāsavāda*

- ( 21 ) *Bhāgavatasvarūpaviṣayakaśaṅkānirāsavāda.*
- ( 22 ) *Svayṛttivāda.*
- ( 23 ) *Jīvavyāpakatvakhāṇḍanavāda.*
- ( 24 ) *Abhāravāda.*
- ( 25 ) *Vastrasevāvāda.*
- ( 26 ) *Ātmavāda.*
- ( 27 ) *Bhaktirasatvavāda.*

Other independent works :

- ( 28 ) *Prasthānaratnākara.*
- ( 29 ) *Samarpaṇanirṇaya.*
- ( 30 ) *Mukticintāmaṇi.*
- ( 31 ) *Dravyaśuddhi.*
- ( 32 ) *Utsavapratāna.*
- ( 33 ) *Utsavabhāvānukrama.*

Commentaries on the works of Vallabha and Viṭṭhaleśa :

- ( 34 ) *Aṇubhāṣyaprakāśa.*
- ( 35 ) *Nyāyamālā.*
- ( 36 ) *Suvarṇasūtra.*
- ( 37 ) *Āvaraṇabhāṅga-Yojanā.*
- ( 38 ) *Ṣoḍaśaparakaraṇagrathasaṅgati.*
- ( 39 ) *Commentary on Yamunāṣṭaka.*
- ( 40 ) *Commentary on Bālabodha.*
- ( 41 ) *Commentary on Siddhāntamuktāvali.*
- ( 42 ) *Commentary on Puṣṭipravāhamaryādā.*
- ( 43 ) *Commentary on Siddhāntarahasya.*

- ( 44 ) Commentary on *Navarātna*  
 ( 45 ) Commentary on *Antahkaranaprabodha*  
 ( 46 ) Commentary on *Bhaktivardhini*  
 ( 47 ) Commentary on *Jalabheda*  
 ( 48 ) Commentary on *Pañcapadya*  
 ( 49 ) Commentary on *Sannyāsasūtrnaya*  
 ( 50 ) Commentary on *Nirodhalaksana*  
 ( 51 ) Commentary on *Sevāphala*  
 ( 52 ) } —Commentaries on the *Bhaktihamsa*.  
 ( 53 ) }  
 ( 54 ) *Bhāvārthādhikaracnabhāṣyaprakāśa*  
 ( 55 ) *Pūrvamīmāṃsākārikāvivarana*  
 ( 56 ) *Subodhiniprakāśa*  
 ( 57 ) } —Minor Commentaries on the *Bhāgavata*  
 ( 58 ) }  
 ( 59 ) *Gāyatrīādyarthaparakāśakārikāvivarana*  
 ( 60 ) *Nyāśādeśāvivarana*  
 ( 61 ) *Patrāvalambanatīkā*  
 ( 62 ) *Vallabhāstakāvivarana*

Commentaries on other works

- ( 63 ) *Māndūkyopaniṣaddīpikā*  
 ( 64 ) *Nṛsiṃhottaratāpinyūpaniṣaddīpikā*  
 ( 65 ) *Kaivalyopaniṣadarthasamgraha*  
 ( 66 ) *Brahmopaniṣadarthasamgraha*  
 ( 67 ) Introduction to *Amṛtatarangiṇī*

We shall now attempt a short description of these works

## Avatāravādāvalī :

Puruṣottama's *Avatāravādāvalī* is not one work, but it is a collection of many *Vāda-Granthas*. Puruṣottama is said to have written fiftytwo *Vādagrāntas*, according to the tradition. There is also another view that he has composed twentyfour *Vādas*. The number twentyfour seems to have some connection with the number of twentyfour incarnations of Viṣṇu and therefore the title given to this collection is *Avatāravādāvalī*<sup>3</sup>. All the *Vādagrāntas* have not been printed and some of them, which are mentioned by Śrī M. T. Telivāla and Śrī H. O. Śastry in the list of Puruṣottama's works, are not found. Again, while the colophons of some of the *Vādas* bear their respective numbers many of them do not bear the numbers and so it is not possible to be exact in that matter. The numbers that are found in the colophons of some individual *Vādas* will be given while dealing with them. It is, however, impossible to treat them all in a definite order because while we know the numbers of some *Vādas*, we cannot fill in a large number of gaps that still remain.

In the beginning of the *Avatāravādāvalī*, Puruṣottama says that he has composed the string of *Vādas* after carefully going through the *Upaniṣads*, the *Śrutis*, the *Smṛtis*, the *Bhāṣyas* and the *Sūtras* together with the various *Prasthānas*. He further says that the *Vādas* which are subtly incorporated in the works like the *Tattva-dīpa-nibandha*, the *Aṅgubhāṣya* etc. are revealed by him by means of reasoned out sentences, after suggesting them

3 C f *Puruṣottamasya kṛtāv Avatāravādāvalīyam* etc  
Pth p 246

in verses <sup>4</sup> Purusottama thus explains the method which has been followed in these treatises <sup>5</sup> A *Vādagrantha* is a short treatise which discusses a particular topic fully Purusottama begins his treatise with an introductory verse, the contents of which are challenged by the opponent and then the discussion starts All these topics, he says, are discussed on the basis of the suggestions that are found in the major works like the *Anubhaṣya* and *Tattvadīpanibandha* Many of these discussions are found in Purusottama's commentaries on those works

(1, 2). *Prahastavada* and its commentary —

The first *Vāda* is called *Prahasta* It is one of the well-known works of Purusottama The word 'Prahasta' means a 'slap' The rather curious title of the work owes its origin to the circumstances in which it was composed, and the aim it desired to achieve Appayya Dīksita, who was a staunch follower of Śaivism, wrote a metrical work *Siva-tattva-vineka* in 64 verses In this work he maintained that Śiva is the Highest Lord, greater even than Viṣṇu, and Brahmā This short work roused a great deal of controversy in those days of sectarian enthusiasm and the followers of Vaiṣṇavism could not tolerate it Purusottama reacted against it sharply and, in his youthful zest, wrote out this 'slap'

4 *Samvikṣyopaniṣacchrutismṛtiganam bhāṣyaṇi sūtranyapi  
Prasthānair vivīdhair yutany atha mayā vidavalī tanyate*

Prh V 3 p 2

5 *Ye tattvadīpabhaṣyaprabhṛtiṣu sauṣṭmye a sūhṛtā vadāh,  
Padye tān avatārya prakatīkurve' tra yukimadvakyaiah*

Prh V. 4 p 3



The *Prahasa* is divided into three Sub-vādas. The first is *Vedāntatātṭparyanirūpaṇa*, the second is *Bhrānta-śaivanirākaraṇa*, and the last is *Mūlarūpanirdhāra*. The introductory verse of the *Prahasa* contains starting points for all the three discussions.

The first part discusses and proves that all the Vedāntic texts teach of Brahman. Brahman is possessed of supramundane qualities; the negative descriptions in the sacred texts refer to the worldly attributes, which Brahman is devoid of. Here the author attacks the *Upādhivāda* and the *Māyavāda* and explains the *Avikṛtaparināmavāda* as the correct theory. The second chapter is the most important part of the work, because here the author strongly repudiates almost all the statements of Dikṣita. He refers to all the authorities, referred to by Dikṣita and many more. He thoroughly discusses all these texts and proves that according to him all of them extol Viṣṇu rather than Śiva, who is the chief Vibhūti of Viṣṇu.<sup>6</sup> In the third part Puruṣottama says that Kṛṣṇa is the Highest Reality. Puruṣottama proves this on the basis of the *Tāpanīyas*, *Bhāgavatapurāṇa*, *Brahmavaivartapurāṇa* and the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*. He also refutes the charge that Kṛṣṇa-Svarūpa is illusory. At the end, again, after the customary salutations, he says that there are rogues, who call themselves Vaidikas and who harass the good. This slap is hurled at them so that they may lose their strength.<sup>7</sup>

6. *Parabrahma ias tad eva mukhyam svarūpam, itarā ॥ tu taratam-abhaviāpānani vibhūtirūpa ॥, teṣu Śivo mukhyavibhūtirūpa ity eva sakalaśāstrīyanīścayah-Prh.* p. 233.

7. *Prh.* V 3. p. 246.

That Purusottama gave importance to this work can be seen from the fact that he has himself written a commentary upon it. He says that he is commenting upon the *Vāda* for the understanding of those who do not possess mature intelligence<sup>8</sup> The last verse of the commentary, however, informs us that Puruṣottama wrote this commentary for Viṣṭhalarāya.<sup>9</sup> The pertinent point here is whether Purusottama thought of writing similar commentaries upon all the *Vādas* The first verse of the commentary shows that he thought of commenting on all the *Vādās*<sup>10</sup> The verses at the end of all the three parts confirm this view<sup>11</sup> The question here is about the exact meaning of the term “*nijakṛtau*,” or “*svakṛtau*” Does it mean *Avatāravādāvali* or *Prahastavāda*? I think, it means the former, because while the *Prahasta* really begins with the verse *Śrutisīrasī yasya mahimā* etc., the commentary begins with the introductory portion which consists of four verses Not only so, but, for the above-mentioned verse, Purusottama says that—*Ādyam vādam avatārayati*

8 *Balabodhavidhaye'dhunā mayā Vādavāravivṛtir vitanyate*  
Prh-vivṛti p 1.

also

*Balavabodhanakṛte'racayac ca tikam* Prh-vivṛti p 246

9 *Kṛtaiān etam prahastaktikām Viṣṭhalarāya pramodaya*  
Prh-vivṛti p 246

10 *Vādavāra-vivṛtir vitanyate* Prh-vivṛti p 1.

11 *Ādyam vādam nijakṛtau vyāvṛnot Puruṣottamah* Prh-vivṛti p 34  
*Dvitiyam vyāvṛnod vādam svakṛtau Purusottamah*

Prh-vivṛti P 233

*Tṛtīyavādam svakṛtau vyāvṛnot Puruṣottamah*

Prh vivṛti P 246

*śrutīty ādi* <sup>12</sup> I think that Puruṣottama first thought of writing a commentary on all the *Vādas*, but finding it unnecessary, he commented upon the *Prahasta* only, which he thought important. It was probably after he stopped writing commentaries, that the *Vivṛti* was dedicated to Viṣṭhalarāya. This view is, however, open to objection. 'Svakṛtau' or 'Nijakṛtau' may be said to mean the *Prahasta* and the numbers *ādya*, *dvitīya* and *trītiya* at the end of each part refer to the *Vādas* which form parts of the *Prahasta*. This brings in the question of the structure of the *Prahastavāda*.

As we have seen above, the work contains three parts, and this has been made clear in the commentary also <sup>13</sup>. Only one introductory verse is given in the text for starting all the three discussions. In the *Vivṛti* again, Puruṣottama says that the *Vāda* is based upon the *Tattvadīpanibandha*. A careful perusal of all the three parts shows that except for their having only one verse as the starting point, they are independent of one another. Some sort of connection can be established among them by pointing out that, while the first discusses Brahman as the subject of the Vedāntic texts, the second is negative in approach, since it proves that Śiva is not the highest God, whereas the third again discusses the original form of Brahman viz Kṛṣṇa. The *Vāda*, thus, not only rejects the contentions of Dīkṣita, but reinforces the position of

12 Prh-vivṛti p 3

13 *Atruvāntaras trayo Vādāḥ Pūrvāḥ Vedāntatattvānyānyūpaniṣad-  
rūpāḥ Sarvamūlatiāḍ asya prathamāya Dvītiyā tu bhīṭāntaśai  
canīrahāra śarūpāḥ Trītiyā tu Bhagavato mīlānīpanīrdhārahā*

the Vaisnavas. The argument, however, is not so impressive, for in that way all the *Vadas* have some connection with one another. I believe that the *Prahasta* is a composite rather than an integrated work and the three component parts are independently understandable. The term '*Svārtau*' or '*Niyakṛtau*' should better refer to the *Avatāravādāvalī*. In fact, Purusottama himself is not clear on this point.

There is not much to be said about the commentary, as such. It explains the text, but more than that it fills in the gaps by adding important discussions. It does not repeat or unnecessarily elaborate the statements made in the text.

### ( 3 ) *Panditakarabhundīpalavāda*

It is a shorter work written with the same purpose. In fact, it supplements the second part of the *Prahasta*. This is made clear by Purusottama himself in his *Prahasta-vivṛti* when he says that whatever regarding the *Purāṇas* has not been stated here, is stated in the other *Vada*, the *Bhūndīpāla*<sup>14</sup>. Here he refers to the *Bhāgavata Kūrma, Śiva, Garuda* and *Padma Puranas*. He also explains how even the highest Lord is said to worship Śiva. He refers to the *Śrutis* and corroborates his statements with the *Brahmasūtras*. Purusottama himself explains the word *Bhūndīpāla*, which, here means a sling. He says that the good should take the '*Bhūndīpāla*' in their hands and easily hurl stone-balls for protecting the line of vedic fields.

14 *Noktam purāṇaviśaye yad ihāprasangād*

*Vādāntare tad uditam khalu Bhūndīpāle Prh vivṛti p 233*

which are crowded by bad twice-borns<sup>15</sup> Not only that, but he even asks the wise to challenge his arguments if they find any draw-back in his reasoning<sup>16</sup> Both *Prāhastā* and *Bhṛṅgopāla* are written by Puruṣottama in a challenging mood

( 4 ) *Bhedābheda-Svarūpa-Nirṇaya*

This is known as *Bhedābheda-vāda* also It is a short work which discusses the theory of Tādātmya viz *Bhedasahisnur abhedah*-identity which tolerates diversity This is pure monism—Sūduha Advaita Puruṣottama proves it on the authority of the *Śruti*s, while refuting the absolute monism of Śaṅkara The number of this *Vāda* as given in the colophon is six

( 5 ) *Pratikṛtipūjanavāda*

Also called *Bhagavatpratikṛtipūjanavāda* or *Bhagavat-pratipūjana* it discusses how the worship of an idol is a source of uplift for a Brahmavadin, while this is not the case with those who follow other systems Again, the worship of an idol does not presuppose the want of intellect in a worshipper, on the other hand it is better from the point of view of Karma and Jñāna also He argues out at the end for his preference to the idol of Kṛṣṇa The last verse informs us that the *Vāda* depends upon the eleventh book of the *Bhagavata* and the

15 *Durdivjasamajasanikulanigamaksetraliraksanayālam*  
*Ādaya Bhṛṅgopālam santo gulikah sukhaḥ ajota*

*Bhṛṅgopāla* P 277

'Bhṛṅgopāla' means a javelin or an arrow that can be shot by hand or in a tube It also means a sling The word 'Gulikaḥ' in the verse has led me to understand the term as meaning a sling

16 *Bhṛṅgopāla* last verse P 277

*Sarvanirnava* chapter of *Tattvadīpanibandha* We know from the colophon that the number of the *Vāda* is fifteen

( 6 ) *Srstibhedavāda*

It is a small but very important work, from the point of view of the Śuddhadvaita. It discusses the various views of causation. Puruṣottama refutes the atomism of the Vaiśeṣika and the Pariṇāmavāda of the Anīśvara Sāṃkhya. He gives the refutation of the Sāṃkhya as given by the Mayāvādins and then refutes the adherents of Mayāvāda also. Finally Puruṣottama explains the Brahmvāda and proves it, on scriptural and other grounds. The *Vāda*, as said by our author, is based upon the *Nibandha* and other works. Its number is five.

( 7 ) *Khyātivāda*

Like the *Srstibhedavāda*, it deals with the theory of khyāti. Here the author discusses all the different theories of khyāti, as advocated by the Buddhists, the Mīmāṃsakas, the Mayāvādins, the Sāṃkhya and the followers of Madhva, Rāmānuja and other teachers. Puruṣottama refutes all these theories except that of Rāmānuja, which also is not accepted in toto. In the Śuddhadvaita, khyāti is accepted for those who have obtained knowledge and anyakhyāti for those who have not. The *Vāda* is based upon *Subodhini* and does not bear any number.

( 8 ) *Andhakāravāda*

This *Vāda* is a short work proving that darkness is a substance. Other theories are discussed and rejected. The *Vāda* is based upon *Subodhini* and bears number nine.

( 9 ) *Brāhmaṇatvādivatavāda*

This *Vāda* is an interesting work, which tries to prove that Brahminhood is some Devata. A man is a

Brahmin or otherwise according as this deity is present or not. It is based upon *Subodhini* and is tenth in number.

( 10 ) *Jivapratibimbatvakhāṇḍanavāda* :

Also called *Pratibimbatvakhāṇḍanavāda*, it is a polemical work directed against the *Pratibimba*-theory of the followers of Śaṅkara. Here all the six explanations of the theory are thoroughly refuted. It is proved at the end that the individual soul is a part of Brahman and yet Brahman is not partite. The number given to this *Vāda* is twelve.

( 11 ) *Āvirbhāvatirobhāvavāda* :

It explains how *Āvirbhāva* and *Tirobhāva* are powers of Brahman. While so doing, Puruṣottama refutes the positions of other systems. This *Vāda* bears no number and like the previous one, is not based upon any particular work of Vallabha.

( 12 ) *Pratibimbavāda* :

This is a short discussion on the real nature of an image according to the *Śuddhādvaita*. Number eight is given to this *Vāda*. It is based upon *Tattvadīpanibandha*.

( 13 ) *Bhaktyutkarṣavāda* :

As its name indicates, it is intended to show the superiority of devotion to other means of emancipation. It is based upon *Subodhini* and bears no number.

( 14 ) *Khalālapanaividhvāmsavāda* :

This is a metrical work in 102 verses. Just as the *Prahasta* and *Bhindipāla* are written against the Śaiva system, this *Vāda* is written against the Śāktas. An important difference between the two cases is that while

the *Prahasta* and *Bhṛṅgipāla* are offensive in character, this work is defensive. The Śaktas have contended that Vaiṣṇavas are really speaking Śaktas because the ornamentation on the image of God leads to its being understood as that of Śakti. The argument is further corroborated by the composition of a work *Swāminīstotra* by Viṭṭhaleśa and by the consecration of the image of Sarasvatī during the Navaratri days. Purusottama refutes all these arguments. The *Vāda* can be divided into three parts as has been done by some. The first part consists of 39 verses, in which the author emphasises the masculine character of God. The second part begins with the fortieth verse and ends with the seventysixth. It deals with the *Swāminīstotra*. A separate title has been given to it by some viz *Svāminīyastakavīśayakāśankānīrasavāda*. The third part dealing with the *Sarasvatīsthāpana* begins with the seventyseventh verse and is continued till the end. To this also a title viz *Sarasvatīsthāpanavīśayakāśankānīrasavāda*, has been given. The *Vāda* bears no number, nor does it mention any work upon the basis of which it is composed.

### (15) *Nāma-vāda*

It is variously known as *Jayaśrīkṛṣṇocāranavāda* or *Nāmaphalādīprakāravāda*. The last is given by Purusottama himself in the colophon. The doubt here expressed is whether the name of God, known or otherwise, will bear fruit. The conclusion arrived at after discussion is that the main fruit can be secured only by knowing the name of God. The *Vāda* is based upon *Subodhini*, *Vidyanmandana* and *Tattvadīpanibandha*. It bears no number.



( 16 ) *Mūrtipūjanavāda* :

This *Vāda* is intended to establish that the image of Lord Kṛṣṇa should be worshipped by the Vaiṣṇavas. This *Vāda* is not numbered nor are we informed about its basis.

( 17 ) *Ūrdhva puṅḍradhāraṇavāda* :

It deals with the Sāmpradāyic practice of having a vertical mark on the forehead with Candana etc. The mark with the ashes is a Śaivaite custom and so that should not be adhered to by the Vaidikas. The *Vāda* bears no number.

( 18 ) *Śaṅhhacakra dhāraṇavāda* :

It also deals with the Sāmpradāyic practice of marking the figures of conch and the disc with clay. The prohibitions against such marks found in other works do not hold water during the actual worship of God. The *Vāda* is eighteenth in number and is based upon the Nibandha.

( 19 ) *Tulasimālā dhāraṇavāda* :

Also named *Mālā dhāraṇavāda*, this *Vāda* intends to prove that the followers of Vaiṣṇavism should invariably wear the string of Tulasi beads. The discussion more or less follows the same pattern as in the previous two *Vādas*. The *Vāda* is seventeenth in number. It is written on the basis of various *Nibandhas* and the practice followed by the Vaiṣṇavas.

( 20 ) *Upadeśaviśayaśaṅkānirūsavāda* :

Also called *Bhaktimārgiyopadeśaviśayaśaṅkānirāsa*, this is not a very short work. It deals with the topic of initiation in the Śuddhādvaita. Puruṣottama first states that the Gāyatrī brings in only the Brahminhood which is a prerequisite of karma. Devotion to God is necessary for

an individual soul, and the Sāṃpradāyic initiation is a prerequisite of devotion. In the path of devotion, therefore, the Śaraṇamāntropadeśa is required. After discussing this Puruṣottama says that there is no harm if both a husband and his wife have only one preceptor. The devotees are of various types, out of which a Śuddhabhakta is the best. The *Vāda* does not bear any number.

( 21 ) *Bhāgavatasvarūpaviśayakaśaṅkānirāsavāda* :

It bears number thirteen and deals with the *Bhāgavata Purāṇa*, which is accepted in the Puṣṭimārga as one of the Prasthānaś. He says that the *Bhāgavata* is a *Mahāpurāṇa* and should be included in the list of eighteen *Purāṇas*. He also quotes references from various works to prove that the *Bhāgavatapurāṇa* is very ancient. The work is based on the *Tattvadīpanibandha*.

( 22 ) *Svavṛttivāda* :

It has been published in the *Puṣṭibhaktisudhā* Vol. III No. 9. The work deals with the Vṛtti or the maintenance of a teacher. It is a very short manual discussing the Vṛtti of a Guru, which should be in keeping with the usual practice of the sect, and the purity etc. of the pupil. The *Vāda* appears to be based upon the *Tattvadīpanibandha*.

(23) *Jivavyāpakatvakhaṇḍanavāda*, (24) *Abhāvavāda* and (25) *Vastrasevāvādā* could not be traced. Over and above these one (26) *Ātmovāda* has been ascribed to him by Shri Telivala and Shri. H. O. Shastri.

*Jivavyāpakatvakhaṇḍanavāda* has been referred to by Puruṣottama himself twice.<sup>17</sup> We shall see in the next

<sup>17</sup> Idam Śarvaṃ Mayā Jivānvāde samyak prapañcitam ato nātrocyate. A. B. P. II. iii. 32. p. 735 and Ity Aṅvātmanvādah. T. S. Ab. V. 53. p. 95.

chapter how many of the *Vāda-granthas* contain the same arguments and even the same phrases found in other important works of the same author. And again, the sentence—" *Ity Aṅvātmavādaḥ* " in the *Āvaraṇabhāṅga* coming after the refutation of the Jīva-vyāpakatva is very suggestive. We can safely say that the said *Vāda* should therefore be considered, as dealing with the problems connected with the atomic measure of the soul, and must be containing the same arguments which are found at the places where the work is referred to<sup>18</sup>

Similar is the case with the *Abhāvavāda* In the *Prasthānaratnākara*, a thorough discussion on the concepts of Prāgabhāva and other Abhāvas is followed by a remark—" *Ity Abhāvavādaḥ* " <sup>19</sup> The arguments that are found here, are also found in the *Āvaraṇabhāṅga* on the *Sarvanirṇaya* chapter of the *Tattvadīpanibandha*.<sup>20</sup> It thus appears that the *Abhāvavāda* contained a refutation of various Abhāvas as separate concepts

*Vastrasevāvāda* could not be found, and the present writer was unable to find any reference to it in the works of Puruṣottama, he studied It may however, be conjectured that it may be dealing with the worship of the clothes of the Ācārya.

18 In the Manuscript-Library of Pandit Gattulajī in Bombay there is an incomplete Manuscript of *Jīvanūtvavāda* It has nine folios It ends abruptly It is dated Śaka 1796 The number of the manuscript is 147. It begins with *Ātmā nityas' citsvarīpaḥ* etc.

19 Pr p 123

20 T. Sn A b 117 pp. 89-92

The word *Ātmavāda* has been used by Puruṣottama while discussing the *satkāryavāda* <sup>21</sup> He argues that the invisible (*Adrṣṭa*) should not be understood as regulating the rise of a particular effect from a particular cause, because '*Ātmavāde tasyāpi dūṣyatvāt*' It is difficult to state whether *Ātmavāda*, here should refer to a book or a theory. It seems that the reference here, is to a work rather than a theory, because Puruṣottama does not argue out against the *Adrṣṭa* here. One *Ātmavāda* of Gopeśvara has been printed in the *Vadavali*. Puruṣottama seems to have written one *Ātmavāda*, but unfortunately we have not got it.

One (27) *Bhaktirasatvavāda* is printed in the *Vālavali*. It is ascribed to Pītāmbara. This short work is written with the intention to show that devotion is a *Rasa*, different from the nine *Rasas* accepted by the rhetoricians. The work is also published in the *Pustibhaktisudhā*, where the editor Ganpatiram Kalidas Shastri says that this is in fact composed by Puruṣottama <sup>22</sup> If the style of the writer is taken to prove the authorship, the opinion of G. K. Shastri seems to be correct because the analysis that we find in the works of Puruṣottama, is found here also. The way in which '*Sneha*' is differentiated from desire, knowledge and all that, is found in the *Suvarṇasūtra* <sup>23</sup>

21 T S Ab V 82 p 141

22 *Iyam kṛtir vastutaḥ Śrīmat Puruṣottamagosvamicarai ānām eva* Fn P B S Vol III No 5

23 Compare—*Snehas ca necchavisēṣaḥ* etc *Vadavali* p 204 with *Snehas catmano manaso va jogyo dharmavisēṣaḥ na tv ichha* etc S S p 7

The phraseological and ideological similarities may thus be adduced in support of Puruṣottama's authorship.

We have already referred to the absence of any authentic information regarding the number of the *Vādas* written by our author. It is quite possible that he might have composed more *Vādas* than those which are known to us. Any way, we know of twenty-six *Vādas*.

A short analysis of the *Vādas*, that we have seen above, would reveal that out of the twenty-six *Vādas*, we have referred to, four are not extant. Out of the remaining works, which are extant, twelve are numbered. The highest number is eighteen given to *Śaṅkhacakradhāraṇavāda*. Puruṣottama himself informs us about the basis of thirteen *Vādas*. One of them *Tulasimālādhāraṇavāda* is based on various works and the Sāṃpradāyic practices, the *Pratikṛtipūjanavāda* is based on *Subodhini* and *Tattvadīpanibandha*. Out of the remaining, six are based upon *Tattvadīpanibandha*, and five upon *Subodhini*.

From the point of view of contents, these works can be classified as follows :-

( i ) Works dealing with philosophical concepts :

The first part of *Prahastavāda*,

*Bhedābhedavāda*,

*Pratikṛtipūjanavāda*,

*Śṛṣṭībhedavāda*,

*Andhakāravāda*,

*Khyātivāda*.

*Pratibimbavāda*,

*Āvirbhāratirobhāvanāda,*  
*Bhaktiutkarsanāda,*  
*Bhaktirasatvanāda,* and  
*Ātmavāda*

(ii) Works mainly polemical in character —

The second part of *Prahastavāda,*  
*Bhindipālanāda,*  
*Jivapratibimbavakhandanavāda,*  
*Khalālanavidhvamsavāda,*  
*Jivavyāpakavakhandanavāda,* and  
*Abhāvanāda*

(iii) Works dealing with the Sāmpradayic beliefs and practices —

The Third part of *Prahastavāda,*  
*Brāhmanatīdidevatāvāda*  
*Nāmvāda,*  
*Mūrtipūjanavāda,*  
*Urdhvapundradhāranavāda,*  
*Śankhucakīadhāranavāda,*  
*Tulasimālādihāranavāda,*  
*Upadeśaviśayaśankānirāsavāda,*  
*Sivarttivāda,* and,  
*Vastrasevāvāda*

(iv) Work dealing with one particular book .—

*Bhāgavataviśayaśankānirāsavāda*

Other independent works :

(28) *Prasthānaratnākara* :

This is one of the most important works of our author. Unfortunately, it is not complete. The part of the work, that is extant, includes the first chapter called *Pramāṇaprakaraṇa*, and a part of the second chapter named *Prameyaprakaraṇa*. The second chapter is not complete

A short analysis of the contents of the first chapter and a part of the second will show how the work is planned and how it is carried out by Puruṣottama.

After paying homage to God Dāmodara (*Dāmnā baddhaḥ*) Puruṣottama says that whatever is found scattered, explained or unexplained, in the authoritative works has been described here with reasoning.<sup>24</sup> He says that Vyāsa has first discussed the principles on the strength of Śabdapramāṇa and has then taught of the Prameya, Sādhana and Phala. Vallabhācārya has done the same thing in his *Subodhini*. This is quite proper, because the Meva depends upon the Māna. Hence in this work also Pramāṇa is described in the beginning. After explaining that the word Pramāṇa means uncontradicted knowledge, as also the means for obtaining such knowledge, Puruṣottama begins the discussion on the theory of knowledge. This is followed by a full-fledged discussion on the Pramāṇas, Śabda, Pratyakṣa, and

24. *Yat prameyem urdhā' kare sthitam*

*Noḥapāditam utopapāditam;*

*Viprakramam iti tanmanīṣayod-*

*Gṛhya yuktibhir ihopavarṇiyate. Pr. V. 2. p. 1.*

Anumāna He discusses other pramanas and rejects them Finally he enters into a discussion whether the Pramānya of knowledge is directly understood or indirectly At the end he says that whatever is left undescribed and whatever is described but was lying scattered in the authoritative works regarding the Pramana has been put together here by him <sup>5</sup> In the beginning of the Prameya prakarana Purusottama says that Brahman is the main Prameya He explains the Sṛstiprakriya and then gives the three divisions—Svarūpakoti, Kāranakoti and Karyakoti He thoroughly discusses the twentyeight principles which are included in the Karanakoti At the conclusion of this the extant part of the work comes to an end

From the foregoing short analysis of the extant portions of *Prasthānaratnākara*, we can understand quite clearly the plan of the work as thought out by our author He first refers to Vyāsa, the author of the *Brahmasūtras* and says that he has carried out his work according to a certain plan—Pramana, Prameya, Sadhana and Phala This is also the position in Vallabhācārya's *Subodhini* We may add here that in the *Sarvanirnayaprakarana* of the *Tattvadīpanibandha* also, Vallabha has followed the same plan Purusottama thus thought of writing four chapters dealing with Pramāna, Prameya, Sādhana and Phala He actually refers to the *Sadhanaprakarana* in the beginning <sup>26</sup>

25 *Evam pramaṇavisaye nupapāditam yat  
Yad viprakṛitam upapāditam ākareṣu  
Saṅgrhya tad gaditam atra mayā tathanyat  
Prasaṅgikam ca sūjanavrajatosanāya* Pr p 15<sup>5</sup>

26 *Siddhante prakaras tu Sadhanaprakara evakṣyate* Pr p 2



That the second chapter is not finished can also be easily understood. The chapter does not contain the colophon or any concluding verse. Again, it does not discuss each and every problem connected with the Prameya, e.g. the Karyakoṭi, the Jīvasvarūpa, the distinction between the Jagat and the Samsara etc. These points are really important and we can not believe that Purusottama has neglected them.

The pertinent point, which remains to be seen is whether Purusottama finished the work and some of its portions were lost or that he left the work unfinished. When Purusottama has written so many works, it is difficult to imagine that he might have left unfinished so important a work. The work is really a treasure, a *Ratnākara* and quite naturally Purusottama must have completed it. Again, many references to it are found in his other works like *Bhāṣyaparakāśa* and *Āvaranabhanga*. If these references are a clue to the earlier composition of *Prasthānaratnākara* we should accept that it was finished by our author and it is our misfortune that we have not been able to obtain the complete text.

#### ( 29 ) *Samarpananirṇaya*

In the manuscript Library of Pandit Gattulalji in Bombay, there is one work of Puruṣottama called *Samarpananirṇaya* or *Ātmanvedanapaddhati*. The manuscript bears number 150 and consists of 16 folios. It is a small work which contains, as its name indicates, the discussion on the Samarpaṇa or surrender to God.

#### ( 30 ) *Mukticintāmaṇi*

In the same Library we have one work *Mukticintāmaṇi*, also called *Bhagavatprasādamāhātmya*. The

manuscript has 11 folios and is dated V S 1728. Number of the manuscript is 176 and the name of the scribe is Vagbhata. The colophon runs *Iti Śrī Mukticintamani Śrīpurusottamadevena sangrhya viracitah*. It is not improbable that Śrī Purusottamadeva is our author. The work is just a compilation and Purusottama might have written it at the young age of 14, which would have been his age in V S 1728.

### (31) *Dravyasuddhi*

*Dravyasuddhi* is an important contribution of Purusottama to Dharmaśāstra. The work, apart from collecting the rules of purification, as its name indicates, is written with an express purpose. While the rules of purification have been laid down by the works on Dharmaśāstra, for the purpose of maintaining purity and sanctity of things and men, Purusottama felt it to be his duty to review them and bring them in line with the Sāmpradāvic practices. The devotion to God, thanks to the imagination of Viṭṭhaleśa, has been a fairly long procedure in the Pustimarga, involving the use of a lot of things and requiring a good deal of time. It was thus necessary to preserve the purity of all the utensils used in the Hariśeva. Hence the rules of *Suddhi* had to be so adjusted and explained as to get sanction for the Sāmpradāvic traditions. Purusottama makes this quite clear in the first verse<sup>27</sup>

Another important point is also to be noted. Purusottama, as we have seen, flourished at the time when

27 *Natvā Śrīvallabhācāryin hariśevopakārikā  
Bahyāthabhyantari dravyasuddhir atra vicāryate*

the hindus became more and more conservative and so all the rules formulated and observed since centuries had to be reviewed in the context of the new situation that arose Puruṣottama felt it to be his duty to put together and interpret the rules which appear in different works <sup>28</sup>

The work contains 29 sections as follows .—

- (i) Snānācamananimitavicāra,
- (ii) Vastrādyantaritasparśe buddhipūrvakasparśe ca snānādivicāra,
- (iii) Śītosṇodakasnānavicāra,
- (iv) Rātrau snānavicāra,
- (v) Rātrau Nadyadijalasnānavicāra,
- (vi) Rātrau janmamṛtīrajahsu kālavibhāgādivicāra,
- (vii) Caturthadinādau rajasvalāśuddhivicāra,
- (viii) Parimitadinottaram punā rajodarśanavicāra.
- (ix) Rajasvalāyā aśucyantarasparsē rajasvalayoh parasparasparsē ca vicāra
- (x) Rajasvalāsnānādivicāra,
- (xi) Atah param etadvyatiriktasnānādiyoganimitta-  
vicāra,
- (xii) Sparśe dosābhāvavicāra,
- (xiii) Bhagavatsevayām daivapitryakarmasu snānā-  
dinā śuddhasya ke vā aśucihetavah katham  
vā tataḥ śuddhir iti vicāryate,
- (xiv) Vastrūdivisaye suddhivicāra,

<sup>28</sup> Nibandhesu vicicyoktūpy adhunā buddhidoratah,  
Yeṣām na bhāsate samyag tata esa samuḥyamah,  
Dravyasūddhi p 4

- (xv) Pātrādisuddhiv icāra,  
 (xvi) Ucc hiṣṭaspṛṣṭapātraśuddhiv icāra,  
 (xvii) Āmedhyaspṛṣṭapātraśuddhiv icāra,  
 (xviii) Satyādisuddhiv icāra,  
 (xix) Dhānyādisuddhiv icāra  
 (xx) Siddhāntaśuddhiv icāra,  
 (xxi) Ghṛtapāyasaḥṣṭam śuddhiv icāra,  
 (xxii) Ghṛtapācitādīnām bhakṣyābhakṣyav icāra,  
 (xxiii) Udakaśuddhiv icāra,  
 (xxv) Bhūśuddhiv icāra,  
 (xxvi) Gṛhaśuddhiv icāra,  
 (xxvii) Rathyāśuddhiv icāra,  
 (xxviii) Prakīrṇaśuddhiv icāra, and  
 (xxix) Ātmaśuddhiv icāra

The work is full of quotations from standard treatises on the subject, like the *Smṛtis*, *Nirṇayasindhu*, *Dinakarodyota*, *Bhagavadbhāskara* etc. Puruṣottama tries to make it as complete as possible, leaving out nothing that is important.

### (32) Utsavapratāna

Festivals have played an important part in the Puṣṭi Sampradāya. We have got many works of the scholars of the Sampradāya, discussing when and how certain important festivals are to be celebrated. The *Utsavapratāna* enjoys a very high position in these works. It begins in the form of a commentary on the *Janmāśṭaminirṇaya* of Viṣṭhaleśa, and after it is finished, Puruṣottama begins to discuss other

festivals independently <sup>29</sup> While so doing, he also includes a commentary on the *Rāmanavaminirṇaya* of Viṭṭhaleśa

Apart from the description of the festivals, Purusottama's purpose is to decide the exact time when these festivals are to be celebrated This is what he himself says in the first verse <sup>30</sup> He says the same thing at the end also <sup>31</sup> Thus the *Utsavapratāna* is more or less a *Kālanirṇayagrantha* It should be noted in this connection that the title of the work, as given in the colophon, is *Samvatsarotsavakālanirṇayapratāna* The work contains a critical discussion on all the festivals referring to the views of many authoritative works like *Kalamādhava*, *Bhagavad bhāskara*, *Dinakarodyota*, *Nirṇayasindhu* and many *Purānas* and other works The work sometimes makes an interesting reading, especially in the description of various festivals Thus for instance, while dealing with the *Balipūjavidhi*, Puruṣottama refers to the tug of war ( *Rajjalarsaṇa* ) as described in the *Ādiya Purāṇa* <sup>32</sup>

SRI C H Shastri of Surat has edited a collection of the available works on the subject by the writers in the *Sampradāya* The title given to it is *Yāvatprāpya-utsava nirṇaya granthasamuccayah* In this we find another work of Purusottama named *Vijayanirṇaya*, dealing with the festivals of *Vijayādashami* Śastri Gangadharaji in his

29 *Atal param stantantratayā nirṇayante* U P P 107

30 *Srīmad ācāryacarāṇan prabhūn Srīviṭhaleśarān, Navotsavānām samayah sopapattika ucyate* U P P 90

31 U P p 150

32 U P p 116

by his son Viṭṭhaleśa<sup>37</sup> Puruṣottama must have definitely noticed the distinction between the two portions. In the beginning of the fourth *Adhyāya* there are eighteen verses while there are only five in the beginning of the third, and there is no such metrical introduction to the first two *Adhyāyas*. The style of Vallabha is terse and laconic, almost epigrammatic while that of Viṭṭhaleśa is more explanatory, and tends to be ornate with long compounds and descriptions full of imagination, sometimes uncalled for in such a work. Further, the former part of the *Bhāṣya* contains violent attacks on other theorists, especially Śaṅkara; this is not the case with the portions written by Viṭṭhaleśa. Vallabha often refers to the older *Upaniṣads*, whereas Viṭṭhaleśa refers more to the minor *Upaniṣads* and the *Purānas*. The second interpretation of the Sūtra I. 1 11. is from the pen of Viṭṭhaleśa, as has been pointed out by Puruṣottama<sup>38</sup> Puruṣottama's commentary itself would, on a careful reading, show the case of dual authorship very clearly. Puruṣottama has to explain much more while commenting upon the portion written by Vallabha than upon that by Viṭṭhaleśa.

We have noted above that on account of the laconic style of Vallabha, *Anubhāṣya* stands in need of an explanation for its complete understanding. A host of commentaries, besides the *Prakāśa* of Puruṣottama, have been written with that purpose. Girīdhara ( born in V. S

37. Ita ārabhya Prabhā am iti pratibhati A B P III. n 34 p 967

38 Sāmpratam tu Prabhucara air akhaṇḍabrahma adena etc A B P. I i. 11 p 169.

1819) has written *Vivaraṇa* on the *Aṇubhāṣya* while a similar work of Muralīdhara is called *Vyākhyā*. One Athuranātha who was a great mimamsist has written one *Prakāśa*. The *Pradīpa* of Iccharama Bhaṭṭa and the *Yojanā* alias *Gūdhārthadīpikā* of Lalu Bhaṭṭa are easier explanations helpful to a student. Besides these there are other commentaries also like *Vedantacandrikā*, probably of Vrajaraja, *Vāgīśaprasāda* of Bālakṛṣṇa, the *Marīcika* of Bhaṭṭa Vrajanātha etc.

Of all the commentaries on the *Anubhāṣya*, the best and the most important is that of Purusottama. He introduces the *Sūtras*, explains the *Bhāṣya* fully and then notes the interpretations of other Bhasyakāras and views of other theorists on the particular topic at the end of the *Sūtra* or the *Adhikāraṇa*, as the case may be. He discusses the views of others and refutes them, if so required. Thus Śaṅkara, Rāmaṇuja, Madhva, Śaiva, etc. are referred to a hundred times. Udayana, Vacaspatimiśra, Jayatīrtha and many others are often mentioned. Thus the commentary is more critical than explanatory. Sometimes we feel that the *Prakāśa* is very scholastic and difficult to be understood. Gopeśvara has written on it a fairly long sub-commentary called *Raśmi*, in which he explains the *Prakāśa* and adds many more discussions which, he thinks, are necessary.

One very important question has been raised with regard to the larger version of the *Aṇubhāṣya* called the *Śrīmadbhāṣya* or the *Bṛhadbhāṣya* and the *Bhāvaṇaprakāśīkāvr̥tti*. The problem requires a discussion here, in as much as it has some bearing on the *Aṇubhāṣyaprakāśa* of Puruṣottama.

A case has been made out by Shri. Telivala<sup>39</sup> and Prof. M. G. Shastri to the effect that Vallabha wrote two commentaries on the *Brahmasūtras*; the one known as the *Aṇubhāṣya* which is extant and well-known, and the other which has been lost to us but which was voluminous and consequently called *Bṛhadbhāṣya* or *Śrīmadbhāṣya*. Prof. Jethalal G. Shah does not agree to this and refutes the arguments advanced by Shri. Telivala and Prof. M. G. Shastri.<sup>40</sup> The important arguments and counter-arguments are as follows :

The title of the *Bhāṣya-Aṇubhāṣya*-itself, shows that this commentary is smaller than the other, which may be named *Bṛhadbhāṣya* or *Śrīmadbhāṣya*. Prof. Shah says that the term *Aṇu* stands for the atomic measure of the individual soul as against the *Vibhūtya* of the same as propounded by Śaṅkara. It should be remembered that Vallabha considers Śaṅkara as his chief adversary. It is necessary for us to understand exactly what Shri. Telivala has to say in this connection. In the editorial note at the end of the *Aṇubhāṣya* ( with *Prakāśa* and *Raśmi* ) III iii he says, " It seems Viṭṭhalaśvara got Vallabhācārya's *Bhāṣya* on the *Brahmasūtras* upto III. ii. 33. It seems this was only a portion in his possession when he composed the *Vidvanmaṇḍana*. It was at a late stage..... that he undertook to complete the *Bhāṣya* fragment of his father on the *Brahmasūtras*. In order to distinguish this *Bhāṣya* from that of his father, he seems to have named it *Aṇubhāṣya*. In *Sūbodhini*, Vallabhācārya does not refer

39. A, B. with P. and R, III. i. Intro. p. 5, 6.

40. Prof; J. G. Shah; *Aṇubhāṣya*; Gujarati Translation



to his commentary on *Brahmasūtras* as *Aṇubhāṣya*, but only as *Bhāṣya* without the word *Aṇu*." The argument thus based on the word *Aṇu*, does not appear to be plausible, because if we believe that Viṭṭhaleśa has given the name *Aṇubhāṣya*, naturally it does not mean that the portion written by Vallabha himself also represents a smaller version of the original text. The explanation of the term *Aṇu*, as given by Prof. J. G. Shah may not appear to be satisfactory, because it is unbelievable that Vallabha, even if he wanted to distinguish his system from that of Śaṅkara, would have hit upon not so very important a point.

Vallabha in his *Prakāśa* on the *Śāstrārtha Prakaraṇa* of *Tattvadīpanibandha* says: "*Cakārān Mimānsādvayabhāṣyam.*"<sup>41</sup> This, says Telivāla, would rather suggest an accomplished fact. Similarly in the *Subodhini* on *Bhāgavatapurāṇa* II. i. 5 he refers to the *Pūrvamimānsābhāṣya* also, as an accomplished fact.<sup>42</sup> Telivāla further points out that in the *Subodhini* on the *Veda-stuti*, Vallabha says: "*Bhāṣye Vistarasyoktatvāt.*" No. such elaboration has been found in the extant *Aṇubhāṣya*. Similarly in the *Subodhini* on the *Bhāgavata* III. iv. 7. Vallabha says: "*Etāny eva guṇopasaṁhārapāde ṣoḍaśādhikaraṇyā pratipādītāni.*" This means that sixteen Adhikaraṇas of the *Brahmasūtras* III. iii. are regarded as Viśeṣaṇas. There is no such reference in the extant *Aṇubhāṣya*. Puruṣottama does not seem to have known this in the beginning. He knew this after writing his *Prakāśa* on *Subodhini* on the

41. T. S. P. V. 5. p. 33.

42. *Bhāvanāpakṣas ca Pūrvamimānsābhāṣya eva nivākṛtāḥ*

*Subodhini* on *Bhāgavata* II. i. 5.

third book of the *Bhāgavatapurāna*. So he added the required references in his *Anubhāsyaprakāśa* in the revised version.

In reply to the argument of Telivala that the references to the *Bhāṣya* suggest an accomplished fact, Prof. Shah says that when one author is writing commentaries on various works simultaneously, he may think of discussing a certain point in a particular work and may forget the same thing while actually writing that portion of that particular work. The argument of Prof. Shah is convincing. Naturally, the references to the *Bhāṣya* in other works can not prove an accomplished fact.

Shri. Telivala has further pointed out certain inconsistencies in the extant *Anubhāṣya*. In the *Ikṣatyadhikaraṇa*, there is no refutation of the Sāṃkhya theory, however, in the beginning of his *Bhāṣya* on *Brahmasūtras* I. 1v, it is said that the Sāṃkhya theory is refuted in the *Ikṣatyadhikaraṇa*. Similarly, the *Tadananyatvadhikaraṇa* should contain a discussion on the theory of *Āvīrbhava-tirobhāva*, but it is silent. Prof. Shah says that even though the word Sāṃkhya is not used in the *Ikṣatyadhikaraṇa*, the refutation is, in fact, implied. As for the second case, Prof. Shah just says that the argument is equally weak. It is surely too much to imagine a separate *Bhāṣya* on account of these inconsistencies. The explanation of the inconsistencies, given by Prof. Shah is very farfetched. Inconsistencies, if they are there, should be accepted as such and no farfetched explanations should be given to prove otherwise.

Shri. Telivala has further pointed out that we find some Sūtras of the third and fourth Adhyāyas of the

*Brahmasūtras*, explained in the *Subodhini*, the explanations of these Sūtras as given in the *Subodhini*, are different from those given in the *Anubhāṣya*, hence the explanations as found in the *Subodhini* must be concurring with those in the *Bṛhadbhāṣya*. Prof. Shah says that the explanations should be viewed in the context in which they are given. One important point, which we should note, is that such Sūtras belong to the portions of the commentary written by Viṭṭhaleśa.

Shri Telivala argues that on a perusal of the *Anubhāṣya* itself, we find that it is an abridgement of a bigger work and that almost all the works of Vallabhācārya have double editions. Prof. Shah correctly dismisses the first argument on the ground of the laconic style of Vallabha. He also says that the argument of double editions is not conclusive, because there are other works which do not have two editions e.g. *Patrāvalambana* and the sixteen tracts, except the *Sevāphala*.

The whole discussion has enjoyed prominence by the publication of some parts of the said *Śrīmadbhāṣya* or *Bṛhadbhāṣya* in the *Pustibhaktisudhā* Vol. VI. Prof. M. G. Shastri wrote an article about it 'Prāptanumānsābhāṣya vibhāgārtha' in *Pustibhaktisudhā*<sup>43</sup>. In this article Prof. Shastri says that the parts of the *Bhāṣya* published in the *Pustibhaktisudhā*, are really speaking portions of the said *Śrīmadbhāṣya* or *Bṛhadbhāṣya*. Shri Telivala, however, observes: In conclusion we ought not to omit reference to one work which passes in the name of *Śrīmad Bhāṣya* of Śrī Vallabhācārya. From the style

43 *Pustibhaktisudhā* (Vol. VIII Nos. 5-6 p. 75)

this seems to be a clumsy attempt of a writer of recent times. All copies seen by us are new. The style is such as leaves little doubts in our minds as to the spurious nature of this production."<sup>44</sup> Thus, the proof, that has been made much of, loses its value.

All this rather long discussion has a direct bearing on the study of Puruṣottama. It has been stated by the scholars of the Saṁpradāya that the 'erudite performance of Puruṣottama, seen in the comparative method as found in the *Aṅubhāṣyaprakāśa*, is an abridgement of the said *Śrīmadbhāṣya*.<sup>45</sup> One thing, that we must note in this connection is that never in his works, Puruṣottama refers to the alleged *Śrīmadbhāṣya*. Puruṣottama, as the study of his works reveals, is not a plagiarist and if he has borrowed bodily from the *Śrīmadbhāṣya* of Vallabha himself, there is no reason why he should not refer to such a work at all.

The *Bhāvaprakāśikāvṛtti*, ascribed to Kṛṣṇacandra, is a work that poses a problem for a student of the Śudbhādvāita. Is it written by Puruṣottama or Kṛṣṇacandra? If it is written by Kṛṣṇacandra, how much does Puruṣottama owe to it? Is it based upon the *Śrīmadbhāṣya*, other than the extant *Aṅubhāṣya*? All these questions require a careful study.

The *Bhāvaprakāśikāvṛtti* is an independent commentary on the *Brahmasūtras*, based upon the *Bhāṣya* of Vallabha.

44. A. B. with P & R. III. 1. Intro. p. 12.

45. *Śrīmadbhāṣyē Śāṅkarakāryādīnām pūrvabhāṣyakṛtām saṁkhyā kṛtastī, saiva Śrīpuruṣottamakṛtaprakāśa udalekhīti sūnīpradāyikāḥ. Aṅubhāṣya*-Ed. S. T. Pathak Vol. II. Intro p. 48.

It explains the Sūtras in line with the explanations offered by Vallabha and Viṭṭhaleśa in the *Bhāṣya* and also discusses some other important points. The explanation on the first Adhyāya appears to be critical, though not so much as the *Prakāśa* of Puruṣottama. Thus, for instance, in the very beginning there is a discussion on the adhyayanavidhi and the views of various thinkers on the same are referred to. Again, there are references to Śaṅkara and others, while explaining I. i. 2. etc. This, however, does not go on for a longer time, and after some Adhikaraṇas, the *Vṛtti* is more or less explanatory. Thus the *Vṛttikāra* does not criticise Śaṅkara in the Ānandamaya Adhikaraṇa and after that the work is, on the whole, free from polemics. The *Vṛtti* on the Adhyāyas II, III and IV is still less critical and sometimes barely explanatory. Thus, for instance, the *Vṛtti* on the Tadananyatva-adhikaraṇa is less critical even than the *Bhāṣya* of Vallabha. The strictures which have been passed against Śaṅkara by Vallabha in II. i. 15, II. ii. 8 etc. are totally absent. Thus the nature of the work is that of a short explanatory imitation of the *Aṇubhāṣya*.

As for the authorship of the work, we should take into account the colophons. The colophon at the end of the first Pāda of the first Adhyāya reads: ".....*Śrīkṛṣṇacandraviracitāyām tacchīṣyapurūṣottamasan̄ghītāyām brahmasūtravṛttau.....etc.*"<sup>46</sup> That at the end of the second Pāda substitutes "*Tacchīṣyapurūṣottamalikhītāyām*" instead of '*San̄ghītāyām*'. Thereafter, there is no reference to Puruṣottama in any colophon. Shri. M. T. Telivala in his Sanskrit introduction to Adhyāya-IV says that the manuscript of the *Vṛtti* is written by Puruṣottama himself.

46. *Bhāvaprakāśikā*. I. P. 45.

The last folio is written by one Kṛṣṇadatta in V. S. '850. Someone has written on it, "*Ivam Vṛttih Gosvāṁipuruṣottamaih svagurunāmnā kṛteti śrutam.*" Thus the Sāṁpradāyic tradition is that the work has, actually, been composed by Puruṣottama and fathered upon his teacher Kṛṣṇacandra. Puruṣottama has actually done so and used the names of his father and his grandfather as the authors of his own works, as we shall see in this chapter. It does not however appear that the *Bhāvaprakāśikā* is really a work of Puruṣottama. We should not forget that the *Vṛtti*, as it is, is more critical in the first Adhyāya than in the other three. Not only so, but the comparative and argumentative style of Puruṣottama is not found in the other three Adhyāyas. Again, the word '*Saṅgṛhīta*' in the colophon is a pointer to this. It seems to me that the work, especially the beginning of it, was revised by Puruṣottama, when he prepared a manuscript copy of the work. The later portions do not appear to have been even revised.

The relation of this work with the *Prakāśa* can be and should be discussed, because it has been argued that Puruṣottama owes much to his teacher Kṛṣṇacandra. It has been said that Puruṣottama has been obliged by two descendants of Vallabha. It was due to Vrajarāya that he got the service of the image of Bālakṛṣṇa, but the profound scholarship of Puruṣottama is due to his teacher Kṛṣṇacandra. Thus, it is said that Puruṣottama's *Prakāśa* contains so many passages, that are found in the *Bhāva-prakāśikā*. If they are not copied out, they are at least summarised or expanded.

A careful comparative study of the two works has, however, led me to quite another conclusion. The *Bhāva-*

*prakāśikā* very rarely contains the references to other commentators, which is the chief merit of the works of Purusottama, and even the references, which are found, are suspicious, because they might have been added by Puruṣottama himself. One instance will be sufficient for this. In the very beginning, we have a discussion on the Adhyayana vidhi, which is found in both the works. In the *Bhāva-prakāśikā*, the author first refers to the Bhāṭṭas, the Prābhakaras, Ramanuja Śamkara, Śaiva, Bhāskara, Madhva and Bhikṣu. Out of them the Śaiva, Śamkara, Bhikṣu and Madhva are just mentioned. Then follows the siddhānta. The views of others are put forth in as less words as possible. In the *Prakāśa* we have a complete explanation of the theories of the Bhāṭṭas, Prabhakaras, Rāmānuja, Śaiva and Bhaskara. Purusottama does not refer to Śamkara, Bhikṣu and Madhva separately, perhaps because they follow one or other of those views. After this, follows a detailed explanation of the Siddhānta, accompanied with the refutation of others' views when required. Last comes a definite refutation of the Śaiva. If we compare the two, we find that the *Bhāvaprakāśikā* does not refute the views, held by others and that it mentions Śamkara, Bhikṣu and Madhva separately. If now Kṛṣṇacandra has written these portions himself, why did he not refute the views of others? Is it that an author like Kṛṣṇacandra should have thought of enumerating these views without arguing against them? It seems that these portions have been added to the *Bhāvaprakāśikā* by Puruṣottama himself after finishing his *Prakāśa*. Hence he might not have thought it necessary to give the arguments all over again. He, again, might have thought of mentioning the names of Śamkara, Bhikṣu and Madhva also when he

revised the *Bhāvaprakāśikā*, so as to make the list more complete and up-to-date. That a comparative study of various views is actually added by Purusottama and does not belong to the original, can be made out by some more arguments also. Firstly, at two places I ii 32 and I iv. 27, the references to others' views are not found in the earlier manuscripts, while they are found in the later ones. These passages are again found ad verbatim in the *Bhāsyaprakāśa*. This is said by Śrī Telivala himself<sup>47</sup>. Secondly, we may actually compare a passage or two. Let us take, for instance, the discussion on the Adhyayanavidhi. In the *Bhāvaprakāśikā* the views of the Bhāṭṭas is given in only one long sentence with numerous clauses and phrases. The same is given at some greater length in the *Prakāśa*, with shorter sentences. Similar is the case with the views of Prābhākaras, Rāmanuja, and Bhāskara. This, however, is not the usual style which we meet with in the *Bhāvaprakāśikā*. It thus appears that these passages are actual summaries of those in the *Aṅubhāsyaprakāśa*. Thus the lack of uniformity in style is an additional argument.

It is stated that the *Bhāvaprakāśikā-vṛtti* is based upon the alleged *Śrīmadbhāṣya* or *Bṛhadbhāṣya*<sup>48</sup>. We

47 Cinhāntargato bhāgo matsannidhau vidyamaneṣu Pracīnahastalikhitatrisv apī pustakeṣu naṣṭi Bhāṣya-prakāśe' jam bhāgo'ksaraṣo mudrito dr̥syate Sa evātra nivesita itī praubhātī Bhāvaprakāśikā I p. 71. footnote. See also footnote on p. 123.

48 Pūrvoktaśrīmadbhāṣyam anusṛtyaiva Bhāvaprakāśakhyā vṛttirvartate-Aṅubhāṣya Ed. S. T. Pathak Vol II Intro. p. 48



have discussed the various arguments and counter-arguments for the *Śrīmadbhāṣya*. As regards the *Bhāvaprakāśikā* itself we have to note the following points.

In the beginning the author salutes Vallabha and Viṭṭhaleśa and says that he intends 'to speak out' the Sūtravṛtti in accordance with the *Śrīmadbhāṣya*<sup>49</sup>. What is meant by *Śrīmadbhāṣya* here? Is it the title of some work or is the term *Śrīmad* just honorific? At three places, the author refers to the *Bhāṣya*. In I. i. 3. while arguing against Rāmānuja, the author enters into a discussion and then says—'*Viśeṣas tu Bhāṣyavibhāgād avadhātavyaḥ*'<sup>50</sup>. Under the same Sūtra again at the end, we have the sentence :—'*Viśeṣo Bhāṣyavibhāge prapañcitaḥ*'<sup>51</sup>. Here the author is arguing for the Samavāyitva of Brahman. Under I. i. 10 he says that some persons understand the Īkṣatyadhikaraṇa as a refutation of the Sāṃkhya theory. Then he says : '*Idam yathā tathā matāntarāṇām dūṣaṇam Bhāṣyavibhāgād avagantavyam*'<sup>52</sup>. Before that, however, he says that even the refutation of the Sāṃkhya view may be accepted<sup>53</sup>. Which *Bhāṣya-vibhāga* is referred to here? It can not surely be the *Aṅubhāṣya* which does not contain any such discussion.

It may appear that the references here are to the *Śrīmadbhāṣya*. We may, however, note here that, while the attempts to prove the composition of a larger

49. '*Śrīmadbhāṣyānusāreṇa sūtravṛttim brūve*' dhunā.

*Bhāvaprakāśikā*. I. p. 1.

50. *Ibid.* p. 12.

51. *Ibid.* p. 14.

52. *Ibid.* p. 21.

53. *Tadapy ānuṣaṅgikatvenāsmākam abhīmatam.* *Ibid.* p. 21.

version of the Bhāṣya have not been found conclusive, as we have seen, there are certain other points also particularly regarding the *Bhāvaprakāśikā*. The colophons of the *Bhāṣyaprakāśa* and the verses in the beginning and at the end would show that Puruṣottama himself refers to the *Bhāṣya*, simply as *Bhāṣya* and not *Aṇubhāṣya*<sup>54</sup>. Only at one place the name *Aṇubhāṣya* is mentioned<sup>55</sup>. Thus even Puruṣottama does not appear to make any distinction between *Bhāṣya* and *Aṇubhāṣya*, as such. Again, in the *Bhāvaprakāśikāvṛtti*, in the Ānandamaya-adhikaraṇa the interpretation of Viṣṭhaleśa has been summarised and separately noticed<sup>56</sup>. Again, the *Bhāvaprakāśikāvṛtti* clearly distinguishes between the portions of Vallabha and Viṣṭhaleśa. At the end of III 11 34 we have "*Ita ārabhya Prabhūnām lekha itī pratibhātī*"<sup>57</sup>. Further we should note that the interpretations of all the Sūtras, even in the latter part, fully concur with those given in the *Aṇubhāṣya*. Thus if we believe that the *Vṛtti* follows the alleged *Śrīmadbhāṣya*, we shall have to accept that the said *Śrīmadbhāṣya* also has dual authorship and is in complete agreement with the *Aṇubhāṣya*. This would cut the very basis upon which the super-structure of the *Śrīmadbhāṣya* is worked out.

54 See *Aṇubhāṣyaprakāśa* Tam Vyāsās ayagocaram prathayitum bhāṣyam ābhasitam V 4, p 1, Bhāṣyaprakāśe prayate tīdino V 8 p 2, Bhāṣyartham yo tigūdhām prakatitam akarot V 1 p 1441. All the colophons read: Puruṣottamasya ikṛtau Bhāṣyaprakāśe

55 Sri Viṣṭhales apadabjaprasādavaralābhatah Prakāśam Aṇubhāṣyasya vitanvan Puruṣottamah A B P V 4 p 1441

56 Prabhucaraṇās tu annamayādīnām api . tebhyo bhedam varīkūntarena sadhayanī Bhāvaprakāśikā I p 23

57 Ibid III p 30

It thus appears that the *Bhāṣyavibhāga* to which the *Vṛtti* refers, cannot be the *Śrīmadbhāṣya*. What else can it be? I think that the reference here is clearly to the *Aṅubhāṣyaprakāśa* of Puruṣottama. The reasons can be given thus. —These discussions are actually found in the *Aṅubhāṣyaprakāśa*. Again the term used at all these places is *Bhāṣyavibhāga* and not *Bhāṣya*. It should also be noted that such references are found in only the first Adhyāya of the *Vṛtti*, and as we have seen above, there is every reason to believe that only the first Adhyāya is revised by Puruṣottama and not the other three. At the end of the whole discussion we may arrive at the following conclusions:—

( a ) The *Bhāvaprakāśikāvṛtti* was written by Kṛṣṇacandra and its first Adhyāya was revised by Puruṣottama.

( b ) It is not based upon the *Śrīmadbhāṣya*, the composition of which appears to be more or less a piece of imagination of some scholars rather than a fact.

( c ) The revision of the *Vṛtti* by Puruṣottama was undertaken after the composition of the *Aṅubhāṣyaprakāśa*.

( d ) There is no evidence of value to show that the *Aṅubhāṣyaprakāśa* is based upon the *Vṛtti* and is an expansion of the same.

Another important point also requires consideration in this connection. Shri. Telivala has found out one commentary on the *Guṇopasāmhārapāda*, which he has printed as an appendix in the *Aṅubhāṣya* with *Prakāśa* and *Raśmi* III. iii. In the editor's note he says: 'We beg to draw the attention of the scholars of the Sāṃpradāya as well as others to the *Parīkṣita* printed here. It is almost a complete commentary on the *Guṇopasāmhāra Pāda* of the

*Anubhāṣya* On a comparison of the same with the *Prakāśa*, we find that almost the whole of it is incorporated in the *Prakāśa*. It seems possible from the style of expression and method of writing that Purusottamaji owes much to this. Its style resembles that of Kṛṣṇacandraji's *Vṛtti*. If so, the comparative method of exposition followed by him in *Prakāśa* owes its origin to the genius of Kṛṣṇacandraji. It is possible that Kṛṣṇacandraji wrote his commentary from the very beginning and the same is incorporated in the *Prakāśa*. The copy of the *Gunopasamhārapādaṅgavarāṇa* seems to be the original in Kṛṣṇacandraji's own hand.

The portions which have been published are not complete. The commentary breaks off in the middle and runs upto III, iii 53 only. The *Vivarāṇa* does not contain any colophon, and naturally bears no date. We have no means to understand how Śrī Telivala could find out the hand-writing of Kṛṣṇacandra. There may appear to be some truth in the statement that the whole of it has been incorporated in the *Prakāśa*, because the similarities are surely there. But even here, we find that the *Vivarāṇa* is very short and its references to the views of others are not so clear as in the *Prakāśa*. The *Vivarāṇa* for instance, does not contain any refutation of Sāṅkhya and others though they are mentioned at the end of the Sūtra III iii 4. The *Prakāśa* contains such refutation. The *Vivarāṇa* is again not Sūtrawise but Adhikaraṇa-wise and it does not explain the whole of *Bhāṣya*. The author seems to be more interested in bringing out the arguments contained in the Adhikaraṇas, rather than writing an explanatory commentary. The distribution of the Sūtras into Adhikaraṇas

in the *Vivaraṇa* is also different from that in the *Prakāśa*, as will be seen from the following table :

Vivarana.		Anubhāṣyapraṅka'sa	
Adhikaraṇa	Sūtras.	Adhikaraṇa.	Sūtras.
1	1- 4	1	1-15
2	5- 8		
3	9-11		
4	12-15		
5	16-17	2	16-17
6	18-19	3	18-23
7	20-23		
8	24	4	24
9	25	5	25-26
10	26		
11	27-28	6	27-28
12	29	7	29
13	30	8	30
14	31	9	31
15	32	10	32
16	33	11	33-34
17	34		
18	35-36	12	35-37
19	37		
20	38	13	38-39
21	39		
22	40-41	14	40-41
23	42	15	42
24	43	16	43
25	44	17	44-53

If Puruṣottama would have followed this *Vivaraṇa*, we can not understand, why he did not follow the Adhi-

karaṇa-vyavasthā also. The *Vivaraṇa* need not be compared with the *Bhāvaprakāśikāvṛtti*, for, while the former is critical and succinct, the *Vṛtti* is more explanatory. Its style of course does not resemble that of the *Vṛtti*, though it may be said to resemble the *Prakāśa*. Anyway, it is difficult to arrive at any definite conclusion on account of our scanty knowledge. The only thing, which I want to point out, is that had there existed an old commentary like this, Puruṣottama's words—'Sampradāye nivṛtte' at the end of of the *Prakāśa*<sup>58</sup> would have lost all their force. Perhaps he might not have made such a statement in the face of such a commentary written by his own teacher.

Thus the *Aṅubhāsyaprakāśa* does not owe much to the *Bhāvaprakāśikāvṛtti*. The so-called *Vivaraṇa* is doubtful in nature. The *Aṅubhāsyaprakāśa* is really the Magnum opus of Puruṣottama and we should fully endorse the high praise of Pandit S. T. Pathak that Puruṣottama, by composing the *Aṅubhāsyaprakāśa*, has become the very life-blood of the Suddhādvaita.<sup>59</sup>

(35) *Njāyamālā* .

It is a short work, written with the express purpose of summarising the Sūtras according to the *Aṅubhāśya* and facilitate the understanding of the same by those, who are unable to go through the whole of the *Bhāsyaprakāśa*. This is stated by Puruṣottama himself in the

58. A. B. P. V. 1. p. 1441.

59. *Vayam tv etatkathane' pi na sahasam angikurmo yat Bhāsyaprakāśapraṇayanena Śrīpuruṣottamamahārājā jīvānubhūtā eva siddhādvaitamatasyeti*

*Aṅubhāśya* : Ed. S. T. Pathak. Vol. II. Intro. p. 45.

beginning.<sup>60</sup> He repeats the same thing at the end also.<sup>61</sup> The work is popularly known as the *Adhikaraṇamālā* or the *Vedāntādhikaraṇamālā*, but the author himself gives the title *Nyāyamālā* or *Vedāntīyanyāyamālā* in the first and the last verses respectively. That is why I have accepted that title.

Shri Telivala and Sankalia believe that the work seems to have been composed by our author at an advanced stage. We can be sure that the work must have followed the *Aṅubhāṣyaprakāśa* rather than preceded it. We cannot say whether it followed the revision of the *Bhāvaprakāśikā* also, though it is very likely.

Ordinarily an *Adhikaraṇamālā* is a summary explanation of the purport of each *Adhikaraṇa*. Puruṣottama however, gives the purport of all the Sūtras except in III iii. & iv. In the very beginning he gives the purport of the whole Śāstra. In the beginning of each *Adhyāya*, he states the purport of all the Pādas. In every *Adhikaraṇa* he clearly shows the five component parts—Viśaya, Viśaya, Pūrvapakṣa, Uttarapakṣa and Saṅgati.

The *Adhyāya* IV of this work was not found by Gopeśvara, who thereupon wrote a *Caturthādhyāya-adhikaraṇamālā* himself. It is interesting to compare the two. Gopeśvara, though a very great scholar, does not appear to be as vigorous or pointed as Paruṣottama.

60. *Bhāṣyaprakāśe visturṇo'rtho' vagantum na śakyate, Sarvaḥ ato' rthaiḥ samgrhya Nyāyamālā vitanyate.*

61. *Vedāntīyanīyamālām Aṅubhāṣyānusāriṇīm Saukāryāyārthabodhasya cakāra Puruṣottamaḥ.*

( 36 ) *Suvarnasūtra*

*Suvarnasūtra* is a commentary of Puruṣottama on the *Vidvanmandana* of Viṭṭhaleśa. *Vidvanmandana* or 'The ornament of the learned' is one of the independent works of Viṭṭhaleśa. Besides finishing the incomplete work of his father, Viṭṭhaleśa wrote some independent works also, out of which the *Vidvanmandana* is the most important. It is divided into 58 sections. After the usual Mangala verse the author immediately discusses the question of Brahman being the material as well as the efficient cause of the world (Sections 1-3). This is followed by a discussion on the theory of Nescience and Superimposition, as advocated by Śamkara's school. (Sections 4-5). Then follows the discussion on the theory of Avidya, as related to the individual soul and a spirited refutation of the bimbapratibimba-bhava and the imaginary nature of the individual soul (Sections 6-9). Viṭṭhaleśa then proves and fully explains the theory of Āvirbhava-tirobhava, replying to the objections raised against it (Sections 10-13). He explains the 'Mahāvākya' (Section 14). Viṭṭhaleśa again attacks the theory of Avidya (Section 15), and the Kalpitakartṛtva of Brahman in connection with the individual souls (Section 16). Thus the author introduces the problem of the individual soul which is an Amsā of Brahman, (Section 17) and which has the tadatmya-relationship with Brahman (Sections 18-19). This again brings in the question of variety in the effects of only one cause. After answering it on the ground of the desire of God, the author uses the same argument to remove the contingency of the Kṛtānt and Akṛtabhyagama and to show that Brahman is not dependent upon the actions of the Jīvas.



(Sections 20-22) The Amśatva of the soul is not metaphorical but real and the spark-fire analogy shows that the individual souls have emanated from Brahman and not created by Him (Sections 23-25) The size of the individual soul is atomic It is discussed with all the arguments based on scriptural authorities (Sections 26-29) Viṭṭhaleśa then enters into a fairly long discussion that Brahman is endowed with contradictory attributes, which are supraworldly and which are not illusory or imagined (Sections 30-40) All the remaining sections are devoted to the consideration of the Līlā of God This Līlā is eternal and real, thereby implying the reality of the world This includes a discussion on the Bhakti (Sections 41-57) In these, 4 sections 53-56 are used to show that the Prabhāṣīya Līlā is illusory The last section is made up of the verses, in which Viṭṭhaleśa pays homage to his father and God (Section 58)

According to Śrī J K Shastri, who has written a Sanskrit preface to the work, the *Vidvanmandana* is worth comparing with the *Khandanakhaṇḍakhādyā* of Śrīharsa Just as that is an important work of the Kevaladvaita system, this is an authoritative treatise on the Suddhādvaita In the benedictory verse Śrīharsa, by saying "*Vande' numayāpi tam,*" implies that Brahman is an object of inference, while for Viṭṭhaleśa Kṛṣṇa is an object of perception That is why he says *Asmādrśām viśayah sada,*" in the benedictory verse Similarly the second verse in the *Khaṇḍana* implies the love in separation by the words '*mānāpanodanavinoda*' while Viṭṭhaleśa expresses the love in union by '*Prabhuh prakāṣibhavat pratiyuvatī-sambhedena*' Whatever it may be, perhaps the subtle and

acute dialectics, found in the *Khandana*, cannot be found in the *Vidvanmandana*

The purpose of this work, as stated in the *Suval nasūtra* by Purusottama is this, Here Prabhucaraṇa who is not able to bear the grief caused by the non-propagation of the main path of devotion and the theory of Brahma vada, necessary for the same, has composed this ornament of the learned<sup>62</sup> These words of Purusottama may be taken to reveal that for Viṭṭhaleśa the propagation of the path of devotion was the main thing and the Brahmavāda was subordinate to it A glance at the analysis of the work, as given by us above, will show that Viṭṭhaleśa cared for the refutation of the theories of Śamkara as much as an explanation of his own doctrines He launches a violent attack against Śamkara, for whom he uses strong words as has been done by his father<sup>63</sup> At one place he jeers at Śamkara by using his own words against him<sup>64</sup> Even in the first of the verses at the end, he calls Śamkara and his followers as Buddhists in disguise<sup>65</sup>

In spite of all this, it should be admitted that Viṭṭhaleśa is clearer in his writing than Vallabha Whereas Vallabha is too laconic and can not be understood without the help of a commentary, this is not the case with Viṭṭhaleśa Especially when the objects of devotion are to be described he is even verbose<sup>66</sup> One may not perhaps

62 S S p 2

63 *Pracchannanāstika* VM p 63, *Pracchannabauddhó* sī atidhr̥ṣṭo' sī VM p 56 etc

64 *Badham braviṣi, nirañkuṣatvat te tuḍasya* VM p 57

65 *Pracchannabauddhas tu te* VM p 353

66 Cf VM p 280, 289 etc

appreciate the interpretations of the Vedic verses given by him<sup>67</sup>. One should however note that there was a tendency among the mediaeval teachers to give similar interpretations, for their own purpose and Viṭṭhaleśa could not be an exception to this.

The *Vidvanmandana*, because of the authority it enjoyed in the *Suddhādvaita*, was commented upon by many scholars. The *Suvarṇasūtra* appears to be the earliest and the most important commentary. Many other commentaries are also found. Girīdhara wrote a commentary called *Haritosini* alias *Dīpikā*. It explains the words of the *Vidvanmandana* and sometimes elucidates the topics. Bhatta Gangādhara Śāstri's commentary is very short and concise. The colophon seems to call it *Vidvanmandana-vivṛti*<sup>68</sup>. The verse at the end however suggests the name *Gangādhara-bodhini*, while J. K. Śāstri calls it *Mandanapīkāśa*. *Siddhāntaobhā* is another commentary, which is unfortunately anonymous and incomplete. The commentary ends abruptly while explaining section 32. It is full of discussions which are critical and scholarly. J. K. Śāstri says that though the manuscript of the work seen by him bears the title *Lekha*, the author accepts *Siddhāntaśobhā* as the title, as can be seen from his own suggestion<sup>69</sup>. A short anonymous commentary called *Vidvanmandanavākyārtha* has been seen by J. K. Śāstri. It just gives the meanings of words and does not elucidate the topics.

67 Cf. VM p. 293, 296, 305, 313, etc.

68 *Gitopāhva-gangādhara-bhaṣṭasya kṛtāḥ Śrīmad Vidvanmandana-vivṛtāḥ sampūrṇā*. VM p. 33<sup>c</sup>.

69 *Asyām Siddhāntaśobhāyām viśadikarīṣyamah*

One Śaḍananda, at the end of the nineteenth century, wrote a work *Sahasrākṣa* with the express purpose of refuting the *Vidvanmandana*. As a rejoinder, Viṭṭhalanātha Gosvāmī of Koṭa composed a work called *Prabhāñjana*. Pandit Gattulāji wrote a critical commentary on this called *Mārutasaḁkti*. In both these works many parts of the *Vidvanmandana* and *Suvarṇasūtra* are explained. Important explanations from these works have been collected together and compiled in the *Tippaṇi*, which is also published together with other commentaries.

Of all the commentaries, the *Suvarṇasūtra* of Purusottama is the most important and authentic. Purusottama calls it *Suvarṇasūtra* or the Golden String which may be used for holding the *Vidvanmaṇḁana* or the Jewel of the Learned.<sup>70</sup> The commentary, as is usual with Purusottama, not only explains the words and sentences but whenever necessary adds discussions to elucidate the knotty problems suggested by Viṭṭhaleśa. As a true comentator, he even shows the figure of speech in the benedictory verse.<sup>71</sup> While explaining dozens of scriptural passages he gives the interpretations of the Śuddhādvaita thinkers side by side with those given by Śaṁkara and others. He also shows the distinction between these interpretations.<sup>72</sup> Purusottama again refers to the six views regarding the

70 Puruṣottamas tanute, Vidvanmaṇḁanayuktau Suvarṇasutram  
S S Introductory V 4 p 2 also  
Vidvanmaṇḁanadharaṇe sukaratasiddhyai yathabuddhyayam  
Taddasaḁ Puruṣottamo vyaracayat Sauvarṇasutram muda  
S S Verse 4 at the end p 357

71 S S p 7

72 S S p 12-19

Pratibimba quite independently of Viṭṭhaleśa and refutes them<sup>73</sup> He refers to Śamkara, Ramanuja, Madhva, Śaiva, Bhikṣu, Vanamālīdasa, Bhāskara, Jayatīrtha, Udayanacārya, Vacaspati Miśra, Mīmamsakas, Sāmkhyas, Niruktamata, Navīnamata, Sāmpradayīkamata, Abhinavamata and a host of such schools and authors In its dialectics *Suvarṇasūtra* is comparable to the *Siddhāntaśobhā* but while the latter does not care to explain the text, Purusottama does It is therefore quite proper that J K Shastri has given it the first place<sup>74</sup>

### (37) *Avāranabhanga-Yojanā*

Puruṣottama commented upon the *Tattvadīpanibandha* of Vallabha It is an authoritative metrical treatise divided into three chapters Śāstrārtha-prakarana, Sarvanirṇaya-prakarana and Bhāgavatārtha prakarana Vallabha has also written a commentary called *Prakāśa* on the first two chapters and a part of the third, upto V 33 on Skandha IV Viṭṭhaleśa tried to finish it and began writing the *Prakāśa* from V 34 on Skandha IV, but he could write only up to V. 135 on Skandha V It is quite possible that Vallabha might have finished the whole of the *Prakāśa* and Viṭṭhaleśa would not have been able to secure it in its entirety Similarly there is a possibility of Viṭṭhaleśa's having finished the *Prakāśa*, but the portions after V 136 on Skandha V might have been gradually lost Any way Purusottama had before him the *Prakāśa* only up to

73 S S p 61-62

74 *Tatratnasv apī pramaṇyaprakarṣavaśena Suvarṇasūtravivṛtiḥ sarvataḥ prathamam sanniveśya sabhājitā* VM Vol III Intro p 9

V 135 on Skandha V Purusottama wrote his *Avāranabhanga* on the *Tattvadīpanibandha* and the *Prakāśa* up to V 135 on Skandha V As for the remaining verses of the third chapter, he wrote an independent commentary which he called *Yojanā* All these chapters have been treated below separately

### Chapter I

The Śastrārtha Prakarana consists of 104 Karikas A brief analysis of the contents is given below —

In the introductory verses 1-6 Vallabha pays homage to Lord Kṛṣṇa and states his plan for writing the three chapters This is followed by a brief mention of the Pramaṇas as accepted in the Śuddhādvaita (V 7-12) Vallabha then discusses the Sadhanas—Jñāna, Karma and Bhakti, and the Adhikāra (V 13-22) The regular Śāstra begins with V 23 Verses 23-53 contain the Sat-prakasana It begins with the discrimination between Jagat and Samsara, and an explanation of nescience (V 23-24) Then follows the description of the nature of Brahman, the Jaḍa, Jīva, and Antarātman (V 25-30), the Samsaraprakara of the Jīvas, Vidyā and Avidyā (V 31-34), the Vilaya-Prakara of the Jīvas as also their Brahmabhāva (V 35-36) This is followed by a discussion on creation (V 37-41) Vallabha explains the nature of devotion (V 42) and various forms of the Highest Lord (V 43-44), followed by the five divisions of Vidyā (V 45-46) Finally Vallabha discusses the question of emancipation, tīrthas, love to God etc (V 47-52) From V 53 begins the Cit-Prakaraṇa dealing with the individual souls They are atomic in measure (V 53-55) Their sentiency is known only by means of the divine sight (V 56) The Ābhāsavāda and

the Pratibimbavāda are wrong ( V 57-60 ) The Mahāvākya is discussed, it does not teach the Mithyatva and Jiva-brahma-aikya as taught by Śamkara ( V 61-63 ) Vallabha again brings in his theory of devotion ( V 64 ) From verse 65 begins the Brahma-prakarana The nature of Brahman is explained as possessed of contradictory attributes ( V 65-67, 71 ) and as the cause of the world ( V 68 ) Brahman is everything ( V 69-70 ), and it is because of its capacity of Āvirbhāva and Tirobhava that it is manifested in various ways ( V 72-75 ) Because of self-creation the contingencies of partiality and cruelty do not arise, Brahman is the doer and is yet not qualified ( V 76-77 ) Vallabha then enters into the refutation of other theories The Māyāvāda is refuted in verses 78-91, dualism in V 92, the Samkhya and Yoga are dealt with in verses 93 and 94 respectively While V 95 refers to the means of liberation, V 96-100 refute others' theories from the point of view of Pralaya The path of love is explained in V 101-103, while V 104 gives the conclusion

The foregoing analysis will show that almost all the theories, taught by Vallabha, are found in this work He calls it the Śāstrartha-prakarana and explains " Śāstrārtha " as " Gitārtha " <sup>75</sup> It is also stated that the *Gitā* is the only Śāstra <sup>76</sup> The chapter however does not seem to be so closely connected with the *Gitā*, as the third chapter is connected with the *Bhāgavatapurāṇa* Shri H O Shastri in his Sanskrit introduction has tried to show how the doctrines taught in the *Gitā* are incorporated here and he has given a list of 25 topics of the *Gitā*, that are dealt

75 Śāstrārtho gitārthah T S P V 5 p 31

76 Ekam Śāstram Devakīputragītam T S V 4

with here <sup>77</sup> But it cannot be said that the chapter necessarily deals with the *Gītā*. If we are to depend upon the list of topics dealt with in the *Gītā* and in this chapter, we can as well say that almost all the Śāstras, the scriptures, the *Sūtras* the *Purānas* and all that, can be shown to teach the same thing. Just as two verses—25b–26a, 90—are direct quotations from the *Gītā*, three verses 43, 44, and 69 are bodily quoted from the *Bhāgavatapurāna* and V. 27, 53 contain references from the *Upansads* <sup>78</sup> V 58 speaks of Jīva as ‘*Gandhaved vyatirekavān*’ which is very close to the *Brahmasūtra* II iii 26 ‘*Vyatireko gandhavat*’ V 83 runs ‘

*Vācārambhanavākyāni tadananyatvabodhanāt,  
Na muthyātvāya kalpante jagato Vyāsagauravāt*

It should be placed by the side of the *Brahmasūtra* II 1 14 ‘*Tadananyatvam ārambhanasabdādibhyah*’ Similarly V 61–62 explain the famous Mahāvākya ‘*Tat tvam asi*’ Many more such instances may be found to prove that the chapter is quite independent of and is in no way closely connected with the *Gītā* so as to be even an independent free exposition of the *Gītā*. The term “*Śāstrārtha*” thus should refer to all the Śāstras. Even H O Shastri admits this <sup>79</sup> Why then should Vallabha have explained the ‘*Śāstrārtha*’ as “*Gītārtha*?” My explanation is just this. It has long been the tradition in India that the founder of a new system of philosophy

77 T S Sanskrit intro p 11

78 ‘*Bahu syām prajāyeya*’ in V 27 and ‘*Dva suparṇa* and ‘*Guham praviṣṭau*’ in V 58

79 *Vastutas tu Śāstrasabdah śabdapramāṇabodhaka eva*



should comment upon all the Prasthānas. Now, Vallabha has commented upon only the *Brahmasūtras* and the *Bhāgavatapurāṇa*, which also is a Prasthāna in his opinion. He has dealt with the important passages of the *Upanisads*, while explaining the *Brahmasūtras*. Though the *Gītā* has been referred to in the *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya*, an explanation of the same cannot be taken for granted. Vallabha did not write a separate commentary on the *Gītā* and that is why perhaps, he stated that the *Sāstrārtha* given in this chapter is the *Gītārtha*, or it is not different from the teachings of the *Gītā*.

*Prakāśa* is Vallabha's own commentary written to explain the verses and elucidate the arguments contained therein. The *Prakāśa* is of course in the usual terse style of Vallabha and very often needs an explanation. We are also informed by Purusottama that the *Prakāśa* on V 75 beginning with, ' *Yad iā evam nirūpatvena, nirākāratvam brahmany āyātity arucyā pakṣāntaram āha-athaveti* ' is from the pen of Viṭṭhaleśa. It is actually a different interpretation given by Viṭṭhaleśa to make his father's point more clear.

Four commentaries are available on the *Prakāśa*. The *Tippaṇi* of Kalyanarāya and *Satsnehabhājana* of Gattulalji are available on only some portions of the *Sāstrārthaprakaraṇa*, as said by Prof. J. G. Shah<sup>80</sup>. Lālūbhaṭṭa has written a commentary called *Yojanā*, Purusottama's commentary is named *Āvaranabhanga*. The last is the best of all because it is the most scholarly and exhaustive. It not only explains the verses and the *Prakāśa*, but it gives

80 T S Preface p 5

so many other discussions with arguments and quotations to corroborate the position of Vallabha. Thus by adopting the method of comparison, elucidation, corroboration and argumentation, it proves to the scholars of immense value for the through understanding of both the *Kārikās* and the *Prakāśa*.<sup>81</sup> The very name of the commentary is suggestive. Puruṣottama himself says that he wants to break open and uncover the meaning of Vallabha's statements.<sup>82</sup>

The question that arises in connection with this work is that of authorship. The *Āvaraṇabhāṅga* in the first chapter is fathered upon Pitāmbara, and not Puruṣottama. The colophon reads: *Iti.....Gosvāmi Śrī. Yadupatisutasya Śrī Pitāmbarasya kṛtau Tattvadīpaprakāśāvaraṇabhāṅge Śāstrārthaprakaraṇam prathamam sampūrṇam*'. We should also note that in the *Suvarṇasūtra* Puruṣottama refers to this work as a composition of his father.<sup>83</sup> The Sāṃpradāyic tradition however records that Puruṣottama, out of respect to his elders, passed on some of his works to them and this is one such case. We shall thus have to depend upon the internal evidence for the authorship. The last verse of the commentary reads:

*Bhagavata iha śaktyā Tattvadīpaprakāśā-  
Varaṇabharavibhāṅge prakriyādyā samāpnot.*<sup>84</sup>

81. T. S. Preface p. 8.

82. *Vivecayann āśayam atra Tattva-  
Dīpaprakāśāvaraṇam bhāṅgāt.*

T. S. Ab. Intro Verse 4.

83. *Ted asmatpūṭṭcarana.r Āvaraṇabhāṅge samyak pradarsitam iti  
neha prapāñcyate.* S. S. p. 340.

84. T. S. Ab. p. 168.

It shows that the author planned to write a commentary on all the three chapters. That on the second and third is written by Purusottama, so we would naturally conclude that Purusottama wrote the commentary on the first chapter also. It may be argued that Pitambarā might not have been able to finish all the three and the second and the third might have been left to Purusottama, but it is difficult to understand why in that case Purusottama does not state a single word for it. In the last verse of the commentary on the second chapter, it is said that the *Āvaraṇabhāṅga* has been finished even on this chapter, because of the merciful glances of the Highest Lord<sup>85</sup>. The force of the word *api*' is a pointer to the single authorship with regard to both the chapters. Further, the remarkable characteristics of Purusottama's comparative style and treatment are found in the *Āvaraṇabhāṅga* on the Śāstrārthaprakāraṇa. The same style is seen in the *Āvaraṇabhāṅga* on other two chapters and in other works of Purusottama. We find here references to Purusottama's own works<sup>86</sup>. Under V 53 the author discusses that the individual soul is atomic and not pervasive. At the end of the discussion he says '*Ity Anvātmavādah*'<sup>87</sup>. Purusottama is said to have written a *Vāda* dealing with that topic. Under V 57-58 there is a discussion on the nature

85 *Yat tasya pūrṇaṣṭh karuṇakataksaṣṭh*

*Pūrṇobhāṣat Sarvaṇinirṇaye*' pi

*Āvaraṇasya bhāṅgah* T Sn Ab p 232

86 See T S Ab *Prahasta* and *Bhūndīpala* are referred to on p 48, *Prasthānaratnākara* on p 94, 95 97, 125 *Andhakaraṭāda* on p 126 *Tapantiya-prakāśa* on p 136, 146 commentary on Gaudapada's *Karika*s on p 158

87 T S Ab p 95

of an image and a refutation of all the six theories of Pratibimba of the Jiva. The same discussion is found almost bodily in the *Pratibimbavāda* and the *Jivapratibimbatvakhcandanavāda*, both of which are written by Puruṣottama. All these arguments, as also the phraseological and ideological similarities that this work bears with the other works of Puruṣottama, lead us definitely to believe that the work is actually written by Puruṣottama and dedicated to his father by writing his father's name as the author.

## Chapter II

The second chapter, Sarvanirṇaya is fairly longer than the first. It has 329 verses. It has four sections, the Pramāna ( V. 1-83 ), the Prameya ( V. 84-184 ), the Phala ( V. 185-294 ), and the Sādhana ( V. 295-329 ). We may analyse the contents as follows —

( a ) Pramaṇaprakaraṇa. The first 32 verses deal with the Vedic Literature viz the *Śrutis*. He gives a general interpretation of the Purva and the Uttara Kaṇḍas. Verses 33-48 deal with the *Smritis*, their importance, their contents, their basis, their authority in relation to the *Śrutis* and their purpose. The subject matter of verses 49-71 is the *Purāṇas*, their subject matter, their number, their relative authority in respect to the *Śrutis* and *Smritis*, their divisions according to the Kalpas etc. Just as the *Gīta* is the leading *Smṛti*, the *Bhāgavata* is the foremost among the *Purāṇas*. The six *Vedāṅgas* are touched upon in verses 72-78, the *Upavedas* in V. 79, the *Kāvya*s in V. 80, *Rāmāyana* in V. 81, the *Vaśiṣṭharāmāyana* and other works in V. 82-83.

(b) Prameyaprakaraṇa. Hari is the only Prameya. For the sake of convenience, He may be understood in three forms (V. 84-85) The causal form has 28 elements, but the causality is only of the Sat and not cit or ānanda. (V. 86-87) The effect-form is manifold (V. 88) The Svarūpa is three-fold. Its description and pramānas are given in V. 89-92. The effects are many and need not be enumerated (V. 93) Vallabha mentions 28 elements and says that the Ādhyātmika is the same as the Ādhidaivika, and the Māyā etc. are not separate categories (V. 94-97) Vallabha then explains the Aksara (V. 98-108), Kāla (V. 109), Karma (V. 110-112) and Svabhāva and the theory of Āvirbhāva-Tirobhāva. (V. 113-116) The Abhāvas cannot be included in the causal form (V. 117) The effects are then discussed with their classification (V. 118-119) With all this there is complete unity in all these forms. (V. 120) There is a discussion on the Ādhidaivika, Ādhyātmika and Ādhibhautika (V. 121-134) Vallabha then explains the Jñāna and Kriyā (V. 135) He refutes the theory of Pratibimba (V. 136), and describes the Vṛtti of Buddhi, Jñāna, Phala etc. (V. 137-139). Then follows an explanation of the theory of Āvirbhāva-Tirobhāva (V. 140-145) The prakārabhedas do not pose any problem (V. 146) Ordinary perception is not a Pramāna but only the Vedas should be depended upon (V. 147-149) Even the Vedas are Prameya. (V. 150) Here Vallabha enters into a discussion on the Nāmaprapaṅca (V. 151-161) He refers to the Purāṇas, the poems of Kālidāsa etc. (V. 162-163) Only that which is connected with the Vedas should be accepted as Pramāna (V. 164-165) Then follows the problem of eternal nature of words etc. (V. 166-176). Kṛṣṇa alone is the pravartaka and not the words. (V. 177-182) Verses 183-184 conclude this section

(c) Phalaprakarana At first is given the Phala according to the dharma of men belonging to a particular cast and a particular span of life (V 185-195) Then the author touches the point of Bhakti (V 196-197) Vallabha discusses the Sadyorukti and Kramamukti according to the Sāmkhya and Yoga (V. 198-207), and says that there is only hell for those who do not follow the path laid down by the scriptures. (V. 208-214) So only the path of the Bhāgavata should be adhered to (V 215-216) The fruit for those who are born śudras is explained (V 217) Vallabha speaks of the fruit according to the path of devotion first (V 218-219) and then in all the remaining paths (V 220-223) He then tells us about the Sāttvikas, their teachers, how they should worship, their connections in the family, the tirthas etc (V 224-255) He then shows the phala in the Karmamarga, the worship of other Gods etc (V. 256-273) He explains the result in the Sāmkhya and Yoga (V 274-276), and the Śākta (V. 277-285) The explanation of weal and woe follows (V 286-292) The enjoyer is treated at the end (V. 293-294)

(d) Sadhanaprakarana.—The chapter begins with an explanation of and a discussion on the knowledge as the means of liberation. (V. 295-302) Devotion is stated to be the best (V. 303-307) Other Sādhanas are not helpful (V 308-311) Vallabha again discusses Jñāna and Bhakti and finally says that 'Love' is the highest (V. 312-328) The last verse (V 329) is just a conclusion indicating the next chapter

The foregoing analysis will show that the chapter is carefully planned and written It contains Vallabha's views on many points, which are not touched upon in other

works Purusottama has enriched the work with his scholarly commentary. He informs us that the passages 'Yad-uktam kiñca tannirūpanam'<sup>88</sup> and 'Atredam ... sādhuikā'<sup>89</sup> are added in the *Prakāśa* by Viṭṭhaleśa.

### Chapter III

This chapter called the Bhagavatārthaprakarana contains 1920 Verses divided into 12 chapters according to the 12 Skandhas of the *Bhagavatapurāna*. Vallabha gives in this work a summary exposition of the meaning of the *Bhagavata*. He says that the meaning has to be understood in seven ways: (i) the Śāstra, (ii) the Skandha, (iii) The prakarana, (iv) The Adhyaya, (v) The Vakya, (vi) The Pada, and (vii) The Aksara<sup>90</sup>. In the chapter, under consideration, Vallabha explains the *Bhāgavata* from the first four points of view. It is thus something like an independent interpretation of the *Purāṇa*, while *Subodhini* is a regular commentary.

Vallabha wrote his *Prakāśa* on the kārīkas only upto kārīka 33 on Skandha IV. The work of finishing the *Prakāśa* was undertaken by Viṭṭhaleśa. Purusottama informs us of this<sup>91</sup>. There are other proofs also for this. The *Prakāśa* on V 6 refers to the ācārya<sup>92</sup>. This shows

88 T Sn Ab p 24

89 T Sn Ab p 114

90 T Bh V 2

91 T Bh Ab p 170

92 *Etad antīm Sṛmadācāryaish kṛta vyākhyā, etad agre Prabhacīya  
Tattveṣu sarveṣum asaktyabhāṣāya Ācāryaish kalas tattveṣu  
praviṣṭa etc*

definitely that Vallabha has not written it. Similar mention is also found in the *Prakāśa* on V. 132<sup>93</sup>

Even Viṭṭhaleśa could not finish the *Prakāśa*. He could go only upto V. 135. So from V. 136 Purusottama himself began his *Yojanā*<sup>94</sup>

Purusottama's *Āvaranabhanga* in this chapter is not so long but is comparatively short. The reason perhaps is that there are not many discussions in this chapter, which explains only one work. His *Yojanā* is more extensive, because here he explains the *kārikās* and there is no *Prakāśa* to comment upon. He begins his *Yojanā* with a separate Mangala and says that the *Yojanā* was shown to him by Prabhucarana<sup>95</sup>. It is very likely that there might have been some sort of traditional explanation of the unexplained verses handed down orally by Viṭṭhaleśa and his sons and Purusottama might have incorporated it in his *Yojanā*.

It will not be out of place here to consider the inter-relation of the three chapters. Vallabha says in the beginning of the first chapter that he will compose the *Sāstrārtha*, *Sarvanirnaya* and *Bhagavatārtha* chapters<sup>96</sup>. He explains the term "*Sāstrārtha*" as the "*Gītārtha*" in his *Prakāśa*. As for the second chapter, Purusottama says that it is "*Nirnaya*" or decision of the knowledge and the like as means of liberation, and of the things as found

93 Tarhy Ācarjair adholokamanam kuto noktam iti ced etc  
T Bh P p 305

94 Iyad avadhy eva Prabhucarana nibandham Prakāśitavantah  
T Bh Ab p 307

95 Cf Iti Śrīmatprabhucaranāḥ Purusottamasya darśita  
Nibandhajojana in all the colophons

96 T S V 5 p 30-32



in the world, such as this is of this nature, this is the fruit or means of this etc <sup>97</sup> Vallabha also says that the second chapter is for removing the asamohāvanā and viparītabhāvana. The Śāstrartha is a smaller chapter and so the Bhāgavatārtha is for its elaboration. Puruṣottama says that the Sāttvikas are of various kinds, those who are bent upon the pramaṇa are satisfied with the first, while the second chapter is for those who prefer the prameya and for whom asambhavanā is possible <sup>98</sup> In the *Prakāśa* on the last verse, Vallabha says that he has explained the Śāstrartha by taking recourse to the pramāṇabala, and now he will speak out the Sarvanīnaya by resorting to the prameyabala <sup>99</sup> Puruṣottama's explanation here is almost the same as given above, though here he adds an explanation of the Pramāṇabala and Prameyabala. In the *Āvaranabhanga* on the second chapter, Puruṣottama explains in the beginning the sangati and the purpose of this chapter at some length. He explains how the Asambhāvanā and Viparītabhāvana are possible. Thus for instance, the Śrutipramāṇa cannot prove something which is contradicted by perception. What again of the *Smṛtis*? Again, when the scriptural authority is established, what about their teaching? Is everything entirely one with Brahman or has Brahman something more than the Jivas?

97 *Jñanader mokṣasadhanamargasya pāparīkādīpadārthajatyā va yō yam nirṇayah, idam evaṅrupaṅgambhūtaphalasādhanaṁ iti niścayah, sapatikarah sarupanīscaya va*

T S Ab p 32-33

98 T S Ab p 32-33

99 *Pramāṇabalam āśritya sastrāṅho vīnirūpitah, Prameyabalam āśritya sarvanirṇaya ucyate T. S. P. p 163*

So many sādhanas have been taught, why then accept devotion only? What is the difference in the fruits obtained by pursuing various sādhanas? All these questions would naturally arise, to those who are of mediocre intelligence or who are dull. As for those who are wise, such decisions as of these questions would just reinforce the theories in their minds.<sup>100</sup>

The connection of the third chapter with the second is easily found out by Vallabha. Vallabha ends his second chapter with a discussion on the Prema-bhakti. By knowing the meaning of the *Bhāgavata* alone, such devotion can arise. If the Bhagavatārtha is not understood or is wrongly understood, there can be no Bhakti. Hence Vallabha finds out a remedy for this and explains the *Bhāgavata*.<sup>101</sup>

To a modern reader, the distinction between the Pramāṇabala and the Prameyabala as also between the Uttama on the one hand and the Madhyama and Manda on the other may not have a strong appeal. Both the chapters may be taken quite independently. Some of the questions that may arise in the first chapter and that are not answered in it are found in the second. The second chapter is definitely more elaborate and goes into the details of various problems. There are however certain points in the first chapter, which are not found in the second. Thus for instance the Jagat-samsara-bheda,

100 T Sn Ab p 1-2

101 *S'ribhagavatattvartham ato vaksye suniścitam Yajñānat paramā pritiḥ Kṛsnah śiḡhram phaliṣyati* T Sn Verse 329. See also *Bhagavataṛthe ajñāte, anyathajñāte ca bhaktir na bhavati!* *Adhikare' pi jāte phalam na bhaviṣyati!* *mayopayaḥ kriyate, Tattvartho vivicyocyate* T Sn P p 231

the Jīva-parimāṇa, and the whole question about the individual soul—all this is not touched upon in the second chapter. Thus the chapters mutually supply the missing links of one another. Even then, they are independently understandable.

Similarly the third chapter is also something like a long appendage, very loosely connected with the first two chapters. While the first two chapters are of the nature of an independent composition, the last is a summary as also an interpretation of one particular work. If we have to take into account the connection of chapters II and III as given by Vallabha, we can say that the summary-cum-interpretation of any of the Prasthānas can be easily tagged on with these chapters and similar connections can be found out. The work is thus not an integrated whole, but a composite one made up of three independent units.

(38) *Ṣoḍaśaparakaraṇagranthasaṅgati :*

Before dealing with this work we may make some preliminary observations, regarding Puruṣottāma's commentaries on the sixteen tracts. Vallabha's sixteen tracts, known as the *Ṣoḍaśagranthas*, have remained very popular among the followers of the Puṣṭimārga. Puruṣottāma is said to have commented upon all of them. I have not however been able to trace all the commentaries, and I doubt whether he actually wrote *Vivṛtis* on all of them. Thus for instance in the introduction to the *Vivekadhairyāśraya*, the Editor Shri. C. H. Shastri says that only four commentaries are available on this work, those of Gopīśa, Gokulotsava, Raghunātha and Vrajarāya. As Shri. Shastri has at his disposal a good deal of manuscript-literature, I

do not think we should doubt his statement. It is very likely therefore that Purusottama did not comment upon all the sixteen tracts. Before however taking a short notice of the tracts and Puruṣottama's commentaries upon them, we should note one independent article, not a work, of Puruṣottama.

In the *Pustibhaktisudhā* Vol V No 8-9 is printed the *Ṣoḍaṣaprakaranagranthānām sangatiḥ* of Purusottama. A similar *Sangati* is also printed in the collection of Vrata-works, edited by Shri C H Shastri, Surat <sup>108</sup>. Here Puruṣottama has explained the interrelation—not the chronological order—of these tracts in two ways. The Lord of the world has ordered devotion to Kṛṣṇa by mind, speech and body. After explaining the removal of sins and love to Mukunda in the (1) *Yamunāstaka*, and deciding the śāstrartha in the (2) *Bālabodha*, devotion as a principle is expounded in the (3) *Siddhāntanuktāvali*. Devotion is two-fold, external and internal. For the former it is necessary to maintain the purity of the external objects as taught by the Ācārya in the (4) *Siddhāntarahasya*. For the internal devotion, purity and steadiness of mind are required. The (5) *Navaratna* and the (6) *Antahkaraṇaprabodha* are for teaching this. The (7) *Vivekadhairyāśraya* describes both the types of devotion. The (8) *Kṛṣṇāśraya* makes our dependence on Kṛṣṇa steady, while the (9) *Catuhśloki* explains in short the sarvaṅgamaṇa. This is followed by the (10) *Pusti-pravāhamaryādā-grantha* which expounds the three different paths. Devotion begins with this and its increase is told in the (11) *Bhaktivardhini*. Bhajana requires the speaker and

the hearer, for which we have the (12) *Jalabheda* and the (13) *Bhaktalakṣaṇa*. (Is it *Pañcapādyā*?) Renunciation is determined in the (14) *Sanayāsanirṇaya*. Then comes the (15) *Nirodhalakṣaṇa* which tells of 'Bhāvo bhāvanayā *siddhaḥ*'. Finally we have the (16) *Sevāphala*.

Another way of understanding the inter-relation of these works is this: The (1) *Yamunāṣṭaka* is the first followed by the (2) *Bālabodha* for acquiring the Svarūpa-yogyatā. Svakīyatā being established, one's own way is preached in the (3) *Siddhānta-muktāvalī*. For a description of the Jīva in that path, the teacher has written the (4) *Puṣṭipravāhamaryādā*. This is followed by a desire to know the duties which are told in the (5) *Siddhānta-rahasya*, taught by the Lord himself. Then comes the (6) *Navaratna* to remove the worry, as to whether or not the Lord has accepted the Jīva. The āntaropadeśa is taught in the (7) *Antaḥkaraṇaprabodha* and the tadaṅgo-padeśa in the (8) *Vivekadhairyāśraya*. This is followed by the (9) *Kṛṣṇāśraya* which should be adhered to even without the upadeśas. The (10) *Catuḥśloki* serves to remove the doubt that this is the path of others. After thus teaching devotion, it is increased in the (11) *Bhaktivardhinī*. The hearer and the speaker are described in the (12) *Jalabheda*. The (13) *Pañcapādyā* is independent. The (14) *Sanayāsanirṇaya* is for knowing the time of renunciation as taught in *Bhaktivardhinī*. Its sādhana is told in the (15) *Nirodhalakṣaṇa*. The fruit of one who follows this path is explained in the (16) *Sevāphala*.

The *Sanṅati* printed in the collection of the Vrata-works corresponds to the second order given above. We shall now turn to those works which have been commented upon by our author.

(39) Commentary on the *Yamunāṣṭaka* :—

*Yamunāṣṭaka* is a small tract in nine stanzas in the Pṛthvi metre. It is written in praise of the river Yamunā. In fact it is an aṣṭaka but the last verse is something like the Phalaśrutī. It is a good piece of work, having some poetic qualities also, so rarely found in Vallabha's writing. The commentary of Viṭṭhaleṣa is more or less explanatory. Puruṣottama in his sub-commentary has, however, made good the loss by bringing in a halo of sanctity and explaining fully each and every word trying to fit it in with the accepted principles of Vallabha's system. He refers to Harirāya twice in V. 1, 7 and under the first verse shows how according to Harirāya these eight verses bring out eight kinds of Aīśvarya of the river. He points out what has been left unexplained by Viṭṭhaleṣa,<sup>103</sup> and explains it fully.

(40) Commentary on the *Bālabodha* :

*Bālabodha* has nineteen verses and a half. Vallabha says in the very first verse that he wants to decide the Siddhāntasaṃgraha for the enlightenment of those who are ignorant.<sup>104</sup> Puruṣottama explains that the "Bāla" here refers to those who are confused on account of the various ways of worshipping many Gods, various ways of liberation and all that.<sup>105</sup> He begins with a statement of four Puruṣārthas and then discusses only Mokṣa. He refers

103. Namatu Kṛṣṇatūryapriyām.. etc. V. 3.

104. .... Sarvasiddhāntasaṃgraham,  
Bālaprabodhanārthāya vedāmi suviniścitam. V. 1.

105. ....Iti Sandihānānām Svānām sandehajanakam tatra  
tatropādeyatā bhramam vārayitum.....etc. Under V. 1.

to the concept of Mokṣa according to the Sāṃkhya and Yoga. He then explains the Parāśraya Mokṣa. Viṣṇu gives Mokṣa while Śiva gives Bhoga. Finally Vallabha comes to the point of devotion with love and surrender. The commentary of Puruṣottama is critical as well as explanatory. He refers often to the other commentators Dvārakeśa and Devakīnandana and shows how their explanations differ from his; he does not refute them. His commentary is definitely more extensive than those of the other two.

( 41 ) Commentary on the *Siddhāntamuktāvali* :

*Siddhāntamuktāvali* in 21 verses begins with the teaching of Kṛṣṇasevā. Kṛṣṇa is the Highest Lord. Vallabha then explains the Akṣara which is manifested as the world and which is meditated upon by those, who follow the path of knowledge. It is explained with the long drawn out metaphor of Gaṅgā. The same metaphor is continued throughout the work to explain the distinctions between the Puṣṭi, Pravāha and Maryādā also, in the course of which Vallabha says that devotion is higher than knowledge. Thus according to Vallabha the work explains the mystery of the Śāstra.<sup>106</sup>

It would be interesting to note here that while Vallabha himself says nothing regarding the title of this work, Viṭṭhaleśa calls it *Siddhāntavāṇīmālā*. The colophon of the work reads—“*Iti Śrīvallabhācāryaviracitā Siddhāntamuktāvali sampūrṇā.*” The last verse of Viṭṭhaleśa's commentary runs:

*Iti Śrīpitṛpādābjaparāgarasasiktahṛt  
Śrīviṭṭhalas tatsiddhāntavāṇīmālām hṛdaye dadhau.*

106. *Evam svaśāstrasari asvam mayā guptam nirūpitaṃ. V. 21.*

Puruṣottama also calls his work *Siddhāntavāṇmālāprakāśa*. The colophon reads—“*Iti...Puruṣottamasya kṛtau Śrīmadācāryasiddhāntavāṇmālāprakāśaḥ sampūrṇaḥ*” In The last verse also he says—“*Svīyasiddhāntavāṇmālā kṛpayā samprakāśitā.*” Kalyāṇarāya in the last verse of his commentary gives the title *Siddhāntamuktāvali*. Other commentators generally give the same title. It is very likely that originally the title might have been *Siddhāntavāṇmālā*.

The work is commented upon by Viṭṭhaleśa. Gokulanātha, Kalyāṇarāya, Puruṣottama, Vallabha, Vrajanātha and Lālu Bhaṭṭa have written sub-commentaries. Dvārakeśa's commentary is not complete. One Haridāsa has explained verses 15 b–17a. Of all these the commentary of Puruṣottama is very helpful in understanding the work. Puruṣottama is as usual not only explanatory but also critical.

(42) Commentary on *Puṣṭipravāhamaryādā* :

This is an incomplete work. Vallabha here sets out to explain the characteristics of Pusti, Pravāha and Maryādā. He differentiates them in the beginning and then explains the prayojana, sādhana, aṅga, kriya, phala etc. of the Puṣṭi souls. The work then breaks off. Gokulanātha in his commentary says that only this part of the work is known. Raghunātha says: ‘*Ita ūrdhvam granthatṛṣṭiḥ.*’ Puruṣottama says: ‘*Etadagre pravāhamārgīyaprayojanasādhanāṅgaphalāni maryādāmārgīyaprayojanasvarūpāṅgakriyāḥ sādhanam phalam ca yāvatajñāyate tāvān grantho’pekṣita iti jñeyam.*’ He is thus the only commentator who informs us about what is wanting. It is not possible that Vallabha might have himself left it incomplete. It is likely that the portions might have been lost on account of a quatrel



between the wife of Gopinatha and Vitthaleśa. It may also be possible that the portions dealing with the Pravāha and Maryādā being uninteresting to the exclusive tendencies of Vitthaleśa might have been neglected with the result that even Gokulanatha was not able to find them.

The commentary of Purusottama is very helpful and critical. The only problem is that it goes under the name of his father Pitāmbara. In the editor's note Shri Telivala says that the *Vivṛti* of Pitāmbara is actually written by Purusottama who seems to have dedicated it to his father. The style, he says, is evidently the famlier one which we meet with, in the other writings of Purusottama. Telivala adds that a perusal of the six manuscripts of the *Vivṛti* reveals that the author has revised it sometime after writing it. As Purusottama was a great authority in the Sampradāya, both the revised and the original versions became current. It is difficult to come to any conclusion regarding the authorship. The analytical approach as found in this commentary is the same as that found in other works of our author. The discussions on the term *Pusti* under V 2, and on the reality of the world under V 9 bear the same arguments and phraseology as found in the works of Purusottama. The author of the commentary refers to the *Vivṛti* of Gokulanātha, and to *Brahmasūtras*, *Vidvanmandana*, etc, but never to the works of Purusottama. At one place there is a reference to the explanation of the last Sūtra in the Ānandamaya-adhikarana, as given in the *Vidvanmandana* and Vitthaleśa's interpretation of the first Sūtra of the same Adhikarana. It should be noted that here the interpretations of Vallabha are not referred to. Thus we have no reason to disbelieve the tradition which

fathers the work upon Purusottama, though it is very likely that Puruṣottama might have revised his father's work

(43) Commentary on *Siddhāntarahasya*

*Siddhāntarahasya* contains only eight stanzas and a half in spite of it, its immense popularity has led to the composition of many commentaries upon it. Vallabha here says that he is speaking out ad verbatim what the Lord told him at night on the bright eleventh of the month of Śravana. All the five faults of the individual souls will be destroyed by the Brahma-sambandha. Hence everything should be surrendered to the Highest Lord. In the last two lines Vallabha gives the analogy of the river Ganga. Vallabha in this work teaches the doctrine of Samarpana or self-surrender.

The work is commented upon by Gokulanatha, Raghunatha, Kalyanaraya, Vrajotsava, Gokulotsava Hariraya Viṭṭhaleśvara, Girīdhara and Lālu Bhatta, besides Purusottama. There is also one anonymous commentary. Purusottama has ably discussed the problems regarding the Brahma-sambandha and has fully explained the text.

(44) Commentary on *Navaratna*

*Navaratna* is so called perhaps because it has nine verses. Here Vallabha thinks of the devotees, who should merge themselves completely in the service of God. After they have surrendered themselves to Him, they should not worry at all. Everything will be done for them by the Lord. Thus the grace of God is the greatest sadhana for such a man.

The text has been explained by Viṭṭhaleśa in his *Vivṛiti*, upon which four sub-commentaries are written.

Puruṣottama's sub-commentary is critical and explanatory. He explains the term *cintā* ( V. 1 ), differentiates between *Dāna* and *Nivedana* ( V. 2 ), elucidates the nature of surrender ( V. 3 ), and shows what should be done when a conflict arises between the desire of the Lord and the orders of the Guru ( V. 7 ) etc.

(45) Commentary of *Antaḥkaraṇaprabodha* :

*Antaḥkaraṇaprabodha* is a small tract written for enlightening the internal Spirit. God is independent and the devotees are dependent upon him. We can not know what God desires and so we must obey His commands. The devotee should think that whatever is necessary for him will be done by God. He should only carry out His orders. He is not like a worldly boss, who is angry at the faults of his employees. He knows that the devotees are likely to commit mistakes. They should not care even for their own bodies. A total unconditional surrender is the best remedy for crossing over the *Māyā* of the Lord. This is the teaching contained in this work. It however reveals a personal tone, as Vallabha refers to the commands of the Lord to himself in V. 5b-6-7a. Puruṣottama's commentary contains all the merits which are found in his other works. He gives the summary of the work at the end. He also discusses fully the various *Ājñās* ( V. 5b-6-7a ). On these however he has written an independent *Lekha* also. Here he gives a different interpretation.

( 46 ) Commentary on *Bhaktivardhini* :

*Bhaktivardhini* in eleven verses is mainly for the increase of devotion for the *hīna-adhikārins*. They should live the life of a householder and observe the duties of

varṇas and āśramas Worldly pursuits should be given up They should worship Kṛṣṇa If the worldly pursuits cannot be given up, their minds should be concentrated on Hari, until the seed of Bhakti is germinated and love is produced The destruction of the worldly passions is the test of divine love, the test of asakti is grha-aruci, and that of vyasana is inability to live without divine presence Bad association or evil food may make the attainment of this stage difficult Such a devotee should therefore stay near a temple and should keep the company of devotees, so that his mind may not be defiled by external forces Vallabha says that one who is always engrossed in the service of the Lord or the conversation regarding Him will never perish

The work is so popular that it has called for 14 commentaries, of Balakṛṣṇa, Gokulanatha, Raghunatha, Kalyanarāya, Hariraya, Gopeśvara, Puruṣottama Vallabha, Jayagopala Bhaṭṭa, Lalu Bhatta, Balakṛṣṇa son of Vallabha, Giridhara, Dvārakeśa and one anonymous commentary Every commentator has explained the text from his own point of view Purusottama's commentary, written in his usual style explains the text and elucidates important points Thus, for instance he explains the word "Bhakti" (V 1) fully from all points of view He also refers to the explanations of others (V 5)

( 47 ) Commentary on *Jalabheda*

*Jalabheda* has 21 verses It gives the characteristics of different teachers of religious subjects The *Taittirīya-Saṃhita* 7 4 12 gives a mantra stating 20 types of waters On the analogy of these 20 kinds, Vallabha has given 20 kinds of teachers Dr Rajendra Lal Mitra says that it is a work on hydropathy Telivala rightly says that it is not so

Four commentaries are written on this work, of Kalyānarāya, Purusottama, Vallabha, and Bālakṛṣṇa. The term "Agni" in V 14 has raised a controversy. Some think it to refer to Rudra while others to Vallabha himself. Purusottama does not enter into this controversy at all but explains "Agni" as 'The speaker of the *Agni Purāna*'

( 48 ) Commentary on *Pañcapadya*

*Pañcapadya* has 5 verses, as its name indicates. It explains the types of 'Hearers', those who are purely of the Puṣṭimarga ( V 1 ) of the Puṣṭimatyādamarga ( V 2 ) Maryādapuṣṭimārga ( V 3-4 ) and finally those who are generally adhikārins for Śravaṇabhakti ( V 5 ). Two commentaries, of Harirāya and Purusottama are available. There is some difference of opinion in their explanations.

( 49 ) Commentary on *Sannyāsanirṇaya*

This work gives Vallabha's ideas regarding renunciation. He says that sannyāsa should not be taken in the Karmamarga. For those, who follow the path of knowledge, Sannyāsa may be taken for desire of knowledge. Similar is the case with those who are already learned. Both of them are however not commendable. Regarding the followers of the path of devotion, renunciation accepted for the sake of sādhana, is not likely to produce happy results. If it is for the phala, it should be done only for experiencing the separation from the Lord, if the Lord so inspires.

Of all the commentaries on this work, that of Purusottama is the best. He refers to the views of Gokularātha, Raghunātha, Gokulotsava, Dvārakṣa, Gopīśa

etc and states his own opinion ( V 1 ) He also explains why renunciation should not be accepted in the Karmamārga by referring to Jaimini ( V 2 ) He shows that the term 'Virahānubhava' can be understood in three ways ( V 7 ) Purusottama shows after Vallabha the distinction between the paths of knowledge and devotion, in favour of the latter ( V 10-11-12, 14, 17 etc ) At the the and he describes how Vallabha himself took the Sannyāsa

#### { 50 } Commentary on *Nirodhalaksana*

*Nirodhalaksana* explains the Nirodha, which means complete attachment to the Lord by a devotee who has forgotten the world Thus the work is intended to lead the service of the Lord on a divine level The work is explained in six different commentaries Purusottama's *Vivṛti* is surely very helpful He explains the 'Nirodha' as 'Prapañcaviśmṛtipūrvakabhagavadāsaktirūpa' ( V 1 ) He explains the utility of the work (in the beginning He also refers at the end to the different order in which the text has been read by Cācā Gopīśa and Hariraya and says that he has followed the text of Vrajarāya He also says that he has not referred to different interpretations

#### { 51 } Commentary on *Sevaphala*

*Sevāphala* is a very small work of seven verses and a half It explains the fruits of Seva Vallabha has himself written a commentary on this The work has become difficult on account of the terse style of Vallabha Eleven commentaries are written on this and commentators have widely differed on the meanings of particular words Purusottama refers to the views of his predecessors often

(e g V. 1) Purusottama generally followed the śāstrīya method in interpreting the term "Sāyujya," while Harirāya and others followed the point of view of Bhaktimārga

Purusottama does not seem to have commented upon the remaining three tracts—*Vivekadhairyāśraya*, *Catuhśloki* and *Krṣṇāśraya*. Any way, I have not been able to find his commentaries on them

### (52-53) Commentaries on *Bhaktihamsa*

*Bhaktihamsa* is an important work of Viṭṭhaleśa explaining the nature of true devotion, as the principal means of emancipation in the Śuddhadvaita system. Viṭṭhaleśa here fully discusses the paths of action, knowledge and devotion. He also explains the trio of Pravāha, Maryādā and Puṣṭi. Besides this he also shows the distinction between the Upanā and Bhakti, Pūja and Bhakti etc. Puṣṭi is solely dependent upon the grace of God.

Reghunātha, born in V S 1611, commented upon it. His commentary is called *Bhakti-tarangini*. Purusottama has written a sub-commentary on it called Tīrtha, so that people can enter the river of devotion through this passage and happily see the 'swan of devotion'<sup>107</sup>. Purusottama has also written an independent commentary upon it called *Viveka*. Though Purusottama does not say anything expressly, he might have in his mind the famous Nirakṣiranyāya of the Hamsa, while naming the commentary. It is interesting to compare the commentaries of the same

107. *Praviśyanena tīrthena nimnam Bhaktitaranginim, Gahamānaḥ  
prapaśyantū Bhaktihamsam mudanvitāh*

author There are naturally so many similarities and almost every idea of the one is repeated in the other in the same manner though not in the same place To take an example we may note that the explanation of the nine steps of devotion in the *Tirtha* is on page 42, while in the *Viveka* it is on p 57 In the *Tirtha* at the end Puruṣottama gives seven verses for the *Granthārthasamgraha* They are not found in the *Viveka* In the *Viveka* however Puruṣottama gives an additional interpretation of the last verse of the *Bhaktihamsa* so as to avoid the *yati-doṣa* It is not found in the *Tirtha* It is rather difficult to explain why Puruṣottama would have written two works, when one could have been sufficient

Puruṣottama is also said to have commented upon the *Bhaktihetunirṇaya* of the Viṭṭhaleśa It has not been found by me

( 54 ) *Bhāvārthādhikaranabhāsyaprakāśa*

Vallabha is said to have commented upon the *Pūrvamīmāṃsāsūtras* of Jaimini also Unfortunately however, only a part of the same is available Vallabha's commentary on the *Pūrvamīmāṃsāsūtras* II 1, known as the *Bhāvārthapāda* has been published in the *Pastibhaktisudha* Vol VII no 2-4 The *Vivarana* alias *Prakāśa* thereon has been published in the same journal Vol VIII nos 5 6 7, 8 and 9 There are 49 Sūtras in all in this Pada This work has been examined by Prof G H Bhatt in two articles from the point of view of Vallabha's interpretations, as also from the textual point of view <sup>108</sup>

108 'Vallabhacarya and Pūrvamīmāṃsa' Journal of the Oriental Institute Vol I, no 4 p 353ff and 'Vallabhacarya's text of the Jaimini Sūtras II 1' Vol II no 1 p 68ff



The commentary *Prakāśa* bears the name of Yadupati as the author. This Yadupati was the grandfather of Puruṣottama. The colophon of the commentary runs : ' *Iti Śrīmadvallabhanandanacaraṇadāsānudāsasrīpītāmbara-tanujaśrīyadupativiracitam Śrīmadācāryaviracitajaiminiy-abhāṣyabhāvārthapādavivaraṇam sampūrṇam.*' Tradition however informs as that the author is Puruṣottama himself, who, out of respect for his grandfather passed of this work in his name. The commentary though short, reveals the special characteristics of Puruṣottama's authorship. There is a reference to the theory of Nityatva-vāda, and to the Vedāntimata under Sūtra 1. The commentator also refers under Sūtra 5 to those who arrange the five Sūtras in only one Adhikaraṇa and says ' *Tad etat sūtraviruddham*'. Besides, there is one strong ground to accept that Puruṣottama is the author of this commentary. In the *Prakāśa* on *Aṇubhāṣya* I. i. 3 a similar discussion occurs. There Puruṣottama makes a reference to these Sūtras and then refers to the present work as his own.<sup>100</sup>

The beginning of the *Vivaraṇa* is noteworthy. It runs: ' *Śrīmatprabhucaraṇakṣpoyā bhāvārthacaraṇabhāṣyam yathāmati vivriyate.*' It appears from this that though Vallabha might have finished his *Bhāṣya*, Puruṣottama could secure only this portion and hence he commented upon it. One cannot be definite about this, because it may be [ that ] Puruṣottama might have secured and commented upon the whole of the *Bhāṣya*, which is lost to us.

109. A. B. P. I. i. 3, p. 109.

( 55 ) *Pūrvamīmāṃsākārikāvivarāṇa* :

42 *Pūrvamīmāṃsākārikās* of Vallabha together with the *Vivarāṇa* of Puruṣottama have been published in the *Pūṣṭi-bhaktisudhā* Vol. V. no. 2. A short analysis of the contents is given here. The author explains the Anubandhacatuṣṭaya in the beginning. ( V. 1-12a ) followed by a discussion on the question whether the Mīmāṃsā is independent or depending upon injunctions. ( V. 12b-23a ) The relation of the two Mīmāṃsās forms the next topic of discussion. ( V. 23b-25a ) Vallabha then discusses the meaning of the word 'atha' in the Sūtra '*Athāto dharmajijñāsā,*' whether it should be understood in the sense of adhikāra or in any other sense. If the latter, we shall have to agree to the vidhi-adhyāhāra ( V. 25b-36 ). Last six verses again discuss the inter-relation of the two Mīmāṃsās in the light of the meaning of the word 'atha' from the point of view of those, who understand both the Mīmāṃsās as forming only one Śāstra. ( V. 37-42 ). Vallabha is so brief and his style so compact that it is rather difficult to understand the verses without the help of the *Vivarāṇa* of Puruṣottama.

Vallabha has written the *Pūrvamīmāṃsābhāṣya* which, as we have seen above, is unfortunately not fully extant. The *Kārikās*, which we have, are something like a metrical commentary on the first of the *Pūrvamīmāṃsā-sūtras*. Puruṣottama says in the beginning: *Śrīmadācārya-caraṇāḥ pūrvamīmāṃsābhāṣyam cikīrṣantaḥ tatra vistareṇa pratipipādayiṣitam jijñāsāsūtrārtham sankṣepeṇa kārikā-bhiḥ sanjighṛkṣantaḥ*. At the end he says: *Iti Śrīmad-vallabhācāryacaraṇaviracitadharmajijñāsāsūtrārthanirṇāyaka-kārikāvivarāṇam Śrīpītāmbaratanujaśrīpuruṣottamakṛ-*

*tam sampūrṇam*. It is important to note that the fortysecond Kārikā does not seem to contain any suggestion that it is the last. It is again doubtful as to whether Vallabha has fully discussed even the first Sūtra. I am rather inclined to believe that Vallabha wrote some or many Kārikās more than 42, and perhaps he wrote or intended to write a metrical summary-cum-commentary on the *Pūrvamimānsāsūtras*. This is what Vallabha has done for the *Bhāgavatapurāṇa* also when he wrote the Kārikās in the last chapter of the *Tattvadīpanibandha* over and above the *Subodhinī* commentary. Anyway Puruṣottama had before him only 42 verses. He commented upon them and called them *Nirṇāyakakārikās* on the first Sūtra.

( 56 ) *Subodhinīprakāśa* ;

Vallabha maintained a very high regard for the *Bhāgavatapurāṇa*, which was raised by him to the status of a Prasthāna. Vallabha wrote his commentary *Subodhinī* on the first three books, on the tenth book and began writing the same on the eleventh. On the eleventh book he could comment only up to the second verse of the fifth Adhyāya. Vallabha is also said to have written a shorter commentary on the *Bhāgavata* called *Sūkṣmaṭikā* but it is not extant. Vallabha's *Subodhinī* on Skandhas IV.-IX and on the remaining part of XI and the Skandha XII is unfortunately not available. The Sāṃpradāyic tradition relates that Vallabha was asked by God not to open the mysterious doctrines in the *Bhāgavata*. He did not obey the orders in the beginning but when the command came forcefully, he had to carry it out. Thus there is *kramabhaṅga* and *apūrṇatā*.

Viṭṭhaleśa wrote a sub-commentary on Skandha X called *Tippaṇi*. Puruṣottama is said to have written his *Prakāśa* on the whole of the *Subodhini* including the *Tippaṇi*, but his *Prakāśa* on the later portion of the Skandha has not been found. Even in the Skandha XI his *Prakāśa* is found on the *Subodhini* only up to V 20 of Adhyāya 4. The extant part of the *Prakāśa* on the Skandha X is fathered upon Pītāmbara. Tradition however runs that it is also written by Puruṣottama. Evidently the style is that of Puruṣottama, as can be seen from his comments on the interpolated chapters (Adhyāyas between X 11 and 12.)

We have noted above, while dealing with the last chapter of the *Tattvadīpanibandha* that, while that chapter is a summary-cum-commentary written independently, though related to the *Bhāgavata*, *Subodhini* is a regular running commentary. Here he has dealt the vakya, pada, and aksara of the *Bhāgavata*<sup>110</sup>. Vallabha says in the beginning of the work '*Arthatryam to vaksyāmi nibandhe'sti catuṣṭayam*'<sup>111</sup>

(57,58) Minor commentaries on the *Bhāgavata*

(I) '*Kathā imāste*' ity etad vivaraṇakārikāvyaḅhya Viṭṭhaleśa has written 20 verses on the *Bhāgavata* XII in 14 discussing the concept of Rasa in the Puṣṭimārga. Puruṣottama has explained them in his usual style.

110 '*Ayam atra nibandhad viśeṣaḥ Vakyapadaksaraṇam atra vaktavyatvat, tatra tu śāstrarthady-upa-yogina evarthasyoktatvad itī*'

Subodhini-prakāśa III 1 1

111 Subodhini 1 1

( II ) *Vṛtrāsurasatuḥślokivivṛti* : The four verses known as the *Vṛtrāsurasatuḥślokī* in Bhāgavata VI are said to deal with the four Puruṣārthas. The first three verses are commented upon by Viṭṭhaleśa while the last by Vallabha. It is on the last verse that Puruṣottama, Harirāya and Śrīvallabha have written their sub-commentaries. The verse is explained in two ways so as to belong to the Maryādāpuṣṭi on the one hand the Puṣṭipuṣṭi on the other. Puruṣottama's commentary does not contain anything quite peculiar.

( 59 ) *Gāyatrīyādyarthaprakāśakakārikāvīraṇa* :

An attempt has been made by Vallabha and his followers to explain the well-known Sāvitrī Ṛc in such a way as to suit their own theory. Vallabha himself has written a commentary on this verse. Viṭṭhaleśa wrote on it a metrical commentary in 35 verses. Puruṣottama has commented upon it. Besides these, there is also one prose passage by Gokaleśa alias Śrīvallabha. Though Prof. M. G. Shastri calls it an independent work it is not different in form from a commentary on Vallabha's *Gāyatrībhāṣya*. Further there is also one *Gāyatrīyarthavīraṇa* in 76 verses by an unknown author. There are also prose works of Indireśa and Govardhana Bhaṭṭa trying to explain the purport of the Gāyatrī. All these have been printed in a collection of the Sāṃpradāyic works on Gāyatrī, edited and published by Prof. M. G. Shastri.

The Sāvitrī verse is a simple prayer to the Sun God Savitrī, the inspirer. It was slowly surrounded with a halo of sanctity and became the "Veda-bija" or the seed of the scriptures. Attempts were then made to interpret the verse

so as to suit the interpreter's own beliefs and there grew a tendency to mystify each and every syllable of the verse Vallabha shows how it teaches the doctrine of Grace Viṭṭhaleṣa goes a step further by explaining each and every word, the metre, the ṛṣi etc—all explained by means of fanciful etymology and imagination Viṭṭhaleṣa says that here the teaching is not just of the doctrine of Grace but even of Love, of Srṅgāra Puruṣottama explains all the 35 verses in his usual analytical style Under V 25 he refutes the interpretation of the Śaivas Some of his explanations are also equally fanciful

( 60 ) *Nyāsādeśavivrtivivarana*

The *Nyāsādeśa* is one verse explaining the famous verse in the *Bhagavad Gītā*, 'Sarvadharmān parityajya etc' (XVIII 66) The verse runs

*Nyāsādeśesu dharmatyajanavacanato kiñcanādhu-  
kriyoktā,*

*Kārpaṇyam vāṅgam uktam maditarabhajanāpekṣaṅam  
vā vyapodham*

*Duḥsādhyecchodyamau vā kvacid upaśamitāv anya-  
sammelane vā,*

*Brahmāstranyāva uktas tad iha na vihato dharmā  
ājñādisiddhah*

In the *Bhagavad Gītā* the Lord tells Arjuna of Niskāma karmayoga and performing one's dharma without attachment How can the verse XVIII 66 be reconciled with this teaching? The *Nyāsādeśa* verse tries to solve this riddle in various ways Viṭṭhaleṣa has written a commentary on it explaining it in two ways Puruṣottama has written a

sub-commentary on it. Puruṣottama does not say much about the Puṣṭi, Maryādā, and all that, as does Viṭṭhaleśa. He refers to Rāmānuja, Śaṁkara and Madhusūdana, refutes them all except the first with whom he shows just the difference of approach. Puruṣottama also refers to the Sāṁpradāyika Mīmāṁsakas and their method of reconciliation. He does not agree with them in toto.

Who is the author of this verse? Some scholars in the Sāṁpradāya think that it is written by Vallabha. This is not correct. It is the fifteenth verse in the *Nyāsāvīmśati* of Ācārya Vedāntadeśika, who was a follower of Rāmānuja<sup>112</sup> It is difficult to state what is the opinion of Viṭṭhaleśa and Puruṣottama about this. Viṭṭhaleśa begins by saying : '...vicārakāntaḥkaraṇakalilam apanayans tad vākyatātparyam ekena ślokenāha...etc.' 'He ends with: !... *Iti piṭṭhaleśa gopipaticaraṇa-reṇu-dhaninā yaḥ. Śriviṭṭhaleśa vivṛto bhāvo mayi sa sthira bhavatu.*'

Puruṣottama begins his commentary with :

*Śrīmadvallabha-nandanacaraṇāmbhoje' nusandhāya,  
Nyāsādeśavivaraṇasyāśayam atra sphuṭīkurve.*

The last verse also has almost the same purport. Thus there is no reference to Vallabha. Again, whenever Viṭṭhaleśa refers to the author he says 'āha' and not 'āhuḥ' which he might have used, had he thought the verse to be of Vallabha. Thus probably even Viṭṭhaleśa and Puruṣottama did not mean that the verse was written by Vallabha.

112. Cf. *Rahasyaratnajātam: Nyāsāvīmśati*, p. 20.

( 61 ) *Patrāvalambanatikā*

The *Patrāvalambana* is a work in 40 verses with prose passages coming between verses 29 and 30, and between 34 and 35. At the end of the prose passage after V. 29 Purusottama says that there is something wanting in the text. V. 30 has only the second line and the refutation of the Māyāvāda which is referred to in V. 36 is not found here<sup>113</sup>. The work is intended to show the correct theories according to the Brahmavāda and to refute the theories of Bhedavāda and Māyāvāda.

The title *Patrāvalambana* has a curious origin. As Paraṣottama informs us, when Vallabha was staying at Caraṇādri, various followers of Māyāvāda and the Bhāṭṭa school of Mīmāṃsā went there from Kāshī for discussion. This resulted in obstruction to his work of devotion and service to God. He thereupon came to Kāshī himself and wrote this tract, placing it at the doors of the Kāśīviśveśa temple. Hence it is called *Patrāvalambana*. Vallabha's idea seems to be that other scholars should first read this and then alone should approach him if their doubts are not resolved.

Puruṣottama's commentary is explanatory. It is very helpful in understanding the text.

( 62 ) *Vallabhāṣṭakavivarana* —

The *Vallabhāṣṭaka* in eight verses was written by Viṭṭhaleśa. It describes the nature of Vallabha as 'Fire' in

113. *Ata yadyapy etavataiva nirvāho bhavati tathāpy upasamhāre māyāvādo nirākṛta itī kathanād atraca [prathamapādād ito'gre etāvati tṛtir itī pratibhāti*



the beginning and as 'Kṛṣṇa' at the end. It is said that the name of the Ācārya is explained in the *Sarvottamastotra*, his qualities in the *Bṛhatkṛṣṇapremāmṛta* and his nature in the *Vallabhāṣṭaka*. Puruṣottama's commentary is faithful and explanatory.

Commentaries on other works.

(63) *Māṇḍūkyaopaniṣad-dīpikā* :

Before dealing with this work we would like to write a few lines on the commentaries of Puruṣottama on the *Upaniṣads*. Vallabha himself did not write commentaries on the *Upaniṣads*. Puruṣottama is however credited with some such commentaries. He is said to have written the *Dīpikās* on the *Kaivalyopaniṣad*, *Brahmopaniṣad*, *Nṛsimhottaratāpinī - upaniṣad*, *Māṇḍūkyaopaniṣad* and *Śvetāśvataropaniṣad*. He is also said to have written the *Upaniṣad-ārtha-saṁgrahas*. I have been able to find out his *Artha-saṁgrahas* on the *Kaivalya* and *Brahma*, while *Dīpikās* on the *Māṇḍūkya* and *Nṛsimhottaratāpinī*. It is possible that Puruṣottama might have written the commentaries, which he has been credited with and might have composed *Arthasaṁgrahas* on many *Upaniṣads*, and they might have been lost.

Bhatt Ramanath Shastri published in V. S. 1980 the *Māṇḍūkyaopaniṣaddīpikā* of Puruṣottama, in Bombay. It contains the commentary not only upon the prose passages of the *Māṇḍūkya* but also upon the first two chapters of the *Kārikās* ascribed to Gauḍapāda. It may appear rather curious that Puruṣottama should have commented upon the verses of Gauḍapāda, the grand-teacher of Śaṅkara. Puruṣottama

has explained the Upaniṣad and the *Kārikās* from the point of view of Śuddhādvaita

While only the commentary upon the first two chapters of the *Kārikās* is extant, we should admit that he intended to comment upon the other two chapters also, as can be seen from his own statement.<sup>114</sup> In *Āvaranabhaṅga* he refers to his commentary thrice<sup>115</sup> All these references, especially the second, make it quite clear that Puruṣottama not only intended to write but actually wrote his commentary upon all the four chapters of the *Gauḍapāda-kārikās*. It is really unfortunate that we have not been able to secure the commentary in full.

( 64 ) *Nṛsiṃhottaratāpinyupanisaddīpikā* .

The *Nṛsiṃhottaratāpini* is a minor *Upaniṣad* belonging to the *Atharvaveda*. It begins with the four divisions of 'Om' in the fashion of the *Māṇḍūkya*. It has nine khaṇḍas in which it appears to teach the absolutism of

114 'Sādhanantarānām smārtānām upasanānām ca sattvāt kim iti Jadacaryādyupadeśa ity etaddvayamatam adī autākhye vicārayiṣye'

*Māṇḍūkyopanisaddīpikā*. p.-55

115 ( 1 ) Yat tu Gauḍavartike-'Bhogārtham sṛṣṭi ity anye kṛdārtham iti cāpare'ity evam prajojanam vikalpya-Devasyaḥ svabhāvavyam aptakāmasya kā sṛṣṭā-iti siddhānta uktah Tatrapī kṛidakṛaṇam eva svabhāvo vaktavyah

T. S. Ab V. 68 p 116

( 2 ) Etena Gauḍavartikānurodhenāpi ye grahitvatvam vidadhati, te' pi pratyuttarītā bodhyāḥ. Gauḍavartikaprakaraṇacatus-ayārthas tu maya tadvyākhyāne sopapattiko nirūpita iti tato' vadheyah

T. S. Ab V. p. 158

( 3 ) Tena Gauḍavartikokta-Satkāryavādadosa api vikārānāṅgikārād eva pariḥrtāḥ. T. Sn. Ab V. 140 p. 117

Śaṅkara. The influence of the *Māṇḍūkya* and the *Gauḍapāḍakārikās* is distinctly traceable. It also combines with this absolutism, the theistic trends as seen in the elevation of Nṛsiṃha. Puruṣottama has commented upon this work from the point of view of Śuddhādvaita. He seems to care only for proving that the *Upaniṣad* does not teach the Kevalādvaita of Śaṅkara. That is why his commentary is very short. It is strange that he does not explain so many passages.

Regarding the *Arthasaṁgrahas* of Puruṣottama, Telivala makes an interesting observation.<sup>116</sup> Puruṣottama is said to have written 52 *Vādagraṅthas*. It does not appear to be correct. It is likely that Puruṣottama might have written 52 *Upaniṣad-arthasaṁgrahas*, and they might have been styled *Vādagraṅthas* by some. Dayaram, the well known Gujarati poet has said in his *Guru-śiṣya-saṁvāda*; that the *Upaniṣads* are only 52. Hence it may be said that Puruṣottama wrote 52 *Arthasaṁgrahas*. It is difficult to say anything for or against this view.

What is the difference between an *Arthasaṁgraha* and a *Dīpikā*? The two terms do not appear to have any wide divergence in their connotation so far as the works of Puruṣottama are concerned. It may be said that the *Arthasaṁgraha* is a shorter commentary while the *Dīpikā* is an extensive commentary. But the *Nṛsiṃhottaratāpini-upaniṣad-dīpikā* is surely not a long commentary. Puruṣottama seems to have used these words without any difference in their meanings.

116. Cf. Puṣṭibhaktisudhā. Vol. V. No. 6.

( 65 ) *Kaivalyopanīśadārthasamgraha*

It has been published in the *Pustibhaktisudhā* Vol V No 6 The *Kaivalya* is a small *Upanīśad*, which like the *Nṛsiṃhottaratāpini*, appears to contain the absolutism of Śaṅkara with the theistic tendencies leaning towards Śaivism Purusottama has interpreted the same so as to find out the Śuddhadvaita and Vaiṣṇavism from it

( 66 ) *Brahmopanīśad-arthasamgraha*

It has been published in the *Pustibhaktisudhā* Vol III No 1 The *Brahmopanīśad* is a short work with the idealistic doctrines Purusottama has explained it in such a way as to show that the first khaṇḍa shows the greatness of Brahman, and the second gives four divisions as found in the *Māṇḍūkya*, the *Viruddhadharmaśrīyatva* etc

Shri G K Shastri at the end, in a foot note says that this appears to be a part of a bigger work called *Upanīśadārthasamgraha* This is similar to the suggestion of Telivāla referred to above

( 67 ) Introduction to *Amṛtatarangīṇī*

The *Amṛtatarangīṇī* commentary on the *Bhagavad Gīta* raises a question of authorship It has been printed together with other commentaries in the publication of the Gujarati Press Prof M G Shastri, in his introduction to his collection of the Śuddhadvaita works on the *Gītā* says 'Śrīmatpurusottamavīracūā ( Śrīmadvrājarayagosyamvīracūeti vṛddah ) *Gītāmṛtatarangīṇī* etc'<sup>117</sup> Thus according to some the work goes under the name of Purusottama, while in the opinion of others it was written

by Vrajarāya. The last ten verses are not useful in throwing light upon this problem. It is a really difficult point. We shall have to rely solely upon the internal evidence.

The commentary begins with an introduction which gives various views regarding the purport of the *Bhagavad-Gītā*, of Śaṅkara, Madhusūdana Sarasvatī, Śrīdhara and Rāmānuja. The author refutes the opinions of the first three and shows partial agreement with that of the last. The author then gives an important discussion on the purport of the *Gītā* as understood in the *Suddhādvaita*.

The regular commentary is however far different from the introduction in its spirit. It explains only the words of the *Gītā* at almost all the places. It does not refer to the interpretations of other commentators even though sometimes it may be necessary. Not only so but sometimes it may appear that the meaning given in the commentary is farfetched. We may just take an instance or two. The *Gītā* II.28 reads : *Avyaktāḍiṇi bhūtāni...* etc. It may be understood in a simple way that the beings are invisible before they are born, they are visible when they are alive and they are again invisible when they die. So in the beginning and at the end they are *Avyakta*, in the middle they are *Vyakta*. This is the meaning generally accepted by the commentators except the author of *Amṛtataraṅgiṇi*. He says that '*Avyakta*' means *Akṣara*, which is the *ādi* or *utpatti* of the bodies, which according to him is the meaning of '*bhūtāni*.' '*Vyaktamadyāni*' is explained as : '*Vyaktam jagat tad eva madhyam sthīrūpam utpattīlayayor madhyam yeṣāṃ tāni*.' Similarly '*Avyaktanidhanāni*' means :

'*Avyakta aksara eva nidhanam layo yesām tāni te*'  
 The commentator then adds '*Atrāyam arthah Yata utpattis tatraiva nāṣe śokah svasyānucita ity arthah | Svasyāpi tanmāranāntaram na narakadisambhāvanā yata utpattisthala eva svasyāpi nāṣo bhaviṣyati*'<sup>118</sup>  
 The commentator's meaning is not convincing. The commentator again brings in the topic of Bhakti every now and then, even at places where it is entirely uncalled for. Thus for instance in Gītā 1.36 He gives two interpretations. In the second interpretation he says '*Tava kā pritiḥ syād*' and thus brings in the idea of Bhakti. He adds after some discussion '*Ātatāyīmārane doṣābhāvas tu dharmasāstravicāreṇārthasāstravicārena vā nirūpito na tu bhaktivicārena, bhaktimargāt tu tayor durbalatvāt tanmāranenāsmākam pāpam eva bhavet pāpāc ca bhagavatsambandho na syād ata eva narānām kṣiṇapāpānām itī nirūpitam*'<sup>119</sup>. It is really very difficult to agree with this. We need not take many more instances to show that the explanations given in the commentary are not convincing.

A perusal of the works of Purusottama will show that the body of the commentary does not contain anything which may enable us to say that the work is from the pen of Purusottama. Not only so, but the essential characteristics of Purusottama's style and treatment are totally absent. Purusottama is never unreasonable, especially when he is commenting upon some important philosophical work and if we look to the instances referred to above, we are not inclined to believe that it is written by him. Again the present writer has not been able to find

<sup>118</sup> *Srīmad Bhagavad Gītā with seven commentaries* p. 91

<sup>119</sup> *Ibid* p. 30

references to this commentary in any of the works of Puruṣottama, though references to the *Gītā* are very often found. Some of the explanations of the verses in the *Gītā* as given by Puruṣottama elsewhere, are different from the explanations given in the said commentary. While explaining the V. 21 of the second chapter of the *Tattvadīpanibandha*, Puruṣottama explains the term, 'Vedavādaratāḥ' occurring in the *Gītā*, II. 42, as : 'Vādaratāḥ na tu tātparyajñātārah'.<sup>120</sup> In the commentary on the other hand it is stated : 'Vedavādaratā iti. vedoktaphalakarmakaraṇam evocitam, na, tu niṣkāmatayā : te tathā'.<sup>121</sup> Similarly Puruṣottama explains 'Traiguṇya-*viṣayāḥ*' occurring in the *Gītā* II. 45, as : 'Traiguṇyam guṇatrayasamudāyo viṣayo bodhyo yeṣāṃ, te tathā'.<sup>122</sup> The Commentary however explains it as : 'Traiguṇyāḥ, triguṇasṛṣṭau, sṛṣṭā ye jīvās tadviṣayās tadartham svargaphalakakarmabodhakā vedāḥ,' and 'Vedās traiguṇya-*aviṣayās* triguṇātmakasvarūpaphalapratipādakāḥ, na tu, sākṣād bhagavatsambandhapratipādakāḥ'.<sup>123</sup> Again the tirade against the *Vedas* in the *Gītā* is explained by Puruṣottama in his *Āvaraṇabhaṅga* as : 'Laukikim pratītim, ādāyaiva vakti'.<sup>124</sup> No such explanation is given in the *Amṛtatarāṅgiṇī*. Thus it may be said that the *Amṛtatarāṅgiṇī* is not written by Puruṣottama but, by Vrajarāya. The introduction is however quite differently conceived and contains all the characteristics of Puruṣottama's pen.

120. T. Sn. Ab. V. 21. p. 22.

121. 'Sṛīmad Bhagavad Gītā with 7 commentaries. p. 107..

122. T. Sn. Ab. V. 21. p. 22.

123. 'Sṛīmad Bhagavad Gītā with 7 commentaries. p. 111.

124. T. Sn. Ab. V. 21. p. 22.

Thus we think that it was prefixed to the commentary by Puruṣottama. It is very easy to understand how the work passed off under the name of our author. Puruṣottama has written many works and fathered them upon his elders, so the *Amṛtataraṅgiṇī* also, to which he has written only an introduction, might have been understood to be his.

### Remarks :

We have described above 67 works of Puruṣottama in all. Puruṣottama might have written many more independent works or commentaries than those, which have been noted above by me. The Sāṃpradāyic tradition has attributed to him such literature that can not be described as anything but vast. He is said to have written as many as nine lacs of Ślokas.<sup>125</sup> Some of his works might have been lost to us. It is also possible that some of his works might have been known and studied by some one or other scholar of the Saṃpradāya and I may not have been able to secure the same. The commentary on the *Dvātrīṃśadaparādhakṣamāpana-stotra* was not found by me. It is possible that there may be some such other works also. Anyway, I have given an account of as many works of Puruṣottama as I could get. I think that I have reviewed almost all his important works and many of his minor works. They are more than sufficient to show how Puruṣottama was a prolific writer, who tried to explain almost all the important works of his great ancestors and who also wrote dozens of independent works to elucidate clearly the principles of the Suddhādaita system, and to criticise the theories, which were unacceptable to him.

125. Cf. 'Yaḥ sarvam navalakṣapadyakamitaprauḍhaprabandham vyadhāt.'



Is it possible to find out a chronological order of his works? We have one piece of evidence for this purpose. Puruṣottama very often refers of his own works and we can easily say that the works, which are referred to, are definitely earlier than those, in which the references are found. The evidence is however not conclusive. It is possible that Puruṣottama might have been writing some works simultaneously. It is also possible that Puruṣottama might be referring to the works which were being written or which he might have only planned to write at the time of referring to them and might not have actually written them. Hence the argument based on these references does not appear to be sound.

Is it necessary to find out the chronological order of his works at all? The question of the chronological order of the works of many authors has been discussed and debated but I may be excused to say that more often than not the discussions of this type appear to be without much value. The chronological order of the works of a particular author should be fixed if and when we are in a position to point out the development of the genius of the author and if we are able to study how the author attained to that particular state of maturity. If we can not do this, the whole question of the chronological order loses its importance and value. What is the position of Puruṣottama? A study of the works of Puruṣottama reveals no such development or attainment of maturity. We have the same author, the same dialectician, with the same manner of presentation throughout in all his works, whether they may be important commentaries or independent works or just minor tracts. We do not therefore think it necessary to enter into such a discussion at all.

may appear rather difficult. Vallabha is too sparing, too laconic to the extent that the exact meaning which he intends to convey cannot often be understood without the help of explanation. Viṭṭhaleśa is surely clear in his writing, he can be easily understood but he shows a tendency for ornamental style, as found in some of the long sentences and compounds in his works.

Puruṣottama, as we have seen in the preceding chapter, is primarily a commentator. In the independent works also, his mission is not just to refute, what others have said and thought, but also to explain clearly his theories. He is simple and clear. He never embarks upon long passages studded with long compounds and difficult words. His sentences are well-balanced. He never tries to be ornate, though he has at his disposal the vast rich vocabulary of the Sanskrit language. He does not even appear to pause for a word, suitable words come to him and his pen goes on easily. He is a Sāstric writer and naturally we will find his language full of all the technical terms in Sanskrit literature. One, who is not conversant with the terminology, may find his works a hard nut to crack, but after the terms are understood, one will find the ease and even grace with which he writes. His explanations are often brimming with homely analogies like '*Sarvam padam hastipade nimagnam*'<sup>1</sup> and proverbs like '*Gajā yatra na gaṇyante maśakānām tu kā kathā*'.<sup>2</sup> The seriousness of the subject naturally requires some amount of dignity and maturity of style. Puruṣottama has the depth and profundity, dignity and maturity, combined with the ease and grace in the language. Puruṣottama however

1. - A. B. P. p. 318.

2. - A. B. P. p. 415.

does not attempt to be a stylist. He is an interpreter and argumentator. He should thus be studied from that point of view.

### Method and approach :

The tradition of the Śuddhādvaita thinkers recognises two methods of exposition, the *pramāṇa* method and the *prameya* method. Puruṣottama is said to have followed the former, while Harirāya and others the latter method. What exactly is meant by this? The words *pramāṇabala* and *prameyabala* are used by Vallabha himself, when he says in his *Prakāśa* on the *Tattvadīpanibandha* at the end of the first chapter that he has expounded the meaning of the *Sāstras* by taking recourse to the *pramāṇabala*, while he will speak out the decision on all the topics by resorting to the *prameyabala*.<sup>3</sup> The distinction between the *pramāṇa* and the *prameya* methods seems to have started on the basis of this reference. The distinction however does not appear to be a very well-known one, and both the terms *pramāṇapaddhati* and *prameyapaddhati* appear to have been very vaguely used. Puruṣottama explains the term *pramāṇabala* as the decided implication of the *pramāṇas*, i. e. the *prasthānas*, following their mutual reconciliation and harmonisation.<sup>4</sup> Puruṣottama gives two explanations for the *prameyabala*. Firstly *prameya* is the Highest Lord, who is known by all the *Vedas* and the like. He is omnipotent. Even then He is capable of particular actions in particular forms, which He assumes.

3. *Pramāṇabalam āśritya sāstrārtho vinirūṇitaḥ, Prameyabalam āśritya sarvanirṇaya ucyaṭe.* T. S. P. p. 168.

4. *Pramāṇānām vedādīnām śrībhāgavatāntānām balam parasparāvirodhena niṣcītam tātparyam ity arthaḥ.* T. S. Ab. p. 168.

This is the prameyabala.<sup>5</sup> Secondly prameya may be understood in the plural referring to the objects of our knowledge, obtained by means of our eyes etc. Their bala means their capacity to produce the particular effects.<sup>6</sup> What should be understood by the term pramāṇa? In this particular context it is to be restricted to denote only the verbal testimony. This would lead to the consideration of the svataḥprāmāṇyavāda and the śabdabala-  
lavicāra as against the parataḥprāmāṇyavāda and the arthabala-  
lavicāra respectively. On the basis of these two distinctions, Puruṣottama says that for those who accept that the means of proof are self-valid and who understand the Sāstrārtha on the strength of the word, and who do not entertain any doubt regarding the theories taught in the Sāstras, the first chapter of the *Nibandha* is written. Those who follow the parataḥprāmāṇyavāda or who do not accept the pramāṇas to be self-proved, and who approach the Sāstras on the ground of the arthabala, may doubt the theories, that have been propounded, or they may accept wrong theories; for them the second chapter is written by the Ācārya.<sup>7</sup> It will thus be seen that the pramāṇabala is for those who follow the svataḥprāmāṇyavāda and the śabdabala, while the prameyabala is for other who adhere to the parataḥprāmāṇyavāda and the arthabala. When one proceeds on the strength of the pramāṇa, one

5. Prameyasya sakalavedādivedyasya, bhagavato balam sarvasamarthatve' pi tattadrūpeṇa pratīyāta-tattatkāryakartṛtvādirūpam. T. S. Ab. p. 168.

6. Prameyāṇām Sāstrānugṛhitacakṣurādi janyapramāviṣayāṇām arthāṇām vā balam tattatkāryajananasāmāthyam.

T. S. Ab. p. 168.

7. Cf. T. S. Ab. p. 168.

would just make the statements regarding what is taught in the scriptures. When on the other hand, one takes recourse to the prameyabala, one would discuss the whole point from the point of view of the prameya or prameyas which are accepted to have certain characteristics; whereas one is śrutitantra, the other is vastu-tantra. This difference can be seen clearly from Vallabha's own treatment as found in the two chapters.

The difference between the two methods in the Śuddhādvaita can thus be explained: The pramāṇa refers to the authoritative scriptural texts. One who follows the texts, the injunctions, prohibitions, meditation, knowledge and even devotion, according to the texts, is called a pramāṇamārgī or a maryādābhakta. But one who irrespective of Vedic rules, approaches the Lord in the manner of the Gopīs, depending solely upon the Lord (Prameya), is called a prameyamārgī bhakta. In other words pramāṇamārga is the maryādāmārga, and the prameyamārga is the puṣṭimārga. The former completely follows the constitutional rules, while the latter solely relies upon the will of the Lord, irrespective of the constitution. We can thus say that Puruṣottama is out and out a pramāṇamārgī, while Harirāya is a prameyamārgī. Harirāya and others who have followed the prameyamārga, have something of mysticism in them; this is not found in Puruṣottama.

There are certain distinguishing characteristics which are found in Puruṣottama's method of presentation and discussion of various views. Puruṣottama comes very late in the philosophical field in India. As we have seen in chapter II, he had many well known contemporary scholars, who contributed some view or other, while commenting

upon the works of others or by means of independent compositions. Apart from that, he had before him the works of scores of illustrious predecessors, whose views were considered authoritative. The Suddhādvaita again was a comparatively modern system. Puruṣottama therefore adopted a comparative method. When any particular point comes up for discussion, Puruṣottama is never contented by giving his own point of view regarding it. He refers to almost all the scholars, who have expressed their views on that particular topic; he refutes them if he thinks it proper, otherwise he just keeps quiet after giving their opinions and stating his own. Thus for instance, in the very beginning of his *Prasthānaratnākara*, Puruṣottama deals with the determinate and indeterminate knowledge. He refers to the Bhāṭṭas, the Bāhyas, the author of *Vedāntaparibhāṣā*, the Naiyāyikas and the Prābhākaras and gives the view according to the Suddhādvaita after that. Again after stating the view of the Bhāṭṭas, he also shows how the nirvikalpaka jñāna as understood in the Bhāṭṭa school can be explained from the point of view of the 'Suddhādvaita'.<sup>8</sup> He refers to the Nihilists and shows how they should be refuted.<sup>9</sup> While dealing with the savikalpaka he refers to the Sāmpradāyika Naiyāyikas and Rāmanātha, whom he refutes.<sup>10</sup> In the *Khyātivāda* he enumerates and explains all the theories of erroneous perception and shows how they are acceptable or unacceptable. Puruṣottama keeps in mind not only the different views expressed by the scholars, but also the

8. Pr. pp. 8-10.

9. Pr. p. 10.

10. Pr. pp. 13-14.

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9. Pr. p. 10.

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refutations that they have given of the rival systems. Thus for instance in his *Prakāśa* on the *Aṅubhāṣya*. I. i. 2. Puruṣottama gives the arguments of those who think that Brahman can be inferred. He then refers to Bhāskara, who refutes this position. The arguments that have been advanced could not satisfy Rāmānuja, who gives his own refutation. The statement of all this is followed by a reference to Udayanācārya, who has given independent arguments to prove that Brahman or Īśvara can be established on the ground of reasoning. Puruṣottama then refers to the Sāmpradāyikamata, the Abhinavamata and to Vijñānabhikṣu and finally refutes them.<sup>11</sup> Similarly under the next Sūtra, he explains the Bhedābheda-vāda of Bhāskara, states its refutation as given by Vācaspati Miśra and then attacks Vācaspati for this refutation.<sup>12</sup> This is the position not only in discussing a particular theory, but even in commenting upon the *Aṅubhāṣya* and other works. In the *Prakāśa* on the *Aṅubhāṣya* at the end of almost every Sūtra or Adhikaraṇa, we find a statement of the interpretations of that Sūtra or set of Sūtras as given by other commentators. While so stating the different interpretations, he shows how and why Vallabha differs from them and how they are faulty. Sometimes he just gives these interpretations and does not make any comments. Thus for instance under sutra -II. ii. 18. Puruṣottama gives the interpretations of Rāmānuja and Bhāskara. The latter is similar to that of Śaṅkara. The same thing has been said with some minor difference

11. A. B. P. pp. 70-81.

12. A. B. P. p. 92-95.

by others also, says Puruṣottama.<sup>13</sup> It should be noted that Puruṣottama here makes no comments of his own. Similarly at the end of the Tarkapāda, Puruṣottama refers to Rāmānuja's interpretation of the Sūtras. II. ii. 42-45, in which Rāmānuja defends the Bhāgavata system. He also refers to Madhva who interpretes the Sūtras so as to repudiate the Śākta system. But he does not say anything for or against them. That is what we want to point out when we say that Puruṣottama adopts a comparative method. He compares the interpretations, theories and statements made by the scholars of his own school with those of others, and this he does, not just for the sake of refuting the other systems, which he very often does not refute. What he puts before us is a thorough comparison of these views and interpretations with or without his comments. This is very helpful for a clear understanding of the Suddhādvaita, when compared with other systems.

Secondly we should note that Puruṣottama's approach to the problems, he would like to discuss, is analytic. Whenever a certain point comes up for discussion, he does not skip over it by saying that this has been so ordered by the Ācārya or that this does or does not appear to be so. He would like to go to the root of the problem and with a thorough presentation of the original texts, he would proceed analysing the whole topic. An interesting illustration of the same can be found in a very scholarly and very difficult discussion of whether the affix, 'mayaṭ' means 'vikāra' or 'prācurya'. Under Sūtra I. i. 12, Puruṣottama refers to many grammatical works, right from Pāṇini's

13. *Etad eva kīncid varlakṣaṇyenānye' py āhuḥ.* A. B. P. p. 635.

*Aṣṭādhyāyī* upto the *Siddhāntaratnākara* of Rāmakṛṣṇa. Similar is his discussion of almost all the topics. Whenever a certain word is used, he explains the exact implication of the term, if it is very important for the theory, that is propounded. He wants to give us a clear picture of what is implied by the particular term; he is never confused or confusing. We shall here take certain examples to illustrate this point.

Individual souls are said to be *aṁśas* of Brahman. In the *Bhāṣyaparakāśa* at end of the third *pāda* of the second *adhyāya*, Puruṣottama discusses the exact implication of this term. He says that the term '*aṁśa*' is used in the *Smṛtis* and the *Sūtras*, while the term '*pāda*' is found in the *Śrutis*. Both are homonyms and are therefore vague. The word '*aṁśa*' may be used for a limb, a son, a piece, a part of something specific, and a constituent part in a bundle. As the *Śruti* passage '*Ardho vā eṣa ātmano yat patnīḥ*' shows, even a wife can be called an '*aṁśa*'. Similarly the term '*pāda*' also means a part or a limb. Even though any of these meanings can be used without being afraid of the contingency of resorting to *lakṣaṇā*, the relation of the *aṁśa* and the *aṁśin* should be understood so as to be in accord with the analogies of the spider and his web and the fire and sparks. This being the case, the *aṁśa* must be something like a part or a piece, the nature of which is not modified; it is therefore not completely or eternally separate from the *aṁśin*, nor is it just an attribute of the same.<sup>14</sup>

The term '*māyā*' is also similarly discussed and explained. Bhāskara says that *māyā* is a revelation devoid

14. A. B. P. pp. 766-767.

of its object. According to Rāmānuja it implies surprise and wonderment. In the Śuddhādvaita however māyā is a special power of the Lord. The proof for this is found in the Bhāgavata passages like, 'Naṭavan mūḍha māyābhir māyeśān no jigīṣasi.'<sup>15</sup> Māyā thus means the deluding capacity of the Highest Lord.<sup>16</sup>

The term 'Bhakti' in the Śuddhādvaita means service and love to the Lord i. e. Premasevā. Taking his clue from a cryptic statement of Vallabha—'Bhaktiśabdasya pratyayārthaḥ prema, dhātvarthaḥ sevā',<sup>17</sup> Puruṣottama develops the idea thus: The meaning is expressed by the affix and the base together and primarily by the affix. So the affix 'Ktin' which is capable of expressing the ordinary meaning of a root, is here combined with the root 'Bhāj' and so primarily expresses the act of worshipping. This is of the nature of service. The word 'sevā' has the conventional sense of physical activity, preceded by constancy or frequency, as can be seen from the usages like 'strisevā', 'auśadhasevā' etc. From the passages like 'Matsevayā pratītam ca' the said activity can be stated to be of the nature of service. Again these passages inform us of the pūrṇatva on account of the sevā. It is possible only when service is mixed with love, otherwise the trouble that it would give would prevent it from being called a puruṣārtha. This being the case, love is the motive and as such the dominant factor in the sevā. Thus it is the meaning of the affix, while the bodily service, which is subordinate to love, is the meaning of the base.<sup>18</sup>

15. Bhāgavata. VIII. 4.

16. A. B. P. p. 876.

17. T. Sn. P. p. 75.

18. T. Sn. Ab. p. 75.

While explaining that the Highest Lord is 'Rasarūpa', Purusottama enters into a discussion of the term 'Rasa'. The term 'Rasa', he says, is used for the taste, viz the quality which is grasped by the tongue, the mobile substance, the quintessence and that which produces happiness which can be enjoyed. The scriptural passages, *Rasam hy evāyam labdhvānandi bhavati* <sup>19</sup> 'Ko hy evanyat kaṅ prāṅyād yady eṣa ākāṣa ānando na syāt', 'Esa hy eva ānandayāti' <sup>20</sup> and others show that Rasa is the bliss, has the purpose of keeping the lifebreath, has its place in the cavity of the heart and produces joy. Thus Rasa is 'Hridayasthaprāṅitanandajanaka ānanda'. The joy which is produced of this, can be enjoyed in all the limbs and so it can be said to pervade the whole body, even then passages like 'sa mānasina ātmā janānām' gives its place to be the mind. Thus the sentiment which is produced in accordance with the theories of the Rasaśāstra, is also an effect of the same Rasa <sup>21</sup>.

An analysis, though short, of the concept of 'sneha' or love is also similarly found. Purusottama says that sneha is an attribute of the mind or the soul, it is not desire 'I like it, I have love for it, I am glad at it, but I do not want it', such sentences are used. Similarly, it is not just knowledge, because, knowledge may be also of our enemies, for whom we have definitely no sneha. Thus sneha is a dharmaviśeṣa <sup>22</sup>.

19 Taittirīya Upaniṣad II 7

20 Taittirīya Upaniṣad II 7

21 S S pp 252-253

22 S S p 7

Important concepts of other systems have also been discussed by our author in the same way. One such concept is 'saṅgati'. Puruṣottama explains 'saṅgati' as *Ananta-rābhudhānaprayojakākāṅksājanakajñānaviśayābrthak*. This means the desire to know why a certain statement is made after that which has already been made. That which is the object of the knowledge required to satisfy that desire, is called 'saṅgati'. It is sixfold, as stated in the verse

*Saprasaṅga upodghāto hetutāvasaras tathā,  
Nirvāhakaikakāryatve sodhā saṅgatiḥ iṣyate*

Prasaṅga is that which can not be avoided, when remembered. Upodghata establishes the topic in hand. Hetuta is the relation between the dependent and that upon which it depends. Avasara is something, which must be stated to satisfy the desire, which does not hinder the progress of the work. Nirvāhakatva serves the purpose of advancing the topic. Ekakāryatva produces an allied effect. This is the explanation of the nature of saṅgati, and not its definition. Puruṣottama himself would like to explain 'saṅgati' as the 'upeksanarhatva,' (not proper to be neglected) of that which is remembered, while the discussion is being carried on by an intelligent man<sup>23</sup>. Hetuta and others are the attributes of the 'upeksanarhatva' and are included in the saṅgati because they are related to the same. Again there is no limitation that 'saṅgati' is only sixfold, other divisions can also be accommodated<sup>24</sup>.

These and many other instances can be adduced to illustrate the analytical approach of Puruṣottama. Puruṣot-

23 *Savadhanapurusaṅgamanavakyaṅgajakāryatvena smṛtasyop  
eksanarhatram eva saṅgatiḥ* A B P pp 130 131

4 A B P pp 130 131

tama's style and method would show that there is something of a modern scholar in him. He has some sense of history, which is said to be so very rare in the works of Indian thinkers. A pointed instance of this is found in the famous *Bhāgavatasvarūpavīśayakāśankānīrāsavāda*, wherein Purusottama discusses whether the *Bhāgavata Purāṇa* is an old work. Puruṣottama says that if the *Bhāgavata* was a modern work, many authoritative writers would not have referred to it in their works. He then proceeds to give a list of those authors and works,<sup>25</sup> beginning with Śaṅkara who in his *Caturdaśamataviveka* refers to the *Bhāgavata*. He also refers to the commentaries on the *Pādmahasranāma* and *Upadeśasāhasrī*, *Saṃvatsarapradīpa* of Prācīna Gauda (Gaudapada ?), *Hemādriyatadānakhaṇḍa*, *Prakriyākāumudī* of Rāmacandra, *Kālanīrnayadīpikāvivarana* of Nṛsiṃhācārya, *Saccaritamīmāṃsā* of Vidyānīvaśa Bhaṭṭācārya, *Bhaktirasāyana* of Madhusūdana Sarasvatī, *Bhaktiratnāvalī* of Viśnupurī, *Ksemendraprakāśa* of Kṣemenāra, *Śivatattvaviveka* of Appayya Dīkṣita, *Nirṇayasindhu*, *Bhagavadbhāṣkāra*, *Dmakarodyota*, and *Caturvīṃśatīvyākhyā* of Bhaṭṭojī Dīkṣita. The list given here shows that Purusottama has in him something of a modern scholar, who would find out such references to prove the antiquity or otherwise of a particular work.

## Dialectics

The term dialectics has been used by most of the modern scholars for describing the philosophical method,

25 *Bhāgavatasvarūpavīśayakāśankānīrāsavāda*

as found in the *Bhāṣyas*, their commentaries, and such other works. Baldwin's *Dictionary* explains the term thus :

Dialectic : ...In ancient philosophy and logic : pertaining to reasoning and argument, and (as a noun) a system or course of reasoning or argument...

Dialectics : (In education) : The Art of teaching by means of discussion as seen in Plato's Dialogues and involving as with Socrates inductive appeals to special instances.<sup>26</sup>

Dr. P. D. Chandratre in his thesis on *Methodology* points out certain important distinctions between the Platonic dialectic and Vāda-paddhati, as followed by Sanskrit writers.<sup>27</sup> While we may not here enter into a discussion regarding this point, it will be sufficient to say that the term dialectic has been loosely used for the Vāda method.

*Vātsyāyana-Bhāṣya* on the *Nyāyasūtras* of Gautama informs us that there are three types of Kathā or debate, viz. Vāda, Jalpa, and Vitaṇḍā.<sup>28</sup> Vāda proceeds with the sole purpose of arriving at the ascertained truth.<sup>29</sup> Gautama calls it a discussion with students, teachers, co-students and persons, who are interested in reaching at

26. Baldwin: *Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology*. Vol. I. p. 278.

27. Chandratre: *Methodology*. p. 238.

28. Tisraḥ: kathā bhavanti, tādō, jalpo vitaṇḍā ceti. *Vātsyāyana-Bhāṣya*. p. 70.

29. *Tattvanirṇayaphalaḥ kathāviśeṣo vādaḥ. Sarvadarśanasamgraha*. p. 239.



a method of mental experimentation, which Plato called the 'Dialectic'—a method well-fitted for use in conversation or dialogue. It consisted in taking up any belief, one of the speakers chose to present; treating it as an hypothesis, and following it ruthlessly to its extreme conclusions. If for one reason the consequences of the hypothesis were unacceptable, a new hypothesis must be tried; and the process may be continued until one is found which leads to no error. Thus the dialectic is a progressive thinking process. The true hypothesis would be the dialectical survivor."<sup>36</sup>

Coming to the Indian Vāda, we can say, following Dr. Chandratre, that according to the definition of Gautama, quoted above there are three features that constitute a Vāda. Firstly the contrary viewpoints should be supported and condemned by means of proofs and reasonings. Secondly none of the view points, accepted or repudiated must be entirely against the main thesis. Vātsyāyana explains the significance of this condition when he says that the fallacy of contradiction (Hetvābhāsa) of Siddhāntavirodha, can be used in the Vāda, but the proper place for the clinchers or nigrāhasthānas is the jalpa or vitaṇḍā, and not Vāda.<sup>37</sup> Third condition of the Vāda is that both the supporting and condemning must be in accordance with the reasoning of five-membered syllogism. It should be however noted that mostly all the writers on the Vedānta

36. W. K. Hocking : *types of Philosophy*. p. 489. Quoted by Chandratre : *Methodology*. pp. 29-30.

37. *Siddhāntam abhyūpetya tadvirodhi viruddhaḥ iti hetvābhāsasya nigrāhasthānasyānujñā vāde. Vatsyāyanabhāṣya*. p. 70. Also see. *Jalpe nigrāhasthānaviniyogād vāde tatpratīṣedhaḥ. Vātsyāyanabhāṣya*. p. 70.

carry on with the three-membered syllogism consisting of *pratiñā*, *hetu* and *udaharana*

In the light of what has been stated above, we would like to examine the *Vādagranthas* of Purusottama. The *Vādagranthas* would in themselves provide for a very important study of Purusottama's dialectics, because they are independent, compact and to the point. An analysis of some of his *Vādas* is given below, so that we may be able to find out the salient features of his *Vādagranthas*.

The *Prahastavāda*, as we have already said, is a composite work of three sections or *avāntaravādas*. It begins with the verse —

*Śrutīśirasī yasya mahīma nirupadhīr*  
*Īśo pi yasya khalu mahīmā,*  
*Tam Kṛṣṇam ādimūrtim namāmi*  
*Niravadyasadguṇam brahma* <sup>38</sup>

The first quarter leads to the discussion on the meaning of the *Vedāntas*. The opponent asks as to how the first quarter can be explained. Puruṣottama replies that all the *Vedāntas* teach Brahman, i. e. they are *Brahma para*. The follower of Śaṅkara points out here the *avastāvika-brahma-paratva*, to which the author says that this is a *śrauta* system and only the *Śrutis* should be accepted as the valid *Pramaṇa* and the thoughts, which go against them, should be countered on the strength of reasoning, which does not go against the *Śrutis*. The author then goes on to show how the belief in the *Sopādhika-brahma-paratva* of the *Śrutis* is untenable, as

it is not vouched for by the scriptural evidence That Brahman has attributes is made out in the *Śrutis* and only the material attributes are rejected Thus Brahman is an abode of contradictory attributes So far, Purusottama bases all his observations on the scriptural passages hundreds of which are quoted and interpreted Purusottama now attacks the theory of Avidya on logical grounds He asks whether Avidya is with or without beginning, whether it is related to the jiva or Brahman, and whether it is sat, asat, both sat and asat or neither sat nor asat Purusottama points out that none of these alternatives is acceptable<sup>39</sup> Purusottama again comes back to the scriptural passages which he explains in extenso to show how they can not be called upon to prove the theory of mayā Purusottama at the end proves the avikṛtaparīnāmavada on the scriptural authority and finally comes again to his point, '*Tasmāc chrutiśirasī nirupadhūr eva brahmano mahimā pratipādyata iti sūpapannam*'<sup>40</sup>

The second part of the *Prahastavāda* is said to be based on the second quarter of the verse quoted above Purusottama begins with a question Accepting that Brahman has endless forms, should all the forms be accepted as equal or should we think that one of them is principal and the others are subordinate? Some think that it is in fact formless but assumes forms owing to māyā and so, whether they are equal or subordinate in relation to one another, does not make any difference Others say that all the forms are māyika, of them that of Viṣṇu is the

39 Prh pp 21-22

40 Prh p 34

highest Still others opine for Śiva The followers of Bhedavāda make out that only one is Brahman, while the other is jīva The author then says that in fact Brahman is beyond the three qualities regulates the *mayā*, is an abode of contradictory qualities and is thus endowed with all the forms It is and is not an agent, it is thus not an object of any dispute, it is faultless and on the analogy of blind men and an elephant, it assumes various forms to give the reward to various worshippers The theory of *maya* has already been refuted The Bhedavāda is not taught by the *Śrutis* Thus the difference of the forms should be discussed Out of these the Highest is transcendental and another is of the nature of *Vibhūti*, the others are still inferior to it Which of them is *Mahamahimayukta* <sup>41</sup> This is a sort of introduction to what Purusottama really wants to write He then states the views of Appayya Dīksita as found in *Śivatattvaviveka*, and refutes him thoroughly with a Vaiṣṇavaite interpretation of the *Śrutis*, *Smṛtis*, *Puraṇas* and all that At the end he says that *Bhagvat* is the principal form of Brahman, and Śiva is the main *Vibhūti* Thus the proposition in the second quarter of the verse is established <sup>42</sup>

The third part deals with the third quarter of the said verse Purusottama here says that *Kṛṣṇa* is the *Ādimūrti* and discusses it on the basis of the *Puranas* minor *Upanisads*, and refutes the contention that *Kṛṣṇatva* is *marīka*

41 Prh p 35

42 Prh p 233

*Bhedābhedasvarūpanirṇaya* begins with :  
*Brahmābhedopāsanāj jñānato vā*  
*Brahmātmaikye' py aṁśatām atyajantaḥ,*  
*Yasyaiśvaryād āsate yanniyamyās*  
*Tam Śrikṛṣṇam devadevam namāmi.<sup>43</sup>*

The verse thus states, the oneness of Brahman and Ātman, the aṁśatva of the individual soul in spite of the said oneness and that everything is controlled and regulated by the Highest Lord. Thus it is necessary to discuss whether the abheda tolerates the bheda or not. The opponent argues that it does not, and makes out a case for absolute Monism. Puruṣottama replies that the theory of Satkāryavāda, which is based on the *Śrutis*, shows that everything existed even prior to the creation. So the attributes like ākāra and kāryatva should be accepted as existing in Brahman. If they are different from Brahman, it would go against the Advaitaśruti. Hence we should accept that Brahman is endowed with the required attributes and is the cause. The effects are one with the cause, though they are mutually different from one another. Similar is the case with the relation of Brahman and Jagat. The relationship between Brahman and the jīvas is like that of gold and a lump of gold. This is also abheda, which tolerates bheda. As here the whole argument proceeds on the basis of Satkāryavāda, Puruṣottama has to refute the Asatkāryavāda, and the belief in the Prāgabdhāva. This is based on reasoning and not verbal testimony. Puruṣottama again comes back to his point and shows how the Bhedasahiṣṇu-abheda is to be accepted in the states of deluge and liberation.

<sup>43</sup> *Bhedābhedasvarūpanirṇaya*, *Vādāvalī*, p. 16.

*Sṛṣṭibhedavāda* is a very important work of Purusottama. It begins with ·

*Yo lilayā kīla gavām avanāya gotram  
Haste' tikomalatame kṛpayā dadhāra,  
Yadrūpam etad akhīlam yata āsa yasmāt  
Sadvad vibhāti tam ajam śaraṇam prapadye.*<sup>44</sup>

The statement of the third quarter is called into question by those, who believe in the Paramāṇuvāda. Purusottama refutes them by strongly attacking the very thesis that the paramāṇus can be the cause. The definition of the atom, as given by the Vaiśeṣikas, is criticised by him vehemently. He says that it is not from the subtle that the gross is produced, on the other hand the gross cause gives rise to subtle effects, as can be surmised from various instances. Purusottama also takes the opportunity to refute the concept of Abhāva. After thus repudiating the ārambhavāda, Purusottama refers to the Anisvara sāmkyas and their theories. They are answered mainly on the scriptural grounds, though the non-sentiency of the Prakṛti is also pointed out. Thus Purusottama says that the sentient Brahman should be accepted as the material and the efficient cause as also the agent of the world on the authority of the Śrutis.<sup>45</sup> Now Purusottama here refers to the Ekadeśin who does not agree to the theory of Pariṇāma and who therefore advances the Vivartavāda. The author here details the arguments of the māyāvādin, for rejecting the Sāmkyan pariṇāmavāda and accepting

44. *Sṛṣṭibhedavāda. Vādāvali. p 82*

45 *Tasmād brahma cetanam jagata upādānam nimittam kartṛ ceti śrutibhya eva mantavyam Vādāvali p 96*

the māyāvāda Purusottama refutes the māyāvāda on scriptural authority, though he uses logic also <sup>46</sup> At the end the Śuddhādvaita views of Āvirbhāva-tirobhāva and Avikrtaparīṇāma are fully explained

In the beginning of the *Khyātivāda* we have the following verse

*Yanmōyayā bahukṣiptā khyāyate buddhir arthavat,  
Nivartate ca yadbodhāt tam namāmi janārdanam.*<sup>47</sup>

The objector can not agree to the first line, but Purusottama answers his objections and says that he is in favour of the Anyakhyāti. Purusottama refers to the Naiyāyikas, who believe in the Anyathākhyati This is refuted on purely logical grounds Similarly the Bhāṭtas, the Prābhākaraś, the Mayāvādins, the Samkhya and Rāmānuja are referred to All are refuted except the last, whose view is also not accepted in toto The difference in the views held by the Viśiṣṭādvaita and the Śuddhādvaita is described and explained by the author Purusottama shows how both Akhyāti and Anyakhyāti are accepted in his system

*Āvirbhāvatirobhāvavāda* is a very important work in as much as it deals with the theory of manifestation and non-manifestation, which constitutes the basic plank of the Śuddhādvaita The first verse runs

*Yadāvirbhāva ānanda āvirbhavati sarvatah,  
Tirobhavanti santāpās tam śraye gokuleśvaram* <sup>48</sup>

46 *Śṛṣṭibhedavāda Vādavalī* p 104

47 *Khyātivāda Vādāvalī* p 119

48 *Āvirbhāvatirobhāvavāda Vādavalī* p 182

The opponent says that one who does not agree to the production and destruction of the effects can not also explain the manifestation and non-manifestation. Purusottama makes out a very strong case for his view. He discusses the Satkāryavāda, utpatti, prāgabhāva and all the theories connected with the Abhāvas, vehemently refutes them and finally explains the Suddhādvaita concept of manifestation and non-manifestation and how it is to be applied to the creation of the world and the Jīvas.

Lastly we shall refer to the *Khalālapanaividhvamsa vāda*, which is metrical and thus unique in certain respects. It does not begin with a verse to which the opponent objects. Puruṣottama here straightly plunges into discussion, when he says that certain followers of the Śākta system doubt there is Śaktitva in the Highest Lord, looking to the ornaments worn by him. Puruṣottama gives the authority of scriptures to prove the masculine character of God. He also refers to the *Svāmnyastaka* and the *Sarvasvatisthāpana*.

We need not refer here to all his *Vādas*, because the *Vādas* which we have referred to will be sufficient for studying the vada-paddhati of Puruṣottama. A study of the above *Vādas* will make clear the following points.

Most of the *Vādas* of Puruṣottama follow a definite fixed pattern. The first verse in almost each of these tracts is written in the form of a benediction, but besides, it also suggests the hypothesis, which is immediately tried. Sometimes we find, as in the first part of the *Prahasta*, that logic is subordinated to scriptures, but that is quite in keeping with the accepted view that the śabda is the highest authority in the suprasensuous realms of metaphy-



sics. It must however be stated to the credit of Puruṣottama, that whenever he argues against a certain theory, he uses logic, if that particular theory is advanced on the ground of reasoning and only when the opponent adduces scriptures in his support, Purusottama meets him on that ground. The first part and even the whole of the *Prahastavāda* is directly concerned with the scriptures. When however the occasion arises, the discourse is carried on with reasoning. Other hypotheses are also put forward as in *Srstibhedavāda* and *Khyātivāda*. They are however refuted by our author, who gives various arguments, logical and scriptural to support his own view and to refute the views of others. We may say that this comes very near to the Platonic Dialectic, as explained by Hocking. There is however one very important point of difference. In Platonic Dialectic the first hypothesis which has been put forward need not be necessarily accepted and other views are tried, when the first is found unacceptable. In the *Vādagrāntas*, as we have seen, the hypothesis suggested by the benedictory verse is the author's own view about the point. Thus the same is finally accepted after other theories are rejected. It can be pointed out, though it is very rare, that the rival theory is not entirely repudiated, while it is neither accepted tully. Thus Ramānuja's view about erroneous perception is not completely refuted in the *Khyātivāda*.

We can as well say that these tracts satisfy the requirements of the Indian Vada. The contrary view points are supported and refuted on the basis of proofs and reasoning. We have noted above that proofs for a Vedantin include scriptures as the final authority. They are to be supported by tarka or reasoning. The ancient logicians

classify tarka into 11 but the modern school accepts only 5 Ātmāśraya (Ignoratio elenchi), anyonyaśraya (Petitio principii), cakraka (circle), anavasthā (regressus ad infinitum), and pramāṇabādhitārthaprasaṅga (reductio ad absurdum) The other six are vyāghata, lāghava, gaurava, utsarga, apavāda, and vaijātya <sup>40</sup> Many of these tarkas are very often found in the *Vādas* of Puruṣottama We may here take some illustrations

The Pramāṇabādhitārthaprasaṅga is found in the *Bhedābhedaśvarūpanirṇaya*, when our author says that if the attributes like ākara, kāryatva, and the like are not accepted as existing in Brahman before creation, the scriptural passages, teaching the satkāryavada, would be rendered meaningless If the effects are said to exist separately from Brahman, it would go against the passages teaching oneness Hence for reconciling these two, we shall have to accept Brahman, which is endowed with these attributes, as the cause <sup>50</sup> This is Pramāṇabādhitārthaprasaṅga

Ātmāśraya and anavastha are found together when Puruṣottama is refuting the concept of production in the asatkāryavada As it is with number, so with production also we should believe that production is produced This is not only without any proof, but it leads to the fallacy of regressus, because utpatti requires another utpatti, this again the third and so on It should not be stated that utpatti is produced from itself, on the basis of the usages like 'Utpattiḥ jata', because that would be ātmāśraya <sup>51</sup>

49 Cf *Sarvadarśanasamgraha* pp 238 239

50 *Vadavali* p 18

51 *Ibid* p 189

Besides these which have been illustrated here, there are many other reasons found in Puruṣottama's argumentation. Thus for instance we find Anyonyāśraya,<sup>52</sup> mānābhāva,<sup>53</sup> dr̥ṣṭāntābhava,<sup>54</sup> prasiddhatva,<sup>55</sup> kalpanā-gaurava,<sup>56</sup> ativyāpti,<sup>57</sup> etc.

The second requirement of a Vāda is that both the view points should not be completely against the main thesis. The idea behind this requirement is, as we have seen above, that the clinchers should not be used in a vāda, the proper place for them being jalpa or vitaṇḍā. In the *Vādas* of our author the contingency of Siddhāntabhaṅga is very often found used against the adversary. We shall see one illustration of this.

The atom is defined in the Vaiśeṣika system as : *'Bhautikatve sati nityo gatimān paramāṇuḥ.'* What is the bhautikatva here? Is it bhūta-sambandhitva? In that case all the premordial elements like earth etc. do not exist in the beginning of creation; there can be no question of the bhūta-sambandhitva. If the opponent takes into account the existence of space, it would also include the mind, and thus the definition will be too wide. If for averting this contingency he refuses to accept the creation as such, the atoms themselves can not exist and this would be tantamount to Siddhāntabhaṅga.<sup>58</sup>

52. Ibid. p. 173.

53. Ibid. p. 186.

54. Ibid. p. 189.

55. Ibid. p. 187.

56. Ibid. p. 189.

57. Ibid. p. 201.

58. Ibid. p. 85.

The third requirement of a Vāda is regarding the five-membered syllogism. The writers on the Vedānta, however, do not generally give all the five but they give only the first three members viz. Pratiñā, Hetu, and Udāharaṇa. Puruṣottama's Vādas afford us with many syllogisms.

One important point which we should note is that the Vādas of Puruṣottama never assume the form of jalpa or vitanda. Most of his Vādagranthas are intended to prove something and not to disprove something. The *Prahasta* and the *Khalālapanaividhyamsa Vādas* are specially directed against the Śaivas and the Śaktas respectively, but there is not just an attitude of putting down an adversary. In the *Prahasta* Puruṣottama proves that Brahman is the teaching of the Vedāntas, that Śiva is the principal Vibhūti and that Kṛṣṇa is the mūlarūpa. In the *Khalālapanaividhyamsavāda* we find that Puruṣottama tries to emphasise the personal aspect of God. One may perhaps point out that the *Jivapratibimbavakhaṇḍanavāda*, as its name indicates, is meant to refute the theory of the followers of Śaṅkara. The last verse of the *Vāda* also lends support to this<sup>59</sup>. But we should bear in mind that after refuting the theory of Pratiḥimba, Puruṣottama shows how the theory of amsatva is faultless. The Prasāṅga dialectics is often found in these works, when Puruṣottama offers different alternatives for understanding the opponent's theory and rejects all of them. But the trend of arguments is never destructive for the sake of

59 Iti śrīvallabhacaryavacun aśayigocaram Pratiḥimbatvavakhaṇḍanam visadikṛtam Vādavalī p 182

being simply destructive. The alternatives are, on the other hand, offered to show the inherent inconsistencies in the theory, which is attacked. Thus when he says that the *māya* is neither *sat*, nor *asat*, nor again both *sat* and *asat* and not even different from both *sat* and *asat*, he points out how the theory of *māyā* cannot be logically explained and accepted.

The observations, which we have made regarding the *Vādagranthas* are equally applicable to the discussions, that are found in other works of our author.

As regards the fallacies of reasons (*hetvābhasas*) the author himself discusses the topic in his *Prasthānaratnākara*. We would like to give here his own explanations and illustrations. The Naiyāyikas classify fallacious reasons into five, *savyabhicāra*, *viruddha*, *sat-pratīpakṣa*, *asiddha* and *badhita*.

*Savyabhicāra* is the straying reason which is explained as *Sādhyatadabhāvasādhakatayā pratīyamānah*. It is twofold—common (*Sadhāraṇa*) and uncommon (*asādhāraṇa*). The former is that which proves both the *sādhyā* and its absence by positive concomitance, e. g. "*Dhūmavān Valneh*" The latter does the same by negative concomitance, e. g. "*Śabdah anityah Śabdavāt*". The logicians give a third variety also called non-conclusive (*anupasamhārin*), which is explained as, *Avrttisādhyakatva* e. g. "*Ākāśavān Dīśah*". Sometimes it is understood as *kevalanvayīdharī āvacchinnaṅpakṣaka* e. g. "*Sarvam anityam Prameyavāt*". The fault here lies with the obstruction in understanding the negative concomitance.

Adverse reason or *viruddha* *hetu* is explained as, "*Sādhyā asāmā ādhikarano hetuh*". The *hetu* is not

coeval with the sādhyā but is entirely different from it e g *Gauh Asvatīvāt* This, says Puruṣottama, is not different from the svarūpasiddhi

Sat-pratīpakṣa or opposable reason is that which obstructs the understanding of the sādhyā e g *Jalam usnam Sparśavattīvāt Nosnam Atejavāt*

Unestablished reason or asiddha is explained as '*Vyabhicārādī anyaparāmarśapratibandhakatavacchedaka dharmatvam asiddhiḥ*' It has three varieties (1) Svarūpasiddhi, e g *Ghataḥ pṛthivī Patatīvāt* (2) Āśrayasiddhi e g *Gaganakamalam surabhukamalam Surabhukamalatvat* (3) Vyāpyatvāsiddhi, e g the concomitance of fire and smoke is absent in a cloud of dust It can also be said to exist when the Sādhyā or the hetu is unknown

Badha or stultified reason is explained as '*Pakṣe sādhyāśūnyatvam*' Thus for instance fire does not exist in water

Puruṣottama discusses upādhi as a fallacy It is defined as '*Sādhyavyāpakatve sati Sadhanavyāpakatvam upādhiḥ*' Thus for instance the syllogism like '*Yagīya himsa adharmasadhanam himsātīvāt*' has this fault because it does not take into account the nisedha of himsa when enjoined in the scriptures<sup>60</sup>

One important point, which we may here note with regard to the dialectical method of Puruṣottama, is that as an honest debater, he does not resort to unfair means of argumentation as employed in the jalpa or vitaṇḍa

Dialectic quibbling or chala is one such way which means a wilful misrepresentation of the views of the opponent<sup>61</sup> It is classified into three, vāk-chala, sāmānya-chala and upacāra-chala In the first, the meaning, which is not intended to be conveyed, is assumed, when the statement of the opponent is vague In the second an absurd signification is urged by using too generic a term. The third is based on the secondary meaning of the words. It is necessary that the views of the opponent should be correctly presented before they are attacked, and we find this particular virtue in the discussions of Purusottama, who has never taken recourse to any of the chalas, mentioned above Not only so, but at many places we shall find the quotations of the view-points of others. Thus for instance the catuṣkoṭīka dialectics of the Bauddhas,<sup>62</sup> the theory of S̄yādvada, as explained by Anantavīrya,<sup>63</sup> the views of logicians, Mīmāṃsakas and others, given in the works of Purusottama, would show that Purusottama is always careful in the presentation of the opinions of others Not only so but at some places he would also show the contents of certain books Thus for instance he says that the Sāṃkhya, well-known by the name of *Kapilasūtras*, has two versions One has 28 Sūtras and is commented upon by Pañcaśikha, the other is *Sāṃkhyapravacanasūtra* in 6 Adhyāyas While the first version just mentions the topics taught in the system, it is the second which explains them fully<sup>64</sup>

61 *Vacana-vaghatō' rthavikalpōpapattya chalam Nyayasūtras*

I II. 10.

62 A B P. p 658

63 A B P. p 664

64 A B P p 154

We have noted above that Purusottama has the dignity and elegance of style. As a result of this he does not very often jeer at his opponents. He treats Śaṅkara, Rāmaṇuja Madhva and all the acāryas with equal respect, as can be seen from the fact that he never uses singular number for them. Singular is used by him only for Śrīkanṭha and Bhikṣu, for neither of whom he seems to have much regard. For Śrīkanṭha, of course, the discussion has more or less the sectarian bias. Purusottama has, again, adopted a critical and liberal attitude. There is however sometimes some caustic criticism from his pen<sup>65</sup>. But they are very rare. Barring some stray passages we can say that Purusottama maintains a high standard of discussion, below which he does not go.

The last point, which we should take into account in relation to Purusottama's argumentation is whether he is himself open to the charge of punarukta, which is a clincher. In many of his works the same arguments are repeated. The theory that darkness is an object is found discussed in the *Prasthanaratnākara*,<sup>66</sup> *Andhakāravāda*<sup>67</sup> and in the *Avāranabhanga*<sup>68</sup>. Similarly the theory of jiva-

65 Of (1) *Ata evam satyapī yat tadavicāreṇānandamaye dukkhaṣṭitvakathanam tad granthakṛto mahadul'khasamskarasya pr bāyam eva gamayati itī dīk A B P p 199* This is against Śaṅkara. (2) *Ata idam bhikṣavaiyagyadaśayam evavadīd itī dīk A B P p 237* This is against Vijnāna bhikṣu. (3) *Vaiśaṣikadarśanasya ulukarūpinī kapaḍena kṛtatvat Vadavalī p 140* This is against the Vaiśeṣikas in the *Andhakāravāda* etc.

66 Pr p 111 ff

67 *Andhakāravāda Vadavalī*

68 Γ S Ab p 125 ff



pratibimbatva is refuted strongly in the *Prasthānatnākara*,<sup>69</sup> the *Vāda* bearing the same name,<sup>70</sup> and the *Āvaraṇabhanga*<sup>71</sup> That an individual soul is atomic is proved in the *Āvaraṇabhanga*,<sup>72</sup> and *Anubhāsyaprakāśa*<sup>73</sup> The way in which God can be realised is explained in the *Anubhāsyaprakāśa*<sup>74</sup> and *Prasthānatnākara*,<sup>75</sup> the passages being completely similar. The *Sṛṣṭiprakṛiya* in the *Anubhāsvaprakāśa*<sup>76</sup> should be compared with that in the *Prasthānatnākara*<sup>77</sup> The refutation of the concept of *Abhāva* is found at many places<sup>78</sup> All these passages have a close affinity not only from the point of view of arguments but even expressions, to the extent that one appears to have been almost quoted from another It is quite likely that Purusottama might have quoted in his works from other works of his own. But does this constitute the fault of repetition? Repetition would be a fault, only when it occurs in the same work and not in different works On the other hand Puruṣottama's intention seems to be that even if one of his works is read, the reader can understand the arguments,

69 Pr p 129 ff

70 *Jivapratibimbatkhaṇḍanavada* in the *Vadavali*

71 T Sn Ab p 102 ff

72 T S Ab p 92 ff

73 A B P p 798 ff

74 A B P p 803 ff

75 Pr p 137

76 A B P p 810 ff

77 Pr p 160 ff

78 Pr p 111 ff T Sn Ab. p 89 ff *Sṛṣṭibhedavāda*, *Āvirbhāvatirobhavatada*, etc

which lead to the position accepted by the Suddhadvaista. The repetition may strike one, who reads many of his works

### Important refutations

Purusottama has refuted almost all other systems in one way or another. It is difficult to show here how he has refuted all these theories, because it will make a volume in itself if we take down all the arguments, advanced by him against others. It will however be useful to see some of his important refutations,

While the Buddhistic theories are rejected by him, when commenting upon *Aṅubhāṣya*, he has independently repudiated the Buddhistic theory of *Sūnyavada*. He asks whether the proof by which the nihilist established the void, exists or does not exist. If it does exist the existence of the *pramāṇa* would go against the accepted principle of void. If it does not exist, how can the principle of void be established with the help of a *Pramāṇa*, which does not exist at all?

The Buddhists advance their famous four-cornered dialectics for establishing the theory of void. They give four alternatives, *sat*, *asat*, *sadasat*, and *sadasadvīlakṣaṇa*, and reject them all. That, which does not exist at all can not be produced by the usage of words. Thus for instance the horn of a hare does not exist at all. That which exists can not be produced either from that which exists or from that which does not exist. The pot or a sprout is produced only by the destruction of a lump of clay or a seed respectively, and so it is not produced from *bhāva*. It can neither be produced from *abhāva*, because otherwise the

essence of non-existence must inhere in the effect, but it is not seen inherent. It can not be produced from itself, because that would be tantamount to the fallacy of *ignoratio elanchi*, and also that of absence of purpose. It cannot further be produced from anything else because in that case everything will be produced from everything, in as much as the other thing, which is the cause, is not definite and thus may be anything. Thus when the concept of production is rejected, that of destruction is also similarly refuted. We can not again accept both *sat* and *asat*, because as *sat* and *asat* are mutually different from each other, one thing cannot be both. The last alternative is also not possible because one thing cannot be different from both *sat* and *asat*, and nothing is seen corresponding to it in the world. Hence the void or *Sūnyatā*, which is kept out of the four alternatives, is the only principle and the attainment of void is salvation according to them.

*Puruṣottama* gives a spirited reply to this. Is the principle of void arrived at by the nihilist on the basis of any proof or just on the basis of the *vastu* without taking the help of any proof? It can not be latter, because then it would be well known to all, like the space and there would be no dispute regarding the same. Again does that basis exist or not? If it does then the *śūnya* which is the abode of this basis must also exist and hence it cannot be kept out of the four alternatives. Similar is the case if it does not exist. Coming to the first alternative even the *pramāṇa* must be either existent or non-existent and this would again bring the whole thing in the four alternatives. What again is the proof, by which the void is established? Is it perception or inference? The former is not possible,

because the object of perception is not well-known to all. Inference is also not helpful. The syllogism, "whatever is inexplicable is *sūnya*," is not proper, because of the want of illustration. For the Buddhists, everything is included in the *pakṣa*. If another syllogism is tried, '*Ghataḥ sūnyah Uktarītyā vicārāsahatvāt Patavat*,' then there is the fallacy of straying reason because in the case of the piece of cloth or the golden ornaments, the theory of the production of an effect after the destruction of a cause (*Upamrdya prādurbhāvah*) is not accepted by all. Hence we must accept the theory of '*Bhavād bhāvotpattiḥ*' and that would go against the *vicarasahatva*, which has been made out. The nihilists are thus refuted by their own arguments.<sup>79</sup>

After refuting the Jain theory of *Syadvāda* following Vallabha, Purusottama refers to one Anantavīrya, who says that the seven statements are based upon the *vivakṣa* or the desire to express a particular thing. Thus when we want to posit a thing, we would say '*Syād asti*', and if we desire to negate it, the statement would be '*Syān nāsti*'. If both positing and negating are desired in a certain order, we have '*Syād asti ca nāsti ca*'. If on the other hand both are desired to be stated simultaneously then the sentence is '*Syād avācyam*'. If the positive is to be stated as indescribable, we have '*Syād asti ca avācyam ca*' and if that is a case with the negative, then '*Syān nāsti ca avācyam ca*' would be the sentence. If all the three are desired to be expressed, we have the last statement, '*Syād asti ca nāsti ca avācyam ca*'.

Puruṣottama asks whether the seven statements which are explained on the ground of *Vivakṣā*, are the natural attributes of the objects or they are adventitious or superimposed or they have that particular thing as their object. If they are natural attributes, they definitely exist and the question of any desire to express does not arise. They cannot be adventitious, because in the absence of definite natural attributes, the adventitious one cannot be stated, as it would go against perception. Nor they can be superimposed, because the attributes, which are superimposed, cannot make the existing ones indefinite. The last alternative is equally wrong, because just by imagining any such position the natural attributes can not be made indefinite. The ancient scholars have already shown how they are mutually inconsistent and contradictory.<sup>80</sup>

Purusottama is very critical of the Vaiṣeṣika concept of paramāṇus. He has refuted the vaiṣeṣika theory of paramāṇus as the cause, while commenting upon *Aṇubhāṣya*.<sup>81</sup> In the *Sṛṣṭibhedavāda*, however, he attacks the very definition of paramāṇus, as given by them. The paramāṇu is defined by them as : '*Bhautikatve sati nityo gatimān paramāṇuḥ.*' What is meant by bhautikatva here? It can not be the quality of being related to the premordial elements, because in the beginning of creation, we can not imagine the existence of elements like the earth, other than those, which are to be created. If the Vaiṣeṣikas point to the existence of space, the definition would as well apply to the mind also. If they do not accept the

80. A. B. P. p. 664.

81. A. B. P. p. 620. ff.

state in the beginning of creation the paramāṇus themselves cannot be accepted and this would amount to Siddhāntabhanga. Bhauktikaṭva again cannot be bhūta-samavāyitva, the quality of being inherent in the elements, because the premordial elements themselves do not exist as shown above. If the definition is somehow understood because of yogyatā, even then, it is too wide and would include the mind also on the strength of the description of the mānasa-srṣṭi in the *Purānas* and the *Yogaśāstra*. If that is accepted as iṣṭāpatti, just as the Paramāṇus would be fivefold, the mind also would be partite and this would go against the eternal nature of the mind. The opponent is thus on the horns of a dilemma.

The Vaiśeṣikas argue that the whole world is produced from substances having less and less of sphericity. This is the case of everything upto the trasareṇu. The dvyāṇukas are also produced from still smaller substances because they are capable of producing the mahat and the dirgha<sup>82</sup>. This would lead to the paramāṇus, which have infinitesimal sphericity and they are not produced from anything else.

Purusottama syas that apart from the question of definition, the argument given above can be advanced further and we can say that as the paramāṇus are capable of producing the objects of medium sphericity viz the dvyānukas, they must also be understood as produced and this would go against their eternity. It should not be argued that the point, where we stop, while going to the cause from the effect, is the paramāṇu, because this would run counter to the accepted principle. If that is done, so

as to avert the contingency of regressus, it is better to leave aside the whole theory of ārambhavāda.

Again the body is made of five elements in which the elements like water are mixed with each other. At the time of separation they would be relegated to the position of atoms and so the clay and the like would not be visible at all. Thus the theory is against perception also.

Again the substances are said to be produced not from the point of view of having a particular form (Rūpavattva), because this would include the atoms of air also. They can not again be from the point of view of mūrtatva, because that would include the mind also, but here the Vaiśeṣikas accept the sparśavattva. Even here it includes the mind, because, the concept of conjunction has been accepted with regard to the mind and conjunction is not different from touch. Hence the theory is fallacious from this point of view also.<sup>83</sup>

Puruṣottama has very vehemently rejected the concept of Prāgabhāva and other abhāvas, as advocated by the Vaiśeṣikas, at many places.<sup>84</sup> Abhāva, says, Puruṣottama, need not be understood as an independent category but it should be included in the Āvirbhāva and Tirobhāva. The Prāgabhāva is the state of the inhering cause, favourable to the manifestation of the effect and co-existing with the non-manifestation. Dhvaṁsābhāva is that state, which is not favourable to the existence of the effect.

83. *Vādāvalī*, pp 85-86.

84. T. Sn. Ab. pp. 89-90, Pr. pp. 111-123, *Sṛṣṭibhedavāda Āvirbhāvatirobhāvavāda*, etc Puruṣottama has also written one *Abhāvavāda*, which is unfortunately not extant.

There is no other proof for establishing the independent existence of the *abhāvas*. It may be argued that the very absence of a pot in a potsherd is a proof for the *Prāgabhāva*. *Puruṣottama* says that such an understanding, by the opponent, has for its object the *Abhāva*, which has its counter-part in the existence of a particular pot. Now the absence of any sense-contact with a pot is general and thus can not lead to the particular, which is required by the *Prāgabhāva* in question. The cognition of the *Prāgabhāva* of a pot in the said potsherd is not capable of being proved because no such appearance is possible. Even though the opponent may admit it, it is not accepted by all *Puruṣottama* further asks as to whether the negation prior to production, as envisaged by the said cognition, is only one for all the pots or is different with different pots. The first alternative can not be accepted, because the production of any pot would destroy the *Prāgabhāva* altogether and there can be no particular *Prāgabhāva* for a particular pot. It cannot be said that it is destroyed by the production of all the pots, because in that case the production of one pot will not destroy the *Prāgabhāva* and the potsherds, which are the parts of the said pot, will have to be understood as showing the *Prāgabhāva* of the pot and not the pot itself. It can not be argued that this is not a contingency, because the existence of the pot obstructs such an understanding. If this is the position, the co-existence of the pot and the *Prāgabhāva* at the same place should be admitted and the contention of the destruction of the *Prāgabhāva* by the production of all the pots would be futile. Further as the counter-parts are transitory, we can not reasonably speak of all the pots. Thus when that which destroys can not be explained, the definition of the *Prāgabhāva* as the



negation which can be destroyed is also wrong. The Opponent points out that there can be a definition like, 'Gandhādyanadhikaraṇakālavṛttyabhāvatva,' or 'Adṛṣṭa-tvāvacchinnādhikaraṇakālavṛttyabhāvatva.' To this Puruṣottama says that as there is no knower of the produced knowledge before creation, there can be no such abhāvatva. The opponent says that God is there to see it all. Well, then we shall accept what is said by God and not what is said by the Opponent.

The second alternative is equally unreasonable. The knowledge of the abhāva is dependent upon that of the counterpart and so in the absence of the latter, the former cannot be known. If the knowledge of the counterpart is accepted in the form of a pot, then the Prāgabhāva will be common to all the counterparts and this would lead to all the contingencies urged above. It should not be argued that the contingency can be averted by accepting the understanding, on account of the subliminal impressions of the supraworldly knowledge, which has for its object a thing of future, due to the common characteristics of the Ghaṭatva. No such understanding is possible because the subliminal impressions for a future object do not exist, when such an experience does not exist. As for the supraworldly knowledge, Puruṣottama says that it will have to be understood in a limited sense, as the said knowledge has, at first, for its object all the pots and this is followed by the Pratiyogināṣyatva of the Prāgabhāva. Or it should be accepted that the latter comes in the beginning and so the supraworldly knowledge is limited from the first instant. After that one should explain the knowledge of the Prāgabhāva for a future pot. This is

ignoratio elenchi, because the futurity is here made up by the prāgabhāva. If futurity is explained as the abode of production, which occurs after the present, then there can be no cognition of the Prāgabhāva. When we see that a pot will be produced from this, there can be no cognition of the Prāgabhāva of that pot. The future existence of the pot does not require the understanding of the Prāgabhāva.

The cognition of the Prāgabhāva can not again be inferred. The syllogism that can be formed is *Kapālam ghataprāgabhāvavat Ghatiyacaramasāmagrīmativāt Yoyaccaramasāmagrīmān sa tatprāgabhāvān Patiyacaramasāmagrīviśīstatantivat*. Purusottama objects to this syllogism by saying, 'Prāgabhāvarūpasādhyatāvacchedakāvacchinnasādhyāprasiddhyā anumānāsāmbhavāt'. He says that there is no proof for comprehending the Prāgabhāva and as the cognition can also be explained on the ground of the samayika-atyantabhāva, the Prāgabhāva can not be established on the ground of cognition and the like.

The opponent changes his stand and says that he may agree that the Prāgabhāva is not established by apprehension. In the relation of the cause and the effect, subsisting in the potsherds and the pot, there must be some regulation for the production of a particular pot from particular potsherds. The regulation can not be possible in the potsherds themselves. There is again the fault of Gaurava in explaining the pot as produced from many potsherds. Hence something, that can regulate the place of production, is required. This necessity can be fulfilled by the concept of Prāgabhāva.

Puruṣottama replies to this that in the Satkāryavāda, it is the sat, which is manifested, hence the deśaniyama is possible by the cause itself. Thus the establishment of the Prāgabhāva, on this ground, is just *abhyupagamaika-saraṇatva* (taking recourse to one's own doctrines). The question of Gaurava does not arise, since many causes lead to one effect. The pot which is to exist to-morrow, is absent today; this involves the time factor, which is also explained in the same way by the satkāryavāda. It should not again be made out that if we do not admit the Prāgabhāva, there will be the contingency of the reproduction of that, which has already been produced. The factor of time involves a certain order. Hence the diffusion of sāmāgrī on account of the Tirobhāva, will account for its destruction and this bars the contention of the reproduction of what is already produced. Therefore the Prāgabhāva cannot be established in this way also.

The opponent then argues that in a pot which is prepared on hearth, the touch, form, taste and smell are produced. Here the cause and the time factor are common. So we should admit the Prāgabhāva of touch etc. Puruṣottama says that such an acceptance is not necessary because the transformation of touch etc. follows from the nature of touch and the like helped by the phenomenon of pāka. As svabhāva is an attribute, there is lāghava in its acceptance.

The opponent points out that the pre-existence, which is found in the cause, can be explained only on the ground of our admitting the Prāgabhāva, because the said Pūrvavartitva is the same as existing at the time; which is covered by the Prāgabhāva. Puruṣottama says that the

pūrvavartitva need not be necessarily explained, because a cause is just the abode of the manifesting capacity. If at all required, it can easily be understood by the knowledge of the effect, which is produced later. Again the Prāgabhāva being the cause, what about the pūrvavartitva existing in it? For this we have only the pragabhava as an explanation and this would result in the fallacy of atmaśraya. Thus the Prāgabhāva which is suggested by the special condition of the cause which is in the process of being known, is known on the basis of the knowledge of Pragabhava. This is the fallacy of circular reasoning or cakraka. It can not be doubted that the Pragabhava is not implied by the condition of the cause. One does not think that a pot will be produced here and just now and there is the Prāgabhāva of a pot, when one does not see the condition of the cause, favourable to the production of a pot. It should not be contended that such an understanding arises only by practice, for then it would arise even when the cause is not seen. Thus the Pragabhava is not different from the cause.

Similar is the case of Dhvamsa, says Purusottama. One, who sees the condition of the cause, detrimental to the existence of the effect, thinks that the pot is destroyed. This does not go against the terminology Dhvamsa and Prāgabhava. Both the terms can easily be used in relation to the cause, bearing in mind that they are relative terms like cause and effect. Similarly the terms Bhava and Dhvamsa also can be used. It should not be made out that as the effect exists in the conditions of Prāgabhāva and Dhvamsa, it must be seen, because the existence of the effect is subtle and subtlety here means that the form is not manifest.

The reciprocal non-existence (*Anyonyābhāva*) and absolute non-existence (*Atyantābhāva*) are like-wise not different concepts<sup>85</sup>

While explaining the *Aṇutva* of the individual soul, *Purusottama* enters into a scholarly refutation of those, who think otherwise

The Jains believe that the soul has middle measure or *dehaparimana*, on the ground that, otherwise, the sentiency, which pervades the whole body, can not be explained. *Purusottama* says that the pervasion of the sentiency can be understood on the analogy of smell, which can spread to other places also. If we accept the Jain theory, the individual soul would be liable to transiency. The eternity of the individual soul is proved by *Purusottama* on the strength of curious and interesting arguments. A child, which is just born, sucks the breasts of its mother, due to hunger. This activity, on the part of a child, can be explained only on the ground of the memory of the experience of averting hunger, that has been experienced before. This means that the soul of the child is the same as that which was present in some other body previously. This leads to its beginninglessness and indestructibility and hence eternity. Another argument given is that of the ghosts, who speak of the previous life.

The soul again can not be said to have the measure, capable of accretion and depletion. As the bodies are different and many and the soul enters them, here also the same problem of *anityatva* would arise. The *jiva* cannot have many *parimāns*, for no such thing can be

seen in the world. If it is accepted as having a body it will be partite and hence transitory.

The logicians and others have used the same arguments to refute other theories and have proved the pervasive measure of the souls on the following grounds. Things, which are produced at various places for our enjoyment, should have our own *adrsta* as the cause. So the cause, at the place of production, is the conjunction of the *jīva* with the *adrsta*. This would lead to the *Vibhutva* of the soul. If the soul is atomic, its attributes like desire and knowledge would be *suprasena*, as the attributes of an atom are. And as an atom is imperceptible, the term 'I' would be countered by perception. The mind again is atomic and the conjunction of the mind and the soul would produce a third substance, as the conjunction of two atoms results in the production of something else. The conjunction of the mind with the sense organs would require the disjunction of the soul and the mind and thus there can be no production of knowledge. This being the case the individual soul must be all-pervasive.

To this Purusottama replies that it has many weak points. If all the individual souls are all-pervading, they would have connection with all the form-ed objects, all the sense organs, minds and bodies. This will result in the enjoyment of all by all and there will be no regulation of a particular enjoyment for a particular soul. The opponent may here point out that there is a fixed place for the non-inherent cause regarding the distinctive qualities of the all-pervading *jīvas* and so the enjoyment can be limited to a place, where the *jīva* and the mind are joined.

Puruṣottama says that no such limitation is useful. When one eats a mango, it is limited to being eaten by the mouth, even then one may say, 'I eat a mango.' Even so here one may say, 'I am enjoying in the body of Devadatta.' Further just as one may say 'There is nothing in my legs but I have headache,' one would also experience 'I am happy in the body of Devadatta, but unhappy in the body of Yajñadatta.' As one jīva is present everywhere, the experiences, produced at the places of conjunction with the respective minds, will be inherent. There would be nothing to bar the after-cognition (anuvyavasāya) regarding the different minds, then all would be omniscient. This does not become an *isṭāpatti* because the opponent does not believe in only one soul but accepts many jīvas. If for establishing the limited enjoyment, some limiting *adrṣṭa* is admitted, it would result in the middle measure of the jīva and this would controvert the accepted *vyapakatva* and *nityatva*, for which it is necessary to admit the enjoyment, limited by other bodies also. This goes against perception. Again all the souls would be omniscient and there will be an unwarranted blending in all the three worlds (*Pratyaksavirodha*, *Sarvajñatāpatti* and *Trailokyasankarāpatti*). This, says Puruṣottama, is '*Ubhayatah pāśā rajjuh*'

Experience and remembrance have not necessarily the same field of operation. In fact remembrance does not require the consideration of the place of action, as we often see the usages like, '*Netrābhyām adrāksam karābhyām asprṣam*', or '*Yam aham adrāksam tam antah smarāmi*'. The logicians would have thus to face the ridiculous position of remembering the taste of a mango in the

body of Yajñadatta, while it has actually been eaten by Davadatta's body. There is again nothing to prove that experience and remembrance would be limited to one body only, for the remembrance of the previous birth can be explained by admitting only one soul, not concerned with a change of bodies. This can not be accounted for by the existence of an Ātivāhika. If one is dead in Prayāga and born in Indraprastha, one may well remember one's jati, or one staying as a spirit in Srughna but dead elsewhere may remember one's friend and relatives, but the Ātmapradeśa limited by the Ātivāhika may not include Srughna, Prayāga or Indraprastha. If for averting this the Ātmapradeśa is not considered but any place related to the Ātivāhika is taken into consideration, then memory would come to the Ātivāhika and not the jiva. Further the Adrṣṭa would have to be inseparably connected with the Ātivāhika, otherwise the sacrifices etc. performed on the earth, would lead to the production of Adrṣṭa in all the souls. Thus even those, who are alive, will be able to enjoy heaven by means of another Ātivāhika. Many Ātivāhikas of liberated souls exist and thus they are by no means rare. The rarity of the Ātivāhikas need not be substantiated by pointing out their transiency, for one may be able to enjoy by means of the Ātivāhika even of a deity, or that which has been attracted by the Adrṣṭa.

It is again impossible to accept the regulating power of the Adrṣṭa. The Adrṣṭa is due to the actions; efforts are made by the conjunction of the mind and the soul. The conjunction thus will be of all the minds with all the souls. Thus we will have all the Adrṣṭas for all. There can be no differer-



tiation in the conjunction of the mind and the soul, for that stands in need of a separate cause. If no other cause is possible, one may believe in the desire of God for the regulation, as to which soul would enjoy what and whose Adṛṣṭa would be produced by which action. Similar is the case in the Aṅvātmavāda. Why then go a long way to establish the Vyāpakatva by accepting the Adṛṣṭava-dātmasamyoga ?

If the Jīvas are all-pervasive, they would not be ruled by God. They would be egoistic on account of their greatness and eternal nature. They are also sentient equally. How then is God superior? So the atomic measure of the Jīvas is necessary for establishing the superiority of God. Even though the Jīva is atomic, sentiency can pervade the whole body, because it has the quality of gliding as is the case with smell. It should not be made out, says Puruṣottama, that in case of atomic souls, happiness and the like will not be perceived, as the perception of qualities requires a larger measure. He says that what is required for perception is the yogyatā. Even in the theory of all-pervasive souls on the other hand, the perception even of the Adṛṣṭa would be irrefutable on account of the sāmānādhikaraṇya of the large measure. The question of the perception of the paramāṇu will not arise at all, because there is no fitness in the atoms, which are not manifested. Again the pleasure and the like are not the attributes of the soul.

As regards the contention, '*Aham iti pratyakṣānupapattiḥ*,' Puruṣottama says that it is not valid. The perception is of the jīva covered with the body. As this entails

co-extension with the grossness and the like, such a perception is only of the nature of illusion

The argument, that the conjunction of the mind and soul, which are of different nature, produces something else, is based upon the theory of the production of a thing from the conglomeration of two atoms. The theory is however wholly discarded by the Vedāntin, who follows the Śrutis. Similar is the case regarding the argument of the non-production of knowledge, as it is based on the same theory.

The jīva, according to the followers of the Śuddhadvaita, may become all-pervasive, if God so wishes, when the aspect of bliss is manifested<sup>86</sup>

Purusottama has refuted almost all other Vedantic theories also in one way or other. For them, however, the emphasis is more on the interpretation of the scriptures, rather than reasoning alone. Even then there are passages in his works, where reason finds its way and we may note some of them here.

Puruṣottama after Vallabha refutes the system of dualism as advocated by Madhva, Mīmāṃsakas and others. He asks as to how dualism can be understood. It may either be on the basis of the difference of upādāna, or that of the natural attributes or of the pramaṇas. The first alternative is not possible, because the scriptures tell of Brahman as the only material cause. Even in the world, if one wants gold, one does not take into consideration the effects of the lump of gold as earrings and the like. The contention that oneness

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86 T S Ab pp 92-95 Purusottama has also written a *Vada* on the subject, as we have seen above.

can not exist between a pot and a piece of cloth is answered by saying that the distinction of the material cause in this respect is mundane. The second alternative is equally meaningless, for once the unity of essence is conceded the distinction of the attributes is immaterial. Otherwise a man on his seat will be different from the same man on his feet, or a piece of cloth, when spread out, will be different from the same, which is rolled. Even the attributes, which do not exist at the same time, do not differentiate the substantive; the attributes that can exist need not surely differentiate the substantive. Thus a pot is not differentiated by taste and form. Even those, that do not exist simultaneously e. g. entrance and exit, may have the difference in their counter parts and not the substantive. Brahman is one and great and thus is not differentiated by attributes. In fact even the attributes also have no essential difference. The entrance and exit having different counterparts may appear as different but are really not different, for there is no proof for this. Even so at other places also the difference is due to egoism and is not real. The third alternative is also wrong. Perception is deluding and so is the case with other means of proof, which are based upon it. Thus we must accept what is established by the *Śrutis*.<sup>87</sup>

As regards the other Ācāryas, Rāmānuja has been criticised often by Puruṣottama. The criticism however is mainly based on the interpretations and the spirit or burden of the attack is that we can not accept the brahman as qualified by the cit and acit in the beginning of creation. It should be noted

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87. T. S. Ab. pp. 158-159.

that the followers of the Suddhādvaita have a soft corner for Rāmānuja. Puruṣottama himself is not so vehement in his criticism of Rāmānuja, because he generally uses, 'Tac cintyam' etc. instead of 'Tad asaṅgataṁ' etc., which he uses, for others.<sup>88</sup> The theories of Śrikanṭha are almost similar to those of Rāmānuja. He is however criticised for his belief in Śiva as the Highest God. Nimbārka is never mentioned by him.

The Bhedābheda-vāda of Bhāskara is criticised by him on interpretative grounds. The reasoning here is as follows:

The *Śrutis* say that if the cause is known, all the effects are known. If we believe in the Bhedābheda, the point of view by which the bheda is accepted, can not be known by the knowledge of the cause, because the effect is different from the cause. If it is known, then the effect is not different and we must accept the abheda completely. Hence we should accept only the avasthābheda between the cause and the effect and not the svarūpabheda.<sup>89</sup>

Puruṣottama at one place<sup>90</sup> defends Bhāskara against Vācaspati. As the whole discussion is very interesting we have put it here in extenso.

Bhāskara's theory is contained in the well-known verse, which is as follows :

*Kāryarūpeṇa nānātvam abhedaḥ kāraṇātmanā,  
Hemātmanā yathā' bhedaḥ kuṇḍalādyātmanā bhīdā.*

88 Of A. B. P. p. 97. etc.

89. A. B. P. p. 534.

90 A. B. P. pp. 93-95.

Vācaspati asks as to what is this abheda, which exists simultaneously with the bheda. Is it mutual absence? If it is, does it subsist between the effect and the cause like a bracelet and gold? If it does not so subsist, then there is oneness and no difference. If it does, there is difference and no oneness. The bhāva and abhava are not non-contradictory, because they do not exist simultaneously. If they do, the kaṭaka and vardhamānaka also would be essentially identical, because in that case difference is not against identity. Again, if the bracelet is one with gold, just as bracelets, crowns and earrings are not different from the point of view of their essence, which is gold, even so they should not be different from the point of view of their essence of bracelets. Hence only gold is the substance and not the bracelets and the like, which are not found to be identical. If it is said that the abheda is only from the point of view of gold and not bracelets, then there surely is bheda from the earrings etc. If bracelets are non-different from gold, why should they not follow in the earrings and the like? If they do not follow, how is it that they are non-different? That one, which is removed when the other follows, is different from the other, just as the string follows, while the flowers do not and are thus different. The earrings and the like do not follow even though gold does. Thus they are also different from gold. If everything is accepted to follow together, the distinctions like 'this is not this' etc. can not be maintained, as there can be no discriminating factor. Again when we know from a distance that there is gold, we will not wish to know whether they are earrings or something else, because there is identity between gold and its viśeṣas and gold is known. If there is difference between them, they will not be known, when the gold is

known Well, says the argumentator, they are identical also why are they not known? On the contrary it is quite proper that they should be known As a rule, when the cause is absent, the effect is also absent The absence of the effect is removed by the presence of the cause So far as identity is concerned, the cause exists Vacaspati says that if the earrings and the like are known by the knowledge of gold, the attempts for knowing them are meaningless When one thing is not known, while the other is known, these two are different When a cub of an elephant is seen and an ass is not, the former is different from the latter When gold is seen from a distance, its distinctions like earrings are not known and are thus different from gold as such What then about the *sāmānādhikaranya* as found in '*Hema kundalam*'? It cannot be explained on the ground of the relationship between the substratum and the dependedent or between the two having a common resort If the reference here is to the presence (*Anuvrtti*) and exclusion (*Vyāvrtti*), why should one wish to know the earrings, when gold is known? *Abheda* again is not *ekantika* or *anaikantika*, from which both are possible Therefore when one of the two can be repudiated, it is proper that the *bhedakalpanā* has *abheda* as its *upadāna* and not vice versa, because the *bheda* depends upon those, which are differentiated If there is not oneness, the difference subsisting on many can not be possible The one again does not depend upon difference When we say that 'A is not B', the comprehension of difference rests upon that of the counter part, while that of oneness does not depend upon anything else Thus the *anirvacaniya-kalpana* is *abhedopādānā* This is also

corroborated by scriptural passages. Therefore the *kūṣasthanīyatā* is real and not *pariṇāmīnīyatā*.

To this Puruṣottama says that it is all wrong. In the theory of Bhāskara, that is refuted, the *bheda* is not accepted as of the nature of reciprocal negation (*anyonyābhāva*) and hence to refute him on this ground is like imagining the smell of a sky-flower. Even if it is accepted, the pot and its absence, as also the pot and things which are different from it, are seen as existing simultaneously on earth and there is no contradiction, as it has been alleged. The total non-existence (*Atyantābhāva*), which is constant and pervading, exists everywhere, hence when the counterpart is brought, it is only an obstruction of the *abhāva-buddhi*. Thus *abheda* can exist, even when there is *bheda* and there can be no contradiction if both co-exist. The contingency again of the oneness of *kaṭaka* and *vardhamānaka* is not so sound, because non-contradiction is never seen as leading to oneness. Vācaspati's attempts to differentiate the bracelets from gold are also futile. Bracelets are just states of gold and are therefore one with and also different from gold. Even Śaṅkara has said the same thing regarding the ocean and its waves. As for the refutation regarding the *pratīvirōdha*, Puruṣottama says that there is no such contradiction, because even though difference is understood from the point of view of *kuṇḍalas*, oneness can equally be understood from the point of view of gold. This is corroborated by evidence. When that is conceded, whatever Vācaspati has said regarding the *bheda* and *abheda*, when gold is seen from a distance, is of no significance. Both the *bheda* and *abheda* are comprehended, and that is what the quoted *kārikā* means. As the effects like the crown and bracelets.

are only states of gold, the *sāmānadhikaranya* with the gold is plausible, so also the *vyavrtti-vyavasthā* and *ujñāsājanakatva*. So the difference is adventitious and not inexplicable. This does not go against the *Śrutis*, which do not teach *mithyātva*. Puruṣottama concludes by saying that the theory of Bhāskara is not faulty in this respect.

Samkara's theory of absolute monism has been the subject of the most severe criticism of Vallabha and his followers. Vallabha thought Samkara to be his chief adversary and attacked him very vehemently. The same is the case with Viṭthaleśa and the array of writers who followed him. Puruṣottama's references to Samkara are however as respectful as those to other Ācāryas and what is more he is never discourteous. Even then, he never simply depends upon the interpretations of the *Śrutis* but supports his statements with sound reasoning. Some of the very important refutations of Samkara's theories, as given by Puruṣottama, are noted below.

In the *Prahaṣṭavāda* Puruṣottama rejects the theory of *Avidyā*. *Avidyā* is said to be an *upadhī* of Brahman. Is it with or without a beginning? It can not be the former. The opponent believes that Brahman, which is endowed with the *upādhis*, is the *Īśvara*. If *avidyā* has a beginning, *Īśvara* would also have it, this would be similar to the theory of *Īśvara* as an effect, as believed by the *sāṃkhya*, and it would go against the Vedāntic theories. The later alternative is equally unacceptable, because that which has no beginning has no end also. Thus there arises the contingency of non-liberation and *Īśvara* would then be inferior even to the individual soul. As *Īśvara* is bound equally as the individual soul, nobody would



worship him. If it is said that the avidyā is without beginning but has an end, even then Īśvara must be accepted as omniscient. He knows all the Vedas; there is nobody else higher than He as an Adhikārin. Those who believe in the direct realization, should admit that such a realization of Brahman is required even for Īśvara. When thus Īśvara is liberated, this would result in the negation of the world. If Īśvara does not obtain liberation, others, who are inferior to him, can also not obtain it and this would go against the theory of direct realization. If we believe in the liberation of others, while Īśvara is not liberated, then Īśvara will be inferior to those, who are capable of self-realization.

As for the avidyā, which leads to the imagination of distinctions, is it connected with jīva or Brahman? It can not be the former, because then it can not imagine the attributes in Brahman. As Brahman is not an object of the mind or speech, and as jīva has no knowledge of the adhiṣṭhāna, the jīva cannot be related to it, and when there is no possibility of relation, there can be no imagination either. The opponent may say that the souls, endowed with knowledge, see Brahman and thus a connection can be established. Puruṣottama says that is wrong. As avidyā is guṇātmikā and as those, who have the required knowledge, see Brahman only after the eradication of the guṇas, there can be no such possibility. Further the advent of knowledge leads to eternity or non-destruction, while this leads to destruction. Should we accept destruction for these who have already reached the state of non-destruction? If the avidyā in the jīvas is to imagine the distinctions in Brahman, the latter must be seen. But Brahman can be an object of visualization

only after the distinctions are imagined. This is *petitio principii*. If we agree to the visualization of the qualITLESS Brahman, how can Brahman be qualITLESS? The second alternative would lead to all the contingencies, stated above regarding the Īṣvara.

Again is the said avidya existent, non-existent, both or neither? The first is not possible, because if it exists as much as Brahman, this would result in dualism. It can not be the second, because then like the sky-flower it can not imagine anything. It is not again the third, because it is imagined itself, in that case like the conch-shell-silver. It can not be imagined by anybody at first, since as the Brahman is qualITLESS, even the jivas do not exist. If it has no beginning, all the fallacies stated above would arise. If we believe that it has not a beginning but an end, then also the contingencies have been stated above. The fourth alternative is equally unacceptable, because in that case, avidya will not be different from Brahman which is neither sat, nor asat. Thus the belief in the upadhis not plausible.<sup>91</sup>

In the *Prasthānaratnakara* while discussing the anumana, Puruṣottama refutes Dharmaraja Dīkṣita, a follower of Śaṅkara. Dharmaraja Dīkṣita gives the following syllogism: '*Brahmabhūnam sarvaṃ mithyā Brahmabhūmatvāt Yad evam tad evam Śūktikārajatavat*' for illustrating the use of the anumana in philosophical thinking. Puruṣottama says that, as the silver which is anīrvacaniya can not be established, the illustration given here is not proper. Even if we may agree to the

illustration, the falsity can be explained on the ground of the buddhyākāratva, and thus it is not proper to adduce the distinction from Brahman for the same. The hetu again is implausible, because of the sentences like, '*Idam sarvam yad ayam ātmā.*'<sup>92</sup> Puruṣottama says that if the hetu is established on the basis of appearance, then nothing is required to be said. The appearance, depends upon the buddhi and we have no objection in accepting it as false. The syllogism would thus be "*Brahmānyatvena pratiyamānam avastu. Ādyantavttvāt. †Svāpnikavat.*" The hetu need not be called common on the ground of counter-syllogism, because the dream experiences are proved to be false. If a man dreams of connections with a woman or of going out to some other country; when he is awake, he does not find a woman or another country; thus the reality of the dream experiences is sublated. This however does not lead to the falsity of the whole world. Puruṣottama gives a syllogism for this. '*Vimataḥ prapañcaḥ svotkṛṣṭasattākasadṛśasṛṣṭipūrvakaḥ. Mithyāsṛṣṭitvāt. Svāpnikavat.*' Scriptural passages can be cited to show that the world, which has Brahman as its essence is not unreal. What is mithyātva? It is that which though unreal, appears to be and is said to be real. The definition of mithyātva given as '*Svābrayāivenābhimatayā-vanniṣṭhātyantābhāvapratiyogitvam*' does not corroborate the advaitic theory of the māyāvādin. It rather goes against him, as it will establish the world as a counterpart of the absolute negation of the world, in connection with Brahman. The opponent has given a syllogism: '*Paṭaḥ etattantuniṣṭhātyantābhāvapratiyogi. Paṭatvāt.*

92. Nṛsīnhottaratāpini Upaniṣad. V.

'Paṭāntaravat.' Puruṣottama objects to this by saying that the hetu is contradicted by perception. The opponent challenges this by saying that there is no fallacy in the hetu, because the object here is the existence of Brahman, which is the substratum. Puruṣottama asks as to what is meant by the compound *Brahmasattā*? Does it mean the existence of Brahman or Brahman which is existence? The first is wrong, because Brahman is not possessed of any attribute. The second goes against the Śrutis (saying that it can not be experienced by our senses. Puruṣottama then shows how the scriptural passages do not go against the Śuddhādvaita.<sup>93</sup>

The most important criticism of Saṅkara is however given in the beginning of the *Aṅubhāṣyaprakāṣa*. Here perhaps Puruṣottama is following in the footsteps of Rāmānuja, who has given a critical and exhaustive refutation of Saṅkara under the first Sūtra in his *Śribhāṣya*. Puruṣottama is however more careful and does not indulge in the repudiation of Saṅkara on a large scale. Puruṣottama thinks it fit to concentrate on the *Adhyāsa-bhāṣya* viz the introductory part of Saṅkara's commentary. We need not here give the Pūrvapakṣa, which is well-known. Apart from the references to the Śrutis, Puruṣottama's arguments are as follows:

Saṅkara has tried to make out the concomitance, that whatever is an object is non-sentient. This vyāpti, says Puruṣottama, is sublated by perception. The sentiency of the soul is accepted by both the parties, it can be grasped by the pratyagvitti (Inner 'knowledge.) The soul

is thus an object of the Pratyagvitti and is thus all-pervading. Hence only the vyāpti viz. whatever is non-sentient is an object, can be established by perception. The opponent need not point out that as the pratyagvitti does not apprehend the ātman, which is cit-ekarasa, it is not an object. Even if we agree to this, the ātman will have to be accepted as an object in some form or another. Otherwise, if there is no object, how can there be any vitti? It should not be said that it is the ego, which is the object and not the soul. According to the Nyāya system, it is the soul which is the object and not the ego. According to the Sāṃkhya, as the ego is non-sentient, if this is the case, the ahantva and the caitanya would appear to be co-eval. In that case when the ego as an object is removed in the pratyagvitti, only the ātman remains as the object. It should not be said that, when the ego is removed, the ātman is known as the very nature of the pratyagvitti. This can not be accepted in the absence of any other means of realization. That is what happens in the world at the time of testing a gem. Otherwise the nityānityavastuviveka is possible even from the systems like the Sāṃkhya; and thus it will not lead to the vicāra-adhikāra, as made out by the opponent. Hence even though the opponent does not wish, he will have to accept reluctantly that ātman is known by 'pratyagvitti. This will not lead to the non-sentiency of the atman on account of its being illuminated by 'an external agency, because one can fall back upon the Śruti passages like 'Atrāyam puruṣaḥ svayam jyotir bhavati.'<sup>94</sup> Thus the ātman should be understood as the abode of sentiency and

94- Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad IV. iii. 9.

yet having the nature of sentiency, and the contrast between the subject and object can be explained away by virtue of our experience. Thus when the relationship of the āśraya and the aśrayin is established, the atman and samvit will have to be admitted as different and thus the substance as an object should also be accepted as distinct. It should not be doubted that as the sattva is inexplicable, those which are connected with it are also equally inexplicable. It is necessary, even for the opponent, to explain the sattva, because otherwise even the samvit will be confounded with asattva. If existence is to be of the nature of luminosity, then the ātman, which is connected with it, surely has the sattva. It is not wise to say that the ātman is of the nature of luminosity and is not connected with it, as there is no pratyakṭva there. 'I know' or 'I am endowed with knowledge' sentences like these show that knowledge is an attribute of the soul. Thus when the existence of the soul different from the luminosity is conceded, the existence of the artha as an object in the form of not being superimposed, is also established, because that which does not exist can not be an object. There is no such cognition as 'I see or experience a sky-flower'. As regards the phantom or mirage it is seen in a superimposed form. It should not be said that there is the straying of existence in the abhava, because, it also has the bhavatva. The abhava is stated to be there, only in the form of the counterpart which is not being experienced. Otherwise even with a counterpart, it will be cognised. It should not be contended that since the samvit is inseparably connected with an object and as it does not shine forth without the object, it can not be called self-luminous. That as the lamp has its nature of light, the samvit is of

the nature of luminosity and this itself is the svatahprakaśa padartha. Similar is the case of the soul. The opponent may here point out that the ātman, which is all-pervading, exists everywhere. Just as water is superimposed on sand resulting in mirage even so the bodies etc. are superimposed on the atman. If we believe in the sattva, it is impossible to explain the limitation at a particular place. Thus we accept the sad-aśad-vilaksīnatva on the basis of its being seen, taking into account its asattva. This, says Purusottama, is improper for those who believe in the vestupariccheda, the samavayin and the like of the substance exist and thus the deśa is easily established. Those, who do not accept it, believe that everything is the effect of Brahman and thus the deśa would be included in it. Thus when the deśa is established as also the bodies etc., it is easy to understand their superimposition on the soul. Otherwise it is difficult to explain it like the sky-flower. The illustration given by the followers of Śaṅkara viz 'Apratyakṣa akāśe mālinyadhyāśavad apratyakṣa ātmani śarīradhyāśah' is not correct. Ākaśa is perceptible to the non-intelligent as space, and to the intelligent on account of the nature of the thing itself. Thus the illustration does not lead to the desired conclusion. At the end of the discussion Purusottama discusses some scriptural passages<sup>95</sup>

We have seen above some important refutations of the theories of others as given by Purusottama. It may not be possible to examine all of them here, because it would add much more to the bulk of this thesis, but we may say that there is nothing wrong in stating that many of his arguments are fairly

reasonable The repudiation of the Buddhistic Catuskoṭika is really a very good specimen of Purusottama's scholarship and capacity as an argumentator Similar is his rejection of the concept of abhāva and the theory of the pervasion of the soul The question however remains only with the last discussion, in which Purusottama attacks Śamkara and his thesis that the subject can never be an object Purusottama's refutation, as detailed above, reminds one of the similar but more violent refutation given by Ramānuja There are flaws in Śamkara's theory, but it should be remembered that it is futile to accept everything reasonable and logical in those realms, where logic has no say of its own It is rather difficult to agree that the ātman is the object of Pratyagvitti, when there is absolute oneness and there can be no subject-object-relationship or duality Śamkara could have very easily pointed out to Ramanuja and Purusottama, what Purusottama has himself said to Vacaspati while defending Bhāskara The whole theory of oneness, adhyāsa, inability to explain the subject-object-relationship and all that, pertain to the esoteric level and not to the exoteric realm of thinking It is useless therefore to argue that 'Aham janāmi' and similar sentences show that knowledge is an attribute of the 'I', when Śamkara is thinking from the point of view of 'Kena kam vijāniyat'.<sup>96</sup>

### Interpretation of the Śrutis

The Śrutis have always been the fountain source of Indian philosophical systems All the systems, especially the Vedāntic ones, are said to be dependent mainly on the Śrutis



and every Ācārya wishes to show that his theories are not new or invented, but are the same as taught in the *Śrutis*, which were not properly understood by others. The *Bhagavad Gītā* and the *Brahmasūtras* also enjoy the same position of the *Prasthānas* or starting points of those systems. For Vallabha, however, the *Bhāgavata* is added to make up the *Prasthānacatuṣṭaya*.

Vallabha says that out of these four *Prasthānas*, the *Śrutis*, the *Gītā*, the *Brahmasūtras* and the *Bhāgavata*, each former can be properly understood with the help of the succeeding one. This has been illustrated by Purusottama thus<sup>97</sup> The *Śruti* says, '*Apāṇipādo Javano grahitā*'.<sup>98</sup> Does this mean that Brahman is devoid of worldly hands and feet or that it is without hands and feet altogether? The *Gītā* passage '*Sarvataḥ pāṇipadam tad*'<sup>99</sup> would help us in this respect and so the alaukikasāmarthya of God is upheld by accepting the former alternative. Similarly the *Gīta* says '*Nityaḥ sarvagataḥ athāṇur acalo'yam sanātanaḥ*'<sup>100</sup> and '*Mamaivamśo jvaloke*'<sup>101</sup> For understanding this the *Brahmasūtras* '*Utkrāntigatyāgatinām*'<sup>102</sup> etc would help in deciding the aṁśatva. The *Sūtras* again say '*Janmādyasya yataḥ*'<sup>103</sup> This can

97 T. S. Ab pp 39 40

98 *S'vetaśvatara Upanisad* III 19

99. *Bhagavad Gīta* XIII 13

100 *Bhagavad Gītā* II. 24.

101 *Bhagavad Gīta*. XV. 7.

102. *Brahmasūtras* II iii. 25.

103 *Brahmasūtras*. I i. 2

be understood with the help of the Bhāgavata passages like 'Janmādyasya yato' *nīayād* <sup>104</sup>

The basic view point regarding the Vedas is almost the same in all the orthodox systems of India. The Vedānta believes in the Svatahprāmānyavada of the *Śrutis*. As Purusottama says the *Vedas* are an independent Pramaṇa for the metaphysical knowledge, on account of three reasons. Firstly it is Sattvaśodhaka. The quality of Sattva which helps in the right knowledge can be purified only by the means, stated in the scriptures, and thus they are an independent proof. Secondly they are the sentences of the Lord Himself. The *Vedas* are regarded in India as Apauruseya. Thirdly they are of the nature of the external breath of the Highest Lord <sup>105</sup>. The *Vedas* are thus eternal. The speciality of the Suddhādvaita is that they believe in a different nāma-prapañca altogether. We shall however discuss that point in the next chapter.

The Vedāntic writers have throughout tried to find out their own theories from the scriptures. From the modern point of view the scriptures are the works of different sages composed at different times and different places. Naturally therefore the scriptures may not appear to present a coherent system and the need for evolving such a system was felt from very early times. Even Bādarāyana has said '*Tat tu samanvayāt*' <sup>106</sup>

104. *Bhagavata*, I 1 1.

105. *Sarvanirapekṣah svatahpramanabhūta veda eva Sattvaśodhakatvāt bhagavadvakyatvat tannīvasitarūpatvacca* T S Ab p 35.

106. *Brahmasūtras* I 1 3. Vallabha's interpretation of this *Sūtra* is not taken into account here.

Vallabha and Viṭṭhaleśa have not commented upon the *Upaniṣads* and though Puruṣottama is said to have written many *Dīpikās*, most of them are unfortunately not found. We have thus to depend upon the interpretations of the *Śrutis* found in the *Aṅubhāṣya* and its *Prakāśa* and other works

Puruṣottama discusses how the conflicting *Śruti* passages should be reconciled and interpreted. If we accept one position and reject the other, then naturally the passage which is rejected would lose its authoritativeness though it may form an integral part of the *Śrutis*. This is undesirable because how can we declare that one passage is right, while the other is wrong? As a consequence, the whole of the *Śruti* would be *Apīāmāṇika*.<sup>107</sup>

How then should the contradictions be reconciled? Puruṣottama says that it can be done by accepting both as equally correct and the contradiction is to be explained on the ground of the superior powers of the Highest Lord. This can be corroborated by the *Śrutis* themselves, e. g. '*Parāsyā Śaktir vividhaive Śrūyate*'<sup>108</sup> etc. Such passages show the capacity of the Highest Lord.<sup>109</sup> Thus even if the *Śrutis* may say that the fire is not hot, we should accept it because the Lord has the form of fire as also of being not hot. That is how the Parabrahman can be both

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107. A. B. P. p. 47.

108. *Svetāśvatara Upaniṣad*. VI. 8.

109. A. B. P. p. 47.

sākāra and nirākāra, i. e. with and without forms.<sup>110</sup> It is thus the expressed sense in the *Vedas*, which is to be accepted and not gauṇī or lakṣanā i. e. secondary. The gauṇī vṛtti, whenever accepted, is only for the ordinary persons.<sup>111</sup> It is on the basis of this that Brahman is accepted in the Suddhādvaita as an abode of contradictory attributes.

There are however three different approaches in connection with the relationship of Brahman and its attributes. Firstly if we take into account the strength of the word, then Brahman is an abode of all the contradictory attributes. We may however think it out in another way also. Whenever Brahman is described, there are given many attributes, negative as well as positive. The negative attributes reject the mundane ones, while the positive descriptions enumerate those, which are supramundane. Thirdly if we go by implication, Brahman is of the nature of all the contradictories.<sup>112</sup> We can easily understand the distinction between the first two approaches. To say that

110. *Tathā ca bhagavataḥ sarvarūpatvena vahnirūpatvād anusṅgārūpatvāc cānusṅgatvavahnitvayor aikādhikaranyāc chivatīādīnām apy aikādhikaranyāt vahnir anusṅgah param brahma brahmavīṣṇuśivākāram anākāram ity aviruddham ity arthah. S. S. pp 124.-125.*

111. *Nān evaṃ sati gauṇī śarvata evocchidyeteti tatsiddhyādisūtrāṇi virudhyerann iti cet, na, tesām mandamadhyamārthatvāt T. S. Ab. p. 37.*

112. *Evameva śabdabalavicāreṇa viruddhasarvadharmāśrayam brahmeti nirṇayaḥ Śrutyuktayuktivā vicāre to laukikadharmasūnyam alaukikasarvadharmayuktam iti nirṇayaḥ. Arthabalavicāre to viruddhasarvarūpam iti nirṇayaḥ. A. B. P. p 933.*

Brahman contains all the attributes, even contradictory ones, can not be reconciled with another statement, made in the same breath, that it has all the supramundane attributes and the negative descriptions pertain only to those attributes, which are mundane. If everything in the *Vedas* is alaukika, everything must be alaukika and we can not explain one word from the point of view of the laukika and the other from that of the alaukika. This is what Puruṣottama knows perfectly well and that is why he distinguishes between the two approaches.

On the whole the approach of the Śuddhādvaita authors towards the *Śrutis* is that of the acceptance of a devotee of everything that is stated, whether it may or may not appeal to reason. In fact there should be no appeal to reason, because it is all beyond the world. Hundreds of passages are interpreted in this way in the works of Vallabha and Puruṣottama.

While the way, in which the passages are interpreted, follows mainly the pattern of the rules of interpretation, generally accepted by all, it is necessary to note one important point. Very often the Śuddhādvaita takes recourse to the *Purāṇas* for understanding the purport of the *Śrutis*. This has already been noted above, while showing the inter-relation of the four Prasthānas. In the *Aṇubhāṣyaprakāśa* Puruṣottama quotes a verse for this :

*Anantaśākhāsāpekṣe vaidikārthasya nirṇaye,  
Svabuddhikalpitād arthād baliyān upabṛmhitah.*<sup>113</sup>

It is interesting to note here that the *Purāṇas* may be understood as an aid to the interpretation of the

113. A. B. P. p. 353. Similar case on p. 1068 also.

*Vedas*, especially for understanding the development of mythology. Dr M Winternitz at one place refers to the efforts of scholars to bring the verses of the Rgveda into unison with the later narratives and to utilize the later in the elucidation of the Rgvedic poem<sup>114</sup>. So far as progressive mythology is concerned, vedic legends can be examined in the light of the Purānic tales. Can the same thing be done for the interpretation of the Upanisadic teaching also?

The most important point that requires to be considered here is the relationship of the Purva and the Uttara Kandas of the Vedic literature. Purusottama gives the different views held by various writers and gives the necessary refutations. Śamkara says that the Purva and the Uttara Kāṇḍas of the *Śrutis* should not be taken together but they are rather against each other, because there is a difference in the subject and the purpose of teaching. Puruṣottama says that in that case, the Uttara Kāṇḍa can not be called the Vedānta at all. If there is no mutual relationship between the two, there is definitely no harmony between them. The Uttara Kāṇḍa is not necessary for explaining the nature of the individual soul which is neither a doer nor an enjoyer. It again does not lend strength to the actions on the basis of the passage 'Yat eva vidyayā karoti',<sup>125</sup> since only the Udgithavidya leads to the Karmapauskalya and this is not the case with the

114 Cf Dr M Winternitz *History of Indian Literature* Vol I p 105. In the footnote, he refers to Geldner in the 'Vedische Studien' I 243-295, and Oldenberg, ZDMG 39, 72ff and 'Die Literatur des alten Indii n' pp 53ff

125 Chandogya Upaniṣad I : 10

whole of the Uttara Kāṇḍa. The ekavākyatā can not be established on the ground of accentuation and grammatical rules, because it is not the proper basis and goes against the well known Mīmāṃsā rule 'Arthakatvād ekam vākyam sākāṅkṣam ced vibhāge syāt'. The relation between the two can again not be established by arguing that sacrifices create a desire to know. Mere desire of knowledge is of no use. The Śruti 'Vedam anūcyācāryo'ntevāsinam anuśāsti',<sup>126</sup> and similar passages differentiate between the *Vedas* and the *Upaniṣads*. The term Vedānta can again not be defended on the ground of conventional usage, because it is not included in the enjoined svādhyāya. (The view point here is of the convention and not the compound 'Vedasya antaḥ'.) In that case its study and deliberations about it (Adhyayana and vicāra) would not be enjoined, i. e. would be avaidha. Its study can not again be included in the vicāra, as found in the passages like 'Tad vijjñāsasva tad brahma'<sup>127</sup> because mere jñāsa can not restrict it to the three upper classes. According to Śaṅkara therefore the *Upaniṣads* can not be called Vedānta at all.

Bhāskara says that the Pūrva and the Uttara Kāṇḍas have different subjects but have the same purpose. This, says Puruṣottama, goes against the *Śrutis* and *Smṛtis* teaching Brahman as the meaning of all the *Vedas* (Sarvavedārtha)

Vijñānabhikṣu believes that the Uttara Kāṇḍa is subordinate to the Pūrva Kāṇḍa, as Brahman is the-

126. Taittirīya Upaniṣad. I. xl. 1.

127. Taittirīya Upaniṣad. III. 1.

Dharma and all the Vedas teach of the Dharma. The Brahmavivara is thus not useless, but is for the purpose of a complete study of the Dharma and would thus be on a par with the *Kalpasūtras*. Puruṣottama argues that this would go against the scriptural passages, which show that Brahman is the meaning of all the Vedas. This would again run counter to the view of the sages like Jaimini who did not complete the Dharmavivara and Vyasa, who did not begin with the Dharmavivara. The analogy of the *Kalpasūtras* is not proper, because of the difference in the topic of discussion (Pratipādyabheda) in the Uttara Kāṇḍa. The opinion of Śrīkaṇṭha is also refuted.

How are the two parts related in the Suddhadvaita? According to the passages like *Mam vidhatte' bhūdhate mam.*<sup>118</sup> the term *Upaniṣad* can be understood to mean the knowledge of Brahman and Ātman according to the Brahmavada. The term *vidyā* means the negation of any understanding of distinctions as per the passage, '*Vidyatmani bhūdhādhan*'<sup>119</sup>. So when the sacrifices are performed with knowledge, they lead to the Karmapauṣkalya. The Vedantas are thus required for the Purva Kāṇḍa. Knowledge again can be obtained by one, who has a pure mind and the sacrifices and the like are instrumental in the purification of the mind. Thus the Pūrva Kāṇḍa is helpful to the Vedanta. Though in both of them Karma and Jñāna are known to be respectively principal, the subject-matter of both is one and the same, in as much as actions and knowledge are different attributes of the same object i. e. the Highest Lord. When they are



combined, the result is the Brahmabhāva and the attainment of the highest position. Thus both of them have the same purpose. This being the case, it is meaningless to point out any contradiction between the two.<sup>120</sup>

According to the Suddhādvaita all the words express God. Purusottama says that those, who take the scriptures as having the purport of action only, are, completely ignorant of the fact that the scriptures teach of the Highest Lord. This is very nicely brought out by Purusottama, whom we may fully quote here. "*Atravim bhāti Vedasyopakramo hi mantradevatāstutyādāvupayuktah. Prakaranam ca yāgasya Sa ca yajño vai viṣṇur iti śruter bhagavadrūpah Devatāś cāgnyādayo yāgeśesā bhagavadamśabhūtāh Kaitā puruso-pi yāgeśeso bhagavadamśah Purusaśesabhūtam phalam apyetasyaivānandasyānyānity ādiśruterbhagavadamśabhūtam Tathavopakaraṇānyapi Evam sarvam sākṣātparamparayā ca bhagavadrūpam iti bhagavaty eva śrutes tātparyam*"<sup>121</sup> Additional arguments are also given by our author to show that the sacrifices are of the nature of the highest Lord. *Vedas* have various branches and each sacrifice e.g. Jyotiṣtoma is described in them in various ways. What is the use of the different descriptions of one and the same sacrifice, when one such description would have been enough? If different descriptions are for those who are not intelligent, then one simple explanation for them would have worked even for those, who are intelligent. Nor are they for propounding the better results,

119 *Bhagavata Purāṇa* XI xix 40

120 A. B. P pp 46-47, 69-70.

121. T Sn Ab p 21

since in that case, it is useless to describe the same fruit everywhere. The variety of descriptions is thus for establishing the similar variety of the forms of the Lord. In the Śākhāntarādhikaraṇa of the *Pūrvamīmāṃsāsūtras*, there are 24 aphorisms to discuss and refute the contention that there is difference of action, corresponding to the difference of Śākhās and it has been established that only one karma is taught in various branches. We should therefore concede that karma has many forms. This can be explained only on the ground of passages like, 'Vedaḥ ca sarvair aham eva vedyaḥ',<sup>122</sup> showing that the Highest Lord is the teaching of the Vedas. The *Śruti* further asserts 'Yed ekam avyaktam anantarūpam'<sup>123</sup> i.e. the God has many or endless forms. Puruṣottama therefore concludes : 'Bhagavato-nekarūpativād yajñarūpasya baluprakārair nirupaṇam'<sup>124</sup>

The Śuddhādvaita thinkers do not agree that the Upāsanās, which form part of Uttara Kānda, are for the purification of the mind, as has been made out by the Māyāvādins. Meditations actually teach of the greatness of God<sup>125</sup>

It will of course be a very useful study to see how the *Upaniṣads* are interpreted in the Śuddhādvaita. Thous-

114. *Bhagavad Gītā* XV 15

123. *Mahānārāṇya Upaniṣad* I 15

124 T. Sn. Ab. pp. 24-26

125. *Udgīthādisūryādyupāsanaya tattatprakāreṇoktam phalam tena tenopāsyena diyate. Tesām ca pratikatvena tatkr̥taphaladanān mūlarūpamāhātmyam, eva pratipāditam bhavati. Jñate ca māhātmye tatra bhaktis tayā jñanam.* T. S. Ab. p 45.

hundreds of passages are interpreted by Vallabha and Puruṣottama, though the former did not comment upon them regularly, while for the later, even though he is said to have done so, most of his commentaries are not extant. It is possible to show these interpretations after collecting the vast number of passages, found explained by them, especially by Puruṣottama in his voluminous works. This however requires a special study from that particular point of view. For the present however I have just given the fundamental approach to the *Śrutis*, as clearly explained by Puruṣottama. Even then I would like to examine here the interpretation of the *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad*, as given by Puruṣottama. Puruṣottama's commentaries on the *Nṛsimhottaratāpinī*, *Kaivalya*, and *Brahma Upaniṣads* are also available, but the purpose of these commentaries appears to be to show that the said works can not be explained so as to teach the Kevalādvaita of Śaṅkara. Even in the commentary on the *Māṇḍūkya* the purpose is definitely the same. It is however an important *Upaniṣad* and Puruṣottama has commented upon the first two chapters of Gauḍapāda's *Kārikās* also. We will therefore study the *Dipikā* of Puruṣottama on this *Upaniṣad*, from three points of view; the interpretation of the *Upaniṣad*, the explanation of the *Kārikās* and the relationship of the *Upaniṣad* with the *Kārikās* in the light of Puruṣottama's remarks.

The *Upaniṣad* begins with the syllable Om. Puruṣottama says that the *Śruti* wants to teach the seed of the expression of Brahman in the whole of the *Vedas*. This is taught by stating the meaning of the syllable Om. The Om is of the nature of Akṣara Brahman. (*Om ity etad akṣaram.*) Everything that can be measured by time, past, present

and future, and whatever is beyond the Time e.g. jīva etc., all this is Om. The speech, which expresses that which is expressed by Om, is an explanation of it<sup>126</sup>. Everything that which is an effect and that which is not, is Brahman. Nothing is different from Brahman. That which we express by the term Om and the term Brahman having all the forms, that soul is Brahman i.e. it is to be expressed by the term Brahman, it is not the Prakṛti<sup>127</sup>. As the term ātman is known to be used for the puruṣa and the individual souls the Upaniṣad says 'So'yam ātmā catuṣpāt,' This is for averting any understanding of the puruṣa or the jīva here. The passage from 'so'yam ātmā' upto 'Sa ātmā sa vijñeyah'<sup>128</sup> is something like an explanation of what has already been stated before<sup>129</sup>. As the Upaniṣad is aware of the difficulty in understanding it, the ātman is divided into four pādas.

What is the meaning of the pāda here? It does not mean 'Legs' as in the case of a cow, it means 'parts' as in the case of a coins<sup>130</sup>. Further it is to be understood.

126 *Idam sarvam tasyopavyakhyanam, Idam sarvam Omkarayonikam vanmayam Upavyakhyanam nikatataya vivarāṇam ity arthaḥ Mandukya dīpikā p 4*

127 *Ayam atma brahma Maṇḍūkya upanīśad 2 This is understood by Puruṣottama as against any doubt regarding the teaching of Prakṛti of the Saṁkhyā*

128 *Maṇḍūkya Upanīśad 7 Maṇḍūkya Dīpikā p 20*

129 *Maṇḍūkya Dīpikā p 5*

130 *Kārṣapaṇader vamaśavācanāḥ padaśabdāḥ na tu gavader vācānavācānaḥ Ibid p 5*

as instrumental everywhere, in so far as it signifies Brahman <sup>131</sup>

The first pāda is said to be Jāgaritasthana i e. having as its resort the sātत्वika antahkaranavrttivīśesa It is described as bahih-prajñah, because, on account of it, the individual souls have the comprehension of the external objects <sup>132</sup>. It has seven limbs and nineteen faces The limbs are the worlds and the faces are, ten organs ( of sensation and action ), five life-breaths and four internal organs. They are doors of approaching it <sup>133</sup> It is described as 'Sthūlabhuk', because it enjoys the gross body of the Brahmanda or the gross objects of enjoyment by means of these doors It is 'Vaiśvānara,' since it leads all the individual souls to their proper worlds and enjoyments in various ways <sup>134</sup> Puruṣottama says that his interpretation is in conformity with the Śruti 'Pādo'sya viśvā bhūtāni' <sup>135</sup> Here Puruṣottama gives a very important explanation of the term pāda, when he says, 'padyate jñāyate param Brahmāneneti pādah' <sup>136</sup> The term pāda thus means that by which Brahman can be known

131 Tatrapī brahmagamakatvat karaṇasādhanah sarvatra, na tū viśvadiṣu karanasadhanas turye karmasadhanah Vairūpyād brahmano nirvacyatāpattes ca Ibid p 5

132 Jagaritam sattviko' ntahkaraṇavrttivīśeṣah sthānam yasya sa jagaritasthanah Bahir laukike bahye viśaye prajña avabhaso yena jivanam sa bahih prajñah Ibid p. 6

133 Mukhany upalabdhividvāraṇi Ibid p 6

134 Viśvan sarvāntaran jivan anekadha tattaducitalokeṣu bhogeṣu ca nayatīti viśvanarah Se eva vaiśvānarah servapiṇḍātma Ibid p 7

135 Rg-veda X 93 3

136 Māṇḍūkya Dīpika P 7

The second is svapnasthāna i.e. having the dream as its abode, the rājasā antahkaranavrttiviśesa. It is *antahprajñā*, because on account of it, one experiences the internal objects in a dream. It is *praviviktabhuk* because of the enjoyment of the internal with respect to the sense organs<sup>137</sup>. It is *tajasa* because it helps in the enlightening of the indriyas. This is the second pada. Here also Purusottama explains pada as '*Jnapako'msah*'<sup>138</sup>.

The susuptasthana, the tāmasā antahkaranavrttiviśesa is the third. It is described as '*ekibhūtah*', because of its inseparable connection with the jiva and it is called '*Prajñānaghana*', since it is the mass of prajñānas. Purusottama explains prajñāna in two ways, (1) *Prajnanāni tattadindriyajanyāni*, (2) *Prakṛstam jñanam yais tāndriyāni*<sup>139</sup>. The term '*eva*' in the Upaniṣad<sup>140</sup> is for averting the knowledge of everything as different from its very nature. The third pada is called '*Anandabhuk*', because as compared with the previous two it is full of bliss. It has the essence of the attributes of Brahman, and it is also the Brahmaloaka. It is not however the Highest Bliss, because the bliss here is measured. This however should not lead us to admit the existence of even the slightest misery, because misery is the result of dualistic experience, which is absent here. Because it is anandamaya, it is said to be

137 *Praviviktam indriyapekṣaya antaram bhunkta itī* Ibid p 9

138 Ibid p 9

139 Ibid p 10

140 *Prajnanaghana evanandamayah Maṇḍukya Upaniṣad* 5

*ānandabhuk* The door of enjoyment is the *cetas*<sup>141</sup> The *viśva* and the *taijasa* though knowing the past and the like, show dualism, but in the third *pada* there is no dualism and thus it is called *prajña* The *Upanisad*, after teaching of the nature, describes his greatness As he inspires all the different things he is the controller of all, like the fourth He knows everything as non-different from himself He is thus *Sarveśvara* and *Sarvajña* He again enters and regulates and is called the *Antaryamin* He is the *Yoni*, the place of origin of everything From him are born all the beings and they merge in him finally

The fourth *pada* is described by *Śruti* at first with negative attributes, so as to differentiate it from the first three He is neither *antahprajña*, nor *bahuhprajña*, because he does not create anything endowed with *vikalpabuddhi*, either externally or internally He is again not *ubhayatah prajña* i e he is omniscient and his *prajña* does not depend upon the object or the *Pramāṇas*<sup>142</sup> It is neither *prajña*, nor *aprajña*, nor even *prajñanaghana* It is not an object of our eyes or any other sense organ He can not again be an object of any organ of action He is beyond all inferences, comparisons, thoughts and expressions After thus distinguishing him from everything else by means of negative attributes, positive description is given for explaining his greatness He is to be approached by those, who have the knowledge of the soul<sup>143</sup> The expanse of the world is

141 *Maṇḍukya Dīpikā* p. 11

142 *Ibid* pp 20-21

143 *Ekatmapratyayasaram ekatmapratyayasair jñānibhiḥ saro' nusar-anam yasya* *Ibid* p 21

quietened in Him. As He is beyond all limitations, there can be no expanse of the world different from Him. He is quiet, benign and devoid of duality. That is how people believe Him to be. He is not 'such and such' alone.<sup>144</sup> He is the ātman, He should be known. Thus even though beyond mind and speech, the description of him is not futile because he is the self. This also makes clear the doctrine of grace.<sup>145</sup>

After this the *Upanisad* with a view to show the affinity between the syllable Om and the Brahman, compares the first three pādas with the three morae, A, U, and M and the last pada with the moraeless nada. Purusottama says after explaining these comparisons, that Om is not different from atman, and on that account not different from Aksara.<sup>146</sup> The *Upanisad* concludes by giving the phalaśruti, *Samviśaty ātmanātmānam ya evam veda*.<sup>147</sup> Purusottama explains 'samviśaty' as 'Upabhunkte' and cites the śruti, 'so' śnute kamān saha brahmaṇā vipaścitā.<sup>148</sup>

While commenting upon the first nine verses of *Kārikās*, Puruṣottama makes an important statement 'Tathā cedam siddhyati Sarvapindātmā viśvāh, sarvendriyātmā tayasah sarvamaṇā-ātmā sarvapraṇātmā vā prājñāh. Evambhavaś cānabhimānena ity evamrūpaḥ paramatmaive jñeyo na tu śārvaḥ'.<sup>148</sup>

144 *Etadṛśam caturtham manyante, na tv etadṛśa eva sah* Ibid p 22

145 *Sa pūrvoktaritika atma viññeyah, atmatvato na taijaryham ity arthah Tatātā śrutyantaroktam taranaikalabhyatiam eva sphuṣṭibhavati* Ibid p 22

146 Ibid pp 31-32

147 Ibid p 32

148 Ibid p 16



From the analysis of the interpretation of the *Upanisad* as given by Purusottama, it is clear that Purusottama and for that matter the Suddhādvaita teachers do not believe that the four quarters as described in the *Upanisad*, refer to the four states of consciousness. They are on the other hand various forms of God, who is capable of assuming endless forms. This is perhaps the reason why at many places in the dissolution of the compounds the instrumental and not the genitive is accepted e.g. *Baluhprajñāh Bāhye visaye prajñā avabhāso jivānam yena sah*<sup>140</sup> etc. Is this a correct reading of the meaning of the *Upanisad*? It appears that the *Upanisad* teaches about the states of consciousness, rather than what is explained by Purusottama, and the interpretation according to that seems more natural. One will also perhaps find that Puruṣottama is unnecessarily bringing in the doctrines of the Suddhādvaita at places. Thus for instance what is the ground for bringing in the 'Gantānandatva' in connection with the prajñā and its (his) attribute 'Ānandamaya'? The explanation of 'Samviśati' as 'Upabhunkte', while interpreting the phalaśruti appears to be far-fetched. It is no use finding fault with Purusottama here and there but it can be said that just as the absolutism of Śaṅkara can not be found out in the *Upanisad* in toto, similarly the Suddhādvaita also can not be accepted as taught here completely.

Coming to the *Karikās* of Gaudapāda, we have already seen in the preceding chapter that though Puruṣottama has commented upon all the chapters, his commentary only on the first two is extant. Any way the

commentary on the first two chapters, especially the second is enough to show how Purusottama has interpreted the *Kārikās* in keeping with his own theories. We may note here some interpretations which are interesting for our purpose.

The *Kārika Devasyaisa svabhāvo'yam āptakāmasya ka sprhā'*<sup>150</sup> is taken by Purusottama to prove the theory of *Lilā* by adding the term *kṛidatah*. He explains - '*Tana kṛidāto'yam svabhāvo na tu sprhayā karanam'*<sup>151</sup>. The immediately preceding *Kārikā* '*Kṛidarthaṃ itī cāpare'* need not warrant such a conclusion, because it is again preceded by '*Bhogārthaṃ sṛstir ity anye'*. Is it that the author of the *Kārikā* really accepted the theory of *Kṛida*? Perhaps he did not, for how to explain the '*Apāre'* otherwise? In the three *Kārikās* I 7-9, the author gives various opinions regarding creation but it may not mean that the last opinion is of the author himself. Perhaps Gaudapada does not prefer the one to the other.

How are the *Kārikās*, I 16, 17, 18 explained by Purusottama? The verse 16 says that when the individual soul, sleeping on account of the beginningless *māyā*, is awake, then the unborn sleepless dreamless non-dualism is known. Purusottama says that *Anādimāyayā* etc means that, when one gets the *Adhikāra* for the realization of the fourth, he knows it, which has been described before. The term '*yadā*' in the verse shows some effort for obtaining the realization, but on the basis of the passage '*Vedānta-*

150 *Gaudapada Kārika* I 9

151. *Māṇḍūkya Dīpikā* p 19

*vijñānasuniścītārthā...etc.*<sup>152</sup> it is suggested that the realization occurs at the time of the end. Puruṣottama argues for this : ‘*Anyathā pūrvaślokena gatārthatvād etam na vadet.*’<sup>153</sup> Kārikā 17 runs ‘If the world exists it will no doubt be removed. This dualism is just *māyā*, there is *advaita* from the highest point of view.’ Puruṣottama says that this verse is intended to teach that dualism is of the nature of interim creation. This is for removing the dualistic ideas in the minds of those, who have the different *Adhikāra*. Kārikā 19 means that the distinctions, if at all imagined by anyone, will be removed. This *Vāda* (discussion ?) is because of preaching. When truth is known there is no dualism. Puruṣottama however explains it in a different way. He says that this verse also corroborates what has been stated in the previous verse. His explanation is : ‘*Kalpito vikalpo mānaso yadi kenacit upāsanena yogādisādhanena vā viśeṣato nivarteta. Tadā śuddhe cetasi upadeśād jñate turiye ayam vādaḥ bheda-pādakatvāt dvaitarūpo na vidyate.*’ Puruṣottama then adds ‘*Sarvasya tadanatirekāt so’ yi pūrvabuddharūpādvaito brahmaiva bhavati.*<sup>154</sup> The verse is really a difficult one for interpretation. Puruṣottama’s explanation of ‘*Kenacit*’ and the way in which he construes the second line do not appear to be convincing.

Puruṣottama’s interpretation of the Kārikās of the second chapter is worth considering. Puruṣottama introduces the chapter by stating that the author wants to prove the unreality of dualism, which is imagined by

152. *Muṇḍaka Upanisad*. III. ii. 6

153. *Māṇḍūkya Dīpikā*. p. 26.

154. *Ibid.* p. 26

the dualists <sup>155</sup> Under the first three verses Puruṣottama gives two syllogisms to prove the unreality of the dream experiences, following the Kārikās They are 'Svāpnikah sarvabhāvabhedāh sarirāntahsthāh. Śarīrasamvrtatvāt Yad yat samvrtam tat tad antahstham Grhākumbhavat Yad vā śarīrasamvrtam tac charirāntahstham. Śirāntrā divat and 'Tathā ca yadi gatvā paśyet tam deśam prapaśyan pratibuddha tatraiva tiśhet Yato naivam ato naivam Yato na gatvā paśyati tatōntareva paśyati'<sup>156</sup> The second line of the third verse according to Puruṣottama counters those, who believe in the reality of the dream creation on the analogy of the creation of the Cintāmani and the like The fourth verse extends the unreality to the internal waking world. The internal waking creation is here, of course, the object, visualized by the mind, which is different from an external object. Thus the svapna and the jāgarita sthānas are of the same type ( Verse 5 ) One may point out that while in the dream everything is created, in the waking state it is the external object that is experienced How can it be unreal ? Kārika 6 replies to this that the object of mental deliberation does not exist before and after that deliberation and is thus on a par with the object, experienced in a dream Puruṣottama says 'Na hi māṇavakah śimhatvena dhyātaḥ śimho bhavati.'<sup>157</sup> It need not be said that the objects of our ideas should not be called unreal, because they very often produce real results The Kārikā 7 is a reply to this. This happens even in dreams Puruṣottama

155. Ibid p 33

156 Ibid pp 33-34

157 Ibid p 37

gives an illustration for this, 'Svāpnikapramadāsparśādinā pāramārthikaskhalanadarśanāt'.<sup>158</sup> It should be noted here that 'Saprayojanā vipratipadyate' is explained by Puruṣottama as 'Saprayojanā svapne' pi vipratipannāto kiñcitkarā satī sattvasādhikā.'

If ādyantavattva is the criterion of unreality, the scriptures enjoining svarga would be futile. Svarga is produced of the apūrva. The apūrva is produced of our own actions and is thus liable to destruction by worship etc. Kārikā 8 is a reply to this. Puruṣottama's explanation of the verse is that the apūrva (*Apūrvam asmatkriyābhivyaktam karma*) is an attribute of the Lord. (*Sthānidharmaḥ : Sthāninaḥ jāgradādīsthānavato dharmah*) as is the case with those, who live in the heaven. (*Svargasthā hi devās tanniyāmakatvena bhagavatā parameśvareṇa sthāpitāḥ sarvadā tatra nivasanti*) For them heaven is not established by the apūrva, but is of the nature of the nature of the avayavas of the Lord. Similarly the apūrva is also not obtained by action but is eternal. The same is the case with heaven. It is only the connection between the two, that is produced and therefore the Karmaśruti is not futile. 'Tān' is the second line of Kārikā 8 is understood by Puruṣottama as 'Svargavāsinaḥ svargān vā svābhīṣajais tān dharmān vā' and 'prekṣate' as 'divyacakṣuṣi labdhe sākṣāt karoti.' The last quarter specifies the prekṣaṇa. 'Yathāiveha susīkṣitaḥ' : 'Yena prakāreṇa bhagavadrūpatayā apūrvatayā vā tatsvarūpajñāne upādhyāyena sutarām dattaśikṣas tathā. Thus he sees the heavens, as he has been taught here about them.<sup>159</sup>

158. Ibid. p. 37.

159. Ibid. pp. 38-39.

If everything is unreal, even the seer would be unreal. This would lead to the śūnyavāda (V 10) Karikā 11 is for giving the Siddhānta. The term 'Devah' in the verse according to Purusottama, has its connection with the kṛidā. Thus the imagination of God is of the nature of sport. The three cases used in 'Atmanā', 'Ātmānam' and 'Ātmā' show that the Lord is the essence of all the Karikas<sup>160</sup>. The nature of the imagination is the regulation of particular names in the particular forms of his own. The term 'sva' in 'svamāyayā' is for showing that this power is non-different and dependent. He knows the distinctions as of his own nature. Purusottama give an illustration for this 'Yathā puruṣaḥ śankhasurabhūmatsyadimudrāḥ svāṅgulibhir vidhāya tasya tattadrūpatām anusandhatte tadvat'<sup>161</sup>.

The Siddhānta would thus show that nothing is unreal. What then about the arguments, advanced for proving the unreality of everything? The karikas, that follow, are for dispelling the doubts regarding this. The Karikā 12 asserts that God imagines the substances thus. He transforms (*Vikaroti vikṛtān karoti*) the illusory substances, which are separate from his essential nature (*aparān Svātmarūp-ebhyo'tirikṛtān*). The objects are irregularly (*avyavasthitān*) imagined in the mind, while those of external experience are regular (*Niyatān*). Even in this false imagination, God does it. The following two verses 13 & 14 are for making clear the unreality of the objects, so imagined.

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160 Ibid p 41

161 Ibid p 41

Verses 15 and 16 show respectively the manner of imagination, corresponding to the two verses 11 and 12. Kārikā 15 says that Lord first imagines (creates?) the jīva who essays to hold the life-breaths or the Hiraṇyagarbha. After this comes the turn of the external objects of enjoyment and the internal instruments of enjoyment. The word 'Pṛthag-vidhān' is for showing that the distinction in these objects is not that of the essence. Kārikā 16 gives the well known illustration of the rope and the snake. The following Kārikās 18 and 19 show how the ignorance as stated in the previous Kārikā, can be destroyed by knowledge. While explaining Kārikā 18 Puruṣottama says that just as darkness is the cause of indiscrimination in the rope-snake example, here also the cause is the māyā of the sporting God. It is described in the last quarter of the Kārikā 19. Puruṣottama explains 'Yayā' *yam jīvo mohito bhavati tādṛkprakārahaḥ svayam parumātmaive māyetyarthaḥ.*<sup>162</sup> Thus the māyā is the svarūpa of the Lord and it deludes the jīva.

The following nine verses are for explaining the Dārṣṭāntika-aṁśa in the preceding verse 18. These verses show that the Highest Lord is the essence of everything. Verses 29 and 30 are for those, who know only one aspect. It is the desire of God, which regulates the knowledge of all these aspects. He protects him, who sees Him in various ways after becoming that which the worshipper sees Him to be. 'Tadgṛhaḥ samupaiti tam' is explained as 'Tadgṛhas tadekaniṣṭho vā tattadbhāvāt-makam ātmānam samupaiti, prāpnoti, tesminllinas'

162. Ibid. p. 47.

*tadātmako bhavatiṭyarthah* <sup>163</sup> Puruṣottama gives another interpretation also, which we have not noted above. 'Avati' is understood as 'Svāntah rakṣati' or 'Sada anusandhatte'. This will be connected with the worshipper. 'Sa bhūtvā' is explained on the basis of 'Devo bhūtvā devān apyeti'. The Karika 30 is also understood in the same way. Those, who know only one aspect of God, have taken Him to be different from the Pranas etc., which are non-different (*Aprthagbhāvaiḥ abhinnasattākaiḥ*). One, who knows this properly, can advance the scriptural views without entertaining any doubt <sup>164</sup>.

The Karikās 31 to 33 which identify the world with the maya, gandharvanagara etc are stated by Puruṣottama as directed against those, who believe in dualism. The world, as understood by them, is really a phantom of imagination. But even the mithyavadins are wrong. Karika 34 is a reply to them. This soul is just imagined even by those, who advocate the Mithyavada. Puruṣottama says: '*ayam ātmā asadbhir mithyābhūtaiḥ bhāvaiḥ prāṇādibhiḥ sādhitam yad advaitam tenāpi kalpitah, arthān mithyāvādibhiḥ Bhāvā apī advayena anyathā bhavanti tathā kalpitāḥ arthād ekaikāṁśavādibhiḥ*' <sup>165</sup>. Thus the monism, accepted by both, is proper. Karikas 35, 36 show how the advaita is to be understood. The world is not pluralistic but is non-different from Brahman. Verses 37, 38 show the means for obtaining the knowledge of the soul. And the last Karikā states the phala. At the end Puruṣottama gives

163 Ibid p 50

164 Ibid p 50

165 Ibid p 52



## *Dialectics and Interpretation*

a very interesting summary of the contents of the second chapter.<sup>166</sup>

The interpretation of the second chapter, as given by Puruṣottama, will make the following points quite clear. In his attempt to find out the Suddhādvaita from the *Kārikās*, Puruṣottama has to explain them in such a way that all the verses, which directly teach the theory of illusion, describe the world as such for those, who are dualists. *Kārikā* 11 is said to give the Siddhānta but the way, in which the following verses 12, 13 are explained in relation to it, is really more ingenious than natural. Even the explanation of the *Kārikās* 11 and 34 appear to be far-fetched. The explanation of the *Kārikā* 8 is a good piece of imagination, as also that of the last quarter of the *Kārikā* 19. The inclusion of the term '*kriḍā*' now and then may be wholly unwarranted. The editor Bhaṭṭa Ramanath Shastri says in his introduction. '*Śrīmatpuruṣottamacaraṇair api, bhavanmatamūlaguroḥ Kārikāsv api māyāvādo na labhyate labhyate tu Brahmavādaḥ iti darśayadbhiḥ svapāṇḍityena vivṛtāh.*'<sup>167</sup> Scholarship is surely there.

The relationship of the *Kārikās* with the *Upaniṣad* has posed a problem for modern scholars.<sup>168</sup> Some of them

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166. Ibid. pp. 54-55.

167. Ibid. Introduction.

168. For a discussion see. Vidhushekhara Bhattacharya. *Āgama-śāstra of Gauḍapāda*. Intro. p. xxxviii. ff., T. M. P. Mahadevan *Gauḍapāda, a study in the early Advaita*. p. 31. ff. Of. also 'The problem of the Upaniṣadic theory of the Āgama Prakaraṇa of Gauḍapāda' by B. N. K. Sharma. Bharatiya Vidyā. Vol. XVII. Nos. 3 & 4.

think that the *Kārikās* also form part of the *Upaniṣad*, while others do not agree to that view. Puruṣottama consistently calls it *Gaudaiārtika*, as we have seen in the previous chapter. In the commentary itself Puruṣottama does not give any clue regarding his own opinion. At one place in the *Āvaranabhanga* Puruṣottama says that the verses in the *Māndūkya Upaniṣad* and the three chapters are read among the *Śruti* by the moderns<sup>169</sup>. Any way the tradition of regarding the *Kārikās* as part of the *Upaniṣad* seems to have been current in the mediaeval times, though the *Suddhādvaita* school does not appear to have accepted it.

### Interpretation of the Sūtras

Whereas the scriptures form the first starting point of the *Suddhādvaita*, as also in all the systems of the *Vedānta*, the *Brahmasūtras* form the third. Vallabha began to comment upon them and his son completed his work. Puruṣottama has written a voluminous sub-commentary on it called *Prakāśa*. At many places Vallabha disagrees from his predecessors and Puruṣottama has tried to uphold his teacher's views with admirable erudition and labour. It will be an interesting study to see how the interpretations of Vallabha differ from those of others. It is easy to say whether this or that interpretation of a particular *Sūtra* appears to be correct, but it is surely difficult, perhaps impossible, to say whether any particular system can be evolved out of the whole work. The *Brahmasūtras*, as we

169 *Vaitathyadvaitalatasantyakhyam prakaranatrayam Maṇḍūkya śhaḥ ślokas ca Gaudapādīyaṅy etanidanitanair Upaniṣatsu gathyante* T. Sn Ab p 63

have them today, do not appear to be the work of a single author or the work even of a particular period and it is very difficult to find out any coherent system of set theologico-philosophical ideas in them. I have tried to examine some of the interpretations of Vallabha and Viṭṭhaleśa, taking into account Puruṣottama's remarks upon them.

Vallabha reads the two Sūtras I. 1. 2 and 3 as one. He refers to others, who separate those Sūtras. He does not give any particular reason for a combination of the Sūtras. He just says: '*Naitat sūtrakārasammatam iti partibhāti*'.<sup>170</sup> It is therefore left for Puruṣottama to point out why Vallabha has differed from all others. Puruṣottama says that in the Brahmasūtras, we find that the Adhikaraṇas are formed after stating that which is to be established and the proof for the same, so it is proper that both the sādhya and the hetu should be expressed here. The term Brahman is understood by the followers of the Sāṃkhya to mean the Prakṛti and so to avert this it is necessary to show that the causality of Brahman is stated in the scriptures. One may point out that even if two Sūtras may be read separately, we may have the Adhikaraṇa of the first three Sūtras. In the first Sūtra in the term '*Atha*', which stands for the prerequisite of the Dharmavicāra, the Brahmavicāra is also implied and thus even though the Pramāṇa has not been expressly stated, Brahman can be taken to be known only from the *Upanisads*. The combination of the Sūtras is thus not necessary. Puruṣottama says that '*Atha*' has many meanings and even if it means

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170, A. B. p. 63.

'*Ānantarya*,' it may not be taken to imply the Dharma vicara. Hence it is better to have only one Sutra. If we agree with those, who accept two different Adhikaranas of the two Sūtras, the first has no hetu while the second lacks the sādhyā. Thus both are wanting and therefore cannot establish the desired Prameya<sup>171</sup>. Though Vallabha here differs from that which has been accepted by all the other commentators, the arguments of Purusottama appear to be plausible.

The third Sutra '*Tat tu samanvayāt*' is also interpreted by Vallabha in a different way. *Samanvaya*' is understood by him to mean '*Samyag anvaya*'. God permeates all in the form of existence, sentiency and bliss. Vallabha gives three reasons for such an interpretation. He says that the Pūrvapakṣa and the Siddhāntapakṣa, as understood by others, are both wrong. Secondly the reconciliation of the conflicting passages is the very purpose of the Śāstra. How can it be the reason for establishing a certain proposition, when the reconciliation is yet to be explained? Thirdly the reconciliation, as understood by others, is not vouched for by the following Sutras. The first and the third of these arguments are, in fact, matters of opinion, and of course each of the commentators will try to show that he alone is correct. To say that the Purvapakṣa is wrong is not a very happy argument in any case, because the purvapakṣa is always proved to be wrong. The second argument of course has its value. Dr V S Ghate however points out 'The same charge, however, may be brought against Vallabha himself,

for Sūtra I. iv. 23 also makes out the same point. i. e. that Brahman is also the material cause of the universe.<sup>172</sup>

The Ikṣatyadhikaraṇa has been understood by all, except Madhva and Vallabha, as directed against the Sāṃkhya view of non-intelligent Pradhāna. Madhva however interpretes it in a different way. Brahman which is described as the object of knowledge (*Ikṣāṇīya*), can not be understood as inexpressible. Vallabha's interpretation of the Sūtras is somewhat similar. We shall note his interpretation of all the Sūtras here. Brahman is not *aśabda* (*na vidyate śabdaḥ yatra, sarva vedāntādyapratipādyam*) because of *Ikṣāti*. Even though Brahman is beyond all the dealings, he becomes an object of *vyavahāra* with his own desire. (I. i. 4.) The Highest Lord endowed with the attributes of *ikṣāti* and the like, can not be *Gauṇa* (*Prakṛti-guṇasattvasambandhavān*), because of the term *ātman* used for him. The term *ātman* stands for the Highest Brahman, which is *Nirguṇa*. (I. i. 5) The term *ātman* again can not be *Guṇa*, because liberation or *mokṣa* is taught of those, who meditate upon him. (I. i. 6) The creator of the world is again not *saguṇa*, because he is not censured as *heya*, as would have been the case with one, endowed with worldly attributes. (I. i. 7) Brahman is again not beyond all the dealings, because the individual soul merges in him everyday in deep sleep. (I. i. 8) Again at the time of liberation everyone becomes similar to God. (*Gati: Mokṣa, sāmānya: samānasya bhāvaḥ.*) (I. i. 9)<sup>173</sup> That everything is an effect of

172. V. S. Ghate. *Vedānta*. p. 59.

173. *Mokṣe sarvasyāpi bhagavatā tulyatvāt*. A. B. p. 156.

Brahman is clearly established by the *Śrutis*. (I. i. 10.) Puruṣottama at the end of the last Sūtra refers to the interpretations of other commentators. He gives the interpretation of Śaṅkara and its refutation given by Jayatīrtha. He gives his own refutation also. Bhāskara, Rāmānuja, Śaiva and Madhva are just referred to. After this Puruṣottama refers to the twofold Sāṅkhya and says that the Sāṅkhya theorists do cite the Śruti passages in support of their own views, but such citations do not show that the scriptures form the main source of their doctrines. That is why Vyāsa has refuted them in the *Ānumānika-adhikaraṇa*, because as they accept the Prakṛti as the main principle, and as it is not known through the scriptures, it is definitely aśabda.<sup>174</sup> Though Puruṣottama is not specific, he seems to imply that the attack on the Sāṅkhya finds its place in the *Ānumānika-adhikaraṇa* and need not thus be the subject-matter of this *adhikaraṇa*. Puruṣottama is however not so clear here as he is elsewhere. His comments are halfhearted and his treatment is such that he is just perhaps trying to follow the work, he is commenting upon, so as not to be open to the charge of Vyākhyeya-grantha-virodha. We may here note some difficulties in the said interpretation. Vallabha begins the *Adhikaraṇa* with the statement '*Evam Brahmaḥ-jñāsām pratijñāya kimlakṣaṇakam brahmety ākāṅkṣāyām janmādisūtradvayena Vedapramāṇakam jagatkartṛ samavāyī cety uktam. Evam trisūtiyā jī jñāsālakṣaṇavicārakartavyatā siddhā.*'<sup>175</sup> If now Brahman is Vedapramāṇaka, why should there be any doubt regarding its being sarva-

174. A. B. P. p. 154.

175. A. B. p. 128.

pramāṇa-aviśaya? Puruṣottama has again criticised Śaṅkara for accepting the indicated sense in the term 'Īkṣati' by believing in the Dhātvarthanirdeśa. Puruṣottama himself however takes 'Īkṣati' as Īkṣābodhaka. While the Sūtras 4 and 5 have something to do with Īkṣāṇa, the Sūtra 6 shows that the creator of the world is not *Gauṇa*. (*Gauṇa* has its connection with the word *Guṇa* according to Vallabha) The question of Brahman being the creator has already been settled in the second sūtra, while the discussion that Brahman is devoid of mundane attributes will find its place in III. ii. What is the use of the same here? Similar is the difficulty with the seventh Sūtra. Vallabha seems to be aware of this difficulty when he says. '*Evam sūtracatuṣṭayena ikṣatihetunā jagatkartṛtvopapattiyā sṛṣṭivākyānām Brahmaparatvam upapāditam.*'<sup>176</sup> This itself may appear rather strained. The remaining three Sūtras have nothing to do with kartṛtva at all. Puruṣottama however tries to connect the Sūtras 8, 9 with the question of vyavahāryatva. He says, '*Evam cātra brahma na sarvavyavahārātītam. Suṣuptipralayayor jivādhāratvena śrutatvāt. Yad yadā yadādhāratvena śrutam tat tadā tatprayuktavyavahāraviśayam ity evam anumānam bodhyam.*'<sup>177</sup> Puruṣottama also says '*Evam ca brahma na sarvadā sarvavyavahārātītam. Mokṣe tathātvena śrāvitatvāt. Yad evam tad evam. Maitreyībrāhmaṇaśrāvitasarvavad ity evam anumānasiddher asya hetutvam bodhyam.*'<sup>178</sup> One may say that the explanations are not very convincing. Similar explanation is not given of the Sūtra 10. At the end however Puruṣottama says,

176. A. B. p. 143.

177. A. B. P. p. 146.

178. A. B. P. p. 148.

'*Evam atra trisūtryām susuptivicārena damandinapralaya-kartrtvam dvitiye moksavicārenātyantikataatkartrtvam tritiye kāryakartrtvapratipādanena naimittikaditakartrtvam bodhitam iti pratibhāti*'<sup>179</sup> The word '*Pratibhāti*' should be noted here. In spite of all the attempts of Purusottama it is not clear how the last three Sūtras have any definite connection with the first four. What again is the theory, that is established here? Is it that Brahman, though beyond all the dealings, is the object of the Vedic teaching or rather becomes so by His own desire? Is it that Brahman is endowed with supramundane attributes only and devoid of the mundane ones? Is it, finally, that Brahman is the creator of all? None of these is the purport of all the Sūtras. If there is no one *visaya*, how can there be one *adhikarana*?

Vallabha directs the whole *Adhikarana* I iii 14-21 against Śaṅkara. Purusottama says *Asminn adhikarane jivabrahmaikyakrtasārasankaravadasya māyāvādasya canirakrtir eva mukhyā*.<sup>180</sup> Vallabha and Purusottama appear to have realized the sheer anachronism of directing the set of *Sūtras* of Bādarāyana against Śaṅkara, who is just a commentator of the *Sūtras*. Vallabha says that as Vedavyāsa is omniscient, he knows that one *mayāvāda* will be taught in future and thus refutes it in anticipation. Purusottama shows how such things are possible. In the *Purāṇas* also Suta has told of future events.<sup>181</sup>

179 A B P pp 150-151

180 A B P p 394

181 A B P pp 401-402



The difficulty in the interpretation of the Ikṣatyadhikaraṇa comes to the fore in the beginning of the fourth quarter of the first Adhyāya. Vallabha says, 'Tatra ikṣater nāśabdamiti sām̐khyamatam aśabdatvād iti nivāritam.' Puruṣottama explains, 'Nanu adṛśyatvādyadhikaraṇa etādrśam api vākyaṃ vicāritam eveti kim anena vicāreṇa ...Tathā ca yady api tadvākyaṃ vicāritam tathāpi tanmatasya sarvathā aśrautatvam eveti nopapāditam ato vicāra ity arthaḥ.'<sup>182</sup> Really speaking both Vallabha and Puruṣottama appear to be in difficulty. There is nothing in the interpretation of I. i. 4-10., which has any connection with the Sām̐khya. Again Vallabha definitely refers to the ikṣatyadhikaraṇa, while Puruṣottama refers to the Adṛśyatvādyadhikaraṇa.

Sām̐kara has often been attacked by scholars, not only ancient but even modern, that his views are not corroborated by the Sūtras. It has been pointed out that the Sūtrakara did not agree to the falsity of the world, for otherwise he would not have refuted the Buddhistic theories in the Sūtra 'Vaidharmyāc ca na svapnādivat'<sup>183</sup> It should be borne in mind that this is the position of almost all the Ācāryas. Vallabha can also be said to be open to the same charge. The Sūtrakara, who says 'Naikasminn asaṃbhavāt', can not be stated to teach Brahman, endowed with contradictory attributes. While Vallabha does not make his position clear, Puruṣottama does not miss the point. He realizes the difficulty and

182. A. B. P. p. 475.

183. Brahmasūtra. II. ii. 29.

tries to make amends by saying that, in fact only Brahman and nothing else is possessed of contradictory attributes <sup>184</sup>

The Sūtra II iii 18 '*Jñō' ta eva*' is a very important Sutra for all Whereas Śamkara takes '*Jñā*' to mean *jñāna*, Ramanuja and Nimbārka understand it as *jñāta* I may quote here the remarks of Dr Ghate about Vallabha He says, 'Vallabha, who also holds with Rāmānuja and Nimbārka that 'knowledge' or 'intelligence' is an attribute ( ) of the jīva, interpretes the Sūtra as stating the prima facie view, according to which jīva is knowledge and therefore Brahman itself, and all distinctions are due to the principle of māyā, though really the jīva is a part (Amśa) of Brahman and is related to it just as sparks are related to fire And, while refuting this view, Vallabha makes very interesting remarks : 'Tasmāt tadamśasya tadvyapadeśavakyamātram svikrtya śistaparigrahārtham mādhyamikasya eva aparāvataro nitarām sadbhīr upekṣyah' of course this interpretation of the Sūtra is far fetched, though it makes no material difference as ultimately he means that the soul is a knower <sup>185</sup> Dr Ghate's reading of Vallabha's interpretation does not seem to be correct This is not a Sūtra, presenting the prima facie view Vallabha begins the Sutra with '*Gunān nirūpayan prathamataś caitanyagunamāha,*' and then explains the Sūtra as '*Jñāś caitanyasvarūpaḥ Ata eva śrutibhyo vijñānamaya ityādībhyah*' Puruṣottama explains it as '*Jñānadharmakatve'pi jñanasvarūpa ity arthah*' <sup>186</sup> Accor-

184. A B P p 660

185 Dr Ghate *Vadānta* p 92

186 A B. P p 706

ding to Vallabha, thus the individual soul is both the knower and the knowledge. The criticism against Śaṅkara is a usual feature of Vallabha's works and need not be understood in the way, in which Dr. Ghate has understood it. Vallabha thus combines the interpretations of Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja and of course his explanation is not so far fetched, as said by Dr. Ghate.

The Sūtra, which should be considered in connection with the different interpretations is II. iii. 50. Though there are many Sūtras in this pāda, that afford an interesting study, I have not here embarked upon a detailed study of Vallabha's interpretations and therefore I will just refer to this Sūtra only. It reads 'Ābhāsa eva ca.' Śaṅkara takes the word *ābhāsa* to mean just appearance. Rāmānuja and Nimbārka understand the term as 'Hetvābhāsa.' The later interpretation is clearly far fetched. Vallabha here agrees with Śaṅkara in the literal sense of the word. But whereas 'Ābhāsa' according to Śaṅkara means Pratibimbatva and consequently mithyātva, this is not what Vallabha means. Jīva is an *ābhāsa*, because the quality of bliss is not manifested in him. Puruṣottama says : 'Tathā ca yathā'nācāri brāhmaṇo brāhmaṇābhāsaḥ, sūtradhāra katve' pi brāhmaṇyākhyadevatāyās tatas tirohitatvāt, tathā jīvo' pi.<sup>187</sup> If we think that the Sūtrakāra does not teach the māyāvāda of Śaṅkara, perhaps the interpretation of Vallabha is the best.

The first Adhikaraṇa of III. ii. deals with the dream world. It has been variously interpreted by the Ācāryas. We shall here give the interpretation of Vallabha. The first

two Sūtras present the prime facie view. The opponent says that there is creation in the dream state, and this has been stated by the *Śrutis*. In some texts the creator is also described. Thus the dream creation, created by Brahman, does exist. From the third Sūtra begins the reply. The exponent says that dream creation is māyā only, because it is not fully manifested. What is meant by 'Māyā' and 'Kārtsnya' ? Puruṣottama here says *Siddhānte tu sāmāthyaviśeṣo māyā. ... Ata Iśvarasya yā vyāmo-hikā śaktiḥ sā māyā prakṛte jñeyā. ... Deśaḥ kālo viśayasannudhir indriyavyāpāro bādhābhāvaś ceti kārtsnyam.*<sup>188</sup> Thus the dream creation is not real. Puruṣottama says : *Tathā caindrajālikena naṭena yathā sāmājikavyā-mohane kautukārtham māyāmātrasṛṣṭiḥ kriyate, tathēś-vareṇa jivavyāmohanādyartham svapnasṛṣṭiḥ kriyate iti na tasyāḥ satyatvam*<sup>189</sup> Why then should God create it at all ? The fourth Sūtra replies to this that the dream is indicative of good and evil, as it has been said in the *Śrutis* and again those who are experts in reading the dreams also say so. Thus the dream is shown to the jīva as a sort of indication. Puruṣottama says that the dream is not as negligible as the sky-flower, because in that case it can not be suggestive of anything. The fifth Sūtra says that it is on account of the desire of the Highest Lord (*Parābhidyānāt*) that the attributes of God are concealed from the individual soul, who suffers, as a consequence, the bondage. Or the non-manifestation of the attributes (*Saḥ : Tirobhāvaḥ Viparyayo vā*) may be due to the connection with the body.

188. A. B. P. p. 876.

189. A. B. P. p. 876

Dr. Ghate has fully discussed the Adhikaraṇa with reference to the interpretations of Śaṅkara, Rāmānuja and Bhāskara, giving three different views, idealistic, realistic and idealistico-realistic respectively. As for Vallabha, he says that the Ācārya 'practically follows the third view and interpretes just in the same way as Bhāskara does with the difference that he interpretes Sūtra 5 just as Rāmānuja does it...'<sup>190</sup> Dr. Ghate is correct when he implies that Vallabha follows the idealistico-realistic view by disagreeing with Śaṅkara, who takes the waking state also to be illusory and with the view of Rāmānuja, that the dream is also real. But there is a fine distinction between his view and that of Bhāskara, in as much as for him the dream creation is a creation of Brahman and not of the individual soul, as understood by Bhāskara. The problem for Vallabha however is that of the connection of the first four Sūtras with the rest. The viṣaya in this Sūtra according to Vallabha is, '*Kiñcid āśaṅkya pariharati. Nanu jīvāya bhagavān sṛṣṭim karoti pradarśayati ca svasya sarvalilām. Anśaś cāyam. Katham asya duḥkhitvam ity āśaṅkya pariharati tuśabdaḥ.*'<sup>191</sup> Why should this question be raised here and not in II. iii? Even though the Sūtra contains the word 'Tirohitam', which Vallabha and his followers understand as a sure indication of the Sūtrakara's belief in the theory of Āvinbhāva-tirobhāva, the Sūtra, as explained by Vallabha, may seem to be out of context as it appears to have nothing to do with the dream creation. The Sūtra 6 again gives an alternative. Vallabha says '*Iṣvarecchayā aiśvarya-āditirobhāvam svamate nirūpya matāntareṇāpi niyatadha-*

190. V. S. Ghate. *Vadānta*. p. 121.

191. A. B. p. 883.

*rmavādena nirūpayati...Asmin pakṣe dehaviyoge eva punar-aiśvaryādiprāptiḥ. Pūrvasmin kalpe vidyamāne' pītī śeṣaḥ.*<sup>192</sup> What is the ground for 'Svamate' here? If the term 'Tirohita' should indicate the Sūtrakara's belief in the theory of Āvirbhāvatirohāva, can one say that the term 'Mōyāmātram' in Sūtra 3 shows that the Sūtrakara accepts the theory of māyā? At the end Vallabha refutes the interpretations, given by others and says '*Nidrāyā vivekaḥjñānābhāvāvasaratvād yathāvyākhyāta- evārthaḥ*'. Puruṣottama says *Idam hi nidrāprakaraṇam. Nidrā ca tadaivāvasaram prāpnoti yadā vivekaḥjñānam na bhavati. Ato jñānatirobhāvasyaivātra vaktavyatvāt tasya cōktarītyaiva bodhāt yathokta evārtha ity arthaḥ.*<sup>193</sup> It is not very clear as to how Vallabha and Puruṣottama call this a nidrāprakaraṇa. Should we think that the last two Sūtras deal with nidrā, while the first four with svapna?

The set of Sūtras and Adhikaraṇas, beginning with II. ii. 11 is very important for our purpose, in as much as they deal with the nature of Brahman in relation to the attributes. Dr. Ghate says that according to Vallabha, Sūtras 11-21 form only one Adhikaraṇa.<sup>194</sup> This is not correct, if we follow Puruṣottama. The question here, according to Vallabha, relates to the attributes of the individual soul and the inert matter, sometimes taught as belonging to Brahman, while at times, they are denied to it. Some believe that the reconciliation can be brought about by admitting the *sthāna*, i. e. the abode; thus.

192. A. B. p. 884.

193. A. B. P. p. 886.

194. V. S. Ghate. *Vedānta* pp. 126-127.

Brahman is endowed with smell in the earth and devoid of it in water. As Vallabha explains '*Evam sthānataḥ paśasyobhayaliṅgam upapadyate.*'<sup>195</sup> The term '*api*' gives an alternative explanation, '*athavā kāraṇa eva rūpam arūpam cāvachedabhedenā acintya-sāmarthyād vā.*'<sup>196</sup> Both these alternatives are wrong (*na*), because Brahman is taught in this way everywhere. (*Sarvatra hi*). Puruṣottama explains that Brahman has no svagatabheda and is of one and the same nature everywhere.<sup>197</sup> In the next Sūtra the opponent says that the explanation of the Siddhāntin is not correct, because of the distinction in the cause and the effect. Thus Brahman, different from the world, is distinct from Brahman endowed with the attributes of the world. (*Na bhedād iti cet.*) The exponent replies that this is wrong (*na*), because Brahman is said to be one everywhere. (*Pratyekam atadvacanāt*) Some *Śrutis* actually deny the bheda. (Sūtra 13) Here ends one Adhikaraṇa.

The second adhikaraṇa, beginning from Sūtra 14 gives the reconciliation in the opinion of the ekadeśin.<sup>198</sup> Brahman is different from (*a*) the world (*rūpavat : rūpyate nirūpyate vyavahriyate iti rūpam sarvavyavahāraviśayatvam tadyuktam rūpavad viśvam.*),<sup>199</sup> because Brahman is taught mainly (*Pradhānatvāt*) wherever it is described. Vallabha adds that the discussion here is regarding the attributes, which are different from Brahman and not

195. A. B. p. 900.

196. A. B. p. 900.

197. A. B. p. 902.

198. A. B. P. p. 905.

199. A. B. pp. 906-907.

those of Brahman <sup>200</sup> The next Sūtra says that just as the light of the sun is and is not an object of our senses in the absence or presence of the clouds and the like, even so Brahman can not be approached by our mundane speech and mind, but it can be approached in the absence of obstructions. Otherwise, the Sūtra will have no meaning (*Avaiyarthiyat*) The Sūtra thus wants to prove that even though Brahman is not an object of worldly dealings, the scriptures are not futile <sup>201</sup> Well, why then not imagine the supramundane sense organs also? To this the reply is given in Sutra 16 that the *Śruti* teaches of Brahman as just a mass of knowledge (*Tanmātram Prajñānaghanamātram*) The scriptures and the smrtis themselves show the absence of the attributes of the jada and the jiva in Brahman (Sūtra 17) <sup>202</sup> The *Śrutis* also give the simile of *sūryaka* (*Sūryena sahitam jalam sūryakam* Sutra 18) Vallabha says at the end '*Tasmaj jadajivadharmānām bhagavaty upacāro nisedhas tu mukhyah*' <sup>203</sup> Purusottama at the end gives the resume which we have quoted in extenso because of its importance "*Brahmanah prapañcavilakṣanātvena kāryāsādhāranadharmānām kāraṇe brahmany abhāvena brahmanas tatsvarūpadharmānām ca laukikamanovāgagocarātvena kṛtsnah prajñānaghana itī śrutyā ākārasya jñanātmakatvena tattatkriyādīnām dharmāṇām ca naisargikatvena tesām ca bhagavat-prākatye eva darśanādīvyavahāravīsayātvena laukikavānmanobhūh pratyamānānānām sthānadharmatvāt tathety ekadeśmatena*

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200 A B p 908

201 A B p 909

202 A B p 913

203 A B p. 914.



*siddham ity arthaḥ. Tena brahmaṇaḥ sthānato jaḍajīvadharmaṭvam svatas tu tadrahitatvam ity ekadeśi-  
matena siddham. Etenāsyādhikaraṇasya prāsaṅgikatvam  
vakṣyamāṇopodghātatvam veti sūcitam.*<sup>204</sup>

Sūtra 19 begins the next adhikaraṇa. It contains the siddhānta against the view of the ekadeśin. The view of the ekadeśin (*Tathātvam*) is not correct (*na*) Water can reflect a substance but the attributes can not contain any such reflection. (*Ambuvad-agrahaṇāt*) Thus the sarvakāma etc. are the attributes of Brahman and are not aupacārika, on account of the connection with the upādhis.<sup>205</sup> How than to reconcile the conflicting passages according to the Siddhānta? Sūtra 20 gives a reply to this. Just as space may be big or small in accordance with its limiting adjuncts, even so here also Brahman is endowed with all the attributes. Thus there is ubhaya-sāmañjasya. Sūtra 21 says that all the attributes, even the contradictory ones, are seen in God. Sūtra 22 gives the way of reconciliation from the point of view of reason. The denial of the attributes in the Śrutis relates to only those which are mundane (*Prakṛtāitāvattva*), and then are spoken of many other attributes, which are supramundane.

Sūtra 23 starts the next adhikaraṇa. Vallabha says that the contradiction has been resolved earlier on the basis of śabdabala and now the Sūtrakara does the same from the point of view of the arthabala. Puruṣottama says that the arthabalavicāra is not necessary but as other sages have taken their stand on the arthabala also, it is necessary to-

204. A. B. P. p. 914.

205. A. B. p. 919.

consider from that point of view also.<sup>206</sup> Sūtra 23 states the prima facie view that Brahman is avyakta. The next Sūtra is a reply to it. Vallabha understands the word 'Api' as a jeer against the opponent, who is a fool. The Highest Lord is seen in the course of intense devotion (*Samrādhana*), when God shows favour. The devotee perceives him, or people like Dhruva can infer him. The '*Pratyakṣānumānābhyām*' may be understood as '*Śrutismṛtibhyām*' also.

Another Adhikaraṇa begins with the Sūtra 25. This and the next Sūtra form the Pūrvapakṣa. The reconciliation of conflicting passages is not proper, on the strength of the perception of a devotee, because there can be no specification. (*Avaiśeṣyāt*) The illustration given here is that of light. In the light of the sun, the moon, the jewels etc, one experiences heat or cold but the light as such is not taken to be manifold. The prakāśa of the Lord depends upon the actions like penance etc. (*Prakāśāś ca karmaṇi*). This is not uniform but is various (*abhyāsāt*) corresponding to different actions and different devotees. The Sūtra 26 takes the argument further. Because of this variation (*ataḥ*) the Lord is manifested in endless ways (*anantena*). But then we should accept some mark (*liṅgam*) of the Lord. This can be decided on the basis of the scriptures or the perception of a devotee. The Sūtra 17 gives a reply to this by saying that Brahman is both without attributes and is endowed with them, because both are taught (*Ubhayavyapadeśāt*). This can be illustrated by taking the instance of a snake, which may

be both straight or coiled. At the end Puruṣottama says 'evam ca śabdabalavicāreṇa viruddhasarvadharmāśrayam brahmeti nirṇayaḥ. Śrutuyuktayuktyā vicāre tu laukika-dharmaśūnyam alaukikasarvadharmayuktam iti nirṇayaḥ. Arthabalavicāre tu viruddhasarvarūpam iti nirṇaya iti bodhanārtham atra tredhā vicāritam.'<sup>207</sup>

Sūtra 28 begins a new adhikaraṇa. The question discussed here is regarding the relationship of Brahman and his dharmas. The Sūtra says that the abodes of light like the sun are non-different from light as also different from the same; both being called tejas. Similarly the attributes are both different and non-different from Brahman. We should note here that Vallabha takes 'Vā' in the sense of 'tu'. Sūtra 29 however says that Brahman should be understood as before. This, says Vallabha, is the way of reconciliation from the point of view of the ekadeśin. This is further corroborated by the next Sūtra, which says that the attributes are also denied to Brahman, as is inferred from 'eva' in the passage 'Ekam evādvitīyam'<sup>208</sup>

Different interpretations have been given by different Ācāryas and it is very difficult to say which of them is correct. The Sūtrakara himself does not appear to be very clear, as can be judged from the repeated use of the term 'vā'. It may be noted that Vallabha's interpretation of 'vā' in the 28th Sūtra as 'tu' does not appear to be very happy. Similarly one may feel that the explanations of 'Arūpavad' in Sūtra 14 and 'api' and 'saṁrādhane' in Sūtra 24 do not seem to be satisfactory. Vallabha's

207. A. B. P. p. 933.

208. Chāndogya Upaniṣad. VI. II. 1.

explanation of 'arūpaśad' as 'jagadvilaksana' reminds one of II 1 4, where the question has already been discussed, though in a different context. The problem before the Sutrakara seems to be as to whether Brahman is possessed of the dharmas and not whether Brahman has the attributes of the jada and the jiva. The greatest problem for Vallabha however lies in his bringing in the ekadeśin. Who is this ekadeśin? Why should there be a complete adhikarana for him? Again the difficulty becomes more acute, when the last two Sutras 29, 30 are said to belong to him. Vallabha has to say *Ubhayam api sūtra-kārasammatam*'<sup>209</sup> Purusottama takes special pains to distinguish between the two positions<sup>210</sup> Again how is it that Vyasa's own opinion is given in the Sūtra 28, and that of the ekadeśin in the sutras 29 and 30? Purusottama spares no pains to defend his teacher. He says that as the view of the ekadeśin is corroborated by another Sūtra 30, we should not think the Sūtrakāra considers the view as equally correct. *Ekam evadvitīyam*',<sup>211</sup> need not deny the attributes also. When we say that Devadatta is at home and nobody else it goes without saying that Devadatta endowed with hands and feet is at home. The argument is given only to show that there is nothing different from Brahman<sup>212</sup>

The opponent of Purusottama is again very searching. It is wrong, he says, to understand the ekadeśin as that of Vyāsa. In other words the opponent asks, what is the

209 A B p 940

210 A B P p 942

211 Chandogya Upaniśad VI II 1

212 A B P p 942

ground for believing that the Sūtra 28 gives the Sva-siddhānta? Puruṣottama replies : ‘*Ekadeśipade atra vyāsasyaiva ekadeśi grāhyaḥ. Anyathā ambuvatsūtreṇa ata eveti sūtrasiddham dṛṣṭāntam na dūṣayet. Vṛddhihrāsādisūtrad-vaye yuktyantaram ca na vadet*<sup>213</sup> The ekadeśin is not mentioned by name, because he may not be so well known as Jaimini. The opponent’s name is equally not given in the Sūtra ‘*Jivamukhyaprāṇalingād iti cet tad vyākhyātam.*’<sup>214</sup> Or it may be that this view is intended for the lower adhikārins. It can also be possibly stated that the ekadeśin may be one Kāśakṛtsna, who is mentioned before in ‘*Avasthiter iti Kāśakṛtsnaḥ.*’<sup>215</sup> It should not again be said that as the Sūtras 29 and 30 come after Sūtra 28, they teach the author’s views. Puruṣottama says “*Dvitiyaskandhe ‘ittham bhāvena kathito bhagavān bhagavattamāḥ, netthambhāvena hi param dṛṣṭum arhanti sūrayaḥ’ ity ādibhir etadamukhyatāyāḥ śukavākye vyāsacaraṇair evoktatvāt.*” The view is admitted only for the lower adhikārins, who may be enlightened by it. Puruṣottama refers here to the *Nāsadiyasūkta*<sup>216</sup> and says that Vyāsa thinks from the point of view of the *līlāśṣṭi*, while others do not understand it.<sup>217</sup> Puruṣottama then goes on to denounce strongly the interpretations of others.

After III. ii. 34. we have a different author for the *Aṇubhāsyā*. Viṭṭhaleśa’s interpretations of the Sūtras may

213. A. B. P. p. 942.

214. *Brahmasūtra*. I. iv. 17.

215. *Brahmasūtra*. I. iv. 22.

216. *Rg-veda*. X. 129.

217. A. B. P. pp. 942-943.

not appear to be a very creditable performance, when compared with those of Vallabha. He distinguishes throughout between Paṣṭi and Maryādā, often refers to Gokula, discusses the incarnations of Viṣṇu, and all that Puruṣottama as a faithful commentator explains all these things. We may note only three instances here.

At the end of III. iii. 2. Viṭṭhaleśa says '*Iyam tūpāsanāmārgiyā vyavasthoktā. Bhaktimārgiyā tu etadvilakṣaṇā.*'<sup>218</sup> Puruṣottama in his explanation says about Nanda etc. but his opponent asks '*Nanu sūtra-kāraṇedam kutroktam yenaivam ucyate?*' Puruṣottama replies '*Agrimasūtre*' *dhikārasyaṇupasaṁhārahetutākathānenātra yathādhikāranirṇayasūcanāt sūcitam iti jānihi.*'<sup>219</sup>

Under Sūtra III. iii. 23 Puruṣottama's opponent asks as to the use of referring to the *Purāṇas* and *Itihāsa*, when all others refer to the maxims of the *Pūrvatantra*. Puruṣottama of course gives the stock reply '*Itihāsapurāṇayor Vedopabṛmhaṇatvāt.*'<sup>220</sup>

Under IV. iv. 7 however Puruṣottama has to say something which, if accepted by an opponent, Puruṣottama would not have tolerated. He says '*Nāyam niyamo yad viṣayavākyam sautrapadānurūpam eva grāhyam iti.*'<sup>221</sup>

It is not within the scope of this work to discuss whether or not Vallabha is faithful to the Sūtrakāra. Various views are expressed regarding this by scholars like

218. A. B. p. 983.

219. A. B. P. p. 984.

220. A. B. P. p. 161.

221. A. B. P. p. 1396.

Ghate<sup>222</sup> and Bhandarkar.<sup>223</sup> The point however is that all the ācāryas have tried to evolve their respective systems from the Sūtras, which, in their turn, have tried to evolve something like an upaniṣadic system, and it is very easy to point out that a particular explanation of a particular Sūtra given by a certain ācārya does or does not appear to be natural. The enigmatic style of the Sūtras has made it very difficult to get a clear idea of the system of the Sūtrakāra.

### Interpretation of the Gītā and Bhāgavata Purāṇa

While the *Bhagavad Gītā* is regarded by all as one of the Prasthānas, Vallabha includes the *Bhāgavata Purāṇa* also in the list. Vallabha himself has not commented upon the *Gītā*, as others have done; and though he has very often referred to it in the course of his commentaries and works, it is very difficult to piece them together and make out a full-fledged commentary. In the first chapter of the *Tattvadīpanibandha* Vallabha understands the term 'Śāstrārtha' as 'Gītārtha'. The point has been discussed by me at some length in the chapter III. Any way Puruṣottama, curiously, keeps quiet in his commentary at that place.<sup>224</sup> The *Amṛtatarāṅgiṇī* commentary is said to have been written by Puruṣottama but it is not correct. It is written by Vrajarāya. Only the introductory portion is from the pen of Puruṣottama. This is however sufficient to show the purport of the *Gītā* according to the Śuddhādvaita.

Puruṣottama, in the beginning, refers to the purport of the *Gītā*, as explained by Śaṅkara and Madhusūdana,

222. Vedānta p. 177.

223. Vaiṣṇavism, Śaivism. etc. p. 230.

and criticises them. He refers to Śrīdhara and offers no comments. At the end he states the views of Rāmānuja and says ' *Idam Siddhāntasyānugunam* ' <sup>225</sup> After this he gives the explanation according to the Suddhādvaita.

The Lord Śrīkr̥ṣṇa who came to the world for the liberation of all, uplifted the devotees by explaining to them the concept of devotion. He could see the dark Kali age, which was devoid of all dharma. Hence for creating devotion in the future generation, he preached his own essential nature to Arjuna, when an occasion for the same arose. Of the fourfold devotees, ārta, jñāsu, arthārthin and jñānin, arjuna had the first two adhikaras. That teaching has been compiled by Vyāsa, who was an incarnation of the knowledge of God, in seven hundred verses. It has been explained by Viṭṭhaleśa in his *Gītātātparya* thus :

*Pravṛttidharmam bhagavān rsidvārā nirūpyatu,  
Nivṛttim istām sudrdhām nihsandigdham harir jagau.  
Sāmkhyam yogo rahasyam ca rahasyatamam eva ca,  
Anyonyādhukyanirdhāro jñānavijñānāyor api  
Svasvarūpavimirdhāro bhajanetarānirnayah,  
Taddhetur gunavaisamyam sarvaśāstravimirnayah  
In gītārthanirdhāro yathābhāgo vitanyate,  
Sāmkhyayogau nirūpyādau mohamutsārya Phālgunam.  
Bhaktiptyūsapātāram krtavān iti samgrahah.* <sup>226</sup>

Viṭṭhaleśa has also discussed, says Purusottama, as to why should the first Adhyāya begin with the speech of

224 T S Ab p 30

225 Bhagavad Gīta with seven commentaries p 11

226 Ibid p 11



Dhṛtarāṣṭra. Dhṛtarāṣṭra is surely not a devotee and his son Duryodhana is an incarnation of a demon. Again as the Brahnavidyā is being taught here, it requires a calm adhikārin, whose resignation is for getting the knowledge of the self. Here the spirit of resignation in Arjuna is for fear of sin. Again if Kṛṣṇa would teach the Brahnavidyā to Arjuna, then Arjuna would also retire from the kingdom and the Samsāra. This is not the position. Hence the teaching is not quite up to the mark here. To this the reply is that the sons of Pṛthā are admitted to the path of devotion by the Highest Lord as his 'own. The Lord with a desire to lighten the burden on the earth made Yudhiṣṭhira perform the Rājasūya, after which the the great war was fought. Again Kṛṣṇa through Yudhiṣṭhira desired to establish the realm of religion and kill the demons This can be possible only in the reign of Yudhiṣṭhira. If however the foes are killed by them, just as brothers kill brothers, and the Pāṇḍavas begin to rule, then the kingdom will have no element of virtue. It is because of this that Kṛṣṇa made Arjuna grieve in the stated way. Hence the withdrawal from war has been described of Arjuna himself; otherwise a warrior would have experienced the feeling of heroism and not of resignation. Hence only the Bhagavadīyatva is the cause of this feeling in Arjuna. 'To such a man only the Bhaktimārga should be taught and as the teaching is not of the common standard, Dhṛtarāṣṭra and his son are brought in the beginning. Again when a Bhagavadīya thinks of doing something according to the desire of God, it is good, not otherwise. 'Thus it should not be understood that the grief of 'Arjuna is for showing that those who are full of grief 'are entitled to know Brahman, because it is not the

primary purpose. The purpose in the *Bhagavad Gītā* is to teach the limits of the path of devotion, the limits that are beyond the world and the Vedas. Puruṣottama thus concludes 'Ato'tra mukhyatayā bhakter evopadeśah yat punaḥ anyat tat sarvaṁ tasyaiva śeṣabhūtam iti dik'<sup>227</sup>

As is the case with the *Śrutis* and the *Sūtras*, the *Bhagavad Gītā* has also been interpreted very often and by many. It is difficult to say dogmatically as to whether the Śuddhādvaita is or is not taught in the *Gīta*.

The *Bhāgavata Purāṇa* is held in very high esteem in the Śuddhādvaita system. Vallabha's *Subodhinī* on the same is not complete. He has also given a chapter-wise summary of the *Purāṇa* in the third chapter of his *Tattvadīpanibandha*. Puruṣottama has written his sub-commentary on the *Subodhinī* and on the said chapter. Puruṣottama has also independently written one tract *Bhāgavatasvarūpaviśayakaśaṅkānirāsavāda*.

The Śuddhādvaita system considers the *Purāṇa* as one of the Prasthānas. *Bhāgavata* is surely immensely popular among the Vaiṣṇavas in India and it really deserves that popularity. The date the *Purāṇa* has baffled the scholars and various views are advanced for the same<sup>228</sup>. It is interesting to note here that Puruṣottama has also tried to show that the *Bhāgavata* is not only a Mahāpurāṇa but is

227 Ibid p 12

228 Cf D K Shastri *Atihāsika sanśodhana* p 189 ff M Winternitz *History of Indian literature* Vol. I pp 554-557, R. C Hazra *Purāṇic records on Hindu rites and customs* (Studies in) pp. 52-57, the *Purāṇa index* Vol I V R R. Dikshitar. Intro pp xxviii-xxx

also very old<sup>229</sup> It is difficult to say anything about it. it is equally difficult to say anything about the philosophical teaching of the Purāṇa.

### Puruṣottama as an interpreter.

We have discussed above the interpretations of the *Śrutis*, *Sūtras* and *Gītā* according to the *Suddhādvaīta*, in the light of Puruṣottama's remarks. We may here add a few lines regarding Puruṣottama's own interpretations of his predecessors, whose works he has commented upon. It should be said at the very outset that Puruṣottama remains completely faithful to Vallabha and Viṭṭhaleśa, whose works he mainly explains. But the problem before Puruṣottama was not just to explain the words of Vallabha and Viṭṭhaleśa but to restate with his scholarship and skill the teachings of Vallabha among the scholars of the day. He had thus to write much more than mere explanations. Vallabha's laconic style makes his works so obscure that very often they can not be understood without the help of a commentary. Puruṣottama's commentaries however supply much more than what is needed. Puruṣottama not only tries to explain the concepts of the *Suddhādvaīta* with clarity and exactitude, but compares them with other systems, defends Vallabha and Viṭṭhaleśa and refutes others. All this he does by way of commentaries, *Prakāśa* on the *Aṇubhāṣya*, *Āvaraṇabhāṅga* on the *Tattvadīpanibandha* etc. Only rarely we find in the *Aṇubhāṣya-Prakāśa* that Puruṣottama indulges in discussions, which are not exactly called for in the *Aṇubhāṣya*. After II. iv. 16 Puruṣottama discusses the *jñānakriyā*,<sup>230</sup> and at

229. *Bhāgavatasvarūpaviśayakaśaṅkāntarāśiṅgāda*. Appendix to 230. A. B. P. pp. 792-804.

the end of the same Pāda there is a long discussion on the Sṛṣṭiprakriyā.<sup>231</sup> Similarly at the end of I. iii. 38 Puruṣottama raises the question whether the Sūdras are also entitled to learn the whole of the *Mahābhārata* and the *Purāṇas* and comes to the conclusion that only those portions which do not teach of Brahman should be read or heard by them.<sup>232</sup>

Whenever he explains, he explains fully. Thus when an Upaniṣadic passage is just referred to in the *Bhāṣya* by a word or two, Puruṣottama would give the whole passage, interpret it and reject the interpretations given by others. He would not leave aside anything that he knows, and of course he knows everything that is required for him to know. Even the traditional story of the vivāda between the Brahmavādin and the Māyāvādin connected with the verse '*Ekam śāstram devakīputragītam etc.*' does not move away from his mind.<sup>233</sup>

When Puruṣottama is defending the interpretations of Vallabha and Viṭṭhaleśa, he is surely brilliant, though at times he seems to be facing difficulties in doing so. The most glaring example of this is found in the *Suvarṇasūtra*, when Puruṣottama has to explain the interpretation given by Viṭṭhaleśa of the Vedic verse '*Tā vām vāstuny uṣmasi gamadhyai...etc.*'<sup>234</sup> Viṭṭhaleśa talks about Gokula and all that. Puruṣottama however can not let it go easily. His opponent immediately asks why should there be such an explanation,

231. A. B. P. pp. 810-813.

232. A. B. P. pp. 442-444.

233. Cf. T. S. Ab. pp. 26-27.

234. Ṛg Veda I. 154. 6.

When even in the *Nirukta* the verse is said to have the sun as its deity. Puruṣottama can of course give the answer. "Prakaraṇānurodhāt. 'Vedaiḥ ca sarvair aham eva vedyah,' 'Sarve vedā yat padam āmanati' iti śrutismṛtibhyām ca. 'Ado yad dāru plavata' ity alakṣmīprakāśakamantrasya puruṣottamakṣetramāhātmye vyāsapādair vedabhāṣye vidyāraṇyena ca Śrījagannāthaparayatā vyākhyānāt, etasyāḥ saraṇer darśitatvāc ca."<sup>235</sup>

Again while explaining his master, Puruṣottama does not miss the textual problems also. Thus for instance, while commenting upon the statement of Vallabha 'Agnisūryasomavidyudrūpā brahmaṇo haṁsoktacaraṇarūpā,' Puruṣottama says 'Rūpād iti pāṭha bhāvapradhāno nirdeśah Rūpeti pāṭhaḥ śrīhastākṣareṣu sandigdhatvād bodhyaḥ.'<sup>236</sup> After III. iv. 21. Puruṣottama says that another Sūtra 'Bhāvaśabdāc ca' is read by others. He then explains why it has not been included here. "Tac ca vidhir vā dhāraṇavad ity atraitasyaiva syāt padvid ity śrutivyākhyānenaiva vyutpāditam ataḥ prayojanābhāvād upekṣitam iti pratibhāti. Lekhakoṣāt tṛṣṭitam veti iṇeyam."<sup>237</sup>

Sometimes Puruṣottama finds that the interpretations of the Sūtras as given by Viṭṭhaleśa are different from those given by Vallabha. Puruṣottama notes the difference carefully in his *Aṇubhāṣyaprakāśa*. Thus for instance at the end of Sūtra II. iii. 42 Puruṣottama notes that while the term 'Prayatna' in the Sūtra is understood as an effort of the individual soul by Vallabha, Viṭṭhaleśa

235. S. S. p. 295.

236. A. B. P. p. 494.

237. A. B. P. p. 1212.

explains it as the effort of the Highest Lord for the purpose of sport <sup>238</sup> Similarly at the end of III 11 18 Purusottama shows how the interpretation of this set of Sūtras given by Vitthaleśa is different from that given by Vallabha <sup>239</sup>

We have stated above that Purusottama is on the whole very faithful to the Ācārya and his son, whose works he explains. A very careful perusal of his commentary on the *Anubhāṣya* will however show that there are cases, of course rare, when Purusottama in his zest to give a scholarly explanation slightly goes off the track. In the very first Sūtra for instance, Vallabha discusses the illustration 'Daśamas tvam asi' and points out that a man knows himself to be the tenth not only because he hears that, but also because he sees himself to be the tenth. The perception here is thus stronger than the Āptavākya. Purusottama however indulges in a scholastic discussion and gives three alternatives: one who sees, one who is blind and one who knows that the soul is different from the body. For all the three the knowledge is only of the body and not the soul, resulting from the Āptavākya. Vallabha's explanation is certainly better <sup>240</sup>. Such instances are very rare and again the difference wherever found, does not make any substantial change in the teaching of the authors. We can say at the end that Purusottama, who is a very capable argumentator, is also very faithful and brilliant interpreter.

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238 A B P p 750

239 A B P pp 914-916

240 A B P p 30

## CHAPTER V

### EXPOSITION OF THE S'UDDHĀDVAITA

#### Introductory :

While the founders of various theories in Indian Philosophy have formulated and preached their own ideas, it was left for their illustrious followers to put their doctrines in a systematic form. Thus whereas Gauḍapāda in his *Kārikās* first brought out the theory of Māyā and that of Ajāti, Śaṅkara surpassed his grand-teacher and people now know Śaṅkara more than they know Gauḍapāda. Śaṅkara was followed by Vācaspati Miśra and others, who systematised Śaṅkara's theories and preached the avacchedavāda, or the pratibimbavāda or whatever Vada, they thought, has been taught by Śaṅkara. This has happened in the case of all the great teachers.

like Rāmānuja, and Madhva, Śrīkaṅṭha and Nimbārka. But Śaṅkara, Rāmānuja, and Madhva are clear in their works. Rāmānuja with his dialectical style and Śaṅkara with his easy and graceful and yet scholarly diction stand in sharp contrast with Vallabha, whose laconic and terse expressions are fused with a very subtle analysis brought forth in his interpretative method. Vallabha is so brief in his works, that it is difficult to understand them fully without the aid of commentaries. We are even confused at times and not in a position to understand what exactly he is driving at. Viṭṭhaleśa, though clearer in exposition than his father, appears to be more concerned with the establishment of the Saṁpradāya than attempting a systematic exposition of his own doctrines. Again one may feel that at times he tends to be sectarian. His special references to Gokula, Puṣṭi, Maryādā and Pravāha, his greater emphasis on the minor and decidedly later *Upaniṣads* and all this may not appear to a critical mind as a very creditable performance. Viṭṭhaleśa was followed by Gokulanātha and Harirāya both of whom can be called the pillars of the Saṁpradāya but their share in the systematic explanation of the philosophical part of the Śuddhādvaita is not so very great as to be taken into account. Puruṣottama alone, the greatest scholar of the Saṁpradāya, was the first writer to note this defect and to try to make up for it.

Again though Puruṣottama is mainly a commentator, he is not merely a writer of commentaries. His *Vādagrāntas* and his *Prasthānaratnākara*, which is unfortunately not complete, show something of a modern scholar in Puruṣottama. Here his aim is not to refute the theories of others but to propound his own and the refutation of



others' thoughts is just a subordinate affair. Again, as we have seen above, Puruṣottama's method is comparative and analytical. So it is by reading Puruṣottama's works that we can find out where exactly the *Suddhādvaita* stands in the whole range of Indian, especially the Vedāntic, philosophy.

Further, Puruṣottama, who has written so much on the *Suddhādvaita*, was rewarded with an enviable title of *Vedapaśu* by his contemporaries and some people even went to the extent of saying that Puruṣottama has taught wrong theories.<sup>1</sup> There may be various reasons for it and we shall deal with them later on. But it is necessary for us to see where Puruṣottama's analysis has led him and whether there is anything in his works, that warrants such a statement. For all these reasons, therefore, we have attempted in the following pages the exposition of the *Suddhādvaita* as given by Puruṣottama.

### Theory of knowledge

Knowledge, says Puruṣottama, is endless and infinite, because it is the very nature of the Supreme Principle, Brahman. When the Lord desires to create and to be manifold, the sentiency which is His very nature, is revealed in many ways. Thus even though it is infinite, it can be understood as tenfold. As stated in the beginning of *Prasthānaratnākara*, these ten types are as follows :—

(1) Knowledge which is the essential nature of God, the essential spirit of all the beings, which is not liable to modification (*vikāra*) and which is to be meditated upon by all.<sup>2</sup>

1. Cf. *Avatāravādāvali*. Hindi. Intro. p. 6.

2. *Tatra sarvātmanbhūtam sarvopāśyam mukhyam avikṛtam svavarūpātmanmakam ekam*. Pr. p. 2.

like Rāmānuja, and Madhva, Śrīkaṇṭha and Nimbarka. But Śaṅkara, Rāmānuja, and Madhva are clear in their works. Rāmānuja with his dialectical style and Śaṅkara with his easy and graceful and yet scholarly diction stand in sharp contrast with Vallabha, whose laconic and terse expressions are fused with a very subtle analysis brought forth in his interpretative method. Vallabha is so brief in his works, that it is difficult to understand them fully without the aid of commentaries. We are even confused at times and not in a position to understand what exactly he is driving at. Viṭṭhaleśa, though clearer in exposition than his father, appears to be more concerned with the establishment of the Sampradaya than attempting a systematic exposition of his own doctrines. Again one may feel that at times he tends to be sectarian. His special references to Gokula, Puṣṭi, Maryādā and Pravāha, his greater emphasis on the minor and decidedly later *Upanisads* and all this may not appear to a critical mind as a very creditable performance. Viṭṭhaleśa was followed by Gokulanātha and Hariṣaya both of whom can be called the pillars of the Sampradāya but their share in the systematic explanation of the philosophical part of the Suddhādvaita is not so very great as to be taken into account. Puruṣottama alone, the greatest scholar of the Sampradāya, was the first writer to note this defect and to try to make up for it.

Again though Puruṣottama is mainly a commentator, he is not merely a writer of commentaries. His *Vādagrāntas* and his *Prasthānaratnākara*, which is unfortunately not complete, show something of a modern scholar in Puruṣottama. Here his aim is not to refute the theories of others but to propound his own and the refutation of

others' thoughts is just a subordinate affair. Again, as we have seen above, Puruṣottama's method is comparative and analytical. So it is by reading Puruṣottama's works that we can find out where exactly the *Suddhādvaita* stands in the whole range of Indian, especially the Vedāntic, philosophy.

Further, Puruṣottama, who has written so much on the *Suddhādvaita*, was rewarded with an enviable title of Vedapaśu by his contemporaries and some people even went to the extent of saying that Puruṣottama has taught wrong theories.<sup>1</sup> There may be various reasons for it and we shall deal with them later on. But it is necessary for us to see where Puruṣottama's analysis has led him and whether there is anything in his works, that warrants such a statement. For all these reasons, therefore, we have attempted in the following pages the exposition of the *Suddhādvaita* as given by Puruṣottama.

### Theory of knowledge

Knowledge, says Puruṣottama, is endless and infinite, because it is the very nature of the Supreme Principle, Brahman. When the Lord desires to create and to be manifold, the sentency which is His very nature, is revealed in many ways. Thus even though it is infinite, it can be understood as tenfold. As stated in the beginning of *Prasthānaratnākara*, these ten types are as follows :—

(1) Knowledge which is the essential nature of God, the essential spirit of all the beings, which is not liable to modification (*vikāra*) and which is to be meditated upon by all.<sup>2</sup>

1. Cf. *Atatāravādāvalī*. Hindi. Ittrō. p. 6.

2. *Tatra sarvātmabhūtam sarv jāśyam mukhyam avikṛtam : svasvatūpātmaḥ ekam*. Pr. 2.

(2) When this essential nature of God is manifested, like the light of the Sun, it is then called the quality of God. It inheres in the individual souls from Him.

(3) In the beginning of the creation, God accepts the Vedaśarīra and we have that knowledge manifested in the form of the Vedas.

(4) The third kind of knowledge becomes the seed from which is manifested in the first creation, the verbal knowledge.

These four types of knowledge are said to be eternal (nitya). The other six which are enumerated below, are said to be Kārya and are attributes of the internal organ (Antahkarana).

(5) When individual words convey the sense, we have the fifth kind of knowledge, depending upon and qualified by the association of particular words. Even for the dumb, who have no speech, gestures take the place of words.

(6) When one knows something by means of his organs of sensation, that is the sixth kind of knowledge, which may be called the sense-knowledge.

The remaining four kinds of knowledge are also related to the individual knower, but depend upon the internal organ.

(7) The Manas, which has the nature and function of conation and non-conation, (Samkalpa & Vikalpa) produces the doubt. (Samśaya)

(8) The body-consciousness, wrong knowledge, decision and memory—all these depend upon the buddhi.

(9) The dream consciousness depends upon the egoism (Ahaṁkāra) associated with the buddhi.

(10) Deep-sleep consciousness where the citta has the vision of the soul as One.

Puruṣottama does not accept the view that the knowledge which is thus produced, is just a transitory phenomenon, lasting for three moments only. Even if we admit its permanence, there can be no contingency of one particular knowledge lasting all the while. When another kind of knowledge is produced due to the presence of other objects and the set of circumstances required for its production, it supercedes the former, which is then relegated to the background and which exists in the subtle form of impressions (Saṃskāra). Whenever the attention of the manas is drawn towards it, it can be discovered in memory; it is not so found out when the manas is busy with other things and does not pay heed to it. It is not necessary therefore to say that the knowledge is destroyed. It is just concealed.

From another point of view, knowledge can be classified as sāttvika, rājasa, and tāmasa according as there is the presence and preponderance of one or another of the three qualities. Out of these three, the last is incapable of proving anything. It is just illusory, is condemned by the cultured people and is adhered to only by the heretics and the low.

The sāttvika knowledge is of the form of pramā or right knowledge; for, whenever there is an increase of sattva, right knowledge is produced owing to various causes like scriptures, action, meditation, mantras, purifications etc. When however the sattva quality is lacking, the same circumstances which produce knowledge, produce error in its lieu. Thus we can say from this positive and

negative concomitance that the knowledge which is produced by the *sattva*, is the *pramāṇa* which is not sublated or which is not liable to sublation<sup>3</sup>

The *sāttvika* knowledge does not accept any distinctions (*vikalpas*) It is the *kaivalya*, which is absolutely valid, the primary notion being the presence of the Universal Essence every where It is *sadātmaka* The syllogism<sup>4</sup> given by Puruṣottama to prove that all the objects are non-different from the Sat on the analogy of the non-difference of the gold and the golden ornaments, because of the inherence of Sat, comes very near to the esoteric knowledge of Śamkara, in which all the distinctions are to be eschewed and there remains only pure being The indeterminate knowledge according to Puruṣottama, is the first apprehension of being alone, without any qualifications and distinctions But while Śamkara's esoteric knowledge does not admit even the knower and the triplicate difference of the knower, known and knowledge, Puruṣottama does not go to that extent The basic difference between the two is that, while Śamkara's *nirvikalpaka* is perfectly in consonance with his own theories of the *nirvikalpaka* Brahman, such is not the case with Puruṣottama, who is not in a position to accept the distinction in the qualityless and the qualified Brahman Puruṣottama's explanation of the *nirvikalpaka* is in keeping with his theory of *tādātmya*

3 *Abadhitaḥ jñānatvam badhayogyavyatirikatatvam va tallakṣaṇam.*  
Pr p 6

4 *Vimata bhavaḥ sadabhinnah ādyantamadhyesu sadanugatattvat.*  
*Yad eva yad anugatam tat tadabhinnam Sauvarṇakūṇḍala-*  
*katakadivat Sadavaśesatvac ca tatha* Pr p 6

The Rājasa knowledge, which is produced by the rājasa-sāmagri, is variously revealed and is full of distinctions. The rājasa knowledge is stated to be savikalpaka. Whenever an object is first known, it is known as pure being viz. we have the indeterminate knowledge on account of the quality of Sattva. This is however immediately superseded by the rajas, which is moved by the internal organ in association with the senses and this leads to the distinction in the name and form of that particular object. The changeover from the indeterminate to the determinate is so rapid that the apprehension of the former is almost absent and we do not at all think that we have passed through one stage and come to another. The procedure however is the same., whether the sensory perception may be simple or complex, as illustrated in that of "a pot" or that of 'a pot on the ground.' Purusottama classifies the savikalpaka into two :

( i ) Viśiṣṭabuddhi - associated knowledge e. g. 'a man with a stick.'

( ii ) Samūhālaṃbanabuddhi-knowledge of a conglomeration of entities. e. g. ' a man and a stick,' ' a pot, a cloth and a pillar.'

Puruṣottama's explanation of the indeterminate and the determinate is that, we have, at first, the revelation of the pure being. This is nirvikalpaka. When the internal organ operates with the senses, that pure being is defined in its name and form; and this is savikalpaka. The distinction between the two forms of knowledge may appear to be rather too minute and scholastic. It is an explanation of the process of perception and cognition from the simple to the complex.

The difference of opinion among various thinkers is due to the difference in their various concepts about the Supreme Principle and its relation with the diversity of the world. The nirvikalpaka-savikalpaka process thus has to be explained in keeping with the theorists' own doctrine of the creation of the world, with all its distinctions and diversities from the cause or causes, which he has postulated. It will be interesting here to compare the Suddhādvaita theory with those of Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja. We have already stated before, how Śaṅkara and Puruṣottama come very near to each other in their concepts of the nirvikalpaka jñāna. Similar is the position with the concepts regarding the savikalpaka also. Puruṣottama points out that the Rājas knowledge has no absolute validity but is useful only in the worldly dealings. He explains the vyavahāra as a bundle of the natural processes of the body and senses and produced by a similar bundle in the mind, which is replete with the egoistic thought of 'I' and 'Mine'.<sup>5</sup> The exoteric reality of Śaṅkara has its reality in the empirical sphere only and has no absolute reality. But the distinction between the two is pointed out by Puruṣottama himself, when he defines the determinates as the interim qualities of the reality.<sup>6</sup> Puruṣottama's explanation can be very easily distinguished from that of Rāmānuja, who thinks that everything, even Brahman is qualified. For him the psychological process from the indeterminate to the determinate is not that from the simple to the complex, but from the complex without the past

5 *Ahammabhimānatmakamanasasannipatajanyo dehendriyadisu-abhavikavyaparatomakah sannipatah* Pr p 7.

6 *Vikalpah satah avāntaraviśeṣāḥ* Pr p 10



associations to the complex, associated with the past experiences.<sup>7</sup> Puruṣottama's explanation of the two types of knowledge is quite in keeping with his theory of Pure Monism, wherein the One becomes manifold and yet remains one and pure.

Puruṣottama classifies the determinate knowledge into doubt, error, decision, memory and dream.

Doubt or *samśaya* is explained by Puruṣottama as the understanding of various and contradictory characters in one substantive.<sup>8</sup> It is further classified into *sama* and *utkaṭakoṭika*. *Sama* is that, in which both the alternatives have equal force, e. g. 'This is a man or not a man' or 'This is a man or a pillar'. The *utkaṭakoṭika* on the other hand, is that in which one of the alternatives is stronger than the other, e. g. 'This is most probably a man.'

*Viparyāsa* is explained by Puruṣottama as the extraneous knowledge revealing an object different from the object, which is contacted by our senses.<sup>9</sup> Here comes the theory of erroneous perception, which is called *khyāti*. Puruṣottama discusses and refutes various *khyātis* and propounds the *anyakhyāti* in his *Khyātivāda*.<sup>10</sup> Puruṣottama's analysis of

7. *Nirvikalpakam api saviśeṣaviśayam eva. Ś'ribhāṣya. I. i. 1. Ato nirvikalpakam ekajatiyeṣu prathamapiṇḍagrahaṇam. And, Tatra prathamapiṇḍagrahaṇe gotvāder anuvṛttākāratā na pratīyate. Dvitiyādipiṇḍagrahaṇeṣv evānuvṛttipratīteḥ. Ś'ribhāṣya. I. i. 1.*

8. *Ekasmin dharmīni viruddhanānākoṭyavagāhi jñānam samśayaḥ. Pr. p. 15.*

9. *Samprayuktabhinnārthamātrapratipādakam bhāhyam. jñānam viparyāsaḥ. Pr. p. 16.*

10. *Khyātivāda; Vādāvalī. p. 120. ff.*

illusion is based upon the objective experience of a subjective impression. In the illusory perception of silver, the illusory silver is revealed to us on account of the objective and external projection of the knowledge through the instrumentality of Māyā. The knowledge of silver is existing as an impression because of our earlier experience of the same. This projected knowledge envelops the object in view, partly or completely and thus we perceive something quite different (Anyā) It is therefore called Anyakhyāti.<sup>11</sup>

Dr. P. D. Chandratre in his thesis '*Methodology of the major Bhāṣyas on the Brahmasūtras*' says, that Vallabha accepts the anyathākhyāti, so that one's mistake of something for some other thing, is due to the similarity of some of the attributes between the two. 'After the attainment of true knowledge however the view-point in this respect is changed to Akhyāti'<sup>12</sup> The Anyathākhyāti is accepted by the Naiyāyikas while the Akhyāti is believed in by the Prābhākaras Vallabha's doctrine of error has been ably explained by Prof. G. H. Bhatt in his article on the subject.<sup>13</sup> Puruṣottama not only refuses to believe in

11 Tat pūrvotpannasyanubhavasya saṃskaratmana sthitasyo-  
dbodhakāṅ prābalye mayikarthakāravatī buddhivṛttir māyayā  
bahih kṣīpyate. Tadā sa purovartinam sarvato' mṣato vāvṛtya  
bahir avabhāsata itī māyikasyānyasyaiva khyānād anyakhyātir  
ity atra vyavahriyate. Pr p 17

Also, Atah śuktirajatādīsthale mayayā bahihkṣiptabuddhivṛtti-  
rūpam jñānam evārthākārena khyāyate itī mantavyam

Khyātivāda Vādātālī p 121

12 Methodology. p 97

13 Prof. G H Bhatt : Vallabhācārya's view on error Siddha.  
Bharatī Vol II

the anyathākhyāti, but even refutes it. Puruṣottama says that if we believe in the appearance of an object otherwise, then that anyathātva would mean yathārthatva or reality.<sup>14</sup> The chimera cannot be regarded as real and cannot therefore be said to exist. Hence we shall have to understand the instrumentality of Māyā and the external projection of our own buddhi, which reveals something other (anya) than the object with which our senses are in contact. This is known as anyakhyāti. In spite of the polemical passages against anyathākhyāti, we shall have to admit the first part of it viz. that of similarity. Thus when Puruṣottama says that the rajatabuddhi comes to the fore because of the latent impressions of the same already existing in our mind, we shall have to accept that rajata and śukti must have some similarity, for otherwise we can not account for the rajatabuddhi alone and not the ghaṭabuddhi, being projected outside. Puruṣottama accepts this by saying that the term anya means sadṛśa.<sup>15</sup> This however is from the point of view of those, who have not attained to the true knowledge. As for those, who have correct knowledge, everything is perceived by them as the manifestation of Brahman; the theory of erroneous perception is that of akhyāti, which is just our inability to note the distinction between the object in view and the object which is perceived. But the question arises here, as to whether we can believe in the erroneous perception of those who have right knowledge.

14. Anyathātve yathārthatāpatteḥ. *Khyātivāda. Vādāvali.* p. 122.

15. Anyapadasya sadṛśyavācakatvenānubhūtasadṛśadharmāṇām eva khyānāt. *Khyātivāda. Vādāvali.* p. 130.

Purusottama himself says that their knowledge is right knowledge <sup>16</sup>

Various theories of erroneous perception in the systems of Indian philosophy do not purport merely to explain the psychological process involved in wrong perception. These theories are in keeping with the doctrines about the reality or otherwise of the universe with its manifold appearances, as related to its Supreme Cause. Every one accepts that the snake perceived in place of rope or silver mistaken for conchshell is false and practically non-existent. But the question is, as to how, that which is not existing, can replace something which exists and can appear as existing. Śamkara who thinks that the perception of everything requires its existence, says that it is inexplicable. If the snake does not exist, it can not be seen. So long as we are seeing it, it is real and we even tremble with fear at its sight. Only when we come to know that it is a rope, we feel that the snake is unreal. The snake thus cannot be said to be real, for otherwise it would not have been sublated, it can not be said to have been unreal, for then it would not have been perceived at all. For Śamkara all knowledge is real in its own sphere. This is not the position of Ramānuja, who goes to the extent of taking even silver as real on the ground of the triplication of the *preordial* elements (Trivrtikarapa), as stated in the scriptures. Purusottama, so to say, steers clear of the two, for he has to explain the theory in keeping with the difference between Jagat and Samsara, maintained by Vallabha. Thus he can not accept the different levels of experience, nor the reality of everything that is perceived.

16 *Atas teṣam jñānasya yatharthatvat* etc Ibid p 130

That is why he says that the silver, that appears in place of conchshell, is an erroneous objective experience of a subjective entity, while the conchshell remains there as true as ever. It is thus our fault that we see silver, it is not the conchshell, which becomes silver owing to our faulty eyes. He believes that *Maṃā* is an instrument in false apperception. Here Purusottama may be said to come very near to the *Ātmakhyāti* of the Buddhists, who believe in the internal existence of silver as a mode of mind and who think that the error consists in regarding what is internal as external. But the two systems are wide apart in their basic theories, for the *Vijñānavādins* think of the internal existence alone of everything and deny the externality of all objects. This can not be admitted by Purusottama, who refutes the theory of *Ātmakhyāti* thoroughly. In the Buddhistic doctrine the externality even of a conchshell is an error.

is not to be equated with sensory perception only, but it also includes the immediate intuition, which may not involve sensory perception. Thus the knowledge arising out of the teaching, 'That thou art' is also immediate because it is intuitive<sup>20</sup>. Thus according to him *pratyakṣa* is the communion of the subject-consciousness and the object-consciousness, for this the body is not indispensable<sup>21</sup>. Vallabha refuses to admit that verbal knowledge can produce immediate apprehension because in the illustration like 'Thou art the tenth', the tenth person sees that he is the tenth and it is this perception, which is more powerful than verbal knowledge<sup>22</sup>. Puruṣottama, while explaining this, says that the sentence 'Thou art the tenth' gives us knowledge not of the *Ātman* but only of the body. According to *Śaṅkara* the passage 'That thou art' produces *atmaśakṣātkāra*. Thus there is disparity of illustration. Vallabha further points out that if we agree to the intuitive knowledge based upon verbal authority, it would mean a mixture of *pramāṇas*, which is undesirable<sup>23</sup>. Puruṣottama is more pointed when he says that *Śaṅkara* means something which goes off its set limits. Thus the passage 'Thou art the tenth' has not the capacity of giving knowledge of the subject, leaving aside that of the object,

20 *Pratyakṣaīagamam cedam phalam Tat tvam asity asaṁsaryatmatvapratipattau satyam saṁsaryātmatvavyavrtteh Śaṅkara-bhāṣya I iv 14.*

21 *Evam sati deha upalabdhir bhavaty asati ca na bhavatisi na dehadharmo bhavitum arhati Śaṅkarabhāṣya III iii 54*

22 *Daśamas tvam asity adau pratyakṣasamagryā balavattvād dehādeh pratyakṣatvat A B I 1 1*

23 *Pramāṇasamkarāpattiś ca A B I. 1 1*

which is the purport of the sentence. Thus the communion of the subject consciousness and the object consciousness is not admissible<sup>24</sup> Immediate knowledge thus is only due to sensory perception in the *Suddhādvaita*.

Memory is explained as knowledge arising from the impressions only<sup>25</sup> The impressions are our past experiences existing in subtle form<sup>26</sup>

The dream experiences have the dream world as their object The dream world is purely illusory and has no element of reality.<sup>27</sup> The reality, which is at times experienced in the dreams, may be explained as on a par with the *chimarae* that we may at times see in the waking state But as the knowledge is of the essential nature of the self, even that which has the dream world as its object is true and not false<sup>28</sup> Here *Puruṣottama* refuses to accept *Madhva's* theory that though the dream world is true and without any material cause, the dream experiences are false *Purusottama* reduces this to absurdity by pointing out that if a man sees his head being cut off in a dream, even though his vision may be untrue, he must have his head cut off and must meet with his death

24 *Daśamas tīam asitī vākyaśthayaṣmatpadasmāntapadarthollan-ghanenāsmatpadārthaviśayakajñānananane tasya jñānasya pramānatvam na syāt* A B P. I 1 p 31. *Puruṣottama* also gives an alternative explanation for the mixture of *pramānas*.

25. *Samiskāramatrajananyam jñānam*. Pr. p. 21

26 Pr p 21

27 *Svāpniki sṣṣir māyāmātram na vastubhūtetī niścayah* Pr p. 24

28 *Jñānam tu tadviśayakam satyam eva Tasyātmarūpatvāt*. Pr. p 25.

The distinction between the dream and the waking state is stated to be the continuation of the latter, while the former is seen and destroyed and there is no continuity between two dreams<sup>29</sup> Śaṅkara distinguishes between the two from two points of view. He says that whatever is perceived in a dream is sublated in the waking state. Besides the criterion of *badha* Śaṅkara also distinguishes the two by stating that the dream experiences are memory or *smṛti* whereas the waking experiences are *upalabdhi*<sup>30</sup>. The orthodox vedantic view is that of the *anṛvacarīya* *khyā*. Śaṅkara refers to this in his *Bhāṣya* on the *Brahmasūtra* II 11 3<sup>31</sup>. It may be said, the reason of *Badha-abadhā* as given by Śaṅkara is not so different from that of Vallabha, who says that a pillar remains a pillar even after years which means that it is not contradicted or sublated, but while Śaṅkara's *Badha-abadhā* depends upon the change from the dream to the waking state, this is not the case with Vallabha, who intends to point out that there is no continuity between two dreams.

Deep sleep experience is stated to be a division of the dream. In deep sleep Purusottama says, the self reveals

29 *Tatha ca svapna jagatadṛśtayoḥ tatkālinayathatvatatkalikanyakalikanyathatvabhavarupavaidharmyaṅ na svapna jagatadṛśtayoḥ, tulyatvam* A B P II 11 29 p 656 Vallabha is far simpler when he says *Varsanamtaram apī dṛśyamah stambhah stambha eva* A B II 11 29 p 656-57

30 *Kim punar vaidharmyam? Badha-badhau itī brumah Apī ca smṛtir esa yat svapnadarśanam Upalabdhis tu jāgaritadarśanam* Śaṅkarabhāṣya II 11 29

31 Cf the quotations from *Vedantaparibhāṣa* and *Brahmavidyā-bhāṣa* in *Brahmasūtras* II 1 & 11 with Śaṅkara's comments Dr Belvalkar p 164



itself<sup>32</sup> *Cinta* or reflection which may be of the nature of synthesis or analysis, which may be by the method of agreement or difference, or which may be of the nature of mental doubt or meditation is to be included in the memory and need not be separately considered. Shame, fear and the like are modes of egoism and are not states of cognition. Recognition is not different from decision. Memory is auxiliary to recognition, which is produced 'in association with the present perception, directly through the operation of memory and indirectly through the operation of past impressions'<sup>33</sup>

The correctness or otherwise of an experience depends upon the predominance of right knowledge or false knowledge respectively. Thus paintings, idolations and stage-representations by actors have the predominance of *prama* in as much as they have the capacity to produce the same feelings, as would have been produced in the presence of the objects, which they have imitated<sup>34</sup>

*Samkara* believes that the subject and the object are fundamentally opposed to each other like light and darkness. The essential nature of the subject is different from that of the object. The subject is sentient while the object is nonsentient. In the opinion of *Samkara* the subject-object relationship is purely relative. In the ultimate analysis, the subject is not even the knower viz the

32 *Susuptis tu svapnasyaivaivāntarabhedah Tatratmasphuranam tu svata eva* Pr p 26

33 S N Daegupta *History of Indian Philosophy* Vol IV p 339

34 *Bhramapramasamūhalaṁbanam tu ekadeśavikṛtam ananyavad bhavati nyāyena bhramadhikye viparyāsa eva Pramadhikye ca niścayah* Pr p 25-26

substance, of which knowledge is an attribute, but is knowledge itself. Thus there is complete identity between the Ātman and samvit. Our statements like 'I am thin,' or 'I am blind' are due to the superimposition of the subject upon the object and vice versa. Similarly when we say 'I know myself', we are trying to turn the subject into an object and thus think in the realm of Adhāsya. Rāmānuja in his *Bhāṣya* on the very first Sūtra, gives a studied refutation of Śaṅkara's position and maintains that knowledge is different from the knower and the known. There can be no samvit without the subject and object. Knowledge again is an attribute of the Ātman. Puruṣottama says that the vyāpti of visayatva and jadatva cannot be maintained as has been done by Śaṅkara, because the sentient Ātman is an object of self realization like 'I know the Ātman'. If the Ātman is not an object of pratyagvitti, that pratyagvitti ceases to be a vitti at all. It is possible to say that everything that is jada is also a visaya, but its converse is wrong<sup>35</sup>. Puruṣottama further says that Ātman and samvit are not synonymous. The relation of Ātman and samvit is that of a substance and its attribute or better, that of aśraya and āśrayin. In the statements like 'I know', or 'I possess knowledge', knowledge is understood as an attribute of 'I'<sup>36</sup>. Puruṣottama says that the object is also real and different from the subject. That the Ātman is revealed by knowledge (paratah-prakāśita) does not render it non-sentient, because

35 *Viśayatvena jadatvena vyaptēh pratyaksabādhitatvat Jadatvena viśayatvena vyapter pratyaksasiddhatvat* A B P I 1. 1 p. 15

36 *Aham janamiti jñānavām aham ity evam atmadharmatvenauatasya bhānāc ca* A B P I 1 1 p. 16

Ātman is self-luminous. Puruṣottama says that it is both, having the essential nature of knowledge and having knowledge as an attribute.<sup>37</sup> This is the real import of the ten divisions of knowledge, given by Puruṣottama. In the system of Rāmānuja, it is very difficult to find out how the attributes are organically related to the substance. For Śaṅkara the attributes and the substance are not related but are one, and the difficulty arises when he tries to explain how Ātman, which is sentiency, becomes sentient. The theory of *anirvacanīyatā* is in fact a frank admission of the inability to explain the problem. But then a very important problem remains unexplained. Rāmānuja's refutation of Śaṅkara touches the same points. The *saṁvit* of Śaṅkara, which is regarded as one with Ātman, is the esoteric knowledge. What then is the use of refuting him with the arguments, which belong purely to the exoteric level? Puruṣottama blends the two positions and tries to avoid the difficulties by stating that knowledge is the nature as also an attribute of the self. This involves the question of the exact relationship between a substance and its qualities, which we shall discuss later on. Again Puruṣottama does not maintain, at least expressly, the distinction between the exoteric and the esoteric spheres of knowledge, and yet he tries to evolve the former from the latter. This can be and is done by him by falling back upon the incomprehensible powers of God.

### Means of proof

Pramāṇas have always occupied an important position in the systems of Indian thought. While beginning his

37. *Citsarūpatve sati svayamprakāśasamvidāśrayatītyanācetanatīāt.* A. B. P. I. i. 1. p. 15.

Prasthānaratnākara, with a chapter on the Pramāṇas, Puruṣottama gives the oft-quoted maxim, 'Mānādhinā meyasiddhī' 1 c 'the establishment of that which is to be measured depends upon that which measures' 38 Vallabha describes pramāṇa as that by which one knows, what is unknown 20 Puruṣottama says in the beginning of his *Prasthānaratnākara*, that the term pramāṇa has two meanings. Firstly it stands for the knowledge which is not sublated or which is different from that which is liable to contradiction, it also stands for that which brings about such knowledge 40 It is interesting to note here that Puruṣottama distinguishes between Karaṇa and Kāraṇa. Karaṇa is explained by him as 'Vyaparavad asādhāranam' 41 or 'A unique agent associated with a dynamic agent with reference to the effects that are to be produced' 42

Vallabha has not said much about pratyakṣa, but Puruṣottama has dealt with it often and at length. Perception or pratyakṣa is defined by Puruṣottama as the pramāṇa, corresponding to and depending upon various sense-faculties 43 The sense-organs are six in number, eye, skin, nose, tongue, ear, and mind. Whereas most of the Indian systems do not admit the mind also as a sense-

38 Pr p 1 Cf also *Citsukhi* II 18, quoted by Dr P D Chandratre, *Methodology* p 44 Fn. 1

39 *Anadhigat irthagantṛtvat pramanasya* A B I i 2 p-80

40 *Ītra pramanasabdo bhavavyutpanno rūdho va abādhitajñane vartate bādhayogyavyatirikte ca Karanavyutpannas tu tadṛśa-jñanakarane* Pr p 1

41 Pr. p 26

42 S N Dasgupta *History of Indian Philosophy* Vol IV p 340

43 *Indriyātmakam pramanam* Pr p 108.

-faculty, Puruṣottama is inclined to admit it as such. It is better he says, to believe that the mind is and is not a sense-faculty, because of its nature of both knowledge and action. It has not been accepted as an indriya because it is superior to the other five. Thus he thinks that the mind has its function of a sense-faculty, but has also something more than that of an ordinary sense-faculty.

These indriyas are atomic, super-sensible and changing (Vikāri). Puruṣottama gives the objects of these faculties as follows :

The eye has as its objects the manifest form, that which has the manifest form, and the modes of the latter like number, extent, separation, conjunction, division, relation, non-relation to others, motion, action, genus and that in which it is inherent. The objects of the skin are the manifest touch and whatever is connected with it. Similar are the cases of nose, tongue and ear, which have their objects as the manifest smell, the manifest taste and the manifest sound respectively, together with all their correlates. It is interesting to note that for Puruṣottama only the manifest form or sound or touch can be an object of its corresponding sense-faculty. Thus the atoms of ghosts, which have no manifest colour can not be an object of the corresponding visual sense faculty. Thus the earth is the object of all the five sense-faculties, water of four (excluding the gustatory), fire of three (excluding the gustatory and the olfactory), air of the tactual and the auditory. Space is the object of the visual sense-faculty only on the ground of the prameyabala \*\*

Directions and time are known only as attributes of the objects of knowledge and not as separate objects. The modes of the mind like desire and others are grasped by the mind. The soul and its attributes are not however objects of mundane sense-faculties.

Tamas or darkness is regarded as a separate positive entity and not mere absence of light. When we do not perceive objects in darkness, we actually see the darkness, which is an entity and which comes in the way of other objects and covers them. Similarly Puruṣottama is inclined to regard the pratibimba also as a separate category.<sup>45</sup>

Puruṣottama refuses to accept abhāva as a separate category and considers the various abhāvas as just different states of the cause. He thinks that they should be included in the avirbhava and tirobhāva. The abhāva came to be regarded as a padārtha by the later Vaiśeṣikas, when the Vaiśeṣika ontology gave way to and absorbed in it the consideration of the Nyaya epistemology. Kanada, for instance, does not admit it. For him absolute non-existence has no meaning while other three abhāvas, the prāgabhāva, the pradhvamsābhava and the anyonyabhava are related to the positive being. The Suddhādvaita believes in the manifestation of the Lord as the world. Hence for Puruṣottama, everything is God. When something is produced, the cause is manifested in that way, when it ceases to exist, that manifestation is withdrawn and there is

45 *Vadavalī Andhakarāṭāda* p 131 ff & *Pratibimbavada* p 193 ff

non-manifestation. Thus there is no abhāva, nothing which is non-existent. Puruṣottama explains all the four abhāvas, as related to the Āvirbhāva and Tirobhāva of the inhering cause. The prāgabhāva or negation antecedent to production is the condition of the material cause, which is not manifested, the condition which is congenial to its manifestation as an effect.<sup>46</sup> Similarly the pradhvaṁsābhāva or the non-existence posterior to destruction is the condition which is against the subsistence of the effect.<sup>47</sup> The anyonyābhāva or the negation of one thing in another and vice versa is just an āvirbhāvaviśeṣa because it is the manifestation of one thing, that excludes that of others.<sup>48</sup> The absolute non-existence, which is illustrated by the son of a barren woman or a sky-flower is nothing but non-manifestation or tirobhāva.

The function and operation of these sense-faculties are of the nature of proximity. ( Pratyāsattirūpa ) It can be divided into two, mundane and supramundane or laukika and alaukika. The supramundane is threefold, sāmānya, yogaja and māyā; while the former is fivefold, saṁyoga, tādātmya, saṁyuktatādātmya, saṁyuktaviśeṣaṇatā and tādātmyasvarūpa. The sāmānya is that which is useful in the knowledge of an individual owing to the general form, which is followed up in it.<sup>49</sup> The yogaja is the perceptual experience of the future or past events and those events, which are beyond the reach of our sense-organs.<sup>50</sup> The māyā is the

46. Tirobhāvasahakṛta Kāryāvirbhāva-anukūlā avasthā. Pr. p. 111.

47. Kāryasthvirpratikūlā. Pr. p. 111.

48. Tasyaiva itaravyāvartakatvād itaravyāvṛttatvāc ca. Pr. p. 115.

49. Anugotākāreṇa tad vyaktijñāna upayujyate. Pr. p. 116.

50. Anāgata-atīta-atIndriyādivastusādivastusākṣātkāre. Pr. p. 116.

perception of those entities, which in fact do not exist<sup>51</sup> When our eye sees an object, it is due to the contact of our eye with that particular object. This is samyoga, by which we know not only that particular object but also its qualities, action and species. Or it may be the identity of the two, which are in contact with each other (Samyuktatādātmya). Similar is the case of the skin, nose and tongue. When however we comprehend the sound by our ears, samyoga alone is the function. With regard to the knowledge of the external objects by the mind, those objects are experienced by the mind through the instrumentality of the sense-faculties, which are connected with the objects on the one hand and the mind on the other. The mind experiences its own attributes like knowledge and happiness because of the relation of identity or tādātmya between the attributes and the substantive. With regard to the comprehension of the modes of mind, the nature of those modes (Vṛttisvarūpa) is the means. Disappearance or tirobhava is known through the indriyasamyuktaviśesanatā.

While dealing with the perceptual experience of external objects, an important point has been made out by the Sāṅkhya and the Vedāntic scholars with regard to the vṛtti or mode. We see a certain object with our eyes, but the same external object is seen even after the eyes are closed. This form cannot be an external object, which is not seen because it can not exist without its substance. Hence it must belong to something within, rather than to the object without. That is how the followers of Sāṅkhya admit the vṛtti. The followers of Śaṅkara accept the

51 Avijyamanānām padārthanān buddhau upas hāṣṭin. Pt. p116



vṛtti as an affect or pariṇāma of the internal organ produced by the contact of the senses with the objects. The Naiyāyikas do not think it necessary to accept the vṛttipadārtha. Puruṣottama says that the experience of an after-image is universal and cannot be rejected as has been done by the Naiyāyikas. The vṛtti therefore has to be admitted but it is not necessary to accept it as a separate category, different from the buddhi. It is just a specific state of the buddhi, aroused by time and produced by the qualities like sattva.<sup>52</sup> Thus when an external object is seen in the waking state by means of our eyes, simultaneously with it is produced the buddhivṛtti of that particular form. When the eyes are closed we experience that very vṛtti. Thus the vṛtti is both guṇajanya and indriyajanya. It is interesting to note that Puruṣottama admits time as a category existing in the buddhi and not in the senses as is done in the *Vedāntaparibhāṣā*. For Puruṣottama time is the determinant of the buddhi and one of the accessories to mental illumination.<sup>53</sup>

Buddhi, says Puruṣottama, is to be inferred from its effect i. e. the knowledge of something.<sup>54</sup> Its place is the heart. A man who is endowed with the buddhi, knows the external objects. So buddhi can be understood as the cause of knowledge, as can be seen in passages like 'a man who is intelligent knows the objects.' (*Yo buddhimāns tasya padārthajñānam bhavati*. Or *Subuddhir ayam padārthān*

52. *Buddhitattvasya kālakṣubdhasattvādiguṇakṛtō vāsthāviśeṣa eva*. Pr. p. 124.

53. Cf. T. Sn. Ab. pp. 107-110.; Pr. pp. 123-26.

54. *Viśiṣṭajñānalakṣanakārya-anumeṣa*. T. Sn. Ab. p. 77.

*jānāti* ) Buddhi and knowledge are used as synonyms on account of the identity of cause and effect. Thus Puruṣottama explains buddhi as '*Yogajadharmā janyo viśistajñānasa mānākāro jñānendriyā-nu-grāhakah padārtho buddhir iti*'<sup>55</sup> When the buddhi functions at the first moment of the operation of senses, there is indeterminate knowledge, when the buddhi is modified in the *vṛtti*, in association with the sense-faculty, the indeterminate becomes determinate. The *vṛttis* appear in succession, with the rise of one *vṛtti*, the former disappears and remains as an impression (*Samskāra*) When these impressions are roused by certain causes and conditions they take the form of memory.

Puruṣottama explains the process of our ordinary knowledge as similar to the process of any other action. According to the Bhagavad Gita, actions of an individual are dependent upon five factors<sup>56</sup> Body is the operating basis while the individual soul is the agent. *Karana* may be diverse, external or internal. *Cesta* or activity signifies the various functions of the *pranas* and body. *Daiva* is time, action, desire of God, the inner controller (*Antaryamin*) and the superintending deities of the sense organs, which are accessory to the chief breath. These are the factors responsible for that action which is the cause of the connection of the mind, which produces knowledge. The whole process can be explained thus. Because of the desire of God, the inner controller who is an *amsā* of God, inspires

55 T Sn Ab p 79

56 Cf *Adhiṣṭhanam tatha karta karanam ce pṛthagvidham Vividhās ca pṛthak cesta daivam caivatra pañcamam Śarira vanmanobhir yat karma prarabhate narah Nyayyam va viparitam va pañcaite tatra hetavaḥ Bhagavad Gita XVIII 14-15*

the internal organ with the help of time and action. The internal organ is fourfold. Rudra is the superintending deity of the ego (ahamkāra), which produces the consciousness of being embodied. Brahmā is the deity of Buddhi, which is responsible for the function of the sense-faculties. The citta is latent but grasps the soul in its unity in deep sleep. The manas, which is supervised by the Moon, heads the list of the organs of both action and sensation, and its function is to inspire the respective indriyas by means of its relation to the organs and their deities. Then these organs perform their respective functions. The sense-organs when inspired by the manas are related with their objects and produce the indeterminate in the manas, which is also in contact with the object through the sense-organs. The manas thus has its mode in the sphere of these sense-organs. When these modes of the manas are qualified by the buddhi, through its own mode, the indeterminate becomes determinate. Because of the infinite number of external objects, the determinate knowledge is infinite; even then it can be classified into doubt, wrong knowledge, right knowledge and memory in the waking state. Similar classification is possible even in the dream state. Puruṣottama says that the buddhi can also be divided into three, the upādāna buddhi, when the mind is attracted by a certain object, the hāna buddhi, when the mind is repelled by a certain object and it wishes to avoid the same, and the upekṣā buddhi when the mind becomes indifferent to a certain object. The sense-organs enlighten an object by establishing contact with it. The eye approaches the objects with the help of its rays, or the power of the superintending Sun, or by the colour (Rūpa), which is its quality. The manas, which rules over the eyes, is also connected with the objects in the same way. Thus

we perceive an object, limited by definite space, as for instance a pot on the earth or the stars in the sky. Regarding the other organs of sensation, it is the manas, which goes to the objects together with the respective organs because they have no rays. However unscientific this process may appear to a modern mind, it is interesting to note how carefully Puruṣottama has given an analysis of the psychology of perception.<sup>57</sup>

This process of perception is not however applicable to the intuitive perception of the Lord. Puruṣottama says that the perceptual realization of God depends upon God himself. It is only by His grace, which is the seed of devotion, that one may see Him. He can also be seen in the state of incarnation because of His general desire that 'May all see me'.<sup>58</sup>

As regards anumana, Puruṣottama says that he has nothing new to say. He defines it as an instrument of inferential knowledge.<sup>59</sup> Vyapti is the invariable concomitance or co-existence of the hetu and the sadhya.<sup>60</sup> It thus requires the presence of a particular sadhya whenever there is a particular hetu, and the absence of the hetu in the absence of the sadhya. The hetu is that which is pressed into service with the object of proving something.<sup>61</sup> The sadhya is

57 Cf. A. B. P. II. iv. 16 pp. 792-794 Pr. pp. 126-128

58 Cf. A. B. P. II. iv. 16 pp. 803-804 Pr. pp. 137-138

59 *Anumitīkaranam anumānam* Pr. p. 138. The same definition in *Tarkasāgraha* P. 34

60 *Avyabhicāritam hetoh sadhyasāmānahīkaraṇyam* Pr. p. 139

61 *Sādhyatvenopādeyatvam hetutvam* Pr. p. 139

an object which is desired to be proved ( *Sisādhayisā-visayatvam* ) Purusottama is inclined to accept the division of *vyapti* into *sama* and *viṣama*, i. e. mutual and one-sided concomitance, following the *Sāmkhyappravacanasūtras*. We have thus the *sama vyāpti* when the circle of the *hetu* and that of the *sādhyā* coincide, when the former falls within the latter, we have the *viṣama vyāpti*.

Purusottama explains the process of inference as the decision of the presence of the *sādhyā* in a particular case, on the ground of the memory of the invariable co-existence of the *hetu* and the *sādhyā*, which we have seen often or once. Thus we have often seen the smoke and fire, both, in the kitchen and the like and we decide the invariable concomitance between the two. After that, when we see smoke on a hill, we remember that concomitance and deduce the existence of fire also. We can say that the *anumāna* is the application to a particular case of a general rule, which again has been formed after looking into a particular case or cases.<sup>62</sup>

While Gautama classifies inference into three, *pūrvavat*, *śesavat* and *samānyato-dṛṣṭa*,<sup>63</sup> The new school of logic gives another classification into *anvayavyatireki*, *kevalānvayi* and *kevalavyatireki*. The second is dependent upon only

62 *Tac ca sāmānadhikarāṇyam bhūyah sakrd evā darsanāt sanskar-odbodhe smṛtipatham arohati. Tatas tatsmarāṇottaram hetuḥ sādhyam niścayayati. Yathā mahanasādaḥ niścite dhūmasya vahnnyavyabhicāritasāmānadhikarāṇye paścāt parvatadaḥ dṛṣṭe dhūme tatsmarāṇottaram dhūmo vahnim niścayayati, dhūmadeśe vahnir itī. Sa niścayo numitiḥ. Pr. p. 142.*

63 *Nyāyasūtras I. 1. 5.*

the positive concomitance as no instance on the negative side is available.<sup>64</sup> Puruṣottama is not, however, inclined to accept it, for even if an object may be said to be knowable in one form, it is not so knowable in another form and thus the negative instances are available.<sup>65</sup> Puruṣottama accepts the other two, i. e. Kevalavyatireki and Anvayavyatireki. The former is arrived at, when only negative instances can be found, as in 'the earth is different from other things because of its earthness.' (*Pr̥thivi itarebhyo bhidyate pr̥thivitvāt.*) In the anvayavyatireki form of anumāna, we have both the positive and negative concomitance as in 'the hill has fire on it because of the smoke.' (*Parvato vahnimān dhūmāt*).

Both these, anvayavyatireki and kevalavyatireki, can be classified into svārtha and parārtha.<sup>66</sup> Svārtha is for resolving the doubts of one's own mind while the other is for convincing others of one's own conclusions. The latter therefore is dependent upon a syllogism, which according to the orthodox Nyāya has five propositions, pratijnā, hetu, udāharaṇa, upanaya and nigamana. Puruṣottama prefers the syllogism with only first three propositions.<sup>67</sup>

Puruṣottama also discusses in his *Prasthānaratnākara* various fallacies of reason, which we have referred to in

64. *Anvayamātravyāptikam kevalānvayi yathā ghaṭo' bhidheyāḥ prameyatvāt paśavat. Tarkasaṅgraha. p. 40.*

65. *Sarvatrāpi kenacidrūpeṇa jñeyatvādisattve' pi rūpāntareṇa tadabhāvasya sārvajanīnatvāc ca kevalānvayisādhyakānumānasyaivābhāvāt Pr. p. 141.*

66. *Idam dviividham api svārthaparārthabhedāt punar dviividham. Pr. p. 143. See also Tarkasaṅgraha p. 37.*

67. *Pr. p. 144,*

the preceding chapter and hence the discussion need not be repeated here.

The most important *pramāṇa* for the *vedānta*, however, is the verbal testimony, which is defined in the *Nyāya-Sūtras* as the instructive assertion of a reliable person.<sup>68</sup> According to *Puruṣottama*, the *āpta* is one who speaks of things as they are.<sup>69</sup> It can be divided into two types, *laukika* and *alaukika*. The *laukika* refers to persons like us while the *alaukika* refers to all from sages to God. Among those who are *alaukika*, the higher a person, the more reliable he is. The most trustworthy and absolutely infallible is therefore God. So the Vedas which owe their origin to Him, constitute the independent *pramāṇa*.<sup>70</sup>

*Puruṣottama* discusses whether or not the Vedas can be treated as an independent *pramāṇa*. Ordinarily, the words of a man depend upon what he has seen or inferred, but this does not mean, says *Puruṣottama*, that verbal testimony owes its authoritativeness to perception or inference. Whenever a word is heard, it has the capacity of conveying to our mind a specific object, which may not have been perceived. The scriptures are not dependent upon perception

68. *Āptopadeśaḥ śabdaḥ. Nyāyasūtras* I. 1. 7. Cf. also *Sa cāptopadeśarūpaḥ. Pr. p. 34.*

69. *Āptaś ca yathāsthitarthatādi. Pr. p. 34.*

70. It is interesting to note that a similar classification has been given in the *Tarkasaṅgraha: Vākyam dvivisham. Vaidikam laukikam ca. Vaidikamīśaroktatvāt sarram eva pramāṇam. Laukikam tvāptoktam pramāṇam. Anyad apramāṇam. Tarkasaṅgraha. p. 53. Cf. also similar classification in the Nyāyasūtras: Sa dvividho dṛṣṭā dṛṣṭārthatādi. I. 1. 8.*

as the dharma, which is nowhere perceived in the world, is taught in the Vedas. We may agree that the words, which establish something connected with the worldly dealings, require perception but this is not the case with the Vedas.<sup>71</sup> The Vedas teach us of the objects, which are supraworldly. So their authoritativeness is self-established.<sup>72</sup> Puruṣottama argues that if we believe in the *parataḥ prāmāṇya*, i. e. its validity depending upon something else and not self-proved, then the right knowledge can be acquired only by the operational capacity of that particular *pramāṇa*, upon which it depends. The knowledge of that capacity again depends upon something else and so on. This would lead to the *regressus ad infinitum*. We shall have therefore to stop somewhere. So we may finally believe in the *pramāṇatva* of the internal organ, which is purified by the Yoga or in the instrumentality of the quality of *sattva*, pure and simple. The purification of the internal organ or the quality of *sattva* can be brought about by the scriptural means alone. Great persons can have faith only in the Vedas. So the Vedas alone, which purify the *sattva*, which are the words of God Himself and are of the nature of His outbreathing, stand as unrivalled. *pramāṇa*.<sup>73</sup>

The impersonal character of the Vedas, as made out and emphasised by the *Mīmāṃsā*, has raised one

71. *Ato Laukikavyavahārasādhakasyaiva śabdasya pratyakṣopajivatvam na Vedasya*. Pr. p. 38.

72. *Śabda eva pramāṇam. Tatpāpy alaukikajñāpaka eva. Tat svataḥsiddhapramāṇabhāvam pramāṇam*. T. S. P. V. 7. p. 35.

73. Cf. T. S. Ab. V. 7. p. 35.



complicated problem regarding the character of words and their relation to the objects, which they convey. If we have to believe in the Vedas as the highest authority, we must understand that relation to be eternal, but the individual objects denoted by the words are perishable. How to explain this? Jaimini says that the words exist for ever, in an unperceived form, they are only made manifest when they are uttered. The relation of words and their meaning is eternal.<sup>74</sup> In that case words can not denote individuals, they have their relation with the form or *ākṛti*, which is eternal. Śamkara generally accepts the opinions of the Mīmamsakas and says that the words have their connection with the form and not with individuals.<sup>75</sup> Though Śamkara accepts the conception of *jāti*, later advaitins like Citsukha do not accept it, because it is difficult to explain the relation of *jāti*, and *vyakti*, class and individuals. Rāmānuja gets over the difficulty by thinking that all the words ultimately denote God. The inner self of all the words is God, as the external form of the objects, which are expressed, may be diverse, we should not think that the words, which ultimately denote God, are synonymous.<sup>76</sup>

74 *Autpatukas tu śabdasyarthena sambandhaḥ*

*Pūrvā-mīmāṃsāsūtras* I 1 5

75 *Ākṛtibhiḥ ca śabdānām sambandho na vyaktibhiḥ*

*Sūmīkarabhāṣya* I III 28

76 *Sarve śabdāḥ paramātmāna eva vacakah* *Sarvādarsana-sangraha* p 104

See also *Iha tu sarvavasthavasthayoḥ paramapurūṣaśarīratvena cidacītoḥ tatprakarātayāna podārthatvāt tatprakarāḥ paramapurūṣaḥ sarvada sarvaśabdavācya itī tiṣeṣaḥ* *Sribhāṣya* I 1 1

relation of the words with an eternal form there would arise the contingency of admitting lakṣaṇa (indication), by which we know of an individual object Vallabha however is staunchly opposed to laksanā in the explanation and interpretation of the Vedic passages. In emphatically advocating the strictly literal interpretation of the Vedic passages, Vallabha surpasses the Mīmāṃsakas also While stating that, by once resorting to lakṣaṇā, we shall resort to it everywhere, which is surely not a happy way of explanations, Vallabha and after him Puruṣottama give a sound argument also The words employed in the Vedas have not always their conventional meaning, but are at times used in their etymological sense. The word *viktaretāh* is an instance It can not have relation with any eternal form that can imply any individual, on the other hand it is an attribute and as the term can be used only after the seminal discharge, it is anitya also<sup>82</sup> To remove this anomaly we shall have to accept a different Vedic world with the celestial objects, that are the avayavas of God Thus all the words, letters and sentences, which are the vikṛti of the Omkara, primarily express God What is briefly stated by the Omkara is stated in the Vedas in so many words<sup>83</sup> How can we know that there is a different Vedic creation? For this is given the example of the word *Jāmadagnya* One may call oneself Jamadagnya or the son of Jamadagni, but he knows himself to be *Jāmadagnya* only indirectly and there is no perceptible

82 A B P I iii 28 p 426

83 *Tathaca bijasaktir eva sarvavrkṣe prasaratity Omkarasya ya paramatmavacakata saiva sarvasmin vedatarau prasṛta.*

evidence for it. Similarly the Vedic world which is different is known only indirectly.<sup>84</sup> The conventional usage in the scriptures is to be understood as it is understood in the world, from the expressions of the elders. Puruṣottama says that people make golden images after knowing the form from the earthen or wooden images. That is why mundane illustrations like that of a pot and the clay are found in the Vedas. So only human beings and not the Vedas are dependent.<sup>85</sup>

The connection of words with individual objects is the question not only with the Vedas but even with ordinary words, which have their worldly usage. That the objects are infinite does not pose any problem for Puruṣottama, who says that all the objects in the world are non-different from God.

It will thus be seen that the Suddhādvaitins not only differ from Śaṅkara, but even from Rāmānuja. They accept the form but are inclined to believe in the relation of words with individual objects. They agree with Rāmānuja in his view that words express God, but while for Rāmānuja, all the words ultimately express God, in the system of Vallabha, all the words primarily express God and there is no scope left for indication. They admit the sphaṭa but not as explained by grammarians. The sphaṭa is not revealed by the letters (*Varṇābhivyaṅgya*) but is explained as '*Sphuṭati vāganena*' i. e. by which the speech becomes manifest. And finally they believe in an entirely different world of the Vedas.

84. Tathā ca parokṣeṣa svasya yathā jāmadagnyāvagatī tathā parokṣeṣāpī tasya prapañcasyāvagatīḥ. A. B. P. I. iii. 28. p. 427.

85. A. B. P. I. i. 4. pp. 136-137.

This world is supramundane and hence the authority of the Vedas can never be questioned, even if they express what may appear to be absolutely wrong and absurd ideas like 'Fire is cold' (*Vahnir anuṣṇah*). That the Vedas are alaukika is enough to seal the lips of any sceptic, who would find out a bundle of contradictions in the Vedic literature. It is a novel and yet a very strong argument of Vallabha and his followers.

Puruṣottama accepts the expressive capacity of all the three, letters, words and sentences. He says that among themselves they bear the relation of principal and subordinate. Thus in a word, the letters are subordinate to the word, and in a sentence the words are subordinate to the sentence. Puruṣottama explains the expressiveness (*Vācakatva*) as the possession of the beginningless capacity favourable to the connotation of a certain meaning, which is understood from it. As this connotation is accepted as eternal, there is nothing to bar the eternal nature of expressiveness.<sup>86</sup> Grammarians believe that śakti is the very nature of the word and is the same as vācakatva. Puruṣottama however understands śakti as the capacity to reveal the meaning and not as vācakatva.<sup>87</sup> Sanketa is explained by him as the divine revelation of śakti so

86. *Vācakatvam cārthapratiti jananānukūlānādiśaktimattvam bodhyam Evam ca śaktyā boḥakatvasyautpattikatvenābhipretatvān na tasya nityatve kim api bādhakam.* Pr. p. 88.

87. *Vastustas tu sādḥutvāparaparyāyā anādivācakatvarūpā arthabodhāvīrbhāvakaśaktir atiriktaiva.* Pr. p. 88.

At another place Puruṣottama explains Śakti as:

*Padapadārthayor nityasambandharūpā.* T. Sn. Ab. V. 153. p. 130.

as to reveal only a particular meaning of a particular word uttered at a particular place and time.<sup>88</sup> Śakti is threefold i. e. it has three vṛttis : (1) Primary or mukhyā, (2) Indication or gauṇī and (3) implication or tātparya. The first is the expressed sense. It is threefold; conventional e. g. maṇḍapa, etymological e. g. pācaka and etymologico-conventional e. g. pañkaja. The second is that which indicates by a possible connection. It is classified into two: (1) Prayojana lakṣaṇā, when some sense is conveyed indirectly with a certain purpose, e. g. Gaṅgāyām Ghoṣaḥ. (2) Gauṇī lakṣaṇā, when the idea of resemblance is meant in a sentence, e. g. Gaur vāhikaḥ.<sup>89</sup> Implication is the utterance of a sentence for conveying a certain purport.<sup>90</sup> Puruṣottama like some rhetoricians, does not accept suggestion or vyañjanā as a separate vṛtti, but includes it in the tātparya.<sup>91</sup>

Puruṣottama does not agree with the Mīmāṃsā doctrine that śabda is pravartaka. In the Śuddhādvaita, it is God who urges people for action. Puruṣottama uses the method of reductio ad absurdum and argues that if we believe that the words are pravartaka, all would be engaged in the activity, as enjoined in the Vedas but this is not the case. So their pravṛtti or otherwise depends upon the desire of God and not the Vedas.<sup>92</sup>

88. *Etaddeśakālavibhedenāsmābhir uccāryamāṇo'yam śabda imam evārtham bodhayatu na tv anyam iśvarakṛtaniyamarūpaḥ śaktisankoca eva sanketapadenocyate. Pr. p. 88.*

89. Pr. p.-93.

90. *Tātparjam ca tatpratiticchayā uccāritatvam. Pr. p. 94.*

91. Pr. p. 95 ff.

92. Pr. p. 101.

Vallabha explains the *Smṛtis* as:

*Ṛṣiṇām pūrvacaritasmaraṇam smṛtir ucyate.*<sup>93</sup>

Puruṣottama gives the same definition in his *Prasthānaratnākara*.<sup>94</sup> Experience, says Puruṣottama, is the root of memory. It may arise owing to the practices of ancient sages, or by worldly dealings, or from the śāstric works on policy or from the Vedas. Out of all these, only the last can serve as the means of valid knowledge. But the validity of the *smṛtis* as a *pramāṇa* is not on a par with the Vedas. Puruṣottama says that just as a mirror reflects an object, the *smṛtis* expound the teaching of the *Vedas*, but just as in the case of reflection there is a fundamental distinction between the object and its image, as seen in a mirror, similarly the *pramāṇya* of the *Smṛtis* is dependent upon the knowledge of the *Vedas*. The *Smṛtis* thus have the purpose of enlarging and strengthening the Vedas and not of replacing them.<sup>95</sup>

*Purāṇas* are understood by Vallabha as being Vedadharmātideśa, i. e. the extension of Vedic teaching.<sup>96</sup> It may be interesting to note that the *Purāṇas* are considered in the Śuddhādvaita as more important than the *Smṛtis*.<sup>97</sup> The *Purāṇas* are of the nature of explanation and expansion of the Vedas (*Vedopabṛmhaṇarūpa*). The *Purāṇas* describe

93. T. Sn. V. 33.

94. Pr. p. 103.

95. T. Sn. Ab. V. 49. p. 38. Cf. also p. 39, where Puruṣottama says: *Smṛtirūpaprāmāṇasya svarūpam janyam na tu vedavat nityam.*

96. T. Sn. P. V. 48.

97. "S'rutismṛti ubhe netre purāṇam hṛdayam smṛtam"  
quoted by Vallabha in T. Sn. P. 49.

the sport of the highest Lord and are thus equally authoritative like the *Vedas*, the only difference between the two being that the *Purānas* are dependent upon a particular kalpa to which they belong, while the *Vedas* are independent of such considerations<sup>98</sup>

Purusottama is not inclined to accept the other pramānas, which are accepted by other systems of thought. Upamāna need not be taken as a separate pramāṇa, for the knowledge of resemblance is obtained by our sense-organs like the eye with the help of the memory of the similarity that has been experienced before<sup>99</sup>. The *yogyanupalabdhi* which is advanced by the *Naiyayikas*, as an argument to prove the *abhava*, has not been admitted by Purusottama. We can not say that something is known by non-apprehension, just as we know it with our own eyes<sup>100</sup>. The *Mīmāṃsakas* accept the *arthapatti* as a separate pramāna, as illustrated by the passage, '*Jivan Devadattah grhe nāsti*', which means that he is out. It is classified by *Parthasarathimīśra* into two, *śrutārthāpatti* and *drṣṭārthapatti*. Purusottama says that the *Arthapatti* of both these types is just auxiliary to the *śabda* and *pratyakṣa* respectively. *Prin S N Dasgupta* says 'Purusottama also admits *arthāpatti* or implication as separate pramāṇa, in

98 *Puraṇam Vedavad eva bhagavannisvasarūpam tattatkalpsya-bhuvanadrumatmakasya bhagavato lilām pratīpadayac chūadirūpasya mahatmyam parubrahmaṇa eva vadati tena tattatkalpātmakakaladhīnam eva tadbalam na tu tannirapekṣam* 111 T Sn Ab V 55 p 54

99 Pr p 148

100 *Cakṣuṣavagatah utad anupalabdhyavagata 111 pratīyabhavat* Pr p 121

the manner of Pārthasārathimīśra<sup>101</sup> It is difficult for me to understand how he has arrived at such a conclusion, when actually Puruṣottama says : '*Evam divividhāpiyam arthāpattir yathāyatham pratyakṣaśabdayor anugrahikā. Pratyakṣādipramitārthajñānadārḍhyahetutvāt. Natu pramāṇāntaram. Tedgamakasya baliyasōbhāvād iti.*'<sup>102</sup>

Aitihya or tradition is explained as a particular statement, the authorship of which is unknown.<sup>103</sup> It is illustrated by 'there is Yakṣa in this tree.' It is no pramāṇa because it is not decisive. It is included in the śabda. Saṁbhava which is like understanding the number hundred in the number thousand, is included in the śabda. Lokaprasiddhi is included in pratyakṣa, ceṣṭā in anumāna, lipi in śabda and pratibhā, which is illustrated by 'my brother is to come to-morrow' is no pramāṇa.

It will thus be seen that only three pramāṇas, pratyakṣa, anumāna and śabda are accepted in the Suddhādvaita. Out of these three, the first two are useful in the ordinary worldly dealings, while in the spiritual matters only verbal testimony is to be taken as authoritative.<sup>104</sup> Puruṣottama says that the validity of the pramāṇas depends upon the quality of sattva present in them.<sup>105</sup> This quality of sattva can be acquired even by yoga, but as the Yoga itself depends upon the *Vedas*, it is better to accept the *Vedas* as the highest pramāṇa.

101. S. N. Desgupta. *History of Indian Philosophy*. Vol. IV. p. 345.

102. Pr. p. 152.

103. *Aviditakarīkaḥ śabdaviśeṣaḥ*. Pr. p. 153.

104. *Pūrvoktāny eva vyavahāre pramāṇāni. Paramārthe tu śabda eveti siddham*. Pr. p. 153.



Perception and inference depend upon persons like us, who are affected by avidyā or ignorance and so they are definitely weaker than śabda<sup>106</sup> Vallabha defines tarka as 'Tarko nāma svotpreksitā yuktih.'<sup>107</sup> Purusottama gives a very interesting argument, when he says that as the world is full of diversity, it is very easy to find out suitable examples for both the argumentators and so it is difficult to give a particular reasoning for a particular point<sup>108</sup>

Purusottama does not seem to have any definite view regarding the spontaneity and self-validity of knowledge. While the followers of Mīmamsā, Kevalādvaita and Viśiṣṭādvaita believe in the self-validity of knowledge, Purusottama says that there are cases where knowledge should be regarded as depending upon accessory influences of memory and the like, hence it should not be regarded as self-valid always<sup>109</sup> For the scriptures of course, he believes in their self-validity, as pointed out above

### Brahman-attributes :

It has often been alleged that Indian philosophers, who have accepted the śabdapramāna as the highest authority, have never cared to prove logically the existence of Brahman but have accepted it from the *Upaniṣads*

105 Sarvaṅy eva pramaṇaṇi sattvam eva kathaṅcana, upaṣṭvanti  
Pr p 35

106 Pr p 105

107 A B II ii II p 568

108 Lokasya vaicitryeṅobhayor vadīnor dṛṣṭāntasaulabhye ekataray-  
uktīnyamakasya hetor abhavac ca-A B P II i. 11. p 569

109 Pr p 155

Vallabha not only refuses to accept tarka, but even condemns those who follow it. The Naiyāyikas, especially Udayanācārya has given so many arguments to prove the existence of Brahman. Rāmānuja in his *Śrībhāṣya* has refuted such arguments as have been advanced before him. Purusottama with his strictly logical mind, gives a studied refutation of all these arguments and tries to prove that Brahman is the Aupanīṣada Puruṣa, which can be known only from the *Upanīṣads* and not by any other means <sup>110</sup>

Brahman thus can not be said to be an object of our worldly dealings. It is beyond all our senses, beyond all our thoughts. It is sarvavyavahāratīta. But if it is beyond the reach of our senses, how can we approach it? What again about the incarnations of God, which, as stated in the *Purāṇas*, are seen by the people? To this the Śuddhādvaitin replies that even if it is beyond the vyahara, and is thus not an object of any pramāna, it becomes an object of the *Vedas*, because of its own desire <sup>111</sup>. So far as the incarnations are concerned Puruṣottama says that Avatāra means the descent of God from the Vaikuṅṭha to the world <sup>112</sup>. These various incarnations of God are like the different parts played by an actor, who may be seen on the stage as a king or as a minister at his own desire <sup>113</sup>.

110 A B P I i 2 pp 70 81

111 *Tataś ca pramanabalena visavah svecchaya uṣayas cetyuktam.*  
A B I i 4 p 134

112 *Avataro nama vaikunṭhasthanad ihagamanam* T S Ab V.  
73 p 121

113 *Yatha nate rajayam aśvó yam tatha sadhāriano matsyó yam varahó yam manusyó yam iti tesam budhijanakety arthah*  
T S Ab V 71 p 120

How is it that Brahman is beyond our ordinary means of proof? The reason is that Brahman has no form, that can be an object of our visual perception. It is like the empty space without clouds. Our eyes which can comprehend only that which is endowed with form, goes far and wide in the sky but grasps nothing. It is only the fathomless blue that is seen by us. Similar is the case with Brahman, which is too subtle for our senses and too far for the ordinary functions of our mind and body<sup>114</sup>. Thus Brahman, which is not in any way an object of our bodily and mental efforts, can be an object on account of its own sweet will, which can make itself seen or unseen, heard or unheard, known or unknown in whatever form it wishes and at whatever time it desires. When it thus wishes to be seen, it is the very profundity of Brahman that helps the mundane sense-faculties in its apprehension<sup>115</sup>.

Brahman, which is formless, is an abode of contradictory qualities according to the *Suddhādvaita*. From the scriptures which are the only authority for knowing Brahman, we find that it is variously described as full of attributes and yet devoid of them. If an attempt is to be made to reconcile those conflicting passages, we shall have to believe that Brahman is possessed of contradictory attributes. Vallabha and his followers believe that Brahman is capable of becoming everything (*sarvabhāvanasamartha*). Hence for one, who accepts the Brahman as stated in the scriptures, there is

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114 Cf T S Ab V 75

115 *Evam sati mām sarve lokadṛṣṭyāna paśyantv iti yadeccha t-<sup>2</sup> brahmaṇo gambhīratāna lokadṛṣṭyāhugrahika bhavati*  
T S Ab V 75 p 126

no conflict nor any shadow of conflict. It is, as Puruṣottama points out, the nature of the thing (*vastusvabhāva*) and how can the essential nature of anything be called into question?<sup>116</sup> We can not counter what is, and the possession of the contradictory attributes by Brahman is. Even if we find something quite wrong and self-contradictory in the śrutis like, 'the fire is cold', we should believe that it is correct, because Brahman can be both fire and cold. Similarly Brahman can be both formless and formed, without hands and feet it can run and catch, without ears it can hear, and without eyes it can see.<sup>117</sup> The contradictory attributes of Brahman can be made out even on the logical grounds. The earth, as we see, is the resting place of the objects, which are by their very nature against each other. Thus for instance a snake and a rat, both of them live on earth. Again we may enter or exit or rest and all these are called actions, We may be awake or may be experiencing dreams, but the resort of both these is our buddhi. Similarly Brahman, which is the almighty basis of everything, the principal substratum of all that works or is worked upon in the universe, is decidedly the abode of contradictory attributes.<sup>118</sup>

116. A. B. P. III. ii. 21. p. 923

117. *Tathā ca bhagavataḥ sarvarūpatvena vahnirūpatvād anuṣṅatvarūpatvāc cānuṣṅatusavahnitvayor aikādhikarāṇyāc chivatīādīnām apy aikādhikarāṇyāt vahnir anusṅaḥ param brahma brahmāviṣṇuśivākāram anākāram ity aviruddham.*

S. S. pp. 124-125.

118. *Brahma Viruddhadharmāśrayam. Viaksitasarvādhāratvat. Sahajaviruddhasarpa-mūṣakādyādhārabhūmivat. Parasparaviruddhanīṣkramapatvapraveśanātvāśrayakarmavat Jāgṛdādyādhārabuddhivac ca. T. S. Aḥ. V. 71. p. 119.*

This possession of contradictory attributes, says Puruṣottama, is found in Brahman more; it is less and less in its effects just as a lotus leaf gets thinner and thinner and is pointed at the end.<sup>119</sup> Thus even the effects have the viruddhadharmāśrayatva, what to talk of Brahman ?

The teachers of the Suddhāvaita have to say something even for those, who do not accept the Viruddhadharmāśrayatva, just on the ground of the essential nature of Brahman. Brahman is different from the world and so the negative descriptions of Brahman are for showing how our mundane attributes can not be applied to it. Thus Brahman is said to be described as endowed not with the ordinary attributes of our world but with the supramundane attributes, stated in the scriptures.<sup>120</sup> This is proved by the scriptures themselves because the negative descriptions are followed by the positive ones. This is just like a statement, 'He is not a sinner but is meritorious.'<sup>121</sup> This kind of reasoning is however for only those, who do not agree to the viruddhadharmāśrayatva on the basis of the vastusvabhāva alone; otherwise the principal tenet of the

119. *Yathā hi Kamalam mūle bhūyaḥ sad agrabhāge aṇiyas tiṣṭhati tathā viruddhadharmaśrayatvam api bhagavati bhūyaḥ sat kāryeṣu hrasad ativiprakṛṣṭe kārye' tyalpaṃ bhavati.*

T. S. Ab. V. 71. p. 119.

120. *Tathā ca jagadvailakṣaṇyabodhanena tatprakāraḥ dharmā niṣīhyante na tu tatsadṛśāḥ svarūpadharmā api.*

A. B. P. III. ii. 22. p. 924.

121. *Asthūlādisrutir na yāvaddharmanīśedhikā. Kiñcin niṣīdhya tadanyasattābodhakatvāt. Yaḥ evaṃ tad evaṃ.*

*Na pāpaḥ puṇyavān ayam ityādivākyaḥ.* S. S. p. 238.

Suddhādvaita is of Brahman possessed of contradictory attributes<sup>1 2 2</sup>

The question of the attributes of Brahman has assumed very much importance in Indian Philosophical systems. The Upanisads, which are the expressions of various thinkers about the Supreme Principle of our life and of our world, show two different trends of thought, both of which are mutually conflicting. While the religious urge of a man would require a God, who is full of all virtues and devoid of all the evil, the reasoning of a man tends to admit of God, nay not a God but a Principle, which is beyond us and beyond all that belongs to us. How can Brahman be bound by the so-called virtues or vices of our fleeting life and changing world? If we accept Brahman as basically different from the world of limitations in which we live and die, we should also be prepared to concede that it can not be possessed of the qualities which are of the limited world and which are thus limited themselves. Thus the bold declarations of Yajñavalkya in *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad*<sup>1 2 3</sup> led to the extreme position of the Buddhists, who would call their principle nothing else but śūnya, which brought their theory dangerously near to nihilism if not to nihilism itself. Śaṅkara, as a master of strictest logic cannot in any case refuse to accept this. If the reality is to exclude the chimeræ and if it is to be eternal, then the Real, rather than that which is not non-real,

122 Ato ye vastusvabhāvato viruddhadharmaśrayatvam na manvate-  
tīn praty evam laukikulaikavibhāgarūpaya yuktya nirṇayah  
A B P III ii 22 p 925.

123 Cf *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad* II iii 6, III ix, 26, IV ii 4, IV  
iv 22, iv v 15

cannot be understood as fettered by our own chains. Brahman can not flow in the limited channels; the only thing which we can say about it is that it is Pure Being, though as a category there may not be much difference between pure being and non-being. Śaṅkara certainly believes in a personal God, but that Īśvara is at a lower level. All the virtues and powers of that God are evaporated in the white heat of the pure being, when we rise from the lower to the higher realm of Truth. The teachers who followed Śaṅkara, could easily see that however logical this position might be, here religion is divorced from philosophy. However ardent a devotee may be, however sincere he may be, he would not like to worship a God, who does not exist in the highest sense. Mere flight of high soaring intellect would not be sufficient for religion, which requires some slice of imagination and emotion. Thus Rāmānuja and the Vaiṣṇava teachers who followed him violently attacked Śaṅkara as a buddhist in disguise. Rāmānuja says that Brahman is possessed of all the attributes, which are good and is devoid of all the qualities, which are bad. Vallabha cannot accept this for obvious reasons. If we believe that God is different from the world, he must not have the attributes of the world. Vallabha can neither accept the position of Śaṅkara, whom he thinks to be his chief adversary because Vallabha believes in the path of devotion as the only and the easiest way of salvation. Hence we have the highest Lord of the Śuddhādvaita, as possessed of supramundane attributes, leaving out the limited worldly qualities. Brahman can thus become even a bundle of contradictory attributes, because all the attributes are superworldly and the term contradictory, which is the word.

of our world, loses all its force. Really what Vallabha intends to say is that Brahman is endowed with all the attributes, though they may appear to be contradictory to us because of its essential nature of being beyond our imagination and intellect. The foregoing analysis will show that the positions taken by Śaṅkara and Vallabha are not far removed from each other, though attempts have been made to show that they are poles apart. The only difference between the two is that while Śaṅkara refuses to adore his God with worldly clothes, Vallabha goes one step forward and adores him with the clothes, which are not worldly. That Vallabha calls Brahman nirguṇa is an unmistakable proof for it, because nirguṇatva means prakṛtaguṇarahitya. It should be noted that according to Puruṣottama one who is possessed of the knowledge of the qualityless Brahman, is one who has been away from the worldly qualities owing to the grace of God.<sup>124</sup>

What again is the relation between Brahman and its attributes? The problem does not arise for Śaṅkara, who does not believe in the qualified Brahman. On the other hand he thinks that absolute oneness or Advaita can not tolerate the difference even within itself, as would be the case if we accept Brahman as possessed of qualities. Brahman according to Rāmānuja, is Viśiṣṭa or qualified by the sentient and the non-sentient both of which form the body of Brahman which is the soul. Here of course Rāmānuja is not so very clear or exact. He says that Brahman is one even though it is qualified, just as the body and the soul

124 *Yas tu bhagavadanugraheṇa prakṛtaguṇarahitō bhūṭ sa nirguṇa brahmanvidyavan ity ucyate* A B P IV III 14 p 1368



together make one man. But this would make his Brahman a composite whole because if we are to believe in the transformation of the *cit* and the *acit* into the gross form from its subtle state, Brahman remaining the same, it would naturally imply that the *cit* and the *acit* are the extraneous qualities attached to Brahman and do not belong to its essential nature. Purusottama rightly points out that if we are to believe in oneness, that One cannot include within itself the qualities which do not form part and parcel of its essential nature<sup>125</sup>. The greatest difficulty with Ramānuja is that, he leaves the relation of Brahman and *cit-acit* partially unexplained, skips over the problem by giving the body-soul analogy which is not quite satisfactory and clings to the term *Advaita*, even though at times the *Dvaita* is not removed<sup>126</sup>. Vallabha's position, as explained by Purusottama, is an attempt to solve this difficulty, while retaining Brahman as possessed of attributes. Vallabha can not agree to any distinction within Brahman, it cannot be a composite whole and so we must accept *ekarupatā* in the essential nature of Brahman as the scriptures always pointedly teach of Brahman as 'one without a second'<sup>127</sup>. Puruṣottama says that a substance and its quality have the inseparable relation between them and it is because of this inseparable relation between the two

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125 *Ātmapadasya kevalatmavacitvena viśeṣanantārasangrahaksamat vāt* A B P I 1 3 p 98

126 Of An eternal relation between them whether essential or accidental will be an inexplicable mystery'  
Radhakrishnan *Indian Philosophy* Vol II p 713-714

127 Cf A B P III ii 11 p 902

that there is non-difference<sup>128</sup> Again the attributes of Brahman are not accidental but essential and Brahman is thus both the knower and the knowledge, the existent and the existence, the blissful and the bliss The relation between the two is thus of *Tādātmya*, which is explained as '*Bhedasahisṅgur abhedah*' Just as sunlight is an attribute of the Sun and is also the essential nature of the Sun, so is the case with Brahman and its attributes.<sup>129</sup> It will thus be seen that Vallabha steers clear between the two positions of Śaṅkara and Ramanuja He accepts the attributes of Brahman and as attributes, they must be different from the substance But then they are inseparable and essential, not accidental or extraneous They thus belong to the very nature of Brahman Hence the difficulties, which are found in the theory of Rāmānuja are avoided

The question also arises whether Brahman should be endowed with a body Puruṣottama after Vallabha rejects the idea outright because the creator Brahman cannot be said to have any limitation of its own that would require a body So in the original form there can be no śarīra<sup>130</sup>

- 128 *Dharmadharminos ca vinabhavena sthitatvad abhedah*  
A B P I iv 2 p 481 See also *Sa ca sampad* (i e abhedah as *bhedaviruddhasampad*), *bhavarūpatve satī svāśrayavinabhūtātvat tadviḥayavartamanatvam itī yavat* A B P III ii 28 p 945
- 129 *Yatha sūryaprakāśasyo tadātmyarūpasya bhedaviruddhasampadō bhedasya kelpāna evam brahmataddharmayoḥ apī*  
A B P III ii 28 pp 935-936
- 130 *Tatṛānyanapeksataya sarvakartur brahmaṇah ka vanūpapattīh syad yena wasyapī śarīram kalpayet Ato mūlarūpe nasy etā śarīram* A B P I i 19 p. 227

**Brahman—the essential form.**

For the sake of a clear understanding of the *Suddhādvaita*, Brahman is to be understood as having three forms, the essential form, the causal form and the effect-form.<sup>131</sup> The essential form of God is threefold viz. *kriyātmaka*, *jñānātmaka*, and *ubhayātmaka*. The first is described in the former part of the Vedic literature. (i. e. *pūrvakāṇḍa*) and the second, in the latter part i. e. the *uttarakāṇḍa* or the *Upaniṣads*. In the *Gītā* and the *Bhāgavata* Brahman is qualified by both action and knowledge, and is showed to be the object of devotion. Here the *Akṣara* is to be included in the *Uttarakāṇḍa* and *Karma* in the *Pūrvakāṇḍa*. Time (*Kāla*) which is of the essential nature of the interior *sat*, *cit* and *ānanda* (existence, consciousness and bliss) and the *svabhāva* or nature, which is not described in the scriptures as an object of production, are to be included in the essential form of Brahman.

When God desires to be many, the aspect of bliss is slightly suppressed because of the rise of the quality of *sattva* in the interior.<sup>132</sup> He thus becomes *gaṇitānanda*. This is called *Akṣara*, the form, which God assumes, when he becomes both *prakṛti* and *puruṣa*. In the *akṣara* are said to remain billions of eggs of all sorts. That is what the *Bhāgavata Purāṇa* calls *Akṣara* as the cause of all the causes.<sup>133</sup> This *Akṣara* is said to be resting at the feet of the Lord and is thus called the tail of the

131. Cf. T. Sn. V. 85. also Pr. p. 164.

132. T. Sn. V. 99.

133. *Tad āhur akṣaram brahma sarvakāraṇakāraṇam. Bhāgavata-purāṇa. III xi 41,*

Blissful.<sup>134</sup> It is again the resting place of God, his ādhāra, his place of resort. Thus it stands for the vyāpivaikuṅṭha. The difference between Akṣara and Puruṣottama is that the Highest Lord only desires for sport and is not entangled in it; the Akṣara on the other hand is entangled in it and with the slight suppression of the aspect of bliss by means of the quality of sattva, it can be called the chief jīva.<sup>135</sup> Puruṣottama, the Highest Lord is again described in the *Śrutis* and the *Smṛtis* to be higher than both kṣara and Akṣara.<sup>136</sup> The Highest Lord is thus the controller of Akṣara. This Akṣara is also ānandamaya. As stated by our author the incarnations of the Puruṣa are blissful and so we must accept the Akṣara also as Ānandamaya, because it is the avatārin of the Puruṣa, which is its avatāra. The difference between the Highest Lord and Akṣara is that of conditions or states and not of entities.<sup>137</sup> Even if we believe that the Akṣara is

134. Brahma puccham pratisṭhā Taittirīya-upaniṣad, II. 5.

135. Tathā, ca Puruṣottamas tu līlayā icchām karoti na tu tayā vyāpṛiyate, ity atirohitānandam. Aksaram tu tayā vyāpṛitam san mūlabhūtena sattvena tirohitānandam mukhyajīvapadavā-  
cyatām dhatte. T. Sn. Ab V. 98 p. 79.

136. Cf. Ksaram pradhānam amṛtākṣaram haraḥ. Śvetaśvatara.  
I. 10.

...Akṣarat parato parah. Mundaka. Upaniṣad. II. 1. 2.

Dvāv imau puruṣau loke ksaraś cākṣara eva ca.

Uttamah puruṣas tv anyah paramātmety udāhṛtaḥ.

Bhagavad Gītā. XV. 16-17. etc.

137. Gītāyām dvādaśe 'evam satatayuktā ye bhaktās tvam paryupā-  
sate, ye cāpy aksaram avyaktam tesām ke yogavittamaḥ' Iti  
praśnena taduttarena cākṣarapuruṣottamayor aikyam avasthā-  
bhedenā bhinnatvam ca bodhitam A. B. P. I II. 23. p. 341.

Ādhāra and Brahman is Ādheya, there is no harm in believing both as one on the ground of the *Viruddhadharmāśrayatva* of God<sup>138</sup>

Aksara is obtained by the followers of the path of knowledge, while the Highest Lord can be realised only by the grace of God, combined with sincere devotion and ardent love. This Aksara can however be understood as paving way to the *paraprāpti*, because it produces the highest knowledge by destroying nescience. The destruction of nescience leads to the manifestation of the aspect of bliss, which may finally lead a devotee to the essential nature of the Highest Lord. It is thus antecedent to the *paraprāpti*<sup>139</sup>. The scriptural passages teaching knowledge are connected with the Aksara. Thus the Aksara is the form assumed by God for the emancipation of the souls following the path of knowledge<sup>140</sup>.

Aksara is a novel conception introduced by Vallabha in the systems of Vedantic thought. Dr P. M. Modi in his '*Akṣara—a forgotten chapter in the History of Indian Philosophy*' has shown how the conception of Aksara besides that of the Supreme Principle has often been met with in the *Upanisads* and the *Gītā*. The concept of Aksara however lost its existence in the works of Gaudapada and Śaṅkara and was not revived by the later Ācāryas until Vallabha, the last Ācārya in Indian Philosophy gave a peculiar position to it in the

138 T Sn Ab V 99 p 81

139 A B P III iii 33 pp 1084-1035

140 T Sn V 99 p 79

framework of his theory of pure Monism. The present writer does not think it proper to discuss the concept of Aksara, as explained in the *Upanisads* and *Gītā*, because it is not within the scope of this study. It is, however, difficult to assert dogmatically as to what exactly has been the meaning of the word, because the *Upanisads* contain speculations of various philosophers belonging to various places and ages while the *Gītā* appears to give more or less a synthetic exposition of the different theories, that were current in those days. It may be possible to understand the Aksara as the immutable principle thus showing the trend of abstraction and negation in the description of the Absolute. But so far as Vallabha is concerned, his idea of the Aksara is neither of abstraction nor of negation. It is the mukhyajiva, or the first product, if the word can be used, and contains within itself crores of eggs for future creation. Vallabha however uses the term found in the *Upanisads* and the *Gīta* for a particular purpose. The *Upanisads*, especially the older ones, generally teach the path of knowledge, while the later and minor *Upanisads* and the *Purānas* teach that of devotion. Vallabha who laid the greatest stress on devotion thought that the Highest Lord could be obtained not by knowledge alone, but by sincere devotion and ardent love of a devotee, favoured by the grace of God. What then about those who follow the path of knowledge or action, as taught in the Śāstras? The term Aksara, found in the *Gītā* and the *Upanisads* was understood and explained by Vallabha as the fruit, obtained by those who follow the path of knowledge. Aksara is again inferior to the Highest Lord, and thus the superiority of the path of devotion is established.

It is possible that Vallabha might have been influenced by Śaṅkara, who also maintained a division of the personal God and the impersonal Brahman, though it should be admitted that there is no parity between the two cases except that there is a division, and that one of the two is higher than the other. The distinction between the personal God and the impersonal Brahman has no place in the theory of Vallabha. Thus whatever may have been the connotation of the term *Akṣara* in the older works, it has a peculiar significance of its own in the philosophy of Vallabha.

Time (*kāla*), action (*karma*) and nature (*svabhava*) are said to be the different forms of *Akṣara*. *Kāla* is manifested with the slight revelation of the aspect of existence (*sat*), having all the aspects of existence, sentiency and bliss inside.<sup>141</sup> It is thus an essential form of the capacity of action, because action is the power of the aspect of *sat*. Hence the other two aspects of sentiency and bliss are suppressed.<sup>142</sup> It can also be described as always moving, the cause of all, or the support of all.<sup>143</sup> As it is the cause of all, it is the cause of worldly dealings like 'soon' or 'late' and being the support, it causes the dealings of past and future.<sup>144</sup> Its first work is

141 *Antahsaccidanando vyavahare ṣatsattva, śena prakatah kalah* Pr p 165

142 *Kalah pūruṣottamasya kriyāśaktirupah cestarupatvat Kriyā ca sada, sasaktiriti yuktas cidanandatvabhavah* T Sn Ab V 105-106 p 84

143 *Nityagatve sati sakalasrayah sakalodbhavo va kalah* Pr p 166

144 *Tena sakalodbhavatvac ciraṅksipradīvyavaharaheti tvam sakala, rayatvad atītanāgatādīvyavaharahetutvam ca darsitam* T Sn Ab V 105-106 p 84

to disturb the equilibrium of the guṇas<sup>145</sup> In the *Tattvadīpanibandha*, the divine form of time is stated to be Akṣara, the material form is the Sun and the spiritual form is the division into aeons, years and months<sup>146</sup> In the *Prasthānaratnākara* however Purusottama says that the material form is the Sun and other luminaries, the spiritual form is the atoms and the Highest Lord is the divine form<sup>147</sup> The time taken by the solar wheel in covering the atomic space is the time-atom which is too subtle<sup>148</sup>

Karma, like kala, is not a distinct category but only a different form of the Akṣara It is the universal action which is capable of being manifested by diverse individual actions, depending upon that which is enjoined or that which is proscribed<sup>149</sup> Like kala, it is also connected with the aspect of sat, while cit and ānanda are suppressed<sup>150</sup> The difference however between kala and karma is quite clear Kala is manifested of itself, while karma is manifested in the form of injunctions and prohibitions by human

145 *Etasya prathamam karyam guṇaksobhah* Pr p 166

146 T Sn V 109 p 80

147 Pr p 166

148 *Tatra yavata kalana suryarathacakram paramanumatram deśam vyapnoti sa kalah paramanuh* Pr p 166

149 *Vidhīnsedhaprakareṇa laukikakṛiyabhiḥ pradeśato bhīvyanjan ayogyā kṛiyā* Pr p 168 See also  
*Vihitanīsiddhaprakarakakṛiyābhīvyangyā kṛiyā karmetī tallakṣanam siddhyatī* T Sn Ab V 112 p 87

150 T Sn V 112 p 86-87



beings.<sup>151</sup> Again it is not eternally manifested like the *kāla*, but subsists only upto the rise of fruit.<sup>152</sup> Karma is universal and is thus not different with different individuals. As it can be manifested in various ways, it can give happiness and miseries to different individuals simultaneously.<sup>153</sup> It is not necessary to accept the *Adiṣṭa*, *apūrva* and such terms as denoting separate categories. They denote only the aspects of karma.

*Svabhāva* or nature is explained as that which produces transformation.<sup>154</sup> It is inferred from the transformation, which is its effect.<sup>155</sup> *Puruṣottama* says that when we see a certain cause producing a particular effect only, we shall have to accept the desire of God as the *hetu* for it. It may be possible to say that the desire of God is the *svabhāva* but it is better to accept it as a separate category, which

151. *Kālaḥ śata eta prakāṣaḥ, ayam tu puruṣair vidhiniṣedha-  
prakāreṇa prakāṣikriyate.* T. Sn. P. V. 110. p. 85.

152. *Phalabhogānantaram karmanāśasmaranāt tathā.*

T. Sn. Ab. V. 110. p. 85.

Also see : *Etasya cābhivyaktyanantaram phalasarvāpanāvadhī  
prākāṣyam phalabhogajanakriyāyāḥ krameṇa tirobhātaḥ.*

Pr. p. 169.

153. T. Sn. Ab. V. 111. p. 86.

154. T. Sn. Ab. V. 111. p. 86; Pr. p. 169.

155. *Parīṇāmaheturam talloksaṇam.* Pr. p. 169.

156. *Parīṇāmena anumeyāḥ.* Pr. p. 169.

is manifested in the form of the desire of God.<sup>157</sup> Thus it is not manifested in the form of sat, cit and ānanda. Puruṣottama also points out that so far as the worldly dealings are concerned, kāla has nothing to do with anything either sentient or otherwise. Karma is useful only as connected with the sentient, whereas svabhāva is connected with both the sentient and the non-sentient.<sup>158</sup> It has thus everything as its basis (*Sarvavastuṣvāśritaḥ*) All these four, Akṣara, kāla, karma, and svabhāva are one with Brahman and are therefore neither effects nor causes.<sup>159</sup> That is why they are included in the essential form of God.

It will not be out of place here to note the conception of Antaryāmin, as taught by the exponents of Pure Monism. God is said to enter the heart of an individual, in the form of a swan, together with the individual soul. This form is called the Antaryāmin or the inner controller. Just as there are many individual souls, there are also many

157. *Dugdhamṛtsūtrūdikam dadhīghatapatādirūpeṇaiva pariṇamati netareṇa rūpeṇa. Tatra tādṛṣṭi bhagavadicchaiva hetuh .... Tathā ca saiva pariṇāmahetubhūtā icchā svabhāva iti vaktum śakyam yady api, tathāpi 'Kālam karma svabhāvam ca māyeso māyayā svayā, Ātman yadṛcehayā prāptam vibubhūṣur upādade' iti vākye upādānagocaratayā kālavād bhinnatayā ca nirdeśāt necchā svabhāvah kintu icchākāreṇa prakāṣo bhavati buddhir wa vijñānarūpeṇa. T. Sn. Ab. V. 113. p. 87.*

158. *Kālah.. ..nirādhāra eva vyavahāropayogi. .... karma .. cetanādhāram eva vyavahāropayogi, tathā svabhāvah ... cetanācetanavastvādhāram (Rūpam) T Sn. Ab. V. 113 p 87.*

159. T. Sn. V. 114. p. 88.

Antaryāmins<sup>160</sup> One may point out the anomaly in believing in so many Antaryāmins. Vallabha says that the difference is not even in the individual souls, and so there is no question regarding the Antaryāmins<sup>161</sup> Vallabha states that distinction among the Antaryāmin, Aksara and Kṛṣṇa is just as between the charioteer the warrior and one who is in the warrior Puruṣottama explains that the Antaryāmin rules over the individual souls like a charioteer, who controls the horses Akṣara again controls the Antaryāmin, just as a warrior directs a charioteer, and Kṛṣṇa rules over Aksara even as the Antaryāmin of a warrior rules over him<sup>162</sup> Thus though the Antaryāmin belongs to the essential form of Brahman, because of its entrance in the effects with the individual souls, it is to be included in the causal form and not the essential form<sup>163</sup>

The concept of Antaryāmin is not new to the Vedānta Ramanuja for instance accepts it as one of the modes of God According to Rāmānuja, Iśvara appears in five different modes, one of which is the Antaryāmin, in which mode he dwells in the heart and is to be seen by Yogins and accompanies the individual souls even when they go to heaven or hell<sup>164</sup> The Antaryāmin is, for all practical

160 *Yatha jivanam nanatvam tathantaryāminam api Ekasmin hr̥daye hansarūpenobhayaprevesat* T S P V 28 p 70

161 *Bhedas tu jive pi nastiti na kapy anupapattih* T S P V 28 p 70

162 T Sn Ab V 121 p 95

163 *Antaryāminam svarupabhutatve pi jivena saha karye praveśat karanakoṣṭhāu eva niveśah* Pr pp 164-165

164 Cf Bhandarkar *Vaiṣṇavism Saivism* etc p 75

bhagavat-tva.<sup>165</sup> What is meant by these 28 categories is that the causality of God is manifested in 28 ways.<sup>166</sup> The *Suddhādvaitins* explain all these tattvas on the strength of the *Gītā* and the *Bhāgavata*-III, as expressly stated by *Puruṣottama*.<sup>167</sup>

Sattva is of the nature of pleasure and illumination, is non-obstructive to pleasure and causes attachment to pleasure and knowledge in human beings.<sup>168</sup> *Rajas* is of the nature of passions, produces desires and associations, and causes attachment to actions.<sup>169</sup> *Tamas* stupefies all the embodied beings and is created by the concealing power, it produces tendency to carelessness, laxity and sleep.<sup>170</sup>

*Puruṣottama* says that we can not accept the theory of the *Sāṅkhya* that these qualities are moving by themselves, because we shall then be confronted with the

165. *Bhagavato bhāvo bhagavattvam. Bhagavataḥ sarvān prati yā sāmānyakāraṇatā sā.. yatas teṣāṃ tathāttvam tasmāt tāni tattvāni na tu sāṅkhyāntaravat pṛthakpadārthatvena tattvāni.* T. Sn. Ab. V. 87. p. 71.

166. *Bhagavato yā kāraṇatā sā loke' ṣṭāvīṃśatidhā prakāṣeti jāvat.* Pr. p. 169.

167. *Ataḥ param gītām tṛtīyaskandham cāśrītya teṣāṃ lakṣaṇāny ucyante.* Pr. pp. 169-170.

168. *Sukhānāvarakatve prakāśakatve sukhātmatve ca sati sukhāsaktiyā jñānāsaktiyā ca dehino dehādyāsaktijanakam sattvam.* Pr. p. 170.

169. *Rajaātmakam vā tṛṣṇāsangādijanakam vā karmāsaktiyā dehino nitarām dehādyāsaktijanakam vā rajaḥ.* Pr. p. 170

170. *Āvaraṇāsaktijanyam sarvadehīmohakam pramāḍālasyanidrābhīr dehino dehādyāsaktijanakam tamaḥ.* Pr. p. 170.

purposes, a connecting link between the individual soul on the one hand and God on the other. If we believe in the devotion as the only means of liberation, it is necessary also to admit God, who can be worshipped and hence who is different from us. In that case the Antaryamin would, so to say, serve as something like a bridge between the two.

### **Brahman—the causal form**

The causal form of God is manifested in 28 categories. They are as follows —

- (1 – 3) Sattva, Rajas, and Tamas,
- (4) Purusa,
- (5) Prakṛti,
- (6) Mahat,
- (7) Ahaṁkāra,
- (8–12) Tanmatras,
- (13–17) Bhūtas,
- (18–22) Karmendriyas,
- (23–27) Jñānendriyas, and
- (28) Manas

Puruṣottama says that all these 28 categories are not separate entities as such, but have God as their essence. We shall presently see how and where the advocates of Pure Monism differ from the Sāṁkhya theorists, but the basic distinction between the two is that while the followers of Sāṁkhya believe all these as separate entities, this is not the case with the Śuddhādvaitins, for whom the term tattva is to be understood as tat-tva or

bhagavat-tva.<sup>165</sup> What is meant by these 28 categories is that the causality of God is manifested in 28 ways.<sup>166</sup> The *Suddhāvaitins* explain all these tattvas on the strength of the *Gītā* and the *Bhāgavata*-III, as expressly stated by *Puruṣottama*.<sup>167</sup>

Sattva is of the nature of pleasure and illumination, is non-obstructive to pleasure and causes attachment to pleasure and knowledge in human beings.<sup>168</sup> *Rajas* is of the nature of passions, produces desires and associations, and causes attachment to actions.<sup>169</sup> *Tamas* stupefies all the embodied beings and is created by the concealing power, it produces tendency to carelessness, laxity and sleep.<sup>170</sup>

*Puruṣottama* says that we can not accept the theory of the *Sāṅkhya* that these qualities are moving by themselves, because we shall then be confronted with the

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166. *Bhagavato yā kāraṇatā sā loke' śjāvīṣṭatidhā prakāṣeti jāvat.* Pr. p. 169.

167. *Ataḥ param gītām tritīyaskandham cāśrītya teṣām lakṣaṇāny ucyante.* Pr. pp. 169-170.

168. *Sukhānūtarakatve prakāśakatve sukhātmatve ca sati sukhāsaktiyā jñānāsaktiyā ca dehīno dehādyāsaktījanakam sattvam.* Pr. p. 170.

169. *Rajaātmakam vā tṛṣṇāsangādījanakam vā karmāsaktiyā dehīno nitarām dehādyāsaktījanakam vā rajah.* Pr. p. 170

170. *Āvaraṇāsaktīyanam sarvadehīmohakam pramāḍālasyanidrābhīr dehīno dehādyāsaktījanakam tamaḥ.* Pr. p. 170.

contingency of rejecting God. Again the Sāṃkhya theory is that these qualities produce each other and coalesce with each other. This, says Puruṣottama, would be tantamount to an incoherent admixture of their respective natures. Nor again should the rajas be admitted as is done by the followers of Kapila, to be of the nature of miseries, for that would run counter to its explanation as being of the nature of passion. Barring these points of difference, Puruṣottama is prepared to accept other points, made out by the Sāṃkhya.<sup>171</sup>

God, says Puruṣottama, is without guṇas but he produces these three guṇas. This can be understood on the analogy of cotton and a thread. There is no thread in the cotton, but the cotton assumes the state of a thread. Similarly the Highest Lord, who is himself nirguṇa, creates them at his will.<sup>172</sup>

Puruṣa, says Puruṣottama, is the Ātman. The term Ātman is explained as derived from the root 'at' to pervade, to envelope. So Ātman is that which envelopes everything, the body, the senses and everything for the sake of others.<sup>173</sup> Puruṣottama explains puruṣa in three

171. Cf. Pr. p. 170. For the Sāṃkhya view see :

*Prityapritivīśadātmakāḥ prakāśapraavṛttinīyamāsthāh. Anyony-ābhībhavāśtrayaḥjananāmīthūnavṛttayaś ca guṇāh. Sattvam laghu prakāśakam iṣṭam upaśṭambhakam calam carajaḥ Guru varaṇakam eva tamah pradīpavac cārthato vṛttīḥ īśvarakṣṇā's Sāṃkhyakārikās'* 12-13.

172. Pr. p. 172

173. *Dehendriyādikam sarvaṃ parārtham atati vyāpnoty adhiṣṭhātī ātmā.* Pr. p. 173.

ways (a) He is beginningless and devoid of qualities, is the controller of prakṛti and is known as an object of the notion 'I' (b) He is self-luminous (c) Even though he is not affected by the quality and faults of the world, he is associated with it<sup>174</sup> The self-luminosity of the puruṣa or the Ātman can be proved by our experience of happiness or absence of miseries when we are enjoying deep dreamless sleep He is thus kevala and the qualifications such as kartṛtva are due to its non-discrimination from the Prakṛti and the like, on account of the desire of the Lord, favourable to creation This can be explained on the analogy of the redness of the Sun which is seen in a red mirror That is why it is capable of liberation (*Mukṭiyogyatva*), because, if the bondage is understood as natural, the scriptures teaching of salvation would be useless

According to the Śuddhāvaita, Puruṣa is one and not many, and there is no difference between Puruṣa and Iśvara, on the ground of the sentiency in the essential nature of both<sup>175</sup> The individual soul or jīva is different from the Puruṣa Having sentiency as its essence, the jīva may be regarded as of the same type as the Puruṣa or as a part

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174 *Tesu anadīve satī nirguṇatve satī prakṛtīnyamakāṭve saty ahamvittivedyatvam ity ekam laukīkam prakāśatvam ity āparam svarūpalakṣaṇam Viśvagatagunadoṣasambandhabhave pī samyag sansargavattvam itī tṛtīyam muktyupayogī Pr p 173*

175 *Cidrūpatvena puruṣeśvarayor availakṣaṇyat Puruṣas tv eka eva Puruṣeśvarayor na vailakṣaṇyam aṇvavāḥ tadanyakalpana partha Pr p 176*



of Puruṣa <sup>176</sup> So the Mūla Puruṣa can be established on the strength of the jīvātman, which is the sākṣin or the witness in the deep sleep

Prakṛti is called Pradhāna or the main form, which God has produced as the material of the world <sup>177</sup> It can be described in six ways, so as to show the six qualities which God has bestowed upon it. It is triḡuṇā or having the three qualities in a state of equidispotion Just as Brahman has sat, cit and ananda as its attributes and also as its essence, similarly the three qualities of sattva, rajas and tamas are not only the attributes but the very essence of the Pradhana This, says Puruṣottama, is the difference of Pure Monism from the theories of Kapila The Pradhāna is again avyakta and becomes abhivyakta or manifest by means of time and the like It is eternal (*nitya*) and has the nature of existence and non-existence (*sadasadātmaḷa*) It is described as 'avīśesa' because the worldly beings are not able to discriminate it and is also called 'vīśesavar', as it shows all the specifications Puruṣottama says that in other systems the relation between Prakṛti and Puruṣa is that of the master and his servant, but in the Śuddhādvaita it is of contact also, because the productive contact of the two is admitted <sup>178</sup> There is no harm in regarding both Prakṛti and Puruṣa as

176 *Jivas tu puruṣatattvad bhinna eva Cidrūpatena tatsajātīyaḷ puruṣasyaivamaṣo va* Pr 177

177 *Bhagavata jagadupadanatvena nimitam mukhyam bhagavad-rūpam* Pr p 185

178 *Prakṛtipuruṣayoḷ ca svasvāmibhava eta sambandho nyatra Prakṛte tu viryadhanasya vivakṣitatāt samyogō pi* Pr p 186.

possessed of form, because even the Highest Lord may be said to have a form on the strength of the theory of Viruddha-dharmāśrayatva

Mahat is produced from the qualities, which are disturbed. It is not different from the sūtra, but is one with it. Sūtra is connected with the power of action and mahat with that of knowledge. So one and the same entity is called both mahat and sūtra, in as much as it can be viewed from the point of view of either knowledge or action.<sup>179</sup> Mahat can be explained in three ways, from the spiritual, the divine and the material points of view. The first refers to its essential nature, the second to its meditation in the form in which it is well-known among Gods, and the last is for explaining it to the people. The first explanation can again be given as threefold, as sāttvika, rājasa and tāmasa. From the sāttvika point of view it can be explained as immutable and capable of manifesting the world, which is its substratum.<sup>180</sup> From the rājasa point of view it can be described as the shoot of the world.<sup>181</sup> From the tāmasa point of view it is described as capable of destroying very powerful tamas.<sup>182</sup> From the adhidaivika or the

179 *Sūtram sūcanat kriyāśaktimān prathamō vikarah Tato mahan jñanāśaktimān Sa ca sutrena samyuktah samyanmīśritah Tatah pṛthan na kintv ekam eā tacyam Jñanakriyāśaktibhyam dvedhocyate* Pr p 187

180 *Tatra kūṭasthatve sati svadharaviśvavyūh jakatvam iti sāttvikam svarūpalakṣaṇam* Pr p 187

181 *Jagadankuratvam* Pr p 187

182 *Atīsamarthatamonasakattam* Pr p 187

celestial point of view it can be stated to be of the nature of pure sattva, which is the place of the manifestation of Vāsudeva, so that it can be meditated upon in that form. From the material or the ādhibhautika point of view, it is explained as the citta, having the unchanging objectless knowledge as its mode.<sup>183</sup> That it is without an object, differentiates it from the buddhi, which is always related to an object. The followers of the Sāṅkhya on the other hand take the buddhi and the citta as synonymous.

Ahaṅkāra or the ego is produced from the mahat. It is described as endowed with the qualities of tamas, rajas and sattva, which respectively produce the tanmātras, the indriyas and the manas.<sup>184</sup> From the celestial point of view it is said to be an abode of Sankatṣaṇa. On the material side it can be stated to be the agent, the means and the effect corresponding to the qualities of sattva, rajas and tamas respectively.<sup>185</sup> One who is the substantive of the ego which is then an attribute, is endowed with quiet and terrible stupefaction.<sup>186</sup> One who has no ego is not stupefied and so the devotee, whose mind is fixed upon God, is different from one who has *śāntaghoravimūḍhatva*.

183. *Ādhibhautikam cittatvaṃ iti lakṣaṇam. Cittatvam ca nirviṣayas-arvavikārahītajñānairttikatvam* Pr. p. 188.

184. Pr. p. 188.

185. *Bhautikalakṣaṇam tu kartṛkaraṇakāryatvam.* Pr. p. 189.

186. *Dharmipurahsaram tu śāntaghoravimūḍhatvam iti bhautikam svarūpalakṣaṇam.* Pr. p. 189

Prana and Buddhi are just different forms of ahamkara. They should not be regarded as separate categories. Prana gives power to all the senses<sup>187</sup>. This is why its attributes are ojas, which is the power of the senses, sahas, which is the power of the Manas, and bala, which means physical strength. Prāna is atomic, but on account of its capacity, it can be fivefold. Thus it can pervade the whole body. The five forms are, Praṇa, Apana, Vyana, Udāna and Samāna<sup>188</sup>.

Buddhi is to be inferred from its effect, which is the knowledge of a particular object<sup>189</sup>.

Tanmatras are defined by Purusottama as subtle states of the elements<sup>190</sup>. The elements are possessed of the qualities like the sound, which are non-manifest<sup>191</sup>. They are five, sound, touch, form, taste and smell. They can be grasped only by the yogins, while people like us can comprehend them only when they are specific. Here the Sāṃkhya theory is accepted by the Suddhādvaita.

Śabda is explained as having the attribute of being comprehended by our ears. It is the tanmatra of space and can be said to be the sign of inference of something

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187 *Praṇalaksanam tu sarvendriyabaladatṛtvam* T Sn Ab V 97 p 78. Also see Pr p 189.

188 Cf T Sn Ab V 97 p 78.

189 *Vīśiṣṭajñānalakṣanakaryanumeya* T Sn Ab V 97 p 78.

190 *Sa ca bhūtasūkṣm vastha* Pr p 189.

191 *Nirviśeṣaśabdadiḡuḡavad bhūtatvam* Pr p 189.

having been seen by a seer.<sup>102</sup> The last is explained rather ingeniously. If a man standing outside the house says that the elephant has gone, then the householder, who is in the house, infers that the man out of the house, has seen the elephant. The sound, which is in the effects and which is consequently qualified, is an attribute of all the five elements and not just of the space, as made out by the followers of the Nyāya system. Puruṣottama gives a very good argument for this. When a gun is fired, the sound has its effect upon the skin and the heart also of the hearer.<sup>103</sup> Puruṣottama also refuses to admit with the Bhāṭṭa school of Mīmāṃsā that śabda is a substance having its measure, and which is liable to contraction and expansion. According to him śabda is a guṇa and not a dravya. Similarly touch or sparśa is the tanmātra of vāyu and is comprehended by the skin.<sup>104</sup> When in the effects, it is the quality of four elements. So it can also be described as an attribute of what is pervaded by the sound or what pervades the form.<sup>105</sup> Rūpa or form is the tanmātra of light and can be grasped by our eyes. It can also be described as having the form similar to the form of a substance or always found as affixed to the substance or occupying the same space as that of a substance.<sup>106</sup> Puruṣottama, it is interesting to note, accepts citra as a separate colour.<sup>107</sup> Rasa or taste is the tanmātra

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192. Pr. p. 189.

193. Pr. p. 191

194. Pr. p. 192

195. Pr. p. 192

196. Pr. p. 196.

197. Citram apy atiriktaṃ rūpaṃ. Pr. p. 196

of water and is grasped by our tongue, and *gandha* or smell is the *tanmātra* of the earth and is grasped by our nose. *Purusottama* also discusses the various divisions of all these

*Bhūtas* or the primordial elements are generally characterised as being endowed with manifest sound and the like. They are five<sup>198</sup> *Ākāśa* is defined in three ways. It gives the worldly space, is an object of the dealings of within and without, and is the substratum of the *prāṇa*, sense-faculties and the internal organ<sup>199</sup> *Puruṣottama* does not accept that *ākāśa* has any form, nor that the blue colour seen above, is an attribute of the sky<sup>200</sup>. Its manifest quality is sound. *Vāyu* is formless, it moves and pervades, carries objects, sound and smell and gives strength to all the sense-faculties<sup>201</sup>. Its manifest quality is touch, and the sound follows from its cause (*Ākāśa*). *Tejas* is explained as capable of enlightening, cooking and digesting, heating that which is cold, eating up and drying<sup>202</sup>. Its special quality is form, while the qualities of sound and touch follow in it from their causes. Water is capable of wetting, sticking, satisfying, living, expanding, flowing, removing the heat, and remaining in a mass<sup>203</sup>. Its specific quality is taste, sound, touch and form follow in

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198 Pr p 202

199 Pr pp 202-203

200 *Nakāśe rūpam Upari nilam paśyata akāśam paśyāmīty eva pratyayat Nilam nabhaḥ paśyamīty atrapi na guṇitvena nabhaso bhānam Guṇatena nilasattve mānābhāvāt* Pr p 207.

201 Pr p 209

202 Pr p 209

203 Pr p 210

it from their causes. The earth is that which has form and which holds the whole world <sup>204</sup>. Its specific quality is smell, while other qualities follow.

Indriyas are described as being produced of the *rajasa ahamkara* and as means of action or knowledge <sup>205</sup>. They can be said to be capable of enlightening about the self through their fruit, while they are connected with the body <sup>206</sup>. They are twofold, faculties of action and those of sensation. Purusottama does not admit that they are transitory or that they are themselves objects of our senses. The indriyas are different from their places in our body and are always superintended by their respective deities, without which they are capable of doing nothing. The five organs of action are speech, hands, penis, feet and anus, while those of knowledge are ears, skin, nose, eyes, and tongue. Purusottama explains them completely, enumerating the superintending deities and describing their scope and action <sup>207</sup>.

Manas is capable of both action and knowledge. It is of the nature of conation and non-conation <sup>208</sup>. Its explanation from the celestial point of view is given as the place of the manifestation of Anuruddha. From the material point of view it is stated to be slowly meditated upon by the yogins. *While dealing with perception,*

204 Pr p 211

205 *Tajasaahamkārōpadeyatve satī jñanakriyanyatarakaranam indriyam* Pr p 214

206 *Dehasamyuktatve satī svaphalen tma jñapakatvam vū* Pr p 214

207 Pr pp 215-217

208. *Tasya ca samkalpavikalpatmakatvam svarūpalakṣanam* Pr p 217.

Puruṣottama says that it can be regarded as both an indriya and not an indriya. In the *prameyarakaraṇa* of the *Prasthānaratnākara* he says that it is not an indriya.<sup>209</sup> Its place is the heart

Puruṣottama is not prepared to accept the *Pragabhava* (Negation antecedent to production) or *dhvamsa* (destruction) as separate categories. It is not different from the state of the cause, the *kāraṇavasthā*, and an *avastha* can not be experienced as an entity different from the entity, of which it is a condition<sup>210</sup>. Puruṣottama further points out that when a man does not see the special state of the cause, favourable to production, he does not think that he is seeing the *pragabhāva* of a particular effect<sup>211</sup>. Again the *prāgabdhāva* does nothing in the production of an effect.<sup>212</sup> Similar is the case with the *dhvamsa* also, which is not distinct from the essential nature of the instrumental or the material cause.<sup>213</sup>

Puruṣottama says that other categories, accepted by other systems, need not be separately enumerated. Thus

209 *Idam ca nendriyam* Pr p. 217

210 *Avasthā ca svarūpatirekeṇa nānubhūyate*

T Sn Ab V 117 p 89

211 *Na hi ghaṭajananānukūlam kāraṇavasthām apaśyataḥ kasyāpi iha ghato bhaviṣyati, idam atra ghaṭapragabhava itī buddhir udeṭi* T Sn Ab V 117. p 90

212 *Tatha ca sadhāraṇakāraṇatītenābhyaupagamyamanāsya tasya vyāpārabhāvat kāraṇatā nangikartum śakyā* T. Sn Ab V. 117 p 90

213. *Ubhayathāpi nimittopādānānyataraśarūpātirikto dhvamsō na nirūpayitum śakyah Tadatiriktyadarśanat* T Sn Ab V. 117 p. 91.



for instance, number, measure, distinction, non-difference, desire, efforts, happiness, miseries, all these can be stated to be existing or otherwise only in so far as they are related to the tattvas, which have been dealt with Sāmānya or generality is co-eval with the tattvas, while samyoga is included in the sparśa. In fact the samānya etc do not exist at all, so far as the causal form of God is concerned. They can be admitted only in the effect-form<sup>214</sup>

The foregoing explanation of the causal form of God, as accepted by the Śuddhādvaita, bears an interesting comparison with the position accepted by the followers of Sāmkhya. In the very beginning of this section we have pointed out that the fundamental difference between the Sāmkhya on the one hand and the Śuddhādvaita on the other is that while the former upholds the dualistic doctrine by considering all these as separate entities, the latter believes all these categories to be just forms of one Supreme God. All the 25 categories of the Sāmkhya have been admitted with the addition of the sattva, rajas and tamas, which though given a prominent place in the Sāmkhya, are according to it not tattvas but qualities or guṇas. It may thus appear that in the Śuddhādvaita we have a Vedāntic superstructure raised upon the principal entities of the Sāmkhya. The primary source of this lies in the *Bhāgavata Purāṇa*, where there is clearly noticeable a deliberate attempt to put the Sāmkhya wine in a monistic bottle. Attempts to harmonise the dualistic theories with those of monism are found in the *Gītā* also. The Sāmkhya philo-

214 *Vastutas tu sāmānyāder abhāva eva. Tasmān naiyāyika-dyupagatapadarthanām śrutipurāṇavirodhe laukīkayuktīyuktatve ca karyakotav eva niveśa ut bhavaḥ.* T. Sn. Ab. V. 117 p. 92.

sophy with all that is admitted in it, has no place in the absolutism of Śaṅkara, but it has crept into the theories advocated by Rāmānuja and the succeeding Vaiṣṇava Ācāryas in one or another form. The Sāṅkhya theories were slowly and slowly almost reshaped so as to suit even a monist like Vallabha. The share of the *Bhāgavatapurāṇa* in this process seems to be very much, but as we are not definite about its date, it can not be properly appreciated.

Another important point is that while explaining these categories, there are given the ādhidaivika explanations referring to Samkarṣaṇa and Aniruddha. The root of this lies in the Caturvyūha theory, as promulgated by the earlier Pañcarātra. This theory has however been criticised by the author of the *Vedānta-sūtras*. Rāmānuja not only accepts the theory but even interprets the *Brahmasūtras* so ingenuously as to get the theory sanctioned by the author of the *Brahmasūtras*. Vallabha while commenting upon the *Sūtras* rejects the theory and agrees with Śaṅkara in his interpretation. Here however we find that if the theory of the vyāhas is also brought in harmony with monism, the *Suddhādvaita* has no objection against it, though it is not expressly stated or referred to. Here also the *Bhāgavata-Purāṇa* seems to have played a very important part, in so shaping it so as to suit Monism.

#### Creation :

Puruṣottama in his *Prasthānaratnākara* and *Aṅubhāṣyaprakāśa*<sup>215</sup> gives the process of creation, following the *Bhāgavata*. II. Brahman first assumes the forms of knowledge, joy, time, desire, action, Māyā, and Prakṛti.

215. Cf. Pr. pp. 159 ff. Also A. B. P. II. iv. 22. pp. 810-813.

Kāla or time is of the nature of the power of action, while desire is the thought of the Lord expressed in ' May I be many and produce <sup>216</sup> This is twofold The first has the nature of differentiation while the second is of the nature of raising and degrading <sup>217</sup>

Considering the first Puruṣottama says that the attributes of sat, cit and ānanda, which are of the nature of action, knowledge and bliss not connected with kāla, are mutually differentiated and while in that process they differentiate their substantive also, thus making Brahman endowed with action, knowledge and bliss Thus the Highest Lord, who is trirūpa, becomes possessed of form (sākāra) Even though thus differentiated, owing to his desire to remain non-differentiated, God remains one whole That is why the effect form is inferior and God with all these three forms is called complete or Pūrṇa The power of the aspect of existence (Sat) is the Māyā, which is of the nature of action, and that of the aspect of sentiency is the Māyā, which deludes <sup>218</sup> The Māyā, which is instrumental in the production of the world, belongs to the aspect of bliss Māyā is thus related to all the forms of God and is therefore comprehensive of everything <sup>219</sup> It thus gives the form to everything, that comes out of the original nature <sup>220</sup> It can thus be accepted as of the nature of place,

216 *Bahu syam prajāyeya Chandogya VI 11 3, Taittirīya II 6*

217 *Dvītyas tutkarṣapakarṣarūpaḥ Pr p 161*

218 *S'aktis tu sadamśasya kriyārūpa cidamśasya vyamohika mayā Pr p 160*

219 *Sañcayakarūpā Pr p 160*

220 *Tato mūlarūpe nirgate aksaramśabhutasya tatra pravesas tadā tasmins tām akṛtim sampadayati. Pr p 160*

time and objects (Desakālavasturūpa) At times it may be said to produce even the desire of the Lord It does not however mean that the original creatorship is devolved upon it <sup>221</sup>

Coming to the second, Purusottama says that all these aspects have that of bliss as the Highest, while the other two viz that of sat and cit are inferior to it and are produced as serving it Then are created knowledge and action, which are the attributes of cit and sat, as powers of the Highest Lord Then the aspect of bliss is endowed with knowledge and action When the attribute of the aspect of cit viz knowledge goes away from the cit, the power of the cit, viz the deluding Maya, deludes it The cit aspect, even though of the nature of understanding, is deluded by it, because of the absence of knowledge which is its attribute, and because of the separation of the aspect of bliss from it The cit is related to Māyā with the understanding that it will be joined with the ananda through this relation Being thus not at ease, it is dependent upon the sutrātman, which is of the nature of the tenfold pranas It is thus called jīva, because of its efforts to hold the pranas <sup>222</sup> Similar is the position of the aspect of existence, which becomes inert because of the absence of the power of action Later on by virtue of activities, which are the parts of the original action, it is manifested in the form of the body and the like When that activity or the attributes of that activity are connected, it is also concealed, when however it is manifested, the terminology ghaṭa

221 *Natu tavatā mūlakartṛtvam* Pr p 161

222 *Tadā praṇadharaṇaprayatnavattvā jīva ity ucyate* Pr p 161.

and the like comes to the Jīva, the Lord and the Buddhi, and when the manifestation is concealed, that terminology produces the understanding of destruction. Similar is the case with the cit, which is manifested and concealed by the knowledge, which is a part of the power of knowledge. The aspect of bliss is to be understood in much the same way. Thus by twofold desire, the inert objects which are manifestations of the cit and which are bound, and the antaryāmins, which rule over them and which are the manifestations of the Ānanda,—all these are produced on the analogy of sparks from fire.

The whole analysis of creation as given by Puruṣottama, has been taken down by us here completely, except some minor omissions. It is interesting to note that the concept of Māyā is accepted by the Suddhādvaita, though it seems to be different from that of Śaṅkara. Māyā is the miraculous power of God, but it is delusive also with regard to its connection with the aspect of cit and in the making of the jīvas this vyāmohikā Māyā has a very important part to play. This vyāmohikā Māyā, it is important to note, is the same as avidyā in the Suddhādvaita.<sup>223</sup>

### Brahman—the effect-form

*The effect form of God, is endless. Even then it can be classified into two, the samaṣṭi and the vyaṣṭi in so far*

223 *Tada cidānsāya śaktir vyāmohikā maya avidyeti yavat* Pr p. 161 See also Prof G H Bhatt's article 'The concept of Māyā in the Suddhādvaita Vedānta' Indika, The Indian Historical Research Institute, Silver Jubilee Commemoration Volume, Bombay 1953

as we view it either collectively or individually.<sup>224</sup> The collective form is of the nature of the *Brahmāṇḍa*, while the individual one is made up of the individual souls and the inanimate objects. The *Antaryāmin*, is not included in the effect form, because it has no ego of the body (*Dehābhimāna*), while the individual soul is so included because it is possessed of that ego.

The individual soul, even though belonging to the effect form and endowed with the bodily consciousness is eternal and is not therefore produced, like an ordinary transitory object. That the individual soul is eternal and does not vanish with the destruction of the body is proved on the strength of a very curious but interesting argument of *Puruṣottama*, who points out that even a newly born child will be hungry and will try to suck its mother. This can be explained, says *Puruṣottama*, only on the ground of that child, remembering its experiences in the previous life. This shows that the *jīva* that was in the previous body has now come over to that of the newly born child.<sup>225</sup> As it is eternal, it can not be said to be produced, for that which has a beginning must have an end and if we believe in the production of the *Jīvas*, we should admit its destruction also and that would run counter to the eternal nature of the *jīvas*, that has been scrupulously

224. Cf. T. Sn. Ab. V. 118, p. 92.

225. *Jātamātrasya bālasya kṣudhātaḥ stanapānātau pravṛttidarśanāt. Tasyāś ca pūrvānubhūtakṣunnivṛttikāraṇabhūtānubhavajanyasmṛtīmantareṇānupapattiyā tasyātmanaḥ pūrvāparajanmīyaśarīrā-tacchinnaśyaikyē siddhe tena cānāditve' nādirbhāvatena ca dhvamsāpratyogitve nityatasya siddhatvāt.*

T. S. Ab. V. 53, p. 92.

maintained in all the scriptures. The analogy that is used is that of the emanation of sparks from fire and this emanation can not be called production.<sup>226</sup> In his famous *kārikā* on creation Vallabha says that those which are transient are produced, with regard to those that are eternal but limited there is contact, while for the eternal and the unlimited there is manifestation.<sup>227</sup> While explaining this *kārikā*. Puruṣottama says that production is the association of the objects due to the externalization; contact is due to the action of coming in; while manifestation is caused by desire. This being the case, when there is manifestation or contact, the essential nature and the qualities of the cause do not undergo any fundamental change or modification and hence the *saṁgama* is not *utpatti*.<sup>228</sup> The writers on the *Suddhādvaita*, especially Puruṣottama, have made deliberate attempts to show that the spark-fire analogy can not and should not mean production.

What is the relation of this individual soul to Brahman? On the strength of the scriptures, the *Gītā*, and the *Sūtras*, the individual soul is said to be an *aṁśa* of Brahman. What exactly is the connotation of this term in connection with the individual soul, as related to

226. *Yato vishphulingavad uccaranam notpattiḥ. Nāmarūpasamban-ahābhāvāt.* A. B. P. II. iii. 17. p. 704.

227. *Anitye jananam nitye paricchinne saṁgamaḥ, Nityāparicchinnatanau prākāṣyam ceti sā tridhā.* A. B. II. iii. 3.

228. *Jananam bahirbhāvahetukaḥ viśayasānisargaḥ, saṁgamaḥ āgamanakriyāhetukaḥ saḥ, prākāṣyam icchāhetukaḥ sa Tathā cātra vibhāgā j jāte bahirbhāve tadānīm svarūpadharmayoḥ anyathābhāvābhāvāt tasya notpattirūpatā.* S. S. pp. 170-171.

Brahman ? The word *Amśa* is used for a part (*Avayava*), a son, a piece (*Khaṇḍa*), a part of something which is specific (*Viśiṣṭavastvekadeśa*), a portion from the whole mass (*Rāśyekadeśa*) or even a wife<sup>229</sup> Similarly the term *pāda* which is found in the *śrutis*, stands for a part or a portion So we may accept any of these senses and there will be nothing wrong Even then however we should accept that meaning, which is properly suitable to the illustrations of sparks and fire and a spider and its web Thinking in this way, we should understand the term *amśa* to mean a piece or a part, but having the essential nature of the whole unchanged<sup>230</sup> That is why the individual soul is called an *ābhāsa* or an appearance of Brahman, just as a Brahmin who is devoid of good conduct, but who bears the sacred thread, is a Brahmin only in appearance<sup>231</sup>

The question naturally arises as to how can non-dualism be explained, when we believe in the *amśatva* of individual souls The individual souls, which are the manifestation of the *cit* aspect and which are *amśas* of Brahman, can be called one with Brahman as a part can not be different from the whole A spark, which is an *amśa* of fire, can not be non-fire But then is not a part

229 *Puruṣottama* quotes the passage *Ardho va eṣa ātmano yat patnīḥ* Here he says that *ardha* means *amśa*

A B P II III 53 p 767.

230 *Tathā satī khaṇḍāṭayavadirūpas tannityatvādibodhakaśrutyanurodhāt avikṛtasvarūpa evamśa siddhyati*

A B P II III 53 p 767

231 *Yatha nacari brahmaṇo brāhmaṇabhāśah, sūtradharakativ' pi brahmaṇyakhyadevatayas tatas tirohitatāt, tatha, jivō pi*

A B P II III 50 p 760



different from the whole? Can we say that a part as such is absolutely one with the whole?

The question does not arise for Saṁkara, nor even for Rāmānuja. Saṁkara with his staunch belief in absolute identity has said that the individual souls are also appearances, imagined by our ignorance. If we have to believe that 'I am Brahman', that 'I' must be wrong and must be Brahman. But then this would lead to the destruction of the individual souls and surely nobody would attempt to realize that Supreme, by the realization of which he will destroy himself.<sup>232</sup> Rāmānuja accepts qualified Monism and so the difference between the individual souls on the one hand and Brahman on the other does not worry him much. Madhva would in fact want difference and try to disprove identity. Bhāskara and Nimbārka admit both oneness and difference, but while the latter leans heavily towards the fundamental nature of difference, the former tries to explain it on the strength of upādhis.

Puruṣottama makes a thorough analysis of the problem, that faces him. The Ācārya, whose theories he is expounding, says just that an aṁśa is not different from the aṁśin, but this is not enough. If we want to promulgate the path of devotion, we must maintain the individuality of the individual souls and the aṁśa, if its aṁśatva is not imagined, can in no case be called absolutely identical with the aṁśin. Puruṣottama therefore says that they must accept the theory of Bhedābheda, while leaning towards abheda and explaining the Bheda as owing to desire. That is why, while referring to Bhāskara,

232. Na hyātmanāśaḥ puruṣārthaḥ. A. B. I. iii, 399.

Puruṣottama says that he admits both *aṃśatva* and *bhinnābhinnatva*<sup>233</sup> This he says is the relationship of *tādātmya* and herein the difference owes its existence to the desire of the Highest Lord and is thus adventitious it is interesting to note that Puruṣottama calls Ramanuja a believer in difference<sup>234</sup> There is no *tāttvikabheda* in the *Suddhādvaita*, where the *jīvatva* is adventitious<sup>235</sup>

This however raises another problem That which is adventitious and not natural, can not be called eternal In his efforts to bring the theory of *aṃśatva* as near to *abheda* as possible, Puruṣottama calls *jīvabhāva* as adventitious, but then how can the individuality of the *jīvas* be eternally maintained if it is not natural? We should here bear in mind that in the *Suddhādvaita*, the highest emancipation is the *Sāyujya*, where a devotee enjoys with God It may be said that the individual soul might have attained the *Brahmabhava*, but even then the distinction does and should persist Again Vallabha argues actually that the destruction of the soul can not be desired by anyone, so there is a deliberate effort on the part of the propounders of the *Suddhādvaita* to retain that individuality Again, it is maintained that the *jīvatva* is only because of the embodied ego (*Dehābhimāna*) and we may say that when that

233 *Tatra aṃśatvam tu yuktam bhinnābhinnatvam ca Śrautatvat*  
A B P II III 53 p 763 See also *Tathā caivam tādātmye*  
*eva vyāsasya tatparyam na nityabhede napy abhede itī*

S S p 175

234 *Atra tādātmyam anangikurvatām tattvikabhedavādinām Rama-*  
*nujamadhvanaṣṭyāyikādinām nanamatāntī* S S p 150

235 *Jīvabhavasya agantukatakalathanena tattviko bhedo varitah* S S.  
p 155

is destroyed the *jivabhāva*, which is adventitious, is also destroyed. What then about eternity and individuality? This contingency appears to arise for all those, who try to retain the individuality of the souls, call them *nitya* and yet try to adhere to Monism. It does not arise for two philosophers only, Śaṅkara and Madhva, both of whom take uncompromising attitudes, the former cutting the Gordian Knot by saying that all the distinctions are false, and the latter flatly rejecting Monism.

Further, what about the souls in the world? Are they one or many? If we believe in only one soul, i. e. *Ekātmavāda*, then the eternal individual souls would pose a problem. If on the other hand we agree to the existence of different individual souls, we must believe in the multiplicity of the souls i. e. *Nānātmavāda*. If a *jīva* is believed to be an *aṁśa* of Brahman, there is bound to be the conclusion of the *aṁśin*, being a composite whole rather than one complete whole. Puruṣottama here takes a compromising attitude and says that from the point of view of the individual souls, we should admit multiplicity, while from the stand point of Brahman there is oneness<sup>236</sup>

There is no agreement among Indian Philosophers regarding the measure of the Individual soul. The followers of the Nyāya believe in the *jīvas* to be omnipresent, but they accept the multiplicity of the souls. The Jains accept the *jīvas* as having the measure of the bodies, which is the residence of those *jīvas*. Śaṅkara thinks that the *jīva*

236 *Evam jīvanam aṁśāte jīvasvarūpavicāreṇa nanātmavādo bhagavatsvarūpavicāreṇa ca ekātmavādaḥ*

as actually not existing in the highest level, and so it may be called vibhu in reality. All the other exponents of the Vedānta accept the jīva to be atomic. Puruṣottama ridicules the theory of vyapakātmavāda by pointing out that if all the jīvas are omnipresent, all would be joined with all the bodies and if one body eats a mango all would enjoy it, because there is no limitation or regulation. So many times one feels that there is nothing at one's feet but the head is aching, similarly there will be an experience of happiness in the body of Devadatta, while simultaneously there may be a feeling of pain in the body of Yajñadatta.<sup>237</sup> So many other arguments are also advanced by Puruṣottama. The jīva again can not be said to have the dehaparimāṇa, because that would lead to the transiency of the jīvas and run counter to their eternity.<sup>238</sup> The materialists believe in the luminosity or sentiency as being a result of the conglomeration of the atoms of the primordial elements. This is also not acceptable, since in that case consciousness would remain in a dead body also.<sup>239</sup> The jīvas then should be admitted as atomic in measure. How then to explain the pervasion of the whole body by the consciousness, which is atomic? This can be explained on the ground of the capacity of the caitanya to pervade the whole body just like a piece of sandal-wood or it may be called its quality of spreading just like that of smell, which spreads here and there leaving its original source.<sup>240</sup>

237 T S Ab V 53 p 93

238 Madhyamaparimāṇatve anityatapatteh T S Ab V 53 p 92

239 Jñanam yasya dharmah sa puñjo bahyaś cen mṛtasarīre pi  
jñanam upalabhyeta T S Ab V 55-56, p 97

240 Sarīśarīragatacaitanyopalambhas tu samarthyaś ca gunud ceti  
sadhitam A B P II iii 28 p 721

One would naturally ask as to how to explain the scriptural passages, that often teach of the pervasion of the soul, if we are to accept it as atomic. Here the followers of the Suddhāvaita state that this can be explained on the ground of the Bhagavattva of the souls. When the aspect of bliss, which is concealed from the individual souls, is manifested, then the soul attains those attributes, which are connected with the aspect of bliss and there is *viruddhadharmaśrayatva*, as of the Highest Lord. Thus even though the soul may be atomic, they may be great and pervading on account of the possession of the contradictory attributes. Thus the *vyapakatva* of the soul who has obtained the realization of Brahman, can be explained. The *vyapakatva* is thus of the nature of *Brahmatva* and not *jīvatva*.<sup>241</sup> The *jīva*, as a *jīva*, is atomic and as Brahman it is pervasive.

Being a part of Brahman, the *jīva* is sentient, and the sentiency is not only an attribute but also the essential nature of the individual soul, just as the attributes of Brahman also constitute its very nature. Puruṣottama gives a very good argument when he says that what is produced by one is one's quality, that which is one's quality is inseparable from the one of which it is a quality, finally that which is inseparable from one is one's essential nature.<sup>242</sup> As the sentiency is an attribute of the

241 *Tasya brahmabhavam prāptasya jīvasya bhagavattvena vyapakatvaśrūtiḥ juyate Na tu jīvatvena rūpeṇa ānandaśābhyuktaiḥ brahmabhavaiḥ sati tasya tadviruddhadharmādhāratām bhavaty atas tatra brahmakotayah paricchedo vyāpakatvam ca pratīyerann iti* A B P II III 30 p 731

242 *Yo yajjanakah sa tadgunako yo yadguṇakah sa tadavinabhūtaḥ, yo yadavinabhūtaḥ sa tadatmakah* A B P II. III 18 p 706

individual soul, it follows as a corollary that it is also its essential nature. Similarly the activity of an individual soul also comes from Brahman. The individual soul is an agent on account of the relationship of *tādātmya*, which it bears with Brahman. Thus the activity is of Brahman and it appears to be in the *jiva* <sup>243</sup>

Here comes perhaps the most crucial problem of all the systems of the world. If the individual souls are agents themselves and if the activity of these *jivas* is to come from Brahman, and also if everything is in and through God, what about the unhappiness experienced by the *jivas*? The contingency that arises for Brahman is that the Highest Lord, who is said to be so merciful and kind, so good and benign, is partial to some who are made happy and cruel to those who are miserable. The human beings in this wide world are daily falling and bleeding upon the thorns of life. Who is responsible for this? The theories of the enjoyment of the fruits of one's own actions and that of the transmigration of soul are formulated as a reply to this, but we shall have to admit in that case that the Highest Lord is dependent upon the actions of an individual. Why should the omnipotent God depend upon the actions and create human beings according to the same? The doctrine of the freedom of will may be and has been admitted in the *Suddhādvaita*. God is like a father, who puts all the necessary material before a child and informs him about the good or bad points connected with them, but it is the child who acts and not the father, who is consequently not responsible for the defaults of the young

243 *Brahmagatam etā kartṛtām brahmatadatmyād eva jive bhūṣate*

one.<sup>244</sup> This however is no solution of the problem, because even if we admit the freedom of will, what about the creator who has created people, some happy, healthy, wealthy and wise, others equally miserable, weak, poor and foolish? The contention of God being dependent upon the actions can not be agreed to by the Suddhādvaita, which believes in the omnipotence of God, who is and must be independent. The karma again being jaḍa or inert must be regulated by someone.<sup>245</sup> Why then not believe in God as the giver of fruits, as He is the source of activity? And if that is accepted, as it is actually accepted, what about the contingency of partiality and cruelty? Vallabha tries to solve the difficulty by pointing out that the creation is of and in the self. God does not create anything new or different from Him, he just manifests himself as the jivas and so even though the maker of miseries, he is neither partial nor cruel.<sup>246</sup> Everything is one with him. The *Brahmasūtra* II 1 34 says that God creates in accordance with the actions of an individual. This sūtra is only for explaining to the opponent.<sup>247</sup> Viṭṭhaleśa has another explanation to offer. He says that God desires to sport and sports

244 Ato guṇadoṣukathanapūrvakam balecchanusarisāmagrisampā dake pitarī yatha na doṣaḥ kintu balasvabhāve tatha brahmaṇy api na doṣaḥ kintu jiva eva A B P II iii 42 p 749

245 Atāḥ karmanīyamaka isvarāṅgikārya eva T S Ab V 76 p 128

246. T S V 76 p 128

247 Pūrvam tadanyatvādi sūtraṅ sarvasya brahmatmakatvam jivasyapi brahmātmakatvam ca pratīpadayan adatra sapekṣatām hetūkaroti tena jñāyate vadibodhanayedam iii

A. B. P. II 1 34. p 602

naturally require some differences and distinctions. There is nothing wrong therefore if we believe the miseries also to be the *līlā* of God.<sup>248</sup> *Puruṣottama* combines the two views into one and says that even though God may give fruit with regard to the karma of individuals He does not become dependent, because He desires to do in that way. While thus following His desire, He can not be said to be cruel or partial, because He is everything. The karma also is an attribute of Brahman and that is how it is accepted as devoid of beginning. Sometimes God may not care for karma, because He is independent.<sup>249</sup>

The explanations of Vallabha and his son and the interpretation of the two views as given by *Puruṣottama* should be given a due place among all those explanations which have so far been given. The contention of *Viṭṭhaleśa* may appear even strange on the face of it. Why should the *jīvas* suffer for the sport of God? Such a God will not be different from the boys, who throw stones in ponds for joy and kill the frogs. Hence the argument based on the *līlā* of God must have the solid backing of the argument based on the oneness or *Ātmaśṣṭi*, if we are to use the terminology of the *Suddhādvaita*. But the explanation

248. The view of *Viṭṭhaleśa* is suggested by his explanation of *Brahmasūtra* II. iii. 42. in which he explains the word *prayatna* as '*Bhagavatkṛtaḥ kriḍārtham udyamaḥ.*' For further explanation see A. B. P. II. iii. 42 p. 750.

249. *Tenātreḍam siddham, Phaladāne bhagavān jivakṛtaprayatnasāpekṣo pi na svātantryāddhiyate. Tathaivalocitavāt. Ālocanānusāreṇa vividham phalam jivebhyo dadad api na vaiṣamyādidoṣabhāg bhavati. Sarvarūpatvāt. karmaṇām apy anāditvam bhagavadharmatvāt. Kvacin maryādām bhinatty api. Svatantratvāt.* A. B. P. II. iii. 42. p. 751.



on the ground of Ātmasr̥ṣṭi requires one's vision cultivated for this, and is in fact a negation of the miseries rather than an explanation of them.

The world is regarded in the Suddhādvaita as a manifestation of the aspect of sat, of God. The Vedānta can not accept the theory of Kaṇāda that the world is produced from the conglomeration of atoms, or from the prakṛti as advocated by the Sāṅkhya. Puruṣottama repudiates both these views thoroughly in his *Sr̥ṣṭibhedavāda*.<sup>250</sup> However the problem for the Suddhādvaita is, whether the world should be accepted as unreal. The whole world with its wide variety of things, both great and small has been a very great problem for the philosophers. It is always fleeting and changing. Can it be called real at all? Again if we are to accept that everything is Brahman, can we equate Brahman with the floating, changing, mass of things which are not satisfactory, not eternal, and not even joyful? Can we believe that this world, which we see around us, is a real transformation of real Brahman?

Sāṅkara says that the world is mithyā or unreal. The reality of the empirical world can not be maintained in the ultimate analysis and so Sāṅkara distinguishes between the vyāvahārika satya or the exoteric truth and the pāramārthika satya or the esoteric truth. Here however it is necessary for us to understand what exactly is meant by Sāṅkara, when he says that the world is mithyā. The world, as it is, is in any case more real than the chimeræ and can not thus be rejected outright as sheer illusion. It can not thus be compared with mirage, or dreams or phantoms of experience. The Prātibhāsika is different from

250. Cf. *Sr̥ṣṭibhedavāda. Vādāvali*. pp. 82-95.

the Vyāvahārika; but just as the Prātibhāsika is negated in the Vyāvahārika, in which we know that all that we have dreamt or seen or thought is wrong, even so we can go one step further and say that the Vyāvahārika is just an appearance, when we go to a still higher level of the Pāramārthika satya. While we are dreaming we do not think that what we experience is false; we know that only when we are out of our dream and find ourselves in the waking state. By the parity of reasoning we can say that the waking worldly state can also be falsified, when we rise still higher due to the dawning light of true knowledge. The reality and otherwise of the world are thus relative. When Śaṅkara says that the world is mithyā, it is so only from the point of view of the highest reality which the world is surely not.

The unreality of the world, with everything that it includes, matter, souls, personal God, and all—even if it may be maintained on the highest level, is a big blow to the religious mind and how so ever great may be the conclusions of this devastating reasoning, a man, especially a man of religion, does not like it. What would be the position then if the whole world is regarded as a phantom of imagination? The Vaiṣṇava teachers who followed Śaṅkara launched a violent tirade against him, and Śaṅkara was called 'Buddhist in disguise' (*Pracchanna-bauddha*) and a False-speaker (*Mithyāvādīn*).<sup>251</sup> Rāmānuja

251. Nāgārjuna distinguishes between two satyas. Cf.

*Die satye sar-upāśritya buddhānām dharmadeśanā,*

*Lokasamvṛtisatyam ca satyam ca paramārthataḥ.*

*Mūlamādhyamikakārikā*, XXIV. 8. quoted in '*Gauḍapāda*' by T. M. P. Mahadevan. p. 206. fn. 70. Even Śūnya of Buddhism is void only in the ultimate analysis.

and Madhva, Bhaskara and Nimbārka—all who followed Samkara said that the world is real and explained the relation of the world and Brahman in their own ways. The world, according to Ramānuja, is the gross acit which is the effect of the subtle acit. This subtle acit, together with the subtle cit, forms the body of Brahman and thus there is qualified monism. Even if we may not enter into a discussion of the relation of the subtle acit and Brahman, we should at least admit that the rudiments of the world are in Brahman. If then the empirical world is ugly, bad and dull, the rudiments should be subtly ugly and subtly bad. Can they be connected with Brahman? If we think that the subtle acit does not contain all this, what can be the source of everything despicable and dissatisfactory in the world which is the gross form of that very subtle acit? Any way the reality of the world, when looked upon in the context of the Advaita, even though that Advaita may be qualified, remains an unsolved problem.

Vallabha and his followers say that the world is not false. It can not be equated with the illusory appearances, because it is the manifestation of the aspect of sat of Brahman, and is thus its effect. As the cause is real, the effect, which is the revelation of its aspect of being, can not be called unreal. The prapañca is thus satya and not mithya. The question now is as to how can the world be called real. What Vallabha and his followers mean by the reality of the world is the reality of the essential form of the world (Brahmarūpena satyatva). We may agree that the world, which is just the manifestation of Brahman, is real in its essence, which is Brahman, but as Dr P. T. Raju puts it, 'the relation between the essence of the

world and the Brahman is not the problem. The problem is about the relation between the world as we experience it and the Brahman'.<sup>252</sup> Thus if Brahman is the norm of reality, can we say that the world, in which we live, is also real?

The answer to this is found in the distinction that has been made out by the followers of pure Monism, between Jagat or Prapañca on the one hand and the Saṁsāra on the other. This distinction has not been maintained by the predecessors of Vallabha and therefore it is a novel theory for the Vedānta. The world has Brahman as its material cause and māyā as an instrument; the saṁsāra on the other hand has no material cause and avidyā or nescience is instrumental for its appearance.<sup>253</sup> The saṁsāra is not produced. It is 'ucyate' and not 'jōyate'.<sup>254</sup> The Saṁsāra is of the nature of pride and consciousness of possession (ahantāmamatātmaka) and is thus destroyed by knowledge. It is the Saṁsāra which ends, when one is liberated, and not the world, which may be merged at the will of God. In the *Suddhādvaita* the terms māyā and avidyā are not synonymous. On the strength of the *Bhāgavata* passage.<sup>255</sup> Puruṣottama says that the avidyā is an effect of the māyā. Avidyā is thus not without a beginning and being one of

252. Dr. P. T. Raju *Idealistic thought of India*. p. 159

253. *Tathā hi prapañcasya brahmopādānakatvam māyākāranakatvam, saṁsārasya nirupādānakatvam avidyākāranatvam itikāranabhedād bhedah*. T. S. Ab. V. 23. p. 60.

254. T. S. P. V. 23

255. *Vidyāvidye mama tanū viddhy udhava śarīrīṇām, Mokṣabandhakarī ādye māyajā me vinirmite*. *Bhāgavata*. XI. xi. 3.

the twelve śaktis of the Lord, it has no power over God.<sup>256</sup> Knowledge puts an end to the avidyā and consequently saṁsāra, but not the prapañca.<sup>257</sup> It should also be borne in mind that avidyā is just removed by vidyā, it is not destroyed. An effect is completely destroyed only when the inhering cause is destroyed. Knowledge can not destroy the māyā which causes avidyā. Avidyā therefore exists in the māyā in a subtle form.<sup>258</sup> Puruṣottama gives an illustration by pointing out that the state of sleep which is removed by wakefulness, remains in the buddhi, as its mode and pervades the internal organ.

Avidyā and vidyā have five divisions each and they are called parvans. The five parvans of the avidyā are the ignorance of the essential nature and the superimposition of the body, the senses, the prāṇa and the internal organ.<sup>259</sup> Avidyā, says Puruṣottama, can be understood either collectively or individually. It is thus samaṣṭirūpā or vyaṣṭirūpā, just as we can understand the forest as one while the trees are many. The samaṣṭirūpā is one of the powers of the Highest Lord, the vyaṣṭirūpā is connected

256. T. Sn. Ab. V. 25. p. 65.

257. *Jñānasya sakāryāvidyānāśakatvam mocanam ca, anyathaiiva avidyayā ahantāmamatātmakasamsārabijatiāt samsārasyāvidyākatvakathanena sakāraṇasya tasyaiiva jñānanāśyatvakathanena ca samyag siddham.* T. S. Ab. V. 81. p. 139.

258. *Kāryasya sarvathā nāśo hi samavāyināśāt. Prakṛte ca avidyāyāḥ sāttvikitvena svajanakamāyānāśakatvābhāvāt māyāsattvāt tatra sūkṣmarūpeṇāvidyāyāḥ sattve tasya upamardo eva na tu nāśaḥ.* T. S. Ab. V. 33-34. p. 74.

259. T. S. V. 32.

with the individual souls <sup>260</sup> There is no question of superimposition with reference to the avidya, which is produced from the mayā, before creation, because the adhyasas come afterwards. Mayā produces mahat, which again creates the ego. Both these are of the nature of the internal organ and so the first is anīhkarapādhyasa. Praṇa is just another form of the ego and there is the pranā dhyāsa. This is followed by the superimposition of the body and the senses. The dehādhyasa leads to a complete forgetting of the essential nature (svarupa-vismaraṇa). This is the ignorance of the nature, which is the same as wrong knowledge. Thus the original nescience leads to the bondage of the dehādhyasa and the superimposition of the attributes of the body, which in its turn produces the cycle of births and deaths. This is samsāra <sup>261</sup>

It will thus be seen that the distinction between the jagat and the samsara depends upon the distinction between the points of view from which we look at the cosmos. If we take it to be just of the essential nature of Brahman, it is the prapañca which exists, if it is understood as a heterogeneous mass of things separated from one another and also from Brahman, there is ignorance and samsāra. Thus it is the difference which is sublated and not the essential nature. When we are in need

260 *Evam sati samaṣṭirūpeṇa vanam itivad aikyam Vyaṣṭirūpeṇa vṛkṣa itivan nanatvam Tatra samaṣṭirūpa bhagavatcchaktir vyaṣṭirūpa jivānam iti siddhyati* T S Ab V 32 p 73

261 *Evam ca mūlavidyakṛto dehādhyasadibandhas tena kṛto yo janmamaraṇādīparamparajanako dehadidharmadhyāseḥ sa samsara iti phalati* T S Ab V 32 p 74

of much of gold we use all the ornaments of gold in our possession and we take them to be gold and not bracelets and rings different from the gold. The distinctions are removed and we have gold alone. Even so here also we have the *prapañca*, which is not false <sup>262</sup> The distinctions are thus due only to the egoism and the things, as they are viewed by the ordinary people in the world, are brought about only by speech <sup>263</sup> The *samsāra* is thus a delusion of the individual soul, due to which he sees things, which do not exist, and does not see what exists in the *prapañca*, which is of the nature of Brahman. Purusottama gives even a syllogism to prove the reality of the *prapañca*. Just as the dream world requires the world which is more real to precede it, even so our *vyāvahārika* *prapañca* follows the *prapañca*, which is relatively more real. The reason given for the premise is the *māyikatva* or the '*māyikatvena abhūmatatva*.' <sup>264</sup> That is why it is said that a *Brahmavādīn* never sees anything bad in the world, because for him everything is of the nature of Brahman <sup>265</sup>

262. *Yathā bahusūvarṇāpekṣāyām tatkāryāni katakakūṣṭhalaghaṭa-  
śarāvādīny ānīyātīvad idam suvarṇam iti suvarṇatvenaiva tāni  
grhyante na tu katakādirūpeṇa iti vikalpabuddher eva bādho na  
tu svarūpasyāpiti tādrśabhānānurodhena api na mithyātvam.  
prapañcasya siddhyati* T S Ab. V 91 p 158.

263. *Tena lokapratīyamānarūpeṇa padārthānam vācarambhāṇa-  
mātratvam eva.* T. S Ab V. 92. p 159

265. T S Ab V 79 p 133.

264. *Vyāvahārikāḥ prapañcaḥ svāpekṣayotkṛstasattākaprapañca-  
pūrvakāḥ Māyikatvenabhūmatatvān māyikatvād vā Svapnadi-  
prapañcavat* S S p 351. also *Srstibhedavāda, Vādāvali,*

The foregoing discussion regarding the distinction between the jagat and the samsāra, eloquently speaks of the exact position that the Śuddhādvaita has taken regarding the world. The world can not be accepted as real, as has been done by Rāmānuja, nor can it be regarded as unreal as taught by Śaṅkara. Vallabha therefore tries to make a compromise by stating the reality of the world in its essential nature and distinguishing it from the samsāra, which is illusory and unreal. When Purusottama postulates another prapañca, which is relatively more real, it may appear that the difference between the Śuddhādvaita and the Kevalādvaita is more of emphasis than of substance. It is interesting to note here that the five parvans of avidyā are, ignorance of the real nature and the adhyāsas, both of which are maintained by Śaṅkara. Purusottama's opponent appears to be correct in pointing out that in the Śuddhādvaita, the ultimate reality of the world is accepted as of the nature of Brahman, after rejecting the same from the point of view of the world, while in Śaṅkara's system there is the rejection of just the ultimate reality of the world as such.<sup>266</sup> Can it be said that Vallabha admits the theories of Śaṅkara for all practical purposes and raises a theistic structure upon them, instead of the absolutistic one constructed by Śaṅkara?

### Theory of causation—Abheda.

After dealing with important points regarding Brahman and the world, together with the individual souls, we shall

266 *Brahmavāde hy advaitārtham jagato jagadrūpeṇa pāramārthikasatyatvam nānāyuktīśrutīśūtrādibhir nirākṛtya tasya tasya brahmarūpeṇa pāramārthikasatyatā pratipādyā Mayāvāde tu jagataḥ pāramārthikasatyatvanirākaraṇamatrena* T. S. Ab. V. 82. p. 140



now turn to the theory of causation as promulgated in the Suddhādvaita. The theory of causation assumes primary importance in Indian systems of philosophy because here the thinkers try to show how the world as an effect can be explained from the principle, that they have accepted. While the followers of the Sāṃkhya believe the Prakṛti to be the cause of the universe together with the Puruṣa, who just 'looks' at it, the Vaiśeṣikas are of the opinion that the gross forms of the world are all derived from the conglomeration of the atoms, which constitute the original cause. All the branches of the Vedānta agree that the ultimate cause, the uncaused cause of the world is Brahman, and all except Madhva admit that Brahman is both the material and efficient cause of the world.

The followers of the Sāṃkhya are refuted by saying that the Prakṛti is inert and thus cannot produce the world<sup>267</sup>. Purusottama says against the Vaiśeṣikas that in the Vedic as well as Puranic literature we find that the gross cause gives rise to the subtle effects and not vice versa. This is found in the world also, for the mass of threads, which is gross gives rise to the piece of cloth, cotton which is a mass causes the thin threads<sup>268</sup>. We can not therefore admit that the cause is subtle and is thus the atoms. The Buddhistic theory of creation of that which exists from that which does not exist, is also vehemently rejected. The Buddhists contend that it is from the seed, which is destroyed, that a sprout is caused. Here also

267 A B II ii 1-10

268 *Sraute paurāṇe ca darśane sthūlad eva karapat suksmasya kāryasya vibhāgen ādāu utpatteh* A B P II ii 12 p 625

Purusottama points out that it is only the gross form of the seed which is destroyed and not its subtle form which definitely exists <sup>269</sup> The world thus is not *asatah sattārūpa*, and must have Brahman as its cause

While the other systems of the Vedānta say that Brahman is the material cause or the *upādāna* of the world, the *Suddhādvaita* prefers the term *samavāyikāraṇa* or the inhering cause. Brahman has three aspects, being, sentiency and bliss, and these aspects are found inherent in the inert worldly objects, the individual souls and the Antaryamins. Thus there is inherence of *sat*, *cit* and *ānanda*. That which is inhered in the other is seen as the latter's essential characteristic, just as a pot shows the essential characteristics of the clay. The whole world, whatever may be the internal differences and distinctions, reveals one common characteristic of being or existence, and we can say that there is inherence or *anvaya* of *sat* in the world <sup>270</sup>. As *sat* is of the essential nature of Brahman, as is the case with *cit* and *ananda*, Brahman is the *samavāyikāraṇa* or the inhering cause of everything. The *Anvaya* or *samanvaya* is the inherence of that which is neither adventitious nor super-imposed, and that is why the name and form or the illusory experiences are not to

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269 *Evañ ca ankūṛadav apī bijasthūla, śasyaivopamardo na te suksma, śasya Tadantasta eva sūkṣma, śanām ankūṛtibhāvāt.*  
A B P. II iii 26 p 651

270 *Yo hi yadvanvitaḥ sa stasmins tadviśayam pratītiṃ adhatte yatha ghaṭādiḥ pṛthivyādi-pratītiṃ Gathatra sarvam astityādi-pratīti-janakatvat sadāyanvitaḥ* A B P I : 3 p 83

be understood as inhered.<sup>271</sup> That is why the samavāya of the Suddhādvaita is different from the inseparable conjunction which is called samavāya by the Vaiśeṣikas

The word Prakṛti stands for the essential nature of the thing and Brahman can just be called Prakṛti in this way, which therefore means the samavāyikāraṇa<sup>272</sup> When we see an earthen pot we know that it is made of clay and thus all the earthen pots can be known as having the clay as their essential inhering cause, similarly when we decide the aspect of being in one substance, it is known as inhering in all the existing substances and so Brahman, which has sat as its aspect, is established as the inhering cause<sup>273</sup> The term prakṛti thus should not necessarily mean the Pradhāna of the Sāṃkhya because the Pradhāna is not a samavāyin

It is quite natural that a question will arise as to why the word upādāna which is used by other systems of the Vedānta, is not found here, while the term samavāya is

271. Anaropitānāgantukarūpenānuvṛttir eva samavayah

A. B. P. I. 1. 3 p 90

272. Prakṛtiśabdaś ca svarūpe rūdhah mṛtprakṛtir ghaṣah, kārpā-saprakṛtiḥ pataḥ ityādīprayogadarśanāt samavāyikāraṇam abhidhate A. B. P. I. iv. 23 p. 530 Puruṣottama further says that the Prakṛti also stands for the efficient cause, on etymological grounds. Prakṛtiḥ kṛtir jena

A. B. P. I. iv. 23 p 530

273. Yatha hyeksmīn mṛtprīṇde mṛdvikāratvaniscayottaram sarvasmīn tatsajātiye tathā jñānan mṛttikāyām tatsamavāyitvajñānam tādrśaikadeśapratyakṣād eva bhavati tathā prakṛte py ekatra sanmayatve niścite sarvesu tatsajātiyesu sadvikaratvajñānat satī sarvasamavāyitvajñānam tādrś'apratyakṣād eva bhavati satī samavāyitvasiddhiḥ A. B. P. I. iv. 23 p 531.

used instead of it. Puruṣottama says that the word upādāna which means the material cause expresses, that which is enveloped by the actions of the agents and which is consequently limited by the same.<sup>274</sup> The upādāna is only a specific state of the samavāyin. It is that aspect of the earth alone which in the form of a lump of clay or threads, limited and worked upon in the process of production, that can be called the material cause or the upādāna for the production of a jar or a piece of cloth. So only the Highest Lord who is not changed or worked upon is the samavāyin of the world by just one of his aspects.<sup>275</sup> The reason thus for the preference of the term samavāyin to the term upādāna lies in the adherence of the thinkers of pure Monism in the avikṛtapariṇāmavāda, as different from the generally accepted pariṇāmavāda or vivartavāda.

Upādāna, says Puruṣottama, is twofold, pariṇāmin and vivarta. The first is defined as the transformation of the Upādāna, the transformation having an equal degree of existence.<sup>276</sup> The vivarta on the other hand is the transformation which has not an equal degree of existence with the upādāna.<sup>277</sup> The pariṇāma can further be understood as either vikṛta or involving change or modification, or

274. *Loke upādānapadena kartṛkriyayā vyāptasya paricchinnasyaivābhidhānadarśanāt.* A. B. P. I. i. 3. p. 118.

275. *Upādānam tu samavāyina evāvasthāviśeṣaḥ. Paricchinnasya kartṛkriyayā vyāptasyaiva mṛtṭpiṇdasūtrādirūpasya pṛthivyamśasyaiva ghaṭapaṇḍyupādānatvadarśanāt. Ata eva bhagavān avikṛta eva jagata ekamśena samavāyī.* Pr. p. 38.

276. *Pariṇāmas ca upādānasamasattāko' nyathābhāvah.* Pr. p. 31.

277. *Upādānasya viśamasattāko' nyathābhāvo vivartah.* Pr. p. 32.

avikṛta, i.e. that which does not involve any such change. The former is illustrated in the manufacture of a pot from the clay, while the shaping of different ornaments of Gold is an example of the latter. In our ordinary affairs of the world, the efficient and the instrumental causes are different from the material cause. Purusottama does not think it necessary to believe in the asamavayīkaraṇa, which is explained by the veśeśikas to be the conjunction of the different constituents like the threads in the production of a piece of cloth. It may be included in the karaṇasamagrī.

The followers of the Śuddhadvaita admit the avikṛta parīnamavāda in which the cause, even though transformed into the effects, retains its essential nature and does not undergo any basic or substantial modification. When milk is transformed into curds, it can not be used as milk and becomes curds only. We can not prepare tea with it. When however ornaments are made of gold, we can use all of them as gold and the gold remains gold even though the distinction between the golden ornaments and gold is of the different shape and different names. They are not different substances.<sup>278</sup>

The avikṛtaparīnamavāda of Vallabha cannot be understood properly without the āvirbhava-tirobhava-vāda, which is one of the most important theories of the Śuddhadvaita. In fact Purusottama explains causality itself

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278 *Yathā bahusūvarnakṛtsayam kṛtakakuṇḍalalakāśabhṅgaram-  
divyakṛtyanādaras tathā Etenākaradibhedakṛta eva tattallauki-  
kavāsidīkavyavaharabheda na vastubhedakṛtah*

as the basis of the power of manifestation.<sup>279</sup> The *āvīrbhāva* and *tīrobhāva* can be explained as manifestation and concealment respectively. The *āvīrbhāva* can be understood as the power of the cause, which reveals outside the latent effect which already exists in the cause; the *tīrobhāva* is that capacity which conceals the effect which exists outside.<sup>280</sup> The terms may be understood simply as *āvīrbhavana* and *tīrobhavana* thus meaning just manifestation and concealment.<sup>281</sup> Viṭṭhaleśa in his *Vidvanmaṇḍana* explains *āvīrbhāva* as being fit to be an object of experience,<sup>282</sup> and *tīrobhāva* as its opposite.<sup>283</sup> Both *āvīrbhāva* and *tīrobhāva* are powers of the lord Puruṣottama also discusses as to whether any such power or powers are necessary in the cause. When a certain effect is produced from a certain cause or a particular set of causes, we should accept the power of that cause or causes to produce that particular effect. This power can not be understood as the nature or the essence of the cause, for neither the nature (*svabhāva*) nor the essence (*svarūpa*) can be avoided and so if we were to understand the productive capacity as either of them, we must admit

279 *Kāraṇatvam cāvīrbhāvakaśaktiyādhāratvam.* Pr p. 26,

280 *Āvīrbhāvaprakāśam bhavayati upādānāntastham karyam bahiḥ prakāśam karoti yā nimittagatā upādānagatā ca śaktiḥ sāvīrbhāvāśabdavacya. Evam tīrobhāvaprakāśam bhavayati bahiḥ prakāśam karyam upādānāntasthāpayati yā śaktir nūśakagata sāvīrobhāvāśabdavacyā. Āvīrbhāvātīrobhāvavāda Vādāvali p 191.*

281. *Āvīrbhāvātīrobhāvavāda Vādāvali p 191.*

282 *Anubhāvaviśayatvayogyatā.* V. M. p 86

283. *Tadaviśayatvayogyatā.* V. M p 86 See also the explanation in S S and Pr p 26 ff

the production of a piece of cloth from the threads which are torn to tatters, or that of a sprout from a seed which is burnt. We should thus accept the power of production as different from the essential nature of the cause and also as liable to obstruction or destruction by an external element.<sup>284</sup> Those powers of production and its opposite can be respectively called āvirbhāva and tirobhāva. The whole process of causation has to be explained in terms of these two powers with which the Highest Lord is endowed. Even the six modifications of becoming (Bhāva-vikāras) as stated by Vārṣyāyaṇi in *Nirukta*<sup>285</sup> can be understood in connection with these two. 'Is being produced' (jāyate) is related to revelation alone, so also 'is' (asti) is so related because of the inherence of the aspect of being. 'Is being transformed', 'grows' and 'waned' (Vipariṇāmate, vardhate and apakṣiyate) are connected with both manifestation and concealment, while 'is being destroyed' (naṣyati) is connected with concealment alone.<sup>286</sup>

The effect thus is only a manifestation of the cause, or in other words the effect is just a manifested state of the cause. This being the case, there is essentially non-difference between the cause and the effect.<sup>287</sup> As everything is caused by Brahman, everything is Brahman. Brahman is revealed in the world by its aspect of sat, in the individual souls by its aspects of sat and cit and in the antaryāmins by its aspects of sat, cit and ānanda. That is

284. T. Sn. Ab. V. 140. p. 113. Also Of *Āvirbhāvatirobhāvavāda*. Vādāvalī. p. 185. ff.

285. *Nirukta*. 1. 2.

286. S. S. pp. 350-351.

287. A. B. P. I. iv. 23. p. 534.

why Brahman is described as devoid of any dualism, either with those who are of the same type or with those who are not of the of same type or with those who are in it.<sup>288</sup> The individual souls, which are sentient and eternal, have a similarity in nature with Brahman and are thus *sajātīya*. The *sajātīyadvaita* is illustrated by *Puruṣottama* as existing in the two different bulls. The inanimate objects are *vijātīya* because of inertia and transiency; and the difference would be just like that between a pot and a piece of cloth. The *Antaryāmins* are *svagata*, because all the aspects of *sat*, *cit* and *ānanda* are manifested in them but they are limited and are capable only of limited and defined action; the illustration given here is that of the flowers and the tree.<sup>289</sup> Brahman has none of these distinctions, as it is inherent in all the three by its various aspects

Causation, says *Puruṣottama*, can be understood on two grounds, *anvaya* and *vyatireka*. They may be explained as meaning the invariable existence of the cause when the effect exists, and the invariable absence of the effect in the absence of the cause, thus implying a relation of invariable concomitance between the cause and the effect. *Anvaya* may also be taken to mean the inherence of the aspects of the cause in the effect and *vyatireka* may be understood as the existence of the cause over and above the effect.<sup>290</sup>

288. *Sajātīyavijātīyasaḡatadīaitavarjitaḡ*. T. S. v. 60. p. 113.

289. T. S. Ab. V. 60. p. 113.

290. *Kāraṇatāgrāhakaucānīyavyatirekau. Tau ca dīividhau. Svastavyāpyetarayāvātākāraṇasattve yatsattve' vaśyam yatsattvam anīyahaḡ. Yada bhāae' vaśyam yadabhāeo vyatirekaḡ. Anvayanam anīyahaḡ...Kāryena saḡ tadaīyavādirūpeṇāvasthānam. Viśeṣeṇātirecanam vyatirekaḡ. Kāryātirekeṇāvasthānam. Pr. p. 32*



While the first explanation of the terms and the second explanation of anvaya leads to the theory of identity, the second explanation of vyatireka is important from another point of view. It shows that in the system of Vallabha God is not wholly transformed into the world and even though it is revealed variously by its aspects it remains over and above the world. God is thus in the world and yet transcends the same. This is meant by vyatireka, *i e viśeṣeṇa atirecana*

How can non-difference or identity be explained in the Suddhādvaita? We have seen that in the Suddhādvaita, Brahman inheres in the effects, or is revealed in the effects and the effects are only a condition of the cause. Essentially therefore the effect is one with the cause, just as the golden ornaments are one with gold. Brahman is transformed in the effects without undergoing any change or modification. All this can be accepted. But even then there are two important points, which require explanation. As we have seen above the problem before a philosopher is not merely to show the essential identity of the world with Brahman, but to explain the world, as it is seen and experienced by us, in its relation to Brahman. Secondly, even in accepting the essential identity and in accepting the difference only of name and form, that name and form which are surely a change or modification, if admitted as real, should be explained in the light of the monistic doctrine, that has been propounded.

As we have discussed in the previous section about the jagat via-a-vis the samsāra, jagat is real only as a manifestation of Brahman and not as the world, which is separated and different from Brahman. In that case the reality of the

jagat as jagat can not be admitted. Puruṣottama says the same thing when he points out that the various forms as seen in the world are only for the worldly dealings. So the reality of the world can not be maintained in the limited and defined form, in which it exists, but from the point of view of reality the world is not non-existent.<sup>291</sup> The illustrations which are given by Puruṣottama to prove the abhedā, are still more pointed. The form of a pot may be different from that of clay, but it does not mean that the pot as a substance is distinct from the clay. A man who is sleeping or standing or sitting or walking may have different postures, but the man remains the same.<sup>292</sup> We may thus consider the distinctions as immaterial, but are they real? While refuting the dualistic theories, Puruṣottama says that they are only due to the ego and are unreal.<sup>293</sup> The distinctions even between things like a pot and a piece of cloth are only mundane and hence unreal.<sup>294</sup> Rāmānuja attacks the

291. *Teṣām rūpāṇām vyavahāramātrārthatvād ity arthaḥ. Etena siddhānte pratiniyatarūpeṇa jagataḥ satyatvābhāvo, na tu satyatvena rūpeṇa jagadabhāva iti bodhitam*

A. B. P. I. iv. 23. p. 536.

292. *Yo vikāraḥ pṛthubudhnodarādih sa vācārambhaṇam vācika-kriyātmako na tu kāraṇād vyaktibhedāpādakaḥ. Yathā svapte utthite upaviṣṭe ca puruṣe' vyavavinyāsabhedo to nāmadheyam nimittikakriyāyāḥ padārthasvarūpabhedānāpādakatvāt nāmaiva. Yathā cātra kāraṇāvasthātmanaivaikarūpasya vivakṣitatvād vyaktibhedānādara iva.*

A. B. P. I. iv. 23. p. 535.

293. *Abhimānamātram eva bhedo na tu vāstavaḥ.*

T. S. Ab. V. 92. p. 159.

294. *Ghaṣapaṣasthale tu vyāvahārikopādānākṛto bheda ity avāstavaḥ.*

T. S. Ab. V. 92. p. 158.

theory of Ātmasvarūpaparināmavāda on the same ground of distinctions. If we believe in both the enjoyer and the objects of enjoyment as the transformations of the essential nature of God, how can there be any distinction between them? Purusottama replies by restating his theory of Pure Monism on scriptural grounds and says that the svabhāva-vibhāga is seen even in the world on account of the disintegration of powers (śaktiśleṣa). This is like a tree, in which the leaves, flowers, fruits and roots—everything is mutually different, but all of them have the unity with the seed so far as their nature (svabhāva) is concerned.<sup>295</sup> We have however seen that the distinctions are only due to the ego and are therefore unreal. Is this the same as Vivartavāda? When Śamkara says that the world is unreal, he rejects the reality of the world, as we see it. If that is vivartavāda, it may be said that it is accepted by the propounders of the Śuddhadvaita also. Purusottama in a way admits this when he says that from the point of view of the antarāsṛṣṭi he accepts vivartavāda, while from the point of view of Brahman he believes in Parīṇāmavāda.<sup>296</sup>

Admitting that there is Parīṇāmavāda from the point of view of Brahman, what about the vikāras? We may say that the vikāras or modifications are unreal, but if we want to maintain the reality of the world, even in its essential form, we must admit at least one kind of change. The jagat is the effect-form of Brahman, in which only one of the three aspects is revealed and the other two

295 A B P II 1 13. p 573

296 *Evam ca antarasṛṣṭim prati vivartopadanatvam atmasṛṣṭim prati parīṇāmyupadānatvam brahmaṇa itī n'ścayah Sṛṣṭibhedavāda Vādāvali. p 113*

are concealed. Similarly the individual souls are an effect with two aspects revealed and only one concealed. Thus there remains a subtle distinction between the cause and the effect, that is between the cause with all the aspects fully manifested and the cause with the manifestation of one or two aspects. A change in the state of the cause can not be refused on any ground. The opponent of Puruṣottama correctly points out that even in the Avikṛtapariṇāmavāda, the change of the avasthā (pūrvāvasthā—anyathābhāvarūpa—vikāra) remains. Puruṣottama says that the change in the state of the cause is not equal to the change in the substance and therefore there is no harm in admitting it<sup>297</sup>. At another place when the theory of Bhāskara is severely criticised by Vācaspati Miśra, Puruṣottama defends Bhāskara by pointing out that the difference between the two ornaments of gold is due to the difference between their respective conditions. That which is conditioned is different as well as non-different from that which conditions, according as we look to them from the point of view of the different conditions or of the oneness of the substance. Thus non-difference does not necessarily mean oneness, and the bheda can be admitted together with the abheda.<sup>298</sup> Thus the unity of the cause and the effect is tolerant of the difference and this is Tādātmya.<sup>299</sup> The bheda which is accepted here is

297. *Tathā ca dadhidugdhanyāyena svarūpasya gandhādiguṇānām cīnyathābhāva evātrāgrāhyavikāratvenābhipreyate, na tu sankhyānyathābhāvo' pi tathātveneti kāryaśrutyānurodhād āngikriyate.* A. B. P. I. iv. 23. p. 539.

298. A. B. P. I. i. 3. pp. 92-95. See also *Bhedābhedasvarūpanirṇaya. Vādāvali.*

299. *Bhēdasahiṣṇur abhēdas tādātmyam.* S. S. p. 149.

due to the desire of God.<sup>300</sup> The powers of āvirbhāva and tirobhāva should also be understood on the basis of the desire of God.<sup>301</sup> That is why Puruṣottama says that in the Suddhādvaita the samavāya is not different from tādātmya and the samavāyikāraṇa is that cause, the effect of which is produced depending upon the cause in the relationship of tādātmya.<sup>302</sup> We may say then that Suddhādvaita is the same as Aicchika-bheda-abheda Sādhanas and Phala

At the very outset it is necessary to make one point clear, so far as this section is concerned. Puruṣottama's contribution to the 'Suddhādvaita is mainly on the philosophical side of the system, though Puruṣottama has commented upon and independently written certain tracts dealing with the practical side of the system, such as the belief in devotion as the highest means of liberation, or the divisions of puṣṭi, pravāha and maryādā, or the desirability of renunciation, etc. If however one wants to get a complete picture of these teachings, one should read the works of Gokulanātha and Harirāya rather than those of Puruṣottama. In this section therefore, we

300. *Bhedasahisṅgātā ca bahu syām prajāyeya iticchāyām tadvyāpārabhūtaśaktibhūgena.* Pr. p. 29.

301. *Evam saty asmin kāle' smin deśe idam kāryam evam bhavatu iticchāviśayatvam āvirbhāvah, tadā tatra tathā tan mā bhavatu iticchāviśayatvam tirobhāvah.* S. S. pp 115-116.

302. *Tatra tādātmyasambandhena yadāśrayam kāryam bhavati tat samavāyikāraṇam.* Pr. p. 27. also: *Ato na samavāyas tādātmyatiriktaḥ.* Pr. p. 29. also: *Yadyapi siddhānte samavāyo nātiriktas tathāpi tādātmyasyaiva nāmūntaram.*

- T. S. Ab. V. 27. pp. 68-69.

have not treated the topics of sādhanas and phala fully, but we have tried to give only those points which deserve special notice in our study of Puruṣottama.

Mokṣa according to the abstract speculations of the idealists of some of the Upaniṣads and according to Śaṅkara is the liberation from all the evils and miseries of the world. That the world is a venue of woe has been accepted by almost all the religious teachers and philosophers. Hence emancipation is definitely devoid of miseries. But is it full of joy also? Happiness and misery are relative terms and so, as argued by the absolutists like Śaṅkara, if we accept happiness or joy in the liberated state, the unhappiness will also be admitted from the backdoor. Hence mokṣa should be understood as total absence of miseries (Atyanta-duḥkha-abhāva). Naturally this could not appeal to the people at large. It is not enough that liberation is just an absence of unhappiness. This is only a negative aspect. There must be something positive also, so as to give solace to the suffering mortals. Puruṣottama rejects the idea of relativity and says that there is full bliss and bliss alone in the state of mokṣa. Brahman is ānandamaya because of the ānandaprācurya. When we say that the sun is full of light or that the summer days are full of heat or that the monsoon nights are completely dark, the opposites of light, heat and darkness are respectively sublated by perceptual experience and cannot be understood as existing even in a minimum degree.<sup>303</sup> Brahman is

303. *Loke' pi pracuraprakāśaḥ savitā prabhūtasantāpo nidāgha-dīvaso'ndhakāramayi varṣāvibhāvāvari bahudhano vaiśravaṇa ityāi vākyāśravaṇe pratiyoginām tamaḥśaityaaprakāśadāridryāṅām pratyakṣato bādhena tatra tadalpavūśankāyū anudayāt. A. B. P. I. i. 12. p. 198.*

thus full of bliss and there is not an iota of its opposite in it. Even so, liberation is also full of joy and not mere negation of miseries.

Can God be obtained? If we just argue that the attainment of anything can be accomplished only when that thing is different from one who obtains it, and that the relationship between the limited jiva and unlimited God is that of oneness, who is to be obtained by whom? That is why Śaṅkara says that mokṣa cannot be obtained, it is<sup>304</sup>. This however is not the position, that can be accepted by the followers of the Śuddhādvaita. If God is not to be obtained, nothing is to be done for it, then what is the use of all the talk of devotion and discipline? Puruṣottama says that the attainment is possible owing to the āvirbhava-tirobhava, depending upon the will of God. As regards the oneness or non-difference between the two, it is the individual soul, who is one with Brahman and not vice-versa, and so the non-difference does not come in the way of prāpti<sup>305</sup>.

The attainment of the Highest Lord means the Sarvātmabhava or the Brahmabhāva with the realization of the presence of Brahman everywhere. It is explained by Puruṣottama as the flashing of Brahman preceded by the revelation of the attributes of Brahman<sup>306</sup>. The highest

304 Cf. *Śaṅkara-bhāṣya* I 1 4, II 1 14

305 *Ananyatvam tu suvarṇasakalanyayena brahmaṇah sakāśāḥ jivasya na tu jivasya sakāśad brahmaṇah iti tasyāpi prāptipratibandhakatvābhavat* A. B. P. I 1 11 pp 178-179

306 *Brahmabhāvaś ca svasmin brahmadharmāvirbhāvapūrvaka-brahmasphūrtirūpa eva* A. B. P. I 1 29 263

kind of liberation however is the *sāyujya*, which is the result of the *Puṣṭi-bhakti*. Purusottama gives an etymological explanation of *sāyujya* as conjunction<sup>307</sup>. It is the eternal enjoyment in the company of Kṛṣṇa.

God, according to the Śuddhādvaita, is not only *Sadhya-rūpa* but even *Sadhanarūpa*, even the means for his realization are of the essential nature of God. They are also the aspects of God. Purusottama says this on the strength of the *Purusasūkta* and the explanation of it in the second book of the *Bhagavata*<sup>308</sup>.



and not vice versa. The attributes of the cause are superimposed upon the effect. Once this is conceded, even though knowledge and meditation may be distinguished with regard to their forms, it should be accepted that both lead to the same result. There is thus no difference between the two in their capacity to produce the result.<sup>310</sup>

As regards the three paths of action, knowledge and devotion, the Suddhādvaita position is that of maintaining the superiority of devotion to the other two. Vallabha and his followers have given many arguments in their support. The path of knowledge leads to the *sagunā mukti*, while that of devotion to the *nirguṇa moksa*. Knowledge, says Purusottama, presupposes the existence of the quality of *sattva* in the seeker of salvation and so the liberation that results cannot be without it, the *nirguṇa mukti* can result only by means of *bhakti*.<sup>311</sup>

After Vallabha, Puruṣottama enters into the discussion of the term *Bhakti*. The base (*prakṛti*) and the affix (*Pratyaya*) express the sense when combined, out of these two the affix is principal. Here the affix which is capable of connoting the general meaning of the root, mainly expresses the devotional action (*bhajanakriyā*), when joined with the root *bhaj*. That action is of the nature of service or *seva*. The term *sevā*, as found in usages like *strisevā*, *ausadhasevā*, etc. has a conventional meaning of a specific bodily activity preceded by either constancy or continuity. As this would imply some unhappiness due to the strain, that the body undergoes, it can not be called a *puruṣārtha*,

310 A B P I I 20 p 232

311 T S Ab V 14 p 51

for which one should try. Service should therefore be preceded by love. Thus the principal connotation of the affix is 'love' and the bodily efforts which are subordinate, are meant by the base. So the combination of the base and the affix means *premasevā*.<sup>312</sup>

Love or sneha is explained as a specific attribute of the self or the mind, and is not a desire, or knowledge or efforts.<sup>313</sup> Bhakti is a rasa and this love to the object of devotion should not be understood as ordinary erotic sentiment which is just an appearance of the love to God and is thus far inferior to it. That is why Puruṣottama after Vallabha takes pains to teach sense-control as an essential prerequisite of a seeker of God.<sup>314</sup>

A very important contribution, that the Śuddhādvaita has made to Indian religious thought, is the Puṣṭimārga. The distinction between the Puṣṭi and the Maryādā has been given in detail by almost all the scholars of the Śuddhādvaita including Puruṣottama.<sup>315</sup> The Puṣṭimārga depends solely upon the Grace of the Lord.<sup>316</sup> The Grace of the Lord (Anugraha) is a separate attribute. It is not just the desire to give fruit, nor the desire or effort to ward off the miseries of others. It does not mean knowledge either. It paves the way to the desire of the

312. T. Sn. Ab. V. 92. p. 75.

313. *Snehaś cātmano manaso vā योग्यो धर्मविशेषः*. S. S. p. 7.

314. T. Sn. Ab. V. 238. pp. 184-186.

315. See *Puṣṭi-pratīkāra-maryādā*; with various commentaries.

316. *Poṣaṇam tadanugrah. Bhāgavata*, II. x. 4.

Lord to give fruit or His acceptance, and is the cause of devotion.<sup>317</sup>

### Conclusion :

We have in the foregoing pages discussed the important tenets of the Śuddhādvaita, as expounded by Puruṣottama following Vallabha and Viṭṭhaleśa. While the system, as explained by Puruṣottama is not and cannot be different from that taught by Vallabha, there is a clear difference in the approach of the two. As we have already stated, Vallabha's laconic style and interpretative method left very much to be understood and assumed. A clear exposition of the Śuddhādvaita was badly needed and it was supplied by Puruṣottama who, however gives not just an exposition, but an analysis and a comparative study, thus arriving at some very important conclusions, which we have attempted to present in this chapter.

For understanding these conclusions better we should see the whole course that Indian Philosophy has taken in the course of centuries. While the Upanisads gave various thoughts in various ways, the trend of abstraction and negation was taken up by the Buddhist idealists, who taught the Viññānavāda and the Śūnyavāda. Śaṅkarācārya gave a positive shape to that trend by postulating the pure being and advocating the unreality of the world in its ultimate sense. Śaṅkara was the master of strictest logic and so attributed all the relationship to Māyā, he frankly admits that it is all inexplicable. Even though

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317 *Tasmāt svīkaraphaladitsāprayojakam kṛpāparaparyayam dhar-  
mantaram eva Sa ca bhaktyupaśeśasyeva bhakter apī karanam*  
Puruṣottama's commentary on the *Puṣṭi-pravāha-māyada*.  
V. 2

Śaṅkara has vehemently denounced the Buddhistic theories, he has equally vehemently repudiated the dualism of the Sāṅkhya or the atomic pluralism of the Vaiśeṣika. For him monism can not be compromised in any way with dualism or pluralism. This however gave a severe blow to all that was emotional and religious, for religion wants heart more than head. Again the political enslavement of the Hindus required something upon which they could fall back and from which they could get solace. This led to the reinforcement of the cult of devotion, which was already popularised by a host of Āḷvārs. Attempts were made to bring in this popular element into the Vedānta. This however wanted a clear recognition of the reality, the ultimate reality of the dual, the devotee and God. People were unable to stand the devastating doctrine of the falsity of the world. Monism had to be compromised with dualism. Rāmānuja qualified it, Madhva accepted dualism alone, Bhāskara and Nimbārka tried to combine the two. Rāmānuja and Nimbārka lean more towards dualism. Vallabha was convinced that the teaching of the *Upaniṣads* and the *Brahmasūtras* is definitely of monism; but he was an equally ardent devotee and Vaiṣṇava. He thereupon promulgated the theory of Pure Monism and retained the individuality of the jīvas and the reality of the world. How can this be possible? Puruṣottama's analysis points to the theory of Tādātmya. He finds that if the reality of the world even as a revelation of one of the aspects of God, is to be retained, the bheda will have to be tolerated. Abheda is here not the outright rejection of the bheda; it allows the aicchika bheda. The Tādātmya relation subsists between Brahman and its dharmas, Brahman and the jīvas, Brahman

and the world. This is where Puruṣottama arrives. Puruṣottama is credited with this exposition by no less an authority than Gīridhara<sup>318</sup>

Viewed in the light of the above remarks, it will be clear that the Śuddhādvaita has tried to teach monism without sacrificing the interest of the cult of bhakti. It is more advaitic than the systems of Rāmānuja, Bhāskara, or Nimbārka, and is more positive, if not dualistic than that of Śaṅkara. The Śuddhādvaita should therefore be called 'Positive Idealism.'




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318 *Bhedābhedapratītiḥ tu madhyamānām prakīrtitā. Ato hi madhyamah pakṣah Śuddhādvaitānurodhatah. Bodhāya bahusandarbhē Gosvāmi Puruṣottamaish, Śrīmadācāryacarāṇair yatra kutrāpi darśitah. Śuddhādvaitamārtandā. V. 34-36 Appendix. Śuddhādvaitasiddhāntapradīpa. p. 226.*

regime of the Moghuls was defied from various quarters. A dark age was looming large over the heads of Indians foreboding the grim picture of petty strifes of small principalities. The conditions were almost on the verge of being chaotic. Fear and distust took the place of peace and stability and inspite of the glory of wealth, there was utter poverty of prosperity and welfare. The Hindu society remained a heterogenous mass of a variety of people having a variety of beliefs. *There were too many religious beliefs and Hinduism was manifold and yet getting more and more conservative.* There were many thinkers, scholars, authors and saints, all struggling to do something and the common man was led to and fro by the conflicting views, which he could not and therefore did not care to understand. It was this age which produced Puruṣottama.

We have to study the aims and achievements of this great scholar, who wrote and discussed and taught throughout the large span of his life. How was he looked upon by his own people? What did he think about them? How could he influence them? What did he contribute to the Saṁpradāya? What can possibly be his place in the history of the Saṁpradāya in particular and of Indian thought in general? All these questions remain to be answered. We have tried in the following pages to give an evaluation from this point of view. We have at our disposal no factual history of the Saṁpradāya, how it suffered the ups and downs in its career of about five hundred years. We have to depend upon the references in his works, the references which are rare and at times not conclusive either. We have also at our disposal some hear-says and traditions.

### Puruṣottama and the Saṁpradāya

While we have no means to know the relations of Puruṣottama with other Gosvāmis of his time, there is every reason to believe that his relations with at least some of them appear to be anything but cordial. Certain charges were levelled against him, we do not know by whom nor do we know whether they were levelled in his own time or after his death, though the later seems to be more probable. This great scholar is said to have been jeered at as 'Vedapaśu' by his contemporaries. Further a more serious charge against him is that with all his efforts to explain the principles of the Śuddhādvaita, Puruṣottama is said to have advocated the 'Apasiddhāntas' or wrong theories.<sup>1</sup>

There are three hearsays which go against him. We have referred to all of them while dealing with Puruṣottama's life. It is said that Puruṣottama brought the image of Bālakṛṣṇa to Surat, hiding it in the locks of his hair. The other two have something to do with his relation with Harirāya. One is that of Harirāya's ordering him to take off the footwear from the feet of Śrīnāthajī and the other is that of the explanation of one passage in the *Subodhinī* to Puruṣottama by an old lady who just heard the explanation given by Harirāya.

The first of these hearsays is nothing but a myth, because the idol of Bālakṛṣṇa was brought to Surat by Vrajarāya, who came to possess the same as a result of the distribution of the images. We have detailed the whole incident in chapter II above. The fact however that such a fiction has been woven round the name of Puruṣottama thows that attem-

1. *Avatāravādāvalī*, Hindi Intro. p. 6.

pts were made in the Saṁpradāya to portray him in not a very good light. The attempts appear to have been made deliberately because it is difficult to find out any basis for the currency of such a tradition. The two hearsays relating Puruṣottama's inferiority to Harirāya were current among the followers of the latter. The historicity of both the stories is seriously questionable. The impression that we get of Puruṣottama from his works is that he was not only a very great scholar but also very exact and fastidious. How is it possible that he might have committed such a breach of discipline, when he was himself so very particular about everything? Even if we admit that Puruṣottama was a young enthusiast when he went to the temple of Śrīnāthajī and hence he might have done this, the second story is still more unacceptable, looking to the deep and penetrating insight that his works show. It is too much to assume that Puruṣottama could understand the meaning of a passage from one who heard it from Harirāya. On the other hand it is very likely that both these stories have been made out by the followers of Harirāya to prove the 'superiority of their old teacher over this young man. Was there some sort of rivalry between these two great men of the system? Harirāya was much older than Puruṣottama and it is not likely that he might have considered this youth as his rival. If at all there was a rivalry, it probably existed in the minds of the followers of Harirāya. But there surely was a difference in the thoughts and treatment of these two and both have played their parts differently in the history of the Saṁpradāya.

Harirāya can best be compared with Gokulanātha and Viṭṭhaleśa. He was a devotee and his mission was to



explain the path of devotion to the masses. His works are mainly short tracts and most of them are on the Subodhini. He taught more of Kṛṣṇa and his Līlā, Puṣṭi and Maryādā rather than Brahman and its attributes or the theory of causation. Puruṣottama on the other hand discussed and debated the principles of the Suddhādvaita philosophy. He was a scholar and he considered it his duty to explain the theories taught by Vallabha by arguments and analysis. The works of Harirāya do not reveal the scholarship that is seen in the works of Puruṣottama. Puruṣottama on his part appears to lack that emotion and spiritual experience of a devotee. Though he was sincere in his devotion, the emotional side of a devotee was burnt in the white heat of his intellectual feats. Harirāya was a mystic, a follower of the Prameya Mārga, while Puruṣottama was rational and leaning towards the Pramāṇa Mārga.

And what did Puruṣottama himself think of the Saṁpradāya as it was before him? Puruṣottama was bold enough to assert that the Saṁpradāya was Nivṛtta. It was due to the grace of Lord Bālakṛṣṇa who inspired his mind that he could know the meaning of *Aṅubhāṣya*.<sup>2</sup> The verses at the end of the *Aṅubhāṣya-Prakāśa* clearly show that while Vallabha and after him Viṭṭhaleśa wrote certain works, their followers did not pay the required attention to explain them. Vallabha preached his theories but he called himself Vallabha Dīkṣita and not Vallabha-

2. *Kṛiḍan śri Bālakṛṣṇaḥ paramakarunayā manmanah prerayitvā, Bhāṣyārtham yō tigūḍham prakāṣitam akaret saṁpradāye nivṛtte.* Concluding V. I. A. B. P. p. 1441.

Ācārya Viṭṭhaleśa was mainly responsible for the establishment of the Śuddhādvaita as a system. While he completed the works, which his father left incomplete and wrote some independent works also, he devoted his time mainly to the propagation and systematisation of the Śuddhādvaita as a Sampradaya, which could open its doors even to the ignorant masses. The worship of the idol of God came to be a full-fledged affair. He was followed by Gokulanatha, Kalyaṇarāya, Hatiraya, and many others who taught, talked and wrote of the *līlā* of the Lord. It was the age of intense intellectual activity in India and scores of scholars came out to support and demolish various theories. Purusottama could see that whatever might have been the effect of the Sāmpradāyic teaching on the masses, it was necessary to face the scholars on an equal ground, if at all the Śuddhādvaita as a system wanted to survive. Purusottama could further see that some important points required to be explained more clearly. The task before Purusottama was thus not only to comment upon the works of Vallabha and Viṭṭhaleśa but also to explain, analyse and find out the exact significance of many of the theories taught by Vallabha with a comparative study of the theories of others. The greatest contribution of Purusottama to the Sampradāya is this. He explained the doctrines and what is more he put the whole system on a dialectical basis, so that the opponents could be met on their grounds. In doing so he had to be an argumentator. Even while commenting upon the sixteen tracts, Purusottama has this very approach. The charge of Purusottama's having taught the *apasiddhāntas* is very serious indeed, but curiously none has said what *apasiddhānta* has been taught by him and how. We have in the preceding chapter given in detail the Śuddhādvaita doctrines

as expounded by Puruṣottama and we have found that Puruṣottama arrives at the belief in Tādātmya: '*Bhedasahiṣṇur abhedah.*' as the teaching of Vallabha. But this is a natural corollary to which any student of Vallabha would be driven and there is nothing wrong in it. Puruṣottama never goes against Vallabha and Viṭṭhaleśa. We have referred above in Chapter V to the statement of Giridhara, who says that the understanding of pure monism is the best, while the Bhedābheda is understood by the Madhyamas. Puruṣottama has mainly taught the Madhyama Pakṣa, while it has been shown at places by Vallabha.<sup>3</sup> Can this be taken as a clue for understanding the said charge of spasiddhānta? Any way there is no apasiddhānta in what Puruṣottama has taught. If Vallabha's philosophical teaching is to be understood from the point of view of reason, the Śuddha-advaita is nothing more, nor anything less than Tādātmya.

Puruṣottama very often does not subscribe to the traditional line adopted by his predecessors. Thus for instance he is the only writer in the Saṁpradāya who pays homage to Gopinātha, the elder son of Vallabha.<sup>4</sup> He calls him the Vallabha-Pratinidhi. The relation between Viṭṭhaleśa and Gopinātha was fairly cordial but after the death of Gopinātha, there was some quarrel between his wife and Viṭṭhaleśa. As a result of this, perhaps, and also because Gopinātha did not enjoy a long life so as to be able to do something for the system, he was completely forgotten by the scholars of the Saṁpradāya. Puruṣottama thought

3. *S'uddhādvaita Mārtaṇḍa*. V. 34-36. Appendix to *S'uddhādvaitasiddhāntapradīpa*. p. 226.

4. A. B. P. Intro. V. 5. p. 1.

it to be sheer injustice and thus he mentioned him even before Viṭṭhaleśa. Curiously enough there is a traditional belief in the Sampradaya that Gopinātha was reborn as Puruṣottama.<sup>5</sup>

Puruṣottama again is completely conservative in his outlook like a typical Brahmin author of mediaeval days. He does not like that even the Śūdras and women should be given freedom to get knowledge as much as a member of the three higher classes. There was a tendency in those days to appeal to the lower strata of ignorant masses and to explain to them the *Bhāgavata*, the *Mahābhārata* and such other works. Puruṣottama tries to put a check on this and says that the Śūdras and women may be allowed to study these works but only those portions which do not treat of Brahman. He discusses the whole point and argues out why they should not be allowed to do so.<sup>6</sup>

A very important point, which should be noted in this connection, is that Puruṣottama was very careful in emphasising a high moral standard for the people. Puruṣottama has discussed the whole question of Indriya-nigraha very forcefully and at length in his *Āvaraṇabhāṅga*.<sup>7</sup> Puruṣottama was also unhappy at the way in which foreign language and dress were wholeheartedly welcomed by people. He called them fools.<sup>8</sup> Puruṣottama had thus something of a reformer in him and he tried hard to

5 Cf. *Puṣṭimarganam pañcavaṁśa* Part II p. 2

6 A B P p. 442-444

7 T Sn Ab. V 238 pp. 184-186

8 *Etena ye nūrkhā anapady apī mlecchadivesabhaṣādīkam rocayante svīkurvanti ca te pi tatheti bodhyam* T Sn Ab p. 163.

to point out that laxity of morals' should never be tolerated in any case.

To remove the ignorance of his own people and to refute the charges against the Saṁpradāya, Puruṣottama goes to the extent of discussing even the practice of the *Brahmasambandha* and the prose passage connected with it. He explains the *Brahmasambandha* as "*Brahmasambandho nāma sarvasmin bhagavatsvāmikatvarūpaḥ sambandhaḥ; tasya kāraṇam nāma bhagavatā ācāryān prati gadyenokto ya ātmasamarpaṇaprakāraḥ; tadrityā bhagavati svātmasahitasvīyasarvapadārthānām bhagavati tathātvavijñāpanam. 'Sa vai naiva reme'iti śruteḥ, 'kriḍārtham ātmana idam trijagat kṛtam te svāmyam tu tatra kudhiyo para īśa kuryur' ity ādivākyāc ca, vastutaḥ sarvasya bhagavadiyatve' pi 'sa vai naiva' ityādi śrutyā ramaṇārtham dvitīyanirmāṇādiśrāvaṇāt tenāpāditā yā tattatpadārthe jīvasya svatvasvīyatvābhimatih tatparityāgena teṣu bhagavadiyatvasya vijñāpanam iti yāvat.*"<sup>9</sup> While discussing the prose passage, Puruṣottama knows that he is not maintaining the secrecy of the Saṁpradāya. He is apologetic for this. He says : "*Yat punaḥ prācinair atra kim api noktam tatra itadgopyatvam eva bijam. Mayā tu yad idam uktam tad bahirmukhamukhadhvāmsārtham eveti na tadvirodho doṣāya. Yad api maduktau mārgarahaṣyaprakāśanāparādha āyāti, tathāpi prakāśanasyānyenaiva kṛtatvena tadarthasendehavāraṇasyaiva matkṛtitayā svotkarṣaprakāśnārthatvābhāvāt bhagavān śrīmadācārya-caraṇāś ca madaparādham kṣamantv iti dik.*"<sup>10</sup>

9. Puruṣottama's *Vivaraṇa* on *Siddhāntarahasya*, p. 39.

10. Puruṣottama's *Vivaraṇa* on *Siddhāntarahasya*, p. 37.

Puruṣottama treats all his predecessors with due respect. This is particularly noticeable in his commentaries on the sixteen tracts, where he refers to the diversity of interpretations given by the earlier writers of the Sampradaya. It is important to note that in these cases Puruṣottama does not refute those who have given different interpretations. He just refers to them and then he appears to give his own view with some hesitation. A typical example of this is found in his commentary on the *Bhaktivardhini*, when he says that he was inspired by the Lord to explain in that way<sup>11</sup>

To wind up the whole discussion we may again briefly indicate Puruṣottama's contribution to the Śuddhādvaita. Firstly Puruṣottama has for the first time analysed and explained the principles of the Śuddhādvaita. Secondly Puruṣottama for the first time put the Śuddhādvaita System on a dialectical basis, on a par with other systems of the Vedānta and outside the Vedānta. Thirdly Puruṣottama tried to raise the moral standard of the people.

### Puruṣottama's influence on the Sampradāya

Puruṣottama's voluminous works, commentaries and independent tracts, opened the eyes of latter scholars of the system. They considered it therefore their duty to focus their attention on the principal works of the Śuddhādvaita, *Anubhāsyā*, *Tattvadīpanibandha* and *Vidvanmandana*. They

11 Puruṣottama's commentary on *Bhaktivardhini* p 40

“*Prāñcas tu kecidimam bhānam asaktīlakṣaṇatvenāhuh. Anye punar vyaśanalakṣaṇatvena Artham ca svasvarītya tamtam ahuh. Mama tu bhagavan evam prentavan iti mayāivam vyakhyatam. Gṛhatyaga evacāryaṇam aśayasya sphuṣatvad iti*”

knew that these works should no longer be neglected and efforts were made to study them and to explain them by writing commentaries on them. This is surely an achievement for Puruṣottama, because his predecessors were mainly content with commenting upon the sixteen tracts and some parts of the *Subodhini* alone. The deep and penetrating insight found in the works of Puruṣottama, however, shows that he set a very high standard of scholarship. As a result of this, his successors followed his voluminous works and many of them appear to have given nothing more than simple short explanations, abridged and culled from the *Prakāśa* or *Suvarṇasūtra* or *Āvaraṇabhāṅga*.

Out of the successors of Puruṣottama, Gopeśvara can be called the most outstanding writer and scholar in the Saṁpradāya. Even his father Gokulotsava, who was born in V. S. 1815, was a very good scholar and was called *Vidvatśiromaṇi* and *Vāk-cāturi-dhurīṇa*. We have seen that Puruṣottama gave his property to another Puruṣottama, son of Muralidhara. This Puruṣottama's son Govardhaneśa also died sonless. His wife Mahārāṇivahuji adopted Gokulotsava in V. S. 1850. Gokulotsava is said to have written some commentaries. Shri C. H. Shastri gave me a list of some of the works written by him. They are : (1) *Saundarya-padyaṭīkā*, (2) *Vivekadhairyāśrayaṭīkā*, (3) *Sannyāsanirṇayaṭīkā* and (5) *Śṅgārarasamaṇḍanaṭīkā*. It is said that Gokulotsava was a very good speaker.

Gopeśvara, born in V. S. 1835, was the eldest son of Gokulotsava. On account of Gokulotsava's adoption to the pontifical chair in Surat, Gopeśvara could acquire all the works, that were in the possession of Puruṣottama. It was a literary heritage and Gopeśvara took the greatest advantage.

other topics also, e. g. the concept of Akṣara,<sup>15</sup> that of Abheda,<sup>16</sup> etc, but one will find that these discussions are subordinated to the discussion on Bhakti. Again many of them are bodily found in the works of Puruṣottama. A typical example of this is Puruṣottama's defence of Bhāskara against Vācaspati in the *Aṅubhāṣyaprakāśa*. The whole passage is almost quoted in the *Bhaktimārtanḍa*.<sup>17</sup>

We have noted above how Gokulotsava came to Surat, after being adopted by Mahārāṣṭravahujī, wife of Govardhanaeśa. His descendants have also been good scholars and sincere devotees. Surat has thus remained a seat of learning. **Puruṣottama's place in Indian Philosophy**

The late Pandit Gattulalji of Bombay is said to have compared Puruṣottama with the famous Jain scholar Hemacandra, described as Kalikālasarvajña, and with Sāyaṇa Mādhyama. He called Puruṣottama a '*Sarvatantrasvatantra*.' The title of Sarvatantrasvatantra, though so much in vogue among ancient scholars, has not often been understood exactly as regards the meaning, it conveys. *Sarvatantraḥ* may mean one who knows all the Tantras. '*Sarvāṇi tantrāṇi veda saḥ*.' Together with this is added '*Sva-tantra*' which shows that such a scholar is not only a very good student of all the systems, but is an independent thinker himself. Thus he has both the scholarship and originality of thinking.

Hemacandra, perhaps the greatest Jain scholar who ever wrote in Sanskrit and Prakrit, was not just a

15. *Bhaktimārtanḍa*, p. 109. ff.

16. *Bhaktimārtanḍa*, p. 116. ff.

17. Cf. *Bhaktimārtanḍa*, p. 205. ff. and A. B. P. pp. 93-95.



philosopher or teacher of Jainism. He was a poet, grammarian, rhetorician, historian, writer of a work on prosody, and what not. Puruṣottama also was a profound scholar of all the branches of Sanskrit literature and philosophy. We have seen that he refers to many works and systems and has so many things of his own to say regarding them. One may perhaps feel that Puruṣottama, though a prolific writer, has written everything by way of explaining the Suddhādvaīta theories and practices while for Hemachndra, it may be said that he has written on all the branches of literature independently.

Puruṣottama should be compared with great commentators like Vācaspati Miśra, Sudarśana Bhaṭṭa, and Jayatīrtha. All these scholars were authors of standard commentaries on the *Bhāṣyas* of their respective masters. Even among these, the figure of Vācaspati Miśra stands aloof. He can really be called Sarvatantrasvatantra, because he has written scholarly and authentic commentaries on almost all the orthodox systems of Indian Philosophy. It is noteworthy that Vācaspati, though said to be a follower of Saṁkara, shows himself an independent thinker, owing allegiance to no single system in a dogged manner. Puruṣottama is surely an independent thinker (Svatantra), and has passed his own comments on the concepts of other systems also, but he is a follower of the Suddhādvaīta, from the first to the last. Curiously however there is one common point between the two. Just as Puruṣottama was charged with having taught the Apasiddhānta, even Vācaspati was taken to task by some for saying something against the *Bhāṣya* of Saṁkara. Amalānanda gives a spirited defence of Vācaspati, when he says :

“*Tasmād Vācaspatimatam Bhāṣyaviruddham it̄  
kaiścīd ayuktam uktam. Kiñ ca—*

*Ajñatvabhrāntatādoṣād arakṣat parameśvaram,*

*Etad bhāṣyārthatattvārtho Vācaspatir agādhadhiḥ.*<sup>18</sup>

Puruṣottama's task however as a commentator of Vallabha was more difficult than that of Vācaspati, Sudarśana, or Jayatīrtha. Śaṅkara, Rāmānuja and Madhva were clear and exact, while Vallabha was not clear, at times very obscure. The difficulty of Puruṣottama thus lay in the terse laconic style of Vallabha. Hence whereas Vācaspati and others were concerned with advancing the arguments for the positions, accepted by their respective Ācāryas, Puruṣottama had to explain the theories of Vallabha, analyse them and then indulge in argumentation.

The real contribution of Puruṣottama to Indian Philosophy is his work for the Sampradāya. He could see that it was an age of chaos, in which the system of Vallabha could flourish only if it was properly explained and argued out. Otherwise it would go down in the eyes of scholars. Puruṣottama did what was needed. His name will be remembered in the History of Indian Thought as the strongest and greatest exponent of the Śuddhādvaita, which was hitherto not properly understood and was therefore either misunderstood or neglected. If one wants to study the system of Vallabha, one should read the works not only of Vallabha and his son, but one should read with them the commentaries of Puruṣottama, besides his independent works.

18. Kalpataru on Brahmasūtras. I. ii. 22, quoted by D. K. Shastri in 'Aitihāsika Saṁśodhana.' p. 122.

The best appreciation of Puruṣottama was made by Prof. M. G. Shastri, who founded an association called 'Śrī Puruṣottama Maṇḍala' in Bombay in 1925 A. D. Every week-end Prof. Shastri came from Poona to Bombay and delivered lectures on the works of Vallabha and Puruṣottama. It is interesting to note that in 1926 A. D. the members of the said association expressed their feeling of gratitude to the learned professor by presenting him an address and a Gold Medal in Bombay.

The present writer has seen a copy of the picture of Puruṣottama and is prepared to endorse readily what Shri. N. D. Mehta has said about him. Shri Mehta who happened to see one such copy remarks that his forehead is brimming with profound thoughts and his large eyes appear to accept the objections of the opponents with an open mind. The pointed tip of his nose shows his ability to refute those objections with subtle arguments, and his chin shows the strength of his firm determination.<sup>19</sup>

At the end of this study, I would like to quote two traditional verses regarding Puruṣottama :

- (1) *Śrīmadvallabhadikṣitāhvayaharer vandyānvaye*  
saptamas-  
*Tatkāruṇyasudhābhiṣekavikasatsaubhāgyabhūmodayaḥ,*  
*Ḍṛpyaddurmadavādividvadbhaduṣkūṭaktikumbhasthali-*  
*Sadyobhañīanakelikesaripatiḥ Pitāmbarasyātmajaḥ.*
- (2) *Nāsīd ena samaḥ samastanīgamasmṛtyāditattvārthavid*  
*Vaktā cāpratimaḥ sadaḥsu viduṣām adyāpi bhūmau*  
budhaḥ,  
*Yaḥ sarvam navalakṣapadyakamitaprauḍhaprabandham*  
vyadhāt  
*Sa Śrīmān Puruṣottamo vijayatām Ācāryacūḍāmaṇiḥ.*

19. Cf. N. D. Mehta, *Hinda Tattvajñānaṇo luhāsa*, p. 260.

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( 2 ) As the whole work is a study of  
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352	24	endless	endless
353	Last	scrupulously	scrupulously
354n	2	* <i>ahābhāvat</i>	* <i>dhābhāvat</i>
375n	5	<i>ṛsiva</i>	<i>ṛsiva</i>
376n	1	* <i>ṛākāṅkṣyam</i>	<i>ṛākāṅkṣyam</i>
379	3	of the of same	of the same
379n	5	<i>yaḍabhāve</i>	<i>yaḍabhāve</i>
382n	3	<i>Ṛṣṣṣibhedavāda</i>	<i>Ṛṣṣṣibhedavāda</i>
384	7	that	that
387n	4	<i>tattatprakaro</i>	<i>tattatprakara</i>
		<i>ṛoktan</i>	<i>ṛoktam</i>
389	8	efforts	effort
390	7	cannot	cannot
390	13	no just	not just
395	Last	thows	shows
398	21	significanse	significance
398	22	comparativa	comparative
398	29	apasiddhāntas	apasiddhāntas
399	4	corollary	corollary
401	27	<i>svotkarṣaprokā</i>	<i>svotkarṣaprokā</i>
		<i>śrṇārtha</i>	<i>śanārtha</i>
405n	2	<i>Vedādisarivaśā-</i> <i>strārthoktām</i>	<i>Vedādisarivaśā-</i> <i>strārthabhūtām</i>